15 files changed, 1748 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_ftp/Makefile b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_ftp/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..4ea360d13f78e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_ftp/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# $Id: Makefile,v 1.2 2000/11/19 23:54:03 agmorgan Exp $
+# $FreeBSD$
+#
+# This Makefile controls a build process of $(TITLE) module for
+# Linux-PAM. You should not modify this Makefile (unless you know
+# what you are doing!).
+#
+# Created by Andrew Morgan <morgan@linux.kernel.org> 2000/08/27
+#
+
+include ../../Make.Rules
+
+TITLE=pam_ftp
+
+include ../Simple.Rules
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_ftp/README b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_ftp/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..0e9315ec2f7a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_ftp/README
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+$FreeBSD$
+This is the README for pam_ftp
+------------------------------
+
+This module is an authentication module that does simple ftp
+authentication.
+
+Recognized arguments:
+
+	"debug"		print debug messages
+	"users="	comma separated list of users which
+			could login only with email adress
+	"ignore"	allow invalid email adresses
+
+Options for:
+auth:	for authentication it provides pam_authenticate() and
+	pam_setcred() hooks.
+
+Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>, 17. June 1999
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_ftp/pam_ftp.c b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_ftp/pam_ftp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..df10a03479a4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_ftp/pam_ftp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+/* pam_ftp module */
+
+/*
+ * $Id: pam_ftp.c,v 1.2 2000/11/19 23:54:03 agmorgan Exp $
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ *
+ * Written by Andrew Morgan <morgan@linux.kernel.org> 1996/3/11
+ *
+ */
+
+#define PLEASE_ENTER_PASSWORD "Password required for %s."
+#define GUEST_LOGIN_PROMPT "Guest login ok, " \
+"send your complete e-mail address as password."
+
+/* the following is a password that "can't be correct" */
+#define BLOCK_PASSWORD "\177BAD PASSWPRD\177"
+
+#include <security/_pam_aconf.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * here, we make a definition for the externally accessible function
+ * in this file (this definition is required for static a module
+ * but strongly encouraged generally) it is used to instruct the
+ * modules include file to define the function prototypes.
+ */
+
+#define PAM_SM_AUTH
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+/* some syslogging */
+
+static void _pam_log(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+
+    va_start(args, format);
+    openlog("PAM-ftp", LOG_CONS|LOG_PID, LOG_AUTH);
+    vsyslog(err, format, args);
+    va_end(args);
+    closelog();
+}
+
+static int converse(pam_handle_t *pamh, int nargs
+		    , struct pam_message **message
+		    , struct pam_response **response)
+{
+    int retval;
+    struct pam_conv *conv;
+
+    D(("begin to converse\n"));
+
+    retval = pam_get_item( pamh, PAM_CONV, (const void **) &conv ) ; 
+    if ( retval == PAM_SUCCESS ) {
+
+	retval = conv->conv(nargs, ( const struct pam_message ** ) message
+			    , response, conv->appdata_ptr);
+
+	D(("returned from application's conversation function\n"));
+
+	if ((retval != PAM_SUCCESS) && (retval != PAM_CONV_AGAIN)) {
+	    _pam_log(LOG_DEBUG, "conversation failure [%s]"
+		     , pam_strerror(pamh, retval));
+	}
+
+    } else {
+	_pam_log(LOG_ERR, "couldn't obtain coversation function [%s]"
+		 , pam_strerror(pamh, retval));
+    }
+
+    D(("ready to return from module conversation\n"));
+
+    return retval;                  /* propagate error status */
+}
+
+/* argument parsing */
+
+#define PAM_DEBUG_ARG       01
+#define PAM_IGNORE_EMAIL    02
+#define PAM_NO_ANON         04
+
+static int _pam_parse(int argc, const char **argv, char **users)
+{
+    int ctrl=0;
+
+    /* step through arguments */
+    for (ctrl=0; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
+
+	/* generic options */
+
+	if (!strcmp(*argv,"debug"))
+	    ctrl |= PAM_DEBUG_ARG;
+	else if (!strncmp(*argv,"users=",6)) {
+	    *users = x_strdup(6+*argv);
+	    if (*users == NULL) {
+		ctrl |= PAM_NO_ANON;
+		_pam_log(LOG_CRIT, "failed to duplicate user list - anon off");
+	    }
+	} else if (!strcmp(*argv,"ignore")) {
+	    ctrl |= PAM_IGNORE_EMAIL;
+	} else {
+	    _pam_log(LOG_ERR,"pam_parse: unknown option; %s",*argv);
+	}
+    }
+
+    return ctrl;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if name is in list or default list. place users name in *_user
+ * return 1 if listed 0 if not.
+ */
+
+static int lookup(const char *name, char *list, const char **_user)
+{
+    int anon = 0;
+
+    *_user = name;                 /* this is the default */
+    if (list) {
+	const char *l;
+	char *x;
+
+	x = list;
+	while ((l = strtok(x, ","))) {
+	    x = NULL;
+	    if (!strcmp(name, l)) {
+		*_user = list;
+		anon = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+    } else {
+#define MAX_L 2
+	static const char *l[MAX_L] = { "ftp", "anonymous" };
+	int i;
+
+	for (i=0; i<MAX_L; ++i) {
+	    if (!strcmp(l[i], name)) {
+		*_user = l[0];
+		anon = 1;
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    return anon;
+}
+
+/* --- authentication management functions (only) --- */
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh,int flags,int argc
+			,const char **argv)
+{
+    int retval, anon=0, ctrl;
+    const char *user;
+    char *users=NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * this module checks if the user name is ftp or annonymous. If
+     * this is the case, it can set the PAM_RUSER to the entered email
+     * address and SUCCEEDS, otherwise it FAILS.
