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authorLi-Wen Hsu <lwhsu@FreeBSD.org>2013-01-06 18:14:23 +0000
committerLi-Wen Hsu <lwhsu@FreeBSD.org>2013-01-06 18:14:23 +0000
commitea301099216326cc9631fbd406f14596bbf3995a (patch)
tree18425a2e18326d02f171252e3c02c33e27992234 /security
parentede09e7ce8a5c947c846b28c63cfc5abec873da0 (diff)
downloadports-ea301099216326cc9631fbd406f14596bbf3995a.tar.gz
ports-ea301099216326cc9631fbd406f14596bbf3995a.zip
Notes
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/vuxml/vuln.xml74
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
index f4a3b811f731..92748ffaf248 100644
--- a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
+++ b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
@@ -51,6 +51,80 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file.
-->
<vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">
+ <vuln vid="1b769b72-582b-11e2-b66b-00e0814cab4e">
+ <topic>django -- multiple vulnerabilities</topic>
+ <affects>
+ <package>
+ <name>django</name>
+ <range><lt>1.4.3</lt></range>
+ </package>
+ <package>
+ <name>django13</name>
+ <range><lt>1.3.5</lt></range>
+ </package>
+ </affects>
+ <description>
+ <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+ <p>The Django Project reports:</p>
+ <blockquote cite="https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2012/dec/10/security/">
+ <ol>
+ <li>
+ <p>Host header poisoning</p>
+ <p>Several earlier Django security releases focused on the issue of
+ poisoning the HTTP Host header, causing Django to generate URLs
+ pointing to arbitrary, potentially-malicious domains.</p>
+ <p>In response to further input received and reports of continuing
+ issues following the previous release, we're taking additional
+ steps to tighten Host header validation. Rather than attempt to
+ accommodate all features HTTP supports here, Django's Host header
+ validation attempts to support a smaller, but far more common, subset:</p>
+ <ul>
+ <li>Hostnames must consist of characters [A-Za-z0-9] plus hyphen
+ ('-') or dot ('.').</li>
+ <li>IP addresses -- both IPv4 and IPv6 -- are permitted.</li>
+ <li>Port, if specified, is numeric.</li>
+ </ul>
+ <p>Any deviation from this will now be rejected, raising the exception
+ django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation.</p>
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ <p>Redirect poisoning</p>
+ <p>Also following up on a previous issue: in July of this year, we made
+ changes to Django's HTTP redirect classes, performing additional
+ validation of the scheme of the URL to redirect to (since, both
+ within Django's own supplied applications and many third-party
+ applications, accepting a user-supplied redirect target is a common
+ pattern).</p>
+ <p>Since then, two independent audits of the code turned up further
+ potential problems. So, similar to the Host-header issue, we are
+ taking steps to provide tighter validation in response to reported
+ problems (primarily with third-party applications, but to a certain
+ extent also within Django itself). This comes in two parts:</p>
+ <ol>
+ <li>A new utility function, django.utils.http.is_safe_url, is
+ added; this function takes a URL and a hostname, and checks
+ that the URL is either relative, or if absolute matches the
+ supplied hostname. This function is intended for use whenever
+ user-supplied redirect targets are accepted, to ensure that
+ such redirects cannot lead to arbitrary third-party sites.</li>
+ <li>All of Django's own built-in views -- primarily in the
+ authentication system -- which allow user-supplied redirect
+ targets now use is_safe_url to validate the supplied URL.</li>
+ </ol>
+ </li>
+ </ol>
+ </blockquote>
+ </body>
+ </description>
+ <references>
+ <url>https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2012/dec/10/security/</url>
+ </references>
+ <dates>
+ <discovery>2012-12-10</discovery>
+ <entry>2013-01-06</entry>
+ </dates>
+ </vuln>
+
<vuln vid="1ae613c3-5728-11e2-9483-14dae938ec40">
<topic>freetype -- Multiple vulnerabilities</topic>
<affects>