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authorDirk Meyer <dinoex@FreeBSD.org>2003-03-23 04:49:53 +0000
committerDirk Meyer <dinoex@FreeBSD.org>2003-03-23 04:49:53 +0000
commit018fc2c47479873ef11ed33518f7d09f966d1a19 (patch)
treecb9ca0f4637ba274c7d814d8ff3f783ca555e6ce /security/openssl
parenta4efa3756710379d50581feb64f9208a8ef4fcb8 (diff)
downloadports-018fc2c47479873ef11ed33518f7d09f966d1a19.tar.gz
ports-018fc2c47479873ef11ed33518f7d09f966d1a19.zip
Notes
Diffstat (limited to 'security/openssl')
-rw-r--r--security/openssl/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c53
2 files changed, 54 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssl/Makefile b/security/openssl/Makefile
index 1a4cd8577ae7..270e2f386bc1 100644
--- a/security/openssl/Makefile
+++ b/security/openssl/Makefile
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
PORTNAME= openssl
PORTVERSION= 0.9.7a
-PORTREVISION= 1
+PORTREVISION= 2
CATEGORIES= security devel
MASTER_SITES= http://www.openssl.org/source/ \
ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/ \
diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c b/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..52777355a66b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+--- ssl/s3_srvr.c 29 Nov 2002 11:31:51 -0000 1.85.2.14
++++ ssl/s3_srvr.c 19 Mar 2003 18:00:00 -0000
+@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@
+ if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT);
++ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */
+ }
+
+ if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff))))
+@@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@
+ (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff))))
+ {
+ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
+- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+- goto f_err;
++ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */
++
++ /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack
++ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version
++ * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would
++ * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext
++ * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except
++ * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks,
++ * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */
++ p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19";
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (al != -1)
+ {
+-#if 0
+- goto f_err;
+-#else
+ /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure
+ * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding
+- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1).
+- * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the
+- * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher:
+- * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
+- * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12).
+- */
++ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH;
+ p[0] = s->client_version >> 8;
+ p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff;
+ RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */
+-#endif
+ }
+
+ s->session->master_key_length=