+     */
+
+    ctrl = _pam_parse(argc, argv, &users);
+
+    retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
+    if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || user == NULL) {
+	_pam_log(LOG_ERR, "no user specified");
+	return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+    }
+
+    if (!(ctrl & PAM_NO_ANON)) {
+	anon = lookup(user, users, &user);
+    }
+
+    if (anon) {
+	retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void *)user);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || user == NULL) {
+	    _pam_log(LOG_ERR, "user resetting failed");
+	    return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * OK. we require an email address for user or the user's password.
+     * - build conversation and get their input.
+     */
+
+    {
+	struct pam_message msg[1], *mesg[1];
+	struct pam_response *resp=NULL;
+	const char *token;
+	char *prompt=NULL;
+	int i=0;
+
+	if (!anon) {
+	    prompt = malloc(strlen(PLEASE_ENTER_PASSWORD) + strlen(user));
+	    if (prompt == NULL) {
+		D(("out of memory!?"));
+		return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+	    } else {
+		sprintf(prompt, PLEASE_ENTER_PASSWORD, user);
+		msg[i].msg = prompt;
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    msg[i].msg = GUEST_LOGIN_PROMPT;
+	}
+
+	msg[i].msg_style = PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF;
+	mesg[i] = &msg[i];
+
+	retval = converse(pamh, ++i, mesg, &resp);
+	if (prompt) {
+	    _pam_overwrite(prompt);
+	    _pam_drop(prompt);
+	}
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+	    if (resp != NULL)
+		_pam_drop_reply(resp,i);
+	    return ((retval == PAM_CONV_AGAIN)
+		    ? PAM_INCOMPLETE:PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+	}
+
+	if (anon) {
+	    /* XXX: Some effort should be made to verify this email address! */
+
+	    if (!(ctrl & PAM_IGNORE_EMAIL)) {
+		token = strtok(resp->resp, "@");
+		retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, token);
+
+		if ((token) && (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)) {
+		    token = strtok(NULL, "@");
+		    retval = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, token);
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    /* we are happy to grant annonymous access to the user */
+	    retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+	} else {
+	    /*
+	     * we have a password so set AUTHTOK
+	     */
+
+	    (void) pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, resp->resp);
+
+	    /*
+	     * this module failed, but the next one might succeed with
+	     * this password.
+	     */
+
+	    retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	}
+
+	if (resp) {                                      /* clean up */
+	    _pam_drop_reply(resp, i);
+	}
+
+	/* success or failure */
+
+	return retval;
+    }
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh,int flags,int argc
+		   ,const char **argv)
+{
+     return PAM_IGNORE;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+
+/* static module data */
+
+struct pam_module _pam_ftp_modstruct = {
+     "pam_ftp",
+     pam_sm_authenticate,
+     pam_sm_setcred,
+     NULL,
+     NULL,
+     NULL,
+     NULL,
+};
+
+#endif
+
+/* end of module definition */
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_rhosts/Makefile b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_rhosts/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..0108969fc5d68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_rhosts/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# $Id: Makefile,v 1.2 2000/11/19 23:54:05 agmorgan Exp $
+# $FreeBSD$
+#
+# This Makefile controls a build process of $(TITLE) module for
+# Linux-PAM. You should not modify this Makefile (unless you know
+# what you are doing!).
+#
+# Created by Andrew Morgan <morgan@linux.kernel.org> 2000/08/27
+#
+
+include ../../Make.Rules
+
+TITLE=pam_rhosts_auth
+
+include ../Simple.Rules
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_rhosts/README b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_rhosts/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..8bd01aa3e7f2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_rhosts/README
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+$FreeBSD$
+arguments recognized:
+
+"no_hosts_equiv"
+"no_rhosts"
+"debug"
+"nowarn"
+"suppress"
+"promiscuous"
+
+.rhosts/hosts.equiv format:
+
+There are positive entries, when one is matched authentication
+succeeds and terminates.  There are negative entries, when one is
+matched authentication fails and terminates.  Thus order is
+significant.
+
+Entry          hosts.equiv                     .rhosts
+<host>         All users on <host> are ok      Same username from <host> is ok
+<host> <user>  <user> from <host> is ok        ditto
+-<host>                No users from <host> are ok     ditto
+<host> -<user> <user> from <host> is not ok    ditto
+
+<host> can be ip (IPv4) numbers.
+
+Netgroups may be used in either host or user fields, and then applies
+to all hosts, or users, in the netgroup.  The syntax is
+
+  +@<ng>
+
+The entries
+
+  <host> +@<ng>
+  +@<ng> +@<ng>
+  +@<ng> <user>
+
+means exactly what you think it does.  Negative entries are of the
+form
+
+  -@<ng>
+
+When the "promiscuous" option is given the special character + may be
+used as a wildcard in any field.
+
+  +                    Allow anyone from any host to connect. DANGEROUS.
+  + +                  Ditto.
+  + <user>             Allow the user to connect from anywhere. DANGEROUS.
+  <host> +             Allow any user from the host. Dangerous.
+  
+These, perhaps more usefull, forms of the + form is also disallowed
+unless "promiscuous" is specified:
+
+  + -<user>            Disallow the user from any host
+  + -@<ng>             Disallow all members of the netgroup from any host
+
+When "promiscuous" is not specified a '+' is handled as a negative
+match.
+
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_rhosts/pam_rhosts_auth.c b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_rhosts/pam_rhosts_auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..f520fda08ba70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_rhosts/pam_rhosts_auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,787 @@
+/*----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Modified for Linux-PAM by Al Longyear <longyear@netcom.com> 96/5/5
+ * Modifications, Cristian Gafton 97/2/8
+ * Modifications, Peter Allgeyer 97/3
+ * Modifications (netgroups and fixes), Nicolai Langfeldt 97/3/21
+ * Security fix: 97/10/2 - gethostbyname called repeatedly without care
+ * Modification (added privategroup option) Andrew <morgan@transmeta.com>
+ *----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *	This product includes software developed by the University of
+ *	California, Berkeley and its contributors.
