aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorMartin Wilke <miwi@FreeBSD.org>2012-05-21 05:31:34 +0000
committerMartin Wilke <miwi@FreeBSD.org>2012-05-21 05:31:34 +0000
commit7044ad9709fea37dca7e65d5670857bd511cec85 (patch)
tree32e43894b3f3463f0b9ad5b771b76526b90317d4 /security/vuxml/vuln.xml
parent7a1146d30ea2156e7abb42de5e0676c1793da58d (diff)
downloadports-7044ad9709fea37dca7e65d5670857bd511cec85.tar.gz
ports-7044ad9709fea37dca7e65d5670857bd511cec85.zip
Notes
Diffstat (limited to 'security/vuxml/vuln.xml')
-rw-r--r--security/vuxml/vuln.xml36
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
index d0f80618563f..51f2e10ac207 100644
--- a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
+++ b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
@@ -65,20 +65,20 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file.
<p>Google chrome team reports:</p>
<blockquote cite="http://googlechromereleases.blogspot.com/2012/05/stable-channel-update.html">
<p>An off-by-one out-of-bounds write flaw was found in the way libxml, a library
- for providing XML and HTML support, evaluated certain XPointer parts (XPointer
- is used by libxml to include only the part from the returned XML document, that
- can be accessed using the XPath expression given with the XPointer). A remote
- attacker could provide a specially-crafted XML file, which once opened in an
- application, linked against libxml, would lead to that application crash, or,
- potentially arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running
- the application.</p>
- <p>Note: The flaw to be exploited requires the particular application, linked
- against libxml, to use the XPointer evaluation functionality.</p>
+ for providing XML and HTML support, evaluated certain XPointer parts (XPointer
+ is used by libxml to include only the part from the returned XML document, that
+ can be accessed using the XPath expression given with the XPointer). A remote
+ attacker could provide a specially-crafted XML file, which once opened in an
+ application, linked against libxml, would lead to that application crash, or,
+ potentially arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user running
+ the application.</p>
+ <p>Note: The flaw to be exploited requires the particular application, linked
+ against libxml, to use the XPointer evaluation functionality.</p>
</blockquote>
</body>
</description>
<references>
- <cvename>CVE-2011-3201</cvename>
+ <cvename>CVE-2011-3202</cvename>
<url>http://googlechromereleases.blogspot.com/2012/05/stable-channel-update.html</url>
<url>https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2011-3102</url>
</references>
@@ -102,9 +102,9 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file.
<blockquote cite="http://inspircd.github.com/">
<p>InspIRCd contains a heap corruption vulnerability that exists in the
dns.cpp code. The res[] buffer is allocated on the heap and can be
- overflowed. The res[] buffer can be exploited during its deallocation.
- The number of overflowed bytes can be controlled with DNS compression
- features.</p>
+ overflowed. The res[] buffer can be exploited during its deallocation.
+ The number of overflowed bytes can be controlled with DNS compression
+ features.</p>
</blockquote>
</body>
</description>
@@ -308,12 +308,12 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file.
<p>The socat development team reports:</p>
<blockquote cite="http://www.dest-unreach.org/socat/contrib/socat-secadv3.html">
<p>This vulnerability can be exploited when socat is invoked with the
- READLINE address (this is usually only used interactively) without
- option "prompt" and without option "noprompt" and an attacker succeeds
- to provide malicious data to the other (arbitrary) address that is then
- transferred by socat to the READLINE address for output.</p>
+ READLINE address (this is usually only used interactively) without
+ option "prompt" and without option "noprompt" and an attacker succeeds
+ to provide malicious data to the other (arbitrary) address that is then
+ transferred by socat to the READLINE address for output.</p>
<p>Successful exploitation may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary
- code with the privileges of the socat process.</p>
+ code with the privileges of the socat process.</p>
</blockquote>
</body>
</description>