MFH: r422668

security/openssl: Update to 1.0.2i

  - Update to 1.0.2i
  - Move from PORTREVISION to PORTVERSION updates
  - Remove patches that are included upstream

Reviewed by:	mat, delphij
Sponsored by:	EuroBSDcon 2016 DevSummit
Differential Revision:	D8006

Approved by:	ports-secteam (delphij)

6 files changed, 13 insertions, 291 deletions

diff --git a/security/openssl/Makefile b/security/openssl/Makefile
index ccf6c51209fd..119f1bbb711d 100644
--- a/security/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/security/openssl/Makefile
@@ -2,9 +2,8 @@
 # $FreeBSD$
 
 PORTNAME=	openssl
-PORTVERSION=	1.0.2
-DISTVERSIONSUFFIX=	h
-PORTREVISION=	14
+PORTVERSION=	1.0.2i
+PORTEPOCH=	1
 CATEGORIES=	security devel
 MASTER_SITES=	http://www.openssl.org/source/ \
 		ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/ \
@@ -182,7 +181,6 @@ pre-everything::
 	@${ECHO_CMD} "# please use DEFAULT_VERSIONS+= ssl=base instead."
 	@${ECHO_CMD} "#"
 	@${FALSE}
-
 .endif
 
 post-patch:
diff --git a/security/openssl/distinfo b/security/openssl/distinfo
index 2a650f5a6f04..749c6789ba4e 100644
--- a/security/openssl/distinfo
+++ b/security/openssl/distinfo
@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
-SHA256 (openssl-1.0.2h/openssl-1.0.2h.tar.gz) = 1d4007e53aad94a5b2002fe045ee7bb0b3d98f1a47f8b2bc851dcd1c74332919
-SIZE (openssl-1.0.2h/openssl-1.0.2h.tar.gz) = 5274412
-SHA256 (openssl-1.0.2h/1001-crypto-hmac-support-EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT-and-set-.patch) = 2eddcb7ab342285cb637ce6b6be143cca835f449f35dd9bb8c7b9167ba2117a7
-SIZE (openssl-1.0.2h/1001-crypto-hmac-support-EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT-and-set-.patch) = 3717
-SHA256 (openssl-1.0.2h/1002-backport-changes-from-upstream-padlock-module.patch) = aee88a24622ce9d71e38deeb874e58435dcf8ff5690f56194f0e4a00fb09b260
-SIZE (openssl-1.0.2h/1002-backport-changes-from-upstream-padlock-module.patch) = 5770
-SHA256 (openssl-1.0.2h/1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch) = c10b8aaf56a4f4f79ca195fc587e0bb533f643e777d7a3e6fb0350399a6060ea
-SIZE (openssl-1.0.2h/1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch) = 20935
-SHA256 (openssl-1.0.2h/1004-crypto-engine-autoload-padlock-dynamic-engine.patch) = 97eb4411d0fc0890e94bc7c2d682f68b71135da782af769ca73914b37da2b1fd
-SIZE (openssl-1.0.2h/1004-crypto-engine-autoload-padlock-dynamic-engine.patch) = 832
+TIMESTAMP = 1474552146
+SHA256 (openssl-1.0.2i/openssl-1.0.2i.tar.gz) = 9287487d11c9545b6efb287cdb70535d4e9b284dd10d51441d9b9963d000de6f
+SIZE (openssl-1.0.2i/openssl-1.0.2i.tar.gz) = 5308232
+SHA256 (openssl-1.0.2i/1001-crypto-hmac-support-EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT-and-set-.patch) = 2eddcb7ab342285cb637ce6b6be143cca835f449f35dd9bb8c7b9167ba2117a7
+SIZE (openssl-1.0.2i/1001-crypto-hmac-support-EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT-and-set-.patch) = 3717
+SHA256 (openssl-1.0.2i/1002-backport-changes-from-upstream-padlock-module.patch) = aee88a24622ce9d71e38deeb874e58435dcf8ff5690f56194f0e4a00fb09b260
+SIZE (openssl-1.0.2i/1002-backport-changes-from-upstream-padlock-module.patch) = 5770
+SHA256 (openssl-1.0.2i/1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch) = c10b8aaf56a4f4f79ca195fc587e0bb533f643e777d7a3e6fb0350399a6060ea
+SIZE (openssl-1.0.2i/1003-engines-e_padlock-implement-sha1-sha224-sha256-accel.patch) = 20935
+SHA256 (openssl-1.0.2i/1004-crypto-engine-autoload-padlock-dynamic-engine.patch) = 97eb4411d0fc0890e94bc7c2d682f68b71135da782af769ca73914b37da2b1fd
+SIZE (openssl-1.0.2i/1004-crypto-engine-autoload-padlock-dynamic-engine.patch) = 832
diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-dsa_ossl.c b/security/openssl/files/patch-dsa_ossl.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 5f282bd49634..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl/files/patch-dsa_ossl.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-
-Fix DSA, preserve BN_FLG_CONSTTIME
-
-Operations in the DSA signing algorithm should run in constant time in
-order to avoid side channel attacks. A flaw in the OpenSSL DSA
-implementation means that a non-constant time codepath is followed for
-certain operations. This has been demonstrated through a cache-timing
-attack to be sufficient for an attacker to recover the private DSA key.
-
-CVE-2016-2178
-
---- crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c.orig	2016-05-03 15:44:42.000000000 +0200