+ * 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+
+#define _BSD_SOURCE
+
+#define USER_RHOSTS_FILE "/.rhosts"     /* prefixed by user's home dir */
+
+#ifdef linux
+#include <endian.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef NEED_FSUID_H
+#include <sys/fsuid.h>
+#endif /* NEED_FSUID_H */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netdb.h>       /* This is supposed(?) to contain the following */
+int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *,const char *);
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifndef MAXDNAME
+#define MAXDNAME  256
+#endif
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include <net/if.h>
+#ifdef linux
+# include <linux/sockios.h>
+# ifndef __USE_MISC
+#  define __USE_MISC
+#  include <sys/fsuid.h>
+# endif /* __USE_MISC */
+#endif
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <sys/file.h>
+#include <sys/signal.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#ifndef _PATH_HEQUIV
+#define _PATH_HEQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv"
+#endif /* _PATH_HEQUIV */
+
+#define PAM_SM_AUTH  /* only defines this management group */
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+/* to the best of my knowledge, all modern UNIX boxes have 32 bit integers */
+#define U32 unsigned int
+
+
+/*
+ * Options for this module
+ */
+
+struct _options {
+    int  opt_no_hosts_equiv;
+    int  opt_hosts_equiv_rootok;
+    int  opt_no_rhosts;
+    int  opt_debug;
+    int  opt_nowarn;
+    int  opt_disallow_null_authtok;
+    int  opt_silent;
+    int  opt_promiscuous;
+    int  opt_suppress;
+    int  opt_private_group;
+    int  opt_no_uid_check;
+    const char *superuser;
+    const char *last_error;
+};
+
+/* logging */
+static void _pam_log(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+
+    va_start(args, format);
+    openlog("pam_rhosts_auth", LOG_CONS|LOG_PID, LOG_AUTH);
+    vsyslog(err, format, args);
+    va_end(args);
+    closelog();
+}
+
+static void set_option (struct _options *opts, const char *arg)
+{
+    if (strcmp(arg, "no_hosts_equiv") == 0) {
+	opts->opt_no_hosts_equiv = 1;
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(arg, "hosts_equiv_rootok") == 0) {
+        opts->opt_hosts_equiv_rootok = 1;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(arg, "no_rhosts") == 0) {
+	opts->opt_no_rhosts = 1;
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(arg, "debug") == 0) {
+	D(("debugging enabled"));
+	opts->opt_debug = 1;
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(arg, "no_warn") == 0) {
+	opts->opt_nowarn = 1;
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(arg, "promiscuous") == 0) {
+	opts->opt_promiscuous = 1;   /* used to permit '+' in ...hosts file */
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(arg, "suppress") == 0) {
+	opts->opt_suppress = 1; /* used to suppress failure warning message */
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(arg, "privategroup") == 0) {
+	opts->opt_private_group = 1; /* used to permit group write on .rhosts
+					file if group has same name as owner */
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(arg, "no_uid_check") == 0) {
+	opts->opt_no_uid_check = 1;  /* NIS optimization */
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (strcmp(arg, "superuser=") == 0) {
+	opts->superuser = arg+sizeof("superuser=")-1;
+	return;
+    }
+    /*
+     * All other options are ignored at the present time.
+     */
+    _pam_log(LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized option '%s'", arg);
+}
+
+static void set_parameters (struct _options *opts, int flags,
+			    int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+    opts->opt_silent                = flags & PAM_SILENT;
+    opts->opt_disallow_null_authtok = flags & PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK;
+
+    while (argc-- > 0) {
+	set_option (opts, *argv);
+	++argv;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obtain the name of the remote host. Currently, this is simply by
+ * requesting the contents of the PAM_RHOST item.
+ */
+
+static int pam_get_rhost(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char **rhost
+			 , const char *prompt)
+{
+    int retval;
+    const char   *current;
+
+    retval = pam_get_item (pamh, PAM_RHOST, (const void **)&current);
+    if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+        return retval;
+
+    if (current == NULL) {
+	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    }
+    *rhost = current;
+
+    return retval;        /* pass on any error from conversation */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Obtain the name of the remote user. Currently, this is simply by
+ * requesting the contents of the PAM_RUSER item.
+ */
+
+static int pam_get_ruser(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char **ruser
+			 , const char *prompt)
+{
+    int retval;
+    const char   *current;
+
+    retval = pam_get_item (pamh, PAM_RUSER, (const void **)&current);
+    if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+        return retval;
+
+    if (current == NULL) {
+	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    }
+    *ruser = current;
+
+    return retval;        /* pass on any error from conversation */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if positive match, 0 if no match, -1 if negative match.
