src-test/lib/libsecureboot/verify_file.c, branch main

veloader: insist on verifying .4th .lua etc

2020-08-21T00:27:06Z

When files are read from .rc or .4th, verify_file is asked to guess the severity (VE_TRY,VE_WANT,VE_MUST) Reviewed by: stevek MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: Juniper Networks

verify_pcr_export: bump kenv_mvallen if needed

2020-06-12T21:55:30Z

The loader.ve.hashed list can easily exceed KENV_MVALLEN. If so, bump kenv_mvallen to a multiple of KENV_MVALLEN to accommodate the value. Reviewed by: stevek MFC after: 1 week

Fix pkgfs stat so it satisfies libsecureboot

2020-03-25T19:12:19Z

We need a valid st_dev, st_ino and st_mtime to correctly track which files have been verified and to update our notion of time. ve_utc_set(): ignore utc if it would jump our current time by more than VE_UTC_MAX_JUMP (20 years). Allow testing of install command via userboot. Need to fix its stat implementation too. bhyveload also needs stat fixed - due to change to userboot.h Call ve_error_get() from vectx_close() when hash is wrong. Track the names of files we have hashed into pcr For the purposes of measured boot, it is important to be able to reproduce the hash reflected in loader.ve.pcr so loader.ve.hashed provides a list of names in the order they were added. Reviewed by: imp MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: Juniper Networks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org//D24027

veloader use vectx API for kernel and modules

2020-03-08T17:42:42Z

The vectx API, computes the hash for verifying a file as it is read. This avoids the overhead of reading files twice - once to verify, then again to load. For doing an install via loader, avoiding the need to rewind large files is critical. This API is only used for modules, kernel and mdimage as these are the biggest files read by the loader. The reduction in boot time depends on how expensive the I/O is on any given platform. On a fast VM we see 6% improvement. For install via loader the first file to be verified is likely to be the kernel, so some of the prep work (finding manifest etc) done by verify_file() needs to be factored so it can be reused for vectx_open(). For missing or unrecognized fingerprint entries, we fail in vectx_open() unless verifying is disabled. Otherwise fingerprint check happens in vectx_close() and since this API is only used for files which must be verified (VE_MUST) we panic if we get an incorrect hash. Reviewed by: imp,tsoome MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: Juniper Networks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org//D23827

Initialize verbosity and debug level from env

2019-10-24T19:50:18Z

For EFI at least, we can seed the environment with VE_VERBOSE etc. Reviewed by: stevek imp Sponsored by: Juniper Networks MFC after: 1 week Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22135

libsecureboot: allow OpenPGP support to be dormant

2019-06-26T23:33:32Z

Since we can now add OpenPGP trust anchors at runtime, ensure the latent support is available. Ensure we do not add duplicate keys to trust store. Also allow reporting names of trust anchors added/revoked We only do this for loader and only after initializing trust store. Thus only changes to initial trust store will be logged. Reviewed by: stevek MFC after: 1 week Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20700

libsecureboot: allow control of when pseudo pcr is updated

2019-05-19T20:28:49Z

During boot we only want to measure things which *must* be verified - this should provide more deterministic ordering. Reviewed by: stevek MFC after: 1 week Sponsored by: Juniper Networks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20297

Allow no_hash to appear in manifest.

2019-04-23T20:25:25Z

sbin/veriexec will ignore entries that have no hash anyway, but loader needs to be explicitly told that such files are ok to ignore (not verify). We will report as Unverified depending on verbose level, but with no reason - because we are not rejecting the file. Reviewed by: imp, mindal_semihalf Sponsored by: Juniper Networks MFC After: 1 week Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org//D20018

Always report file with incorrect hash.

2019-04-09T22:20:11Z

Create kernel module to parse Veriexec manifest based on envs

2019-04-03T03:57:37Z

The current approach of injecting manifest into mac_veriexec is to verify the integrity of it in userspace (veriexec (8)) and pass its entries into kernel using a char device (/dev/veriexec). This requires verifying root partition integrity in loader, for example by using memory disk and checking its hash. Otherwise if rootfs is compromised an attacker could inject their own data. This patch introduces an option to parse manifest in kernel based on envs. The loader sets manifest path and digest. EVENTHANDLER is used to launch the module right after the rootfs is mounted. It has to be done this way, since one might want to verify integrity of the init file. This means that manifest is required to be present on the root partition. Note that the envs have to be set right before boot to make sure that no one can spoof them. Submitted by: Kornel Duleba Reviewed by: sjg Obtained from: Semihalf Sponsored by: Stormshield Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D19281