diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/openssl')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl/Makefile | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c | 53 |
2 files changed, 54 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/openssl/Makefile b/security/openssl/Makefile index 1a4cd8577ae7..270e2f386bc1 100644 --- a/security/openssl/Makefile +++ b/security/openssl/Makefile @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ PORTNAME= openssl PORTVERSION= 0.9.7a -PORTREVISION= 1 +PORTREVISION= 2 CATEGORIES= security devel MASTER_SITES= http://www.openssl.org/source/ \ ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/ \ diff --git a/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c b/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..52777355a66b --- /dev/null +++ b/security/openssl/files/patch-ssl-s3_srvr.c @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +--- ssl/s3_srvr.c 29 Nov 2002 11:31:51 -0000 1.85.2.14 ++++ ssl/s3_srvr.c 19 Mar 2003 18:00:00 -0000 +@@ -1447,7 +1447,7 @@ + if (i != SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); ++ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); */ + } + + if ((al == -1) && !((p[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) +@@ -1463,30 +1463,29 @@ + (p[0] == (s->version>>8)) && (p[1] == (s->version & 0xff)))) + { + al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; +- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); +- goto f_err; ++ /* SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); */ ++ ++ /* The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack ++ * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version ++ * number check as a "bad version oracle" -- an alert would ++ * reveal that the plaintext corresponding to some ciphertext ++ * made up by the adversary is properly formatted except ++ * that the version number is wrong. To avoid such attacks, ++ * we should treat this just like any other decryption error. */ ++ p[0] = (char)(int) "CAN-2003-0131 patch 2003-03-19"; + } + } + + if (al != -1) + { +-#if 0 +- goto f_err; +-#else + /* Some decryption failure -- use random value instead as countermeasure + * against Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding +- * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). +- * But note that due to length and protocol version checking, the +- * attack is impractical anyway (see section 5 in D. Bleichenbacher: +- * "Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA +- * Encryption Standard PKCS #1", CRYPTO '98, LNCS 1462, pp. 1-12). +- */ ++ * (see RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). */ + ERR_clear_error(); + i = SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; + p[0] = s->client_version >> 8; + p[1] = s->client_version & 0xff; + RAND_pseudo_bytes(p+2, i-2); /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure */ +-#endif + } + + s->session->master_key_length= |