+ */
+
+static int
+__icheckhost (pam_handle_t *pamh, struct _options *opts, U32 raddr
+	      , register char *lhost, const char *rhost)
+{
+    struct hostent *hp;
+    U32 laddr;
+    int negate=1;    /* Multiply return with this to get -1 instead of 1 */
+    char **pp, *user;
+
+    /* Check nis netgroup.  We assume that pam has done all needed
+       paranoia checking before we are handed the rhost */
+    if (strncmp("+@",lhost,2) == 0)
+      return(innetgr(&lhost[2],rhost,NULL,NULL));
+
+    if (strncmp("-@",lhost,2) == 0)
+      return(-innetgr(&lhost[2],rhost,NULL,NULL));
+
+    /* -host */
+    if (strncmp("-",lhost,1) == 0) {
+	negate=-1;
+	lhost++;
+    } else if (strcmp("+",lhost) == 0) {
+        (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **)&user);
+        D(("user %s has a `+' host entry", user));
+	if (opts->opt_promiscuous)
+	    return (1);                     /* asking for trouble, but ok.. */
+	/* If not promiscuous: handle as negative */
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /* Try for raw ip address first. */
+    if (isdigit(*lhost) && (long)(laddr = inet_addr(lhost)) != -1)
+	return (negate*(! (raddr ^ laddr)));
+
+    /* Better be a hostname. */
+    hp = gethostbyname(lhost);
+    if (hp == NULL)
+	return (0);
+    
+    /* Spin through ip addresses. */
+    for (pp = hp->h_addr_list; *pp; ++pp)
+	if (!memcmp (&raddr, *pp, sizeof (U32)))
+	    return (negate);
+
+    /* No match. */
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 on positive match, 0 on no match, -1 on negative match */
+
+static int __icheckuser(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct _options *opts
+			, const char *luser, const char *ruser
+			, const char *rhost)
+{
+    /*
+      luser is user entry from .rhosts/hosts.equiv file
+      ruser is user id on remote host
+      rhost is the remote host name
+      */
+    char *user;
+
+    /* [-+]@netgroup */
+    if (strncmp("+@",luser,2) == 0)
+	return (innetgr(&luser[2],NULL,ruser,NULL));
+
+    if (strncmp("-@",luser,2) == 0)
+	return (-innetgr(&luser[2],NULL,ruser,NULL));
+
+    /* -user */
+    if (strncmp("-",luser,1) == 0)
+	return(-(strcmp(&luser[1],ruser) == 0));
+
+    /* + */
+    if (strcmp("+",luser) == 0) {
+	(void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (const void **)&user);
+	_pam_log(LOG_WARNING, "user %s has a `+' user entry", user);
+	if (opts->opt_promiscuous)
+	    return(1);
+	/* If not promiscuous we handle it as a negative match */
+	return(-1);
+    }
+
+    /* simple string match */
+    return (strcmp(ruser, luser) == 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 for blank lines (or only comment lines) and 0 otherwise
+ */
+
+static int __isempty(char *p)
+{
+    while (*p && isspace(*p)) {
+	++p;
+    }
+
+    return (*p == '\0' || *p == '#') ? 1:0 ;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0 if positive match, 1 if _not_ ok.
+ */
+
+static int
+__ivaliduser (pam_handle_t *pamh, struct _options *opts,
+	      FILE *hostf, U32 raddr,
+	      const char *luser, const char *ruser, const char *rhost)
+{
+    register const char *user;
+    register char *p;
+    int hcheck, ucheck;
+    char buf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 128];                       /* host + login */
+
+    buf[sizeof (buf)-1] = '\0';                 	/* terminate line */
+
+    while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), hostf) != NULL) {   /* hostf file line */
+        p = buf;                              /* from beginning of file.. */
+
+	/* Skip empty or comment lines */
+	if (__isempty(p)) {
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+	/* Skip lines that are too long. */
+	if (strchr(p, '\n') == NULL) {
+	    int ch = getc(hostf);
+
+	    while (ch != '\n' && ch != EOF)
+		ch = getc(hostf);
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If there is a hostname at the start of the line.  Set it to
+	 * lower case. A leading ' ' or '\t' indicates no hostname
+	 */
+
+	for (;*p && !isspace(*p); ++p) {
+	    *p = tolower(*p);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * next we want to find the permitted name for the remote user
+	 */
+
+	if (*p == ' ' || *p == '\t') {
+
+	    /* <nul> terminate hostname and skip spaces */
+	    for (*p++='\0'; *p && isspace(*p); ++p);
+
+	    user = p;                   /* this is the user's name */
+	    while (*p && !isspace(*p))
+		++p;                    /* find end of user's name */
+	} else 
+	    user = p;
+
+	*p = '\0';              /* <nul> terminate username (+host?) */
+
+	/* buf -> host(?) ; user -> username(?) */
+
+	/* First check host part */
+	hcheck=__icheckhost(pamh, opts, raddr, buf, rhost);
+
+	if (hcheck<0)
+	    return(1);
+
+	if (hcheck) {
+	    /* Then check user part */
+	    if (! (*user))
+		user = luser;
+
+	    ucheck=__icheckuser(pamh, opts, user, ruser, rhost);
+
+	    /* Positive 'host user' match? */
+	    if (ucheck>0)
+		return(0);
+
+	    /* Negative 'host -user' match? */
+	    if (ucheck<0)
+		return(1);
+
+	    /* Neither, go on looking for match */
+	}
+    }
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * New .rhosts strategy: We are passed an ip address. We spin through
+ * hosts.equiv and .rhosts looking for a match. When the .rhosts only
+ * has ip addresses, we don't have to trust a nameserver.  When it
+ * contains hostnames, we spin through the list of addresses the nameserver
+ * gives us and look for a match.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if ok, -1 if not ok.
+ */
+
+static int
+pam_iruserok(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+	 struct _options *opts, U32 raddr, int superuser,
+	 const char *ruser, const char *luser, const char *rhost)
+{
+    const char *cp;
+    struct stat sbuf;
+    struct passwd *pwd;
+    FILE *hostf;
+    uid_t uid;
+    int answer;
+    char pbuf[MAXPATHLEN];               /* potential buffer overrun */
+
+    if ((!superuser||opts->opt_hosts_equiv_rootok) && !opts->opt_no_hosts_equiv ) {
+
+	/* try to open system hosts.equiv file */
+	hostf = fopen (_PATH_HEQUIV, "r");
+	if (hostf) {
+	    answer = __ivaliduser(pamh, opts, hostf, raddr, luser
+				  , ruser, rhost);
+	    (void) fclose(hostf);
+	    if (answer == 0)
+		return 0;      /* remote host is equivalent to localhost */
+	} /* else {
+	    No hosts.equiv file on system.
+	} */
+    }
+    
+    if ( opts->opt_no_rhosts )
+	return 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Identify user's local .rhosts file
+     */
+
+    pwd = getpwnam(luser);
+    if (pwd == NULL) {
+	/* 
+	 * luser is assumed to be valid because of an earlier check for uid = 0
+	 * we don't log this error twice. However, this shouldn't happen !
