vendor/openzfs/2.0-rc0-g184df27

1 files changed, 374 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/module/os/linux/zfs/policy.c b/module/os/linux/zfs/policy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..5267d67eea828
--- /dev/null
+++ b/module/os/linux/zfs/policy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+/*
+ * CDDL HEADER START
+ *
+ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
+ * Common Development and Distribution License (the "License").
+ * You may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ *
+ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
+ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
+ * and limitations under the License.
+ *
+ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
+ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
+ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
+ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
+ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
+ *
+ * CDDL HEADER END
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003, 2010, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2013, Joyent, Inc. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC.
+ *
+ * For Linux the vast majority of this enforcement is already handled via
+ * the standard Linux VFS permission checks.  However certain administrative
+ * commands which bypass the standard mechanisms may need to make use of
+ * this functionality.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/policy.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/vfs_compat.h>
+
+/*
+ * The passed credentials cannot be directly verified because Linux only
+ * provides and interface to check the *current* process credentials.  In
+ * order to handle this the capable() test is only run when the passed
+ * credentials match the current process credentials or the kcred.  In
+ * all other cases this function must fail and return the passed err.
+ */
+static int
+priv_policy_ns(const cred_t *cr, int capability, int err,
+    struct user_namespace *ns)
+{
+	if (cr != CRED() && (cr != kcred))
+		return (err);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS)
+	if (!(ns ? ns_capable(ns, capability) : capable(capability)))
+#else
+	if (!capable(capability))
+#endif
+		return (err);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+priv_policy(const cred_t *cr, int capability, int err)
+{
+	return (priv_policy_ns(cr, capability, err, NULL));
+}
+
+static int
+priv_policy_user(const cred_t *cr, int capability, int err)
+{
+	/*
+	 * All priv_policy_user checks are preceded by kuid/kgid_has_mapping()
+	 * checks. If we cannot do them, we shouldn't be using ns_capable()
+	 * since we don't know whether the affected files are valid in our
+	 * namespace.
+	 */
+#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS)
+	return (priv_policy_ns(cr, capability, err, cr->user_ns));
+#else
+	return (priv_policy_ns(cr, capability, err, NULL));
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks for operations that are either client-only or are used by
+ * both clients and servers.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_nfs(const cred_t *cr)
+{
+	return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, EPERM));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Catch all system configuration.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_sys_config(const cred_t *cr, boolean_t checkonly)
+{
+	return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, EPERM));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Like secpolicy_vnode_access() but we get the actual wanted mode and the
+ * current mode of the file, not the missing bits.
+ *
+ * Enforced in the Linux VFS.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_access2(const cred_t *cr, struct inode *ip, uid_t owner,
+    mode_t curmode, mode_t wantmode)
+{
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a special routine for ZFS; it is used to determine whether
+ * any of the privileges in effect allow any form of access to the
+ * file.  There's no reason to audit this or any reason to record
+ * this.  More work is needed to do the "KPLD" stuff.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_any_access(const cred_t *cr, struct inode *ip, uid_t owner)
+{
+	if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
+		return (0);
+
+	if (inode_owner_or_capable(ip))
+		return (0);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS)
+	if (!kuid_has_mapping(cr->user_ns, SUID_TO_KUID(owner)))
+		return (EPERM);
+#endif
+
+	if (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, EPERM) == 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	if (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, EPERM) == 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	return (EPERM);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine if subject can chown owner of a file.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_chown(const cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
+{
+	if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
+		return (0);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS)
+	if (!kuid_has_mapping(cr->user_ns, SUID_TO_KUID(owner)))
+		return (EPERM);
+#endif
+
+	return (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_FOWNER, EPERM));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine if subject can change group ownership of a file.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_create_gid(const cred_t *cr)
+{
+	return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_SETGID, EPERM));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Policy determines whether we can remove an entry from a directory,
+ * regardless of permission bits.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_remove(const cred_t *cr)
+{
+	return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_FOWNER, EPERM));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine that subject can modify the mode of a file.  allzone privilege
+ * needed when modifying root owned object.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_setdac(const cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
+{
+	if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
+		return (0);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS)
+	if (!kuid_has_mapping(cr->user_ns, SUID_TO_KUID(owner)))
+		return (EPERM);
+#endif
+
+	return (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_FOWNER, EPERM));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Are we allowed to retain the set-uid/set-gid bits when
+ * changing ownership or when writing to a file?