-+++ crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c	2016-06-12 22:57:49.000000000 +0200
-@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@
-         if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q))
-             goto err;
-     while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ;
--    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
--        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
--    }
- 
-     if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
-         if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
-@@ -282,6 +279,11 @@
-     } else {
-         K = &k;
-     }
-+
-+    if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) {
-+        BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+    }
-+
-     DSA_BN_MOD_EXP(goto err, dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx,
-                    dsa->method_mont_p);
-     if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-s3_srvr.c b/security/openssl/files/patch-s3_srvr.c
deleted file mode 100644
index b7ca8069688b..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl/files/patch-s3_srvr.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-CVE-2016-2177
-
---- ssl/s3_srvr.c.orig
-+++ ssl/s3_srvr.c
-@@ -980,7 +980,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- 
-         session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
- 
--        if (p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= d + n) {
-+        if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 >= (d + n) - p) {
-             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-             goto f_err;
-@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-     /* get the session-id */
-     j = *(p++);
- 
--    if (p + j > d + n) {
-+    if ((d + n) - p < j) {
-         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-         goto f_err;
-@@ -1054,14 +1054,14 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- 
-     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-         /* cookie stuff */
--        if (p + 1 > d + n) {
-+        if ((d + n) - p < 1) {
-             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-             goto f_err;
-         }
-         cookie_len = *(p++);
- 
--        if (p + cookie_len > d + n) {
-+        if ((d + n ) - p < cookie_len) {
-             al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-             goto f_err;
-@@ -1131,7 +1131,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-         }
-     }
- 
--    if (p + 2 > d + n) {
-+    if ((d + n ) - p < 2) {
-         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
-         goto f_err;
-@@ -1145,7 +1145,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
-     }
- 
-     /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */
--    if ((p + i + 1) > (d + n)) {
-+    if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) {
-         /* not enough data */
-         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
-@@ -1211,7 +1211,7 @@ int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
- 
-     /* compression */
-     i = *(p++);
--    if ((p + i) > (d + n)) {
-+    if ((d + n) - p < i) {
-         /* not enough data */
-         al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-         SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl_sess.c b/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl_sess.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 321ef62e2aee..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl_sess.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-CVE-2016-2177
-
---- ssl/ssl_sess.c.orig
-+++ ssl/ssl_sess.c
-@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-     int r;
- #endif
- 
--    if (session_id + len > limit) {
-+    if (limit - session_id < len) {
-         fatal = 1;
-         goto err;
-     }
diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-t1_lib.c b/security/openssl/files/patch-t1_lib.c
deleted file mode 100644
index b9ef5c35c920..000000000000
--- a/security/openssl/files/patch-t1_lib.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-CVE-2016-2177
-
---- ssl/t1_lib.c.orig
-+++ ssl/t1_lib.c
-@@ -1867,11 +1867,11 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
-         0x02, 0x03,             /* SHA-1/ECDSA */
-     };
- 