+	 * --cristiang 
+	 */
+	return(1);
+    }
+
+    /* check for buffer overrun */
+    if (strlen(pwd->pw_dir) + sizeof(USER_RHOSTS_FILE) + 2 >= MAXPATHLEN) {
+	if (opts->opt_debug)
+	    _pam_log(LOG_DEBUG,"home directory for `%s' is too long", luser);
+	return 1;                               /* to dangerous to try */
+    }
+
+    (void) strcpy(pbuf, pwd->pw_dir);
+    (void) strcat(pbuf, USER_RHOSTS_FILE);
+
+    /*
+     * Change effective uid while _reading_ .rhosts. (not just
+     * opening).  If root and reading an NFS mounted file system,
+     * can't read files that are 0600 as .rhosts files should be.
+     */
+
+    /* We are root, this will not fail */
+#ifdef linux
+    /* If we are on linux the better way is setfsuid */
+    uid = setfsuid(pwd->pw_uid);
+    hostf = fopen(pbuf, "r");
+#else
+    uid = geteuid();
+    (void) seteuid(pwd->pw_uid);
+    hostf = fopen(pbuf, "r");
+#endif
+
+    if (hostf == NULL) {
+        if (opts->opt_debug)
+	    _pam_log(LOG_DEBUG,"Could not open %s file",pbuf);
+	answer = 1;
+	goto exit_function;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If not a regular file, or is owned by someone other than
+     * user or root or if writeable by anyone but the owner, quit.
+     */
+
+    cp = NULL;
+    if (lstat(pbuf, &sbuf) < 0 || !S_ISREG(sbuf.st_mode))
+	cp = ".rhosts not regular file";
+    else if (fstat(fileno(hostf), &sbuf) < 0)
+	cp = ".rhosts fstat failed";
+    else if (sbuf.st_uid && sbuf.st_uid != pwd->pw_uid)
+	cp = "bad .rhosts owner";
+    else if (sbuf.st_mode & S_IWOTH)
+	cp = ".rhosts writable by other!";
+    else if (sbuf.st_mode & S_IWGRP) {
+
+	/* private group caveat */
+	if (opts->opt_private_group) {
+	    struct group *grp = getgrgid(sbuf.st_gid);
+
+	    if (NULL == grp || NULL == grp->gr_name
+		|| strcmp(luser,grp->gr_name)) {
+		cp = ".rhosts writable by public group";
+	    } else if (grp->gr_mem) {
+		int gcount;
+
+		/* require at most one member (luser) of this group */
+		for (gcount=0; grp->gr_mem[gcount]; ++gcount) {
+		    if (strcmp(grp->gr_mem[gcount], luser)) {
+			gcount = -1;
+			break;
+		    }
+		}
+		if (gcount < 0) {
+		    cp = ".rhosts writable by other members of group";
+		}
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    cp = ".rhosts writable by group";
+	}
+
+    } /* It is _NOT_ safe to append an else here...  Do so prior to
+       * S_IWGRP check */
+
+    /* If there were any problems, quit. */
+    if (cp) {
+	opts->last_error = cp;
+	answer = 1;
+	goto exit_function;
+    }
+
+    answer = __ivaliduser (pamh, opts, hostf, raddr, luser, ruser, rhost);
+
+exit_function:
+    /*
+     * Go here to exit after the fsuid/euid has been adjusted so that
+     * they are reset before we exit.
+     */
+
+#ifdef linux
+    setfsuid(uid);
+#else
+    (void)seteuid(uid);
+#endif
+
+    if (hostf != NULL)
+        (void) fclose(hostf);
+
+    return answer;
+}
+
+static int
+pam_ruserok (pam_handle_t *pamh,
+	     struct _options *opts, const char *rhost, int superuser,
+	     const char *ruser, const char *luser)
+{
+    struct hostent *hp;
+    int answer = 1;                             /* default to failure */
+    U32 *addrs;
+    int n, i;
+
+    opts->last_error = (char *) 0;
+    hp               = gethostbyname(rhost);         /* identify host */
+
+    if (hp != NULL) {
+	/* First of all check the address length */
+        if (hp->h_length != 4) {
+            _pam_log(LOG_ALERT, "pam_rhosts module can't work with not IPv4 "
+		     "addresses");
+            return 1;                                    /* not allowed */
+        }
+
+        /* loop though address list */
+        for (n = 0; hp->h_addr_list[n]; n++);
+        D(("rhosts: %d addresses", n));
+
+        if (n) {
+            addrs = calloc (n, hp->h_length);
+            for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+                memcpy (addrs+i, hp->h_addr_list[i], hp->h_length);
+
+            for (i = 0; i < n && answer; i++) {
+                D(("rhosts: address %d is %04x", i, addrs[i]));
+                answer = pam_iruserok(pamh, opts, addrs[i], superuser,
+				      ruser, luser, rhost);
+                         /* answer == 0 means success */
+            }
+
+            free (addrs);
+        }
+    }
+
+    return answer;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Internal function to do authentication
+ */
+
+static int _pam_auth_rhosts (pam_handle_t *pamh,
+			     int flags, 
+			     int argc,
+			     const char **argv) 
+{
+    int retval;
+    const char *luser;
+    const char *ruser,*rhost;
+    struct _options opts;
+    int as_root = 0;
+    /*
+     * Look at the options and set the flags accordingly.
