2 files changed, 7 insertions, 98 deletions

diff --git a/security/ssh/Makefile b/security/ssh/Makefile
index 7cb228b6fadb..0fd2b1158785 100644
--- a/security/ssh/Makefile
+++ b/security/ssh/Makefile
@@ -12,12 +12,14 @@ PORTNAME=	ssh
 PORTVERSION=	1.2.27
 PORTREVISION=	1
 CATEGORIES=	security ipv6
-MASTER_SITES=	ftp://ftp.cs.hut.fi/pub/ssh/ \
-		ftp://ftp.bitcon.no/.4/console/system/ \
-		ftp://ftp.kddlabs.co.jp/.0/security/Crypto/SSH/ \
-		ftp://ftp.vision.net.au/ftp7/linuxberg/files/console/system/ \
+MASTER_SITES=	ftp://ftp.cs.engr.uky.edu/cs/software/ \
+		ftp://ftp.cs.umn.edu/dept/users/rybski/ \
+		ftp://ftp.net.ohio-state.edu/disk/d/security/ssh/ \
+		ftp://ftp.cronyx.ru/.w2/mirror/ssh/old/ \
+		ftp://ftp.nsysu.edu.tw/Unix/Security/ssh/old/ \
+		ftp://ftp.tokyonet.ad.jp/.da0/security/ssh/old/ \
 		ftp://ftp.comp.hkbu.edu.hk/.6/unix/ \
-		ftp://ftp.du.se/disk1/mirrors/ssh/
+		ftp://ftp.dei.uc.pt/.disk2/Crypto/SSH/old/
 
 MAINTAINER=	kris@FreeBSD.org
 
diff --git a/security/ssh/pkg-descr b/security/ssh/pkg-descr
index 14497e434279..e08cd3baca01 100644
--- a/security/ssh/pkg-descr
+++ b/security/ssh/pkg-descr
@@ -3,96 +3,3 @@ to execute commands in a remote machine, and to move files from one
 machine to another.  It provides strong authentication and secure
 communications over insecure channels.  It is intended as a replacement
 for rlogin, rsh, and rcp.
-
-FEATURES
-
- o  Complete replacement for rlogin, rsh, and rcp.
-
- o  Strong authentication.  Closes several security holes (e.g., IP,
-    routing, and DNS spoofing).  New authentication methods: .rhosts
-    together with RSA based host authentication, and pure RSA
-    authentication.
-
- o  Improved privacy.  All communications are automatically and
-    transparently encrypted.  RSA is used for key exchange, and a
-    conventional cipher (normally IDEA, DES, or triple-DES) for
-    encrypting the session.  Encryption is started before
-    authentication, and no passwords or other information is
-    transmitted in the clear.  Encryption is also used to protect
-    against spoofed packets.
-
- o  Secure X11 sessions.  The program automatically sets DISPLAY on
-    the server machine, and forwards any X11 connections over the
-    secure channel.  Fake Xauthority information is automatically
-    generated and forwarded to the remote machine; the local client
-    automatically examines incoming X11 connections and replaces the
-    fake authorization data with the real data (never telling the 
-    remote machine the real information).
-
- o  Arbitrary TCP/IP ports can be redirected through the encrypted channel
-    in both directions (e.g., for e-cash transactions).
-
- o  No retraining needed for normal users; everything happens
-    automatically, and old .rhosts files will work with strong
-    authentication if administration installs host key files.
-
- o  Never trusts the network.  Minimal trust on the remote side of
-    the connection.  Minimal trust on domain name servers.  Pure RSA
-    authentication never trusts anything but the private key.
-
- o  Client RSA-authenticates the server machine in the beginning of
-    every connection to prevent trojan horses (by routing or DNS
-    spoofing) and man-in-the-middle attacks, and the server
-    RSA-authenticates the client machine before accepting .rhosts or
-    /etc/hosts.equiv authentication (to prevent DNS, routing, or
-    IP-spoofing).
-
- o  Host authentication key distribution can be centrally by the
-    administration, automatically when the first connection is made
-    to a machine (the key obtained on the first connection will be
-    recorded and used for authentication in the future), or manually
-    by each user for his/her own use.  The central and per-user host
-    key repositories are both used and complement each other.  Host
-    keys can be generated centrally or automatically when the software
-    is installed.  Host authentication keys are typically 1024 bits.
-
- o  Any user can create any number of user authentication RSA keys for
-    his/her own use.  Each user has a file which lists the RSA public
-    keys for which proof of possession of the corresponding private
-    key is accepted as authentication.  User authentication keys are
-    typically 1024 bits.
-
- o  The server program has its own server RSA key which is
-    automatically regenerated every hour.  This key is never saved in
-    any file.  Exchanged session keys are encrypted using both the
-    server key and the server host key.  The purpose of the separate
-    server key is to make it impossible to decipher a captured session by
-    breaking into the server machine at a later time; one hour from
-    the connection even the server machine cannot decipher the session
-    key.  The key regeneration interval is configurable.  The server
-    key is normally 768 bits.
-
- o  An authentication agent, running in the user's laptop or local
-    workstation, can be used to hold the user's RSA authentication
-    keys.  Ssh automatically forwards the connection to the
-    authentication agent over any connections, and there is no need to
-    store the RSA authentication keys on any machine in the network
-    (except the user's own local machine).  The authentication
-    protocols never reveal the keys; they can only be used to verify
-    that the user's agent has a certain key.  Eventually the agent
-    could rely on a smart card to perform all authentication
-    computations.
-
- o  The software can be installed and used (with restricted
-    functionality) even without root privileges.
-
- o  The client is customizable in system-wide and per-user
-    configuration files.  Most aspects of the client's operation can
-    be configured.  Different options can be specified on a per-host basis.
-
- o  Automatically executes conventional rsh (after displaying a
-    warning) if the server machine is not running sshd.
-
- o  Optional compression of all data with gzip (including forwarded X11
-    and TCP/IP port data), which may result in significant speedups on
-    slow connections.