--    if (data >= (limit - 2))
-+    if (limit - data <= 2)
-         return;
-     data += 2;
- 
--    if (data > (limit - 4))
-+    if (limit - data < 4)
-         return;
-     n2s(data, type);
-     n2s(data, size);
-@@ -1879,7 +1879,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
-     if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
-         return;
- 
--    if (data + size > limit)
-+    if (limit - data < size)
-         return;
-     data += size;
- 
-@@ -1887,7 +1887,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
-         const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
-         const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock);
- 
--        if (data + len1 + len2 != limit)
-+        if (limit - data != (int)(len1 + len2))
-             return;
-         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0)
-             return;
-@@ -1896,7 +1896,7 @@ static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data,
-     } else {
-         const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock);
- 
--        if (data + len != limit)
-+        if (limit - data != (int)(len))
-             return;
-         if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0)
-             return;
-@@ -2053,19 +2053,19 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
-     if (data == limit)
-         goto ri_check;
- 
--    if (data > (limit - 2))
-+    if (limit - data < 2)
-         goto err;
- 
-     n2s(data, len);
- 
--    if (data + len != limit)
-+    if (limit - data != len)
-         goto err;
- 
--    while (data <= (limit - 4)) {
-+    while (limit - data >= 4) {
-         n2s(data, type);
-         n2s(data, size);
- 
--        if (data + size > (limit))
-+        if (limit - data < size)
-             goto err;
- # if 0
-         fprintf(stderr, "Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size);
-@@ -2472,18 +2472,18 @@ static int ssl_scan_clienthello_custom_tlsext(SSL *s,
-     if (s->hit || s->cert->srv_ext.meths_count == 0)
-         return 1;
- 
--    if (data >= limit - 2)
-+    if (limit - data <= 2)
-         return 1;
-     n2s(data, len);
- 
--    if (data > limit - len)
-+    if (limit - data < len)
-         return 1;
- 
--    while (data <= limit - 4) {
-+    while (limit - data >= 4) {
-         n2s(data, type);
-         n2s(data, size);
- 
--        if (data + size > limit)
-+        if (limit - data < size)
-             return 1;
-         if (custom_ext_parse(s, 1 /* server */ , type, data, size, al) <= 0)
-             return 0;
-@@ -2569,20 +2569,20 @@ static int ssl_scan_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p,
-                              SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS);
- # endif
- 
--    if (data >= (d + n - 2))
-+    if ((d + n) - data <= 2)
-         goto ri_check;
- 
-     n2s(data, length);
--    if (data + length != d + n) {
-+    if ((d + n) - data != length) {
-         *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
--    while (data <= (d + n - 4)) {
-+    while ((d + n) - data >= 4) {
-         n2s(data, type);
-         n2s(data, size);
- 
--        if (data + size > (d + n))
-+        if ((d + n) - data < size)
-             goto ri_check;
- 
-         if (s->tlsext_debug_cb)
-@@ -3307,29 +3307,33 @@ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len,
-     /* Skip past DTLS cookie */
-     if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
-         i = *(p++);
--        p += i;
--        if (p >= limit)
-+
-+        if (limit - p <= i)
-             return -1;
-+
-+        p += i;
-     }
-     /* Skip past cipher list */
-     n2s(p, i);
--    p += i;
--    if (p >= limit)
-+    if (limit - p <= i)
-         return -1;
-+    p += i;
-+
-     /* Skip past compression algorithm list */
-     i = *(p++);
--    p += i;
--    if (p > limit)
-+    if (limit - p < i)
-         return -1;
-+    p += i;
-+
-     /* Now at start of extensions */
--    if ((p + 2) >= limit)
-+    if (limit - p <= 2)
-         return 0;
-     n2s(p, i);
--    while ((p + 4) <= limit) {
-+    while (limit - p >= 4) {
-         unsigned short type, size;
-         n2s(p, type);
-         n2s(p, size);
--        if (p + size > limit)
-+        if (limit - p < size)
-             return 0;
-         if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) {
-             int r;
--- 
-1.9.1
-