+     */
+    memset (&opts, 0, sizeof (opts));
+    set_parameters (&opts, flags, argc, argv);
+    /*
+     * Obtain the parameters for the various items
+     */
+    for (;;) {                         /* abuse loop to avoid goto */
+
+	/* get the remotehost */
+	retval = pam_get_rhost(pamh, &rhost, NULL);
+	(void) pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, rhost);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+	    if (opts.opt_debug) {
+		_pam_log(LOG_DEBUG, "could not get the remote host name");
+	    }
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/* get the remote user */
+	retval = pam_get_ruser(pamh, &ruser, NULL);
+	(void) pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, ruser);
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+	    if (opts.opt_debug)
+		_pam_log(LOG_DEBUG, "could not get the remote username");
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/* get the local user */
+	retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &luser, NULL);
+
+	if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+	    if (opts.opt_debug)
+		_pam_log(LOG_DEBUG, "could not determine name of local user");
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	if (opts.superuser && !strcmp(opts.superuser, luser)) {
+	    as_root = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* check if the luser uid == 0... --cristiang */
+	if (! opts.opt_no_uid_check) {
+	    struct passwd *luser_pwd;
+
+	    luser_pwd = getpwnam(luser);
+	    if (luser_pwd == NULL) {
+		if (opts.opt_debug)
+		    _pam_log(LOG_DEBUG, "user '%s' unknown to this system",
+			     luser);
+		retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    if (luser_pwd->pw_uid == 0)
+		as_root = 1;
+	    luser_pwd = NULL;                                   /* forget */
+	}
+/*
+ * Validate the account information.
+ */
+	if (pam_ruserok (pamh, &opts, rhost, as_root, ruser, luser) != 0) {
+	    if ( !opts.opt_suppress ) {
+		_pam_log(LOG_WARNING, "denied to %s@%s as %s: %s",
+			 ruser, rhost, luser, (opts.last_error==NULL) ?
+			 "access not allowed":opts.last_error);
+	    }
+	    retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+	} else {
+	    _pam_log(LOG_NOTICE, "allowed to %s@%s as %s",
+                     ruser, rhost, luser);
+	}
+	break;
+    }
+
+    return retval;
+}
+
+/* --- authentication management functions --- */
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_authenticate (pam_handle_t *pamh, 
+			 int flags,
+			 int argc, 
+			 const char **argv)
+{
+    int retval;
+
+    if (sizeof(U32) != 4) {
+        _pam_log (LOG_ALERT, "pam_rhosts module can\'t work on this hardware "
+		  "(yet)");
+        return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    }
+    sethostent(1);
+    retval = _pam_auth_rhosts (pamh, flags, argc, argv);
+    endhostent();
+    return retval;
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh,int flags,int argc,
+		   const char **argv)
+{
+    return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* end of module definition */
+
+
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+
+/* static module data */
+
+struct pam_module _pam_rhosts_auth_modstruct = {
+    "pam_rhosts_auth",
+    pam_sm_authenticate,
+    pam_sm_setcred,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+    NULL,
+};
+
+#endif
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..fb3bb56f4ca0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_securetty/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# $Id: Makefile,v 1.2 2000/11/19 23:54:05 agmorgan Exp $
+# $FreeBSD$
+#
+# This Makefile controls a build process of $(TITLE) module for
+# Linux-PAM. You should not modify this Makefile (unless you know
+# what you are doing!).
+#
+# Created by Andrew Morgan <morgan@linux.kernel.org> 2000/08/27
+#
+
+include ../../Make.Rules
+
+TITLE=pam_securetty
+
+include ../Simple.Rules
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_securetty/README b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_securetty/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..fe17ce5c2f6cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_securetty/README
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+$FreeBSD$
+pam_securetty:
+	Allows root logins only if the user is logging in on a
+	"secure" tty, as defined by the listing in /etc/securetty
+
+	Also checks to make sure that /etc/securetty is a plain
+	file and not world writable.
+
+	- Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
+		July 25, 1996.
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..b99a2f07194b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_securetty/pam_securetty.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/* pam_securetty module */
+
+#define SECURETTY_FILE "/etc/securetty"
+#define TTY_PREFIX     "/dev/"
+
+/*
+ * by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
+ * July 25, 1996.
+ * This code shamelessly ripped from the pam_rootok module.
+ * Slight modifications AGM. 1996/12/3
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define PAM_SM_AUTH
+
+/*
+ * here, we make a definition for the externally accessible function
+ * in this file (this definition is required for static a module
+ * but strongly encouraged generally) it is used to instruct the
+ * modules include file to define the function prototypes.
+ */
+
+#define PAM_SM_AUTH
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+
+/* some syslogging */
+
+static void _pam_log(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+
+    va_start(args, format);
+    openlog("PAM-securetty", LOG_CONS|LOG_PID, LOG_AUTH);
+    vsyslog(err, format, args);
+    va_end(args);
+    closelog();
+}
+
+/* argument parsing */
+
+#define PAM_DEBUG_ARG       0x0001
+
+static int _pam_parse(int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+    int ctrl=0;
+
+    /* step through arguments */
+    for (ctrl=0; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
+
+	/* generic options */
+
+	if (!strcmp(*argv,"debug"))
+	    ctrl |= PAM_DEBUG_ARG;
+	else {
+	    _pam_log(LOG_ERR,"pam_parse: unknown option; %s",*argv);
+	}
+    }
+
+    return ctrl;
+}
+
+/* --- authentication management functions (only) --- */
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh,int flags,int argc
+			,const char **argv)
+{
+    int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    const char *username;
+    char *uttyname;
+    char ttyfileline[256];
+    struct stat ttyfileinfo;
+    struct passwd *user_pwd;
+    FILE *ttyfile;
+    int ctrl;
+
+    /* parse the arguments */
+    ctrl = _pam_parse(argc, argv);
+
+    retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &username, NULL);
+    if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || username == NULL) {
+	if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
+            _pam_log(LOG_WARNING, "cannot determine username");
+	}
+	return (retval == PAM_CONV_AGAIN
+		? PAM_INCOMPLETE:PAM_SERVICE_ERR);
+    }
+
+    retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, (const void **)&uttyname);
+    if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uttyname == NULL) {
+        if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG) {
+            _pam_log(LOG_WARNING, "cannot determine user's tty");
+	}
+	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+    }
+
+    /* The PAM_TTY item may be prefixed with "/dev/" - skip that */
+    if (strncmp(TTY_PREFIX, uttyname, sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1) == 0)
+	uttyname += sizeof(TTY_PREFIX)-1;
+
+    user_pwd = getpwnam(username);
+    if (user_pwd == NULL) {
+	return PAM_IGNORE;
+    } else if (user_pwd->pw_uid != 0) { /* If the user is not root,
+					   securetty's does not apply
+					   to them */
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+    }
+
+    if (stat(SECURETTY_FILE, &ttyfileinfo)) {