+ * "issuid" should be true when set-uid; only in that case
+ * root ownership is checked (setgid is assumed).
+ *
+ * Enforced in the Linux VFS.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(const cred_t *cr, boolean_t issuidroot)
+{
+	return (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_FSETID, EPERM));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine that subject can set the file setgid flag.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(const cred_t *cr, gid_t gid)
+{
+#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS)
+	if (!kgid_has_mapping(cr->user_ns, SGID_TO_KGID(gid)))
+		return (EPERM);
+#endif
+	if (crgetfsgid(cr) != gid && !groupmember(gid, cr))
+		return (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_FSETID, EPERM));
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine if the subject can inject faults in the ZFS fault injection
+ * framework.  Requires all privileges.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_zinject(const cred_t *cr)
+{
+	return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, EACCES));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine if the subject has permission to manipulate ZFS datasets
+ * (not pools).  Equivalent to the SYS_MOUNT privilege.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_zfs(const cred_t *cr)
+{
+	return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, EACCES));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Equivalent to secpolicy_zfs(), but works even if the cred_t is not that of
+ * the current process.  Takes both cred_t and proc_t so that this can work
+ * easily on all platforms.
+ *
+ * The has_capability() function was first exported in the 4.10 Linux kernel
+ * then backported to some LTS kernels.  Prior to this change there was no
+ * mechanism to perform this check therefore EACCES is returned when the
+ * functionality is not present in the kernel.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_zfs_proc(const cred_t *cr, proc_t *proc)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_HAS_CAPABILITY)
+	if (!has_capability(proc, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		return (EACCES);
+	return (0);
+#else
+	return (EACCES);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+secpolicy_setid_clear(vattr_t *vap, cred_t *cr)
+{
+	if ((vap->va_mode & (S_ISUID | S_ISGID)) != 0 &&
+	    secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(cr,
+	    (vap->va_mode & S_ISUID) != 0 &&
+	    (vap->va_mask & AT_UID) != 0 && vap->va_uid == 0) != 0) {
+		vap->va_mask |= AT_MODE;
+		vap->va_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine that subject can set the file setid flags.
+ */
+static int
+secpolicy_vnode_setid_modify(const cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
+{
+	if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
+		return (0);
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_USER_NS)
+	if (!kuid_has_mapping(cr->user_ns, SUID_TO_KUID(owner)))
+		return (EPERM);
+#endif
+
+	return (priv_policy_user(cr, CAP_FSETID, EPERM));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine that subject can make a file a "sticky".
+ *
+ * Enforced in the Linux VFS.
+ */
+static int
+secpolicy_vnode_stky_modify(const cred_t *cr)
+{
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+secpolicy_setid_setsticky_clear(struct inode *ip, vattr_t *vap,
+    const vattr_t *ovap, cred_t *cr)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	if ((vap->va_mode & S_ISUID) != 0 &&
+	    (error = secpolicy_vnode_setid_modify(cr,
+	    ovap->va_uid)) != 0) {
+		return (error);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check privilege if attempting to set the
+	 * sticky bit on a non-directory.
+	 */
+	if (!S_ISDIR(ip->i_mode) && (vap->va_mode & S_ISVTX) != 0 &&
+	    secpolicy_vnode_stky_modify(cr) != 0) {
+		vap->va_mode &= ~S_ISVTX;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for privilege if attempting to set the
+	 * group-id bit.
+	 */
+	if ((vap->va_mode & S_ISGID) != 0 &&
+	    secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(cr, ovap->va_gid) != 0) {
+		vap->va_mode &= ~S_ISGID;
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check privileges for setting xvattr attributes
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_xvattr(xvattr_t *xvap, uid_t owner, cred_t *cr, mode_t type)
+{
+	return (secpolicy_vnode_chown(cr, owner));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check privileges for setattr attributes.
+ *
+ * Enforced in the Linux VFS.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_vnode_setattr(cred_t *cr, struct inode *ip, struct vattr *vap,
+    const struct vattr *ovap, int flags,
+    int unlocked_access(void *, int, cred_t *), void *node)
+{
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check privileges for links.
+ *
+ * Enforced in the Linux VFS.
+ */
+int
+secpolicy_basic_link(const cred_t *cr)
+{
+	return (0);
+}