1 files changed, 0 insertions, 129 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d865b9cce8ebd..0000000000000
--- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
- /*
-  * General front end for stream and datagram IP services. This program logs
-  * the remote host name and then invokes the real daemon. For example,
-  * install as /usr/etc/{tftpd,fingerd,telnetd,ftpd,rlogind,rshd,rexecd},
-  * after saving the real daemons in the directory specified with the
-  * REAL_DAEMON_DIR macro. This arrangement requires that the network daemons
-  * are started by inetd or something similar. Connections and diagnostics
-  * are logged through syslog(3).
-  * 
-  * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands.
-  */
-
-#ifndef lint
-static char sccsid[] = "@(#) tcpd.c 1.10 96/02/11 17:01:32";
-#endif
-
-/* System libraries. */
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#include <netinet/in.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <syslog.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#ifndef MAXPATHNAMELEN
-#define MAXPATHNAMELEN	BUFSIZ
-#endif
-
-#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
-#define STDIN_FILENO	0
-#endif
-
-/* Local stuff. */
-
-#include "patchlevel.h"
-#include "tcpd.h"
-
-int     allow_severity = SEVERITY;	/* run-time adjustable */
-int     deny_severity = LOG_WARNING;	/* ditto */
-
-main(argc, argv)
-int     argc;
-char  **argv;
-{
-    struct request_info request;
-    char    path[MAXPATHNAMELEN];
-
-    /* Attempt to prevent the creation of world-writable files. */
-
-#ifdef DAEMON_UMASK
-    umask(DAEMON_UMASK);
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * If argv[0] is an absolute path name, ignore REAL_DAEMON_DIR, and strip
-     * argv[0] to its basename.
-     */
-
-    if (argv[0][0] == '/') {
-	strcpy(path, argv[0]);
-	argv[0] = strrchr(argv[0], '/') + 1;
-    } else {
-	sprintf(path, "%s/%s", REAL_DAEMON_DIR, argv[0]);
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Open a channel to the syslog daemon. Older versions of openlog()
-     * require only two arguments.
-     */
-
-#ifdef LOG_MAIL
-    (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, FACILITY);
-#else
-    (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID);
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * Find out the endpoint addresses of this conversation. Host name
-     * lookups and double checks will be done on demand.
-     */
-
-    request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, argv[0], RQ_FILE, STDIN_FILENO, 0);
-    fromhost(&request);
-
-    /*
-     * Optionally look up and double check the remote host name. Sites
-     * concerned with security may choose to refuse connections from hosts
-     * that pretend to have someone elses host name.
-     */
-
-#ifdef PARANOID
-    if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), paranoid))
-	refuse(&request);
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * The BSD rlogin and rsh daemons that came out after 4.3 BSD disallow
-     * socket options at the IP level. They do so for a good reason.
-     * Unfortunately, we cannot use this with SunOS 4.1.x because the
-     * getsockopt() system call can panic the system.
-     */
-
-#ifdef KILL_IP_OPTIONS
-    fix_options(&request);
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * Check whether this host can access the service in argv[0]. The
-     * access-control code invokes optional shell commands as specified in
-     * the access-control tables.
-     */
-
-#ifdef HOSTS_ACCESS
-    if (!hosts_access(&request))
-	refuse(&request);
-#endif
-
-    /* Report request and invoke the real daemon program. */
-
-    syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s", eval_client(&request));
-    closelog();
-    (void) execv(path, argv);
-    syslog(LOG_ERR, "error: cannot execute %s: %m", path);
-    clean_exit(&request);
-    /* NOTREACHED */
-}