5 files changed, 164 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
index d2d5fa27521c..fab7e814568b 100644
--- a/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
+++ b/security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	wpa_supplicant
 PORTVERSION=	2.5
+PORTREVISION=	1
 CATEGORIES=	security net
 MASTER_SITES=	http://w1.fi/releases/
 
diff --git a/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame b/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7b76ccaca55c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no
+ PMF in use
+
+WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is
+enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station
+side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
+
+--- wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
++++ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
+@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
+ 	end = ptr + key_len_total;
+ 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total);
+ 
++	if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) {
++		wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO,
++			"WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled");
++		return;
++	}
++
+ 	while (ptr + 1 < end) {
+ 		if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element "
diff --git a/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation b/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..99365a1a341e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
+
+All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
+room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
+fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
+The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
+buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
+termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+--- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	/*
+ 	 * buffer and ACK the fragment
+ 	 */
+-	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+ 		data->in_frag_pos += len;
+ 		if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
+@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+-
++	}
++	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
+ 				     EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
+ 				     EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
+@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
+ 	 * we're buffering and this is the last fragment
+ 	 */
+ 	if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+-		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
+ 			   (int) len);
+-		data->in_frag_pos += len;
+ 		pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
+ 		len = data->in_frag_pos;
+ 	}
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation b/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..fcf2555cad25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation
+
+All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
+room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
+fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
+The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
+buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
+termination. (CVE-2015-5314)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++---
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+--- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
++++ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
+@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 	/*
+ 	 * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
+ 	 */
+-	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
++	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
+ 		if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
+ 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
+ 				   "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
+@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 		}
+ 		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+ 		data->in_frag_pos += len;
++	}
++	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
+ 			   (int) len);
+ 		return;
+@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
+ 	 * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
+ 	 */
+ 	if (data->in_frag_pos) {
+-		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
+-		data->in_frag_pos += len;
+ 		pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
+ 		len = data->in_frag_pos;
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
+-- 
+1.9.1
+
diff --git a/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m b/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8a604e532ace
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message
+
+If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity
+exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and
+data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange()
+did not take this corner case into account and could end up
+dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid
+message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316)
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+--- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
++++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
+@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
+ 	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
+ 
+ fin:
+-	bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
++	if (data->grp)
++		bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
+ 	BN_clear_free(x);
+ 	BN_clear_free(y);
+ 	if (data->outbuf == NULL) {
+-- 
+1.9.1
+