+	_pam_log(LOG_NOTICE, "Couldn't open " SECURETTY_FILE);
+	return PAM_SUCCESS; /* for compatibility with old securetty handling,
+			       this needs to succeed.  But we still log the
+			       error. */
+    }
+
+    if ((ttyfileinfo.st_mode & S_IWOTH)
+	|| !S_ISREG(ttyfileinfo.st_mode)) {
+	/* If the file is world writable or is not a
+	   normal file, return error */
+	_pam_log(LOG_ERR, SECURETTY_FILE
+		 " is either world writable or not a normal file");
+	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    }
+
+    ttyfile = fopen(SECURETTY_FILE,"r");
+    if(ttyfile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
+	_pam_log(LOG_ERR,
+		 "Error opening " SECURETTY_FILE);
+	return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+    }
+    /* There should be no more errors from here on */
+    retval=PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    /* This loop assumes that PAM_SUCCESS == 0
+       and PAM_AUTH_ERR != 0 */
+    while((fgets(ttyfileline,sizeof(ttyfileline)-1, ttyfile) != NULL) 
+	  && retval) {
+	if(ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] == '\n')
+	    ttyfileline[strlen(ttyfileline) - 1] = '\0';
+	retval = strcmp(ttyfileline,uttyname);
+    }
+    fclose(ttyfile);
+    if(retval) {
+	if (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG)
+	    _pam_log(LOG_WARNING, "access denied: tty '%s' is not secure !",
+		     uttyname);
+	retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+    }
+    if ((retval == PAM_SUCCESS) && (ctrl & PAM_DEBUG_ARG))
+	_pam_log(LOG_DEBUG, "access allowed for '%s' on '%s'",
+		 username, uttyname);
+    return retval;
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh,int flags,int argc
+		   ,const char **argv)
+{
+     return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+
+/* static module data */
+
+struct pam_module _pam_securetty_modstruct = {
+     "pam_securetty",
+     pam_sm_authenticate,
+     pam_sm_setcred,
+     NULL,
+     NULL,
+     NULL,
+     NULL,
+};
+
+#endif
+
+/* end of module definition */
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_shells/Makefile b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_shells/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..f60780452dbea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_shells/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# $Id: Makefile,v 1.2 2000/11/19 23:54:05 agmorgan Exp $
+# $FreeBSD$
+#
+# This Makefile controls a build process of $(TITLE) module for
+# Linux-PAM. You should not modify this Makefile (unless you know
+# what you are doing!).
+#
+# Created by Andrew Morgan <morgan@linux.kernel.org> 2000/08/27
+#
+
+include ../../Make.Rules
+
+TITLE=pam_shells
+
+include ../Simple.Rules
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_shells/README b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_shells/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..7e358fe0995b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_shells/README
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+$FreeBSD$
+pam_shells:
+	Authentication is granted if the users shell is listed in
+	/etc/shells. If no shell is in /etc/passwd (empty), the
+	/bin/sh is used (following ftpd's convention).
+
+	Also checks to make sure that /etc/shells is a plain
+	file and not world writable.
+
+	- Erik Troan <ewt@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
+		August 5, 1996.
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_shells/pam_shells.c b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_shells/pam_shells.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..d83e0f2ee8702
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_shells/pam_shells.c
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/* pam_shells module */
+
+#define SHELL_FILE "/etc/shells"
+
+/*
+ * by Erik Troan <ewt@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
+ * August 5, 1996.
+ * This code shamelessly ripped from the pam_securetty module.
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+
+#define _BSD_SOURCE
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/*
+ * here, we make a definition for the externally accessible function
+ * in this file (this definition is required for static a module
+ * but strongly encouraged generally) it is used to instruct the
+ * modules include file to define the function prototypes.
+ */
+
+#define PAM_SM_AUTH
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+
+/* some syslogging */
+
+static void _pam_log(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+
+    va_start(args, format);
+    openlog("PAM-shells", LOG_CONS|LOG_PID, LOG_AUTH);
+    vsyslog(err, format, args);
+    va_end(args);
+    closelog();
+}
+
+/* --- authentication management functions (only) --- */
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh,int flags,int argc
+			,const char **argv)
+{
+     int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+     const char *userName;
+     char *userShell;
+     char shellFileLine[256];
+     struct stat sb;
+     struct passwd * pw;
+     FILE * shellFile;
+
+     retval = pam_get_user(pamh,&userName,NULL);
+     if(retval != PAM_SUCCESS) 
+       return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+
+     if(!userName || (strlen(userName) <= 0)) {
+       /* Don't let them use a NULL username... */
+       pam_get_user(pamh,&userName,NULL);
+        if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+	  return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+     }
+
+     pw = getpwnam(userName);
+     if (!pw)
+	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;		/* user doesn't exist */
+     userShell = pw->pw_shell;
+
+     if(stat(SHELL_FILE,&sb)) {
+	_pam_log(LOG_ERR,
+	        "%s cannot be stat'd (it probably does not exist)", SHELL_FILE);
+	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;		/* must have /etc/shells */
+     }
+
+     if((sb.st_mode & S_IWOTH) || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+	_pam_log(LOG_ERR,
+	        "%s is either world writable or not a normal file", SHELL_FILE);
+	return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+     }
+
+     shellFile = fopen(SHELL_FILE,"r");
+     if(shellFile == NULL) { /* Check that we opened it successfully */
+	_pam_log(LOG_ERR,
+	        "Error opening %s", SHELL_FILE);
+       return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+     }
+     /* There should be no more errors from here on */
+     retval=PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+     /* This loop assumes that PAM_SUCCESS == 0
+        and PAM_AUTH_ERR != 0 */
+     while((fgets(shellFileLine,255,shellFile) != NULL) 
+	   && retval) {
+       if (shellFileLine[strlen(shellFileLine) - 1] == '\n')
+	   shellFileLine[strlen(shellFileLine) - 1] = '\0';
+       retval = strcmp(shellFileLine, userShell);
+     }
+     fclose(shellFile);
+     if(retval)
+       retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+     return retval;
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh,int flags,int argc
+		   ,const char **argv)
+{
+     return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+
+/* static module data */
+
+struct pam_module _pam_shells_modstruct = {
+     "pam_shells",
+     pam_sm_authenticate,
+     pam_sm_setcred,
+     NULL,
+     NULL,
+     NULL,
+     NULL,
+};
+
+#endif
+
+/* end of module definition */
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_warn/Makefile b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_warn/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..46201d0a99f2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_warn/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#
+# $Id: Makefile,v 1.2 2000/11/19 23:54:06 agmorgan Exp $
+# $FreeBSD$
+#
+# This Makefile controls a build process of $(TITLE) module for
+# Linux-PAM. You should not modify this Makefile (unless you know
+# what you are doing!).
