From 68f206fa2488011cf024427892b06e97ad567fa1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Martin Wilke Date: Tue, 11 Mar 2008 23:25:38 +0000 Subject: - Fix previos commit * sort * more reference --- security/vuxml/vuln.xml | 14 ++++++++------ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) (limited to 'security/vuxml/vuln.xml') diff --git a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml index 6274e5b89c81..a7c9544d4074 100644 --- a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml +++ b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml @@ -48,18 +48,20 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file.

Ian Jackson reports on the debian-security mailinglist:

When a block device read or write request is made by the guest, - nothing checks that the request is within the range supported by the - backend, but the code in the backend typically assumes that the - request is sensible.

+ nothing checks that the request is within the range supported by + the backend, but the code in the backend typically assumes that + the request is sensible.

Depending on the backend, this can allow the guest to read - and write arbitrary memory locations in qemu, and possibly gain - control over the qemu process, escaping from the - emulation/virtualisation.

+ and write arbitrary memory locations in qemu, and possibly gain + control over the qemu process, escaping from the + emulation/virtualisation.

CVE-2008-0928 + http://secunia.com/advisories/29172 + http://secunia.com/advisories/29172 http://lists.debian.org/debian-security/2008/02/msg00064.html -- cgit v1.2.3