+#
+# Created by Andrew Morgan <morgan@linux.kernel.org> 2000/08/27
+#
+
+include ../../Make.Rules
+
+TITLE=pam_warn
+
+include ../Simple.Rules
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_warn/README b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_warn/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..cd8158bfaa7b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_warn/README
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# $Id: README,v 1.1.1.1 2000/06/20 22:12:10 agmorgan Exp $
+# $FreeBSD$
+
+This module is an authentication module that does not authenticate.
+Instead it always returns PAM_IGNORE, indicating that it does not want
+to affect the authentication process.
+
+Its purpose is to log a message to the syslog indicating the
+pam_item's available at the time it was invoked. It is a diagnostic
+tool.
+
+Recognized arguments:
+
+	<none>
+
+module services provided:
+
+	auth		_authenticate and _setcred (blank)
+	acct		_acct_mgmt [mapped to _authenticate]
+	session		_open_session and
+			_close_session [mapped to _authenticate ]
+	password	_chauthtok [mapped to _authenticate]
+
+
+Andrew Morgan
+1996/11/14
diff --git a/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_warn/pam_warn.c b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_warn/pam_warn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..ac627fb363c85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/libpam/modules/pam_warn/pam_warn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/* pam_warn module */
+
+/*
+ * $Id: pam_warn.c,v 1.1.1.1 2000/06/20 22:12:10 agmorgan Exp $
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ *
+ * Written by Andrew Morgan <morgan@linux.kernel.org> 1996/3/11
+ */
+
+#define _BSD_SOURCE
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+/*
+ * here, we make a definition for the externally accessible function
+ * in this file (this definition is required for static a module
+ * but strongly encouraged generally) it is used to instruct the
+ * modules include file to define the function prototypes.
+ */
+
+#define PAM_SM_AUTH
+#define PAM_SM_PASSWORD
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+
+/* some syslogging */
+
+static void _pam_log(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+
+    va_start(args, format);
+    openlog("PAM-warn", LOG_CONS|LOG_PID, LOG_AUTH);
+    vsyslog(err, format, args);
+    va_end(args);
+    closelog();
+}
+
+/* --- authentication management functions (only) --- */
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc
+			, const char **argv)
+{
+     const char *service=NULL, *user=NULL, *terminal=NULL
+	 , *rhost=NULL, *ruser=NULL;
+
+     (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE, (const void **)&service);
+     (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, (const void **)&terminal);
+     _pam_log(LOG_NOTICE, "service: %s [on terminal: %s]"
+	      , service ? service : "<unknown>"
+	      , terminal ? terminal : "<unknown>"
+	 );
+     (void) pam_get_user(pamh, &user, "Who are you? ");
+     (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (const void **)&ruser);
+     (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, (const void **)&rhost);
+     _pam_log(LOG_NOTICE, "user: (uid=%d) -> %s [remote: %s@%s]"
+	      , getuid()
+	      , user ? user : "<unknown>"
+	      , ruser ? ruser : "?nobody"
+	      , rhost ? rhost : "?nowhere"
+	      );
+
+     /* we are just a fly on the wall */
+
+     return PAM_IGNORE;
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t *pamh,int flags,int argc
+		   , const char **argv)
+{
+    return PAM_IGNORE;
+}
+
+/* password updating functions */
+
+PAM_EXTERN
+int pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh,int flags,int argc
+		   , const char **argv)
+{
+    /* map to the authentication function... */
+
+    return pam_sm_authenticate(pamh, flags, argc, argv);
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN int
+pam_sm_acct_mgmt (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
+                  int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+    /* map to the authentication function... */
+
+    return pam_sm_authenticate(pamh, flags, argc, argv);
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN int
+pam_sm_open_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
+                     const char **argv)
+{
+    /* map to the authentication function... */
+
+    return pam_sm_authenticate(pamh, flags, argc, argv);
+}
+
+PAM_EXTERN int
+pam_sm_close_session (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc,
+		      const char **argv)
+{
+    /* map to the authentication function... */
+
+    return pam_sm_authenticate(pamh, flags, argc, argv);
+}
+
+#ifdef PAM_STATIC
+
+/* static module data */
+
+struct pam_module _pam_warn_modstruct = {
+    "pam_warn",
+    pam_sm_authenticate,
+    pam_sm_setcred,
+    pam_sm_acct_mgmt,
+    pam_sm_open_session,
+    pam_sm_close_session,
+    pam_sm_chauthtok,
+};
+
+#endif
+
+/* end of module definition */