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Diffstat (limited to 'src/plugins/preauth/securid_sam2/securid2.c')
-rw-r--r--src/plugins/preauth/securid_sam2/securid2.c670
1 files changed, 670 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/plugins/preauth/securid_sam2/securid2.c b/src/plugins/preauth/securid_sam2/securid2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..ca99ce3ef61f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/plugins/preauth/securid_sam2/securid2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,670 @@
+/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
+/* plugins/preauth/securid_sam2/securid2.c */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may
+ * require a specific license from the United States Government.
+ * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
+ * export to obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label
+ * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a
+ * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software.
+ * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Naval Research Laboratory (NRL/CCS)
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify and distribute this software and its
+ * documentation is hereby granted, provided that both the copyright
+ * notice and this permission notice appear in all copies of the software,
+ * derivative works or modified versions, and any portions thereof.
+ *
+ * NRL ALLOWS FREE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE IN ITS "AS IS" CONDITION AND
+ * DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY OF ANY KIND FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER
+ * RESULTING FROM THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef ARL_SECURID_PREAUTH
+
+#include "k5-int.h"
+#include <kdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <adm_proto.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <acexport.h>
+#include <sdi_defs.h>
+#include <sdi_athd.h>
+#include "extern.h"
+
+#define KRB5_SAM_SECURID_NEXT_CHALLENGE_MAGIC 0x5ec1d000
+struct securid_track_data {
+ SDI_HANDLE handle;
+ char state;
+ char passcode[LENPRNST+1];
+ long hostid;
+};
+
+#define SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN 1 /* Ask for a new pin */
+#define SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN_AGAIN 2 /* Ask for new pin again */
+#define SECURID_STATE_NEXT_CODE 3 /* Ask for the next pin code */
+#define SECURID_STATE_INITIAL 4
+
+static char *PASSCODE_message = "SecurID Passcode";
+static char *NEXT_PASSCODE_message = "Next Passcode";
+static char *NEW_PIN_AGAIN_message = "New PIN Again";
+static char PIN_message[64]; /* Max length should be 50 chars */
+
+/*
+ * krb5_error_code get_securid_key():
+ * inputs: context: from KDC process
+ * client: database entry of client executing
+ * SecurID SAM preauthentication
+ * outputs: client_securid_key: pointer to krb5_keyblock
+ * which is key for the client's SecurID
+ * database entry.
+ * returns: 0 on success
+ * KRB5 error codes otherwise
+ *
+ * builds pricipal name with final instance of "SECURID" and
+ * finds the database entry, decrypts the key out of the database
+ * and passes the key back to the calling process
+ */
+
+static krb5_error_code
+get_securid_key(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
+ krb5_keyblock *client_securid_key)
+{
+ krb5_db_entry *sam_securid_entry = NULL;
+ krb5_key_data *client_securid_key_data = NULL;
+ int sam_type = PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID;
+ krb5_error_code retval = 0;
+
+ if (!client_securid_key)
+ return KRB5_PREAUTH_NO_KEY;
+
+ retval = sam_get_db_entry(context, client->princ,
+ &sam_type, &sam_securid_entry);
+ if (retval)
+ return KRB5_PREAUTH_NO_KEY;
+
+ /* Find key with key_type = salt_type = kvno = -1. This finds the */
+ /* latest kvno in the list. */
+
+ retval = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, sam_securid_entry,
+ -1, -1, -1, &client_securid_key_data);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while getting key from client's SAM SecurID entry");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ retval = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, client_securid_key_data,
+ client_securid_key, NULL);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while decrypting key from client's SAM SecurID entry");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+cleanup:
+ if (sam_securid_entry)
+ krb5_db_free_principal(context, sam_securid_entry);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+securid_decrypt_track_data_2(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
+ krb5_data *enc_track_data, krb5_data *output)
+{
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+ krb5_keyblock sam_key;
+ krb5_enc_data tmp_enc_data;
+ sam_key.contents = NULL;
+
+ retval = get_securid_key(context, client, &sam_key);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ return retval;
+
+ tmp_enc_data.ciphertext = *enc_track_data;
+ tmp_enc_data.enctype = ENCTYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ tmp_enc_data.kvno = 0;
+
+ output->length = tmp_enc_data.ciphertext.length;
+ free(output->data);
+ output->data = k5alloc(output->length, &retval);
+ if (output->data == NULL)
+ goto cleanup;
+ retval = krb5_c_decrypt(context, &sam_key,
+ KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_CHALLENGE_TRACKID, 0,
+ &tmp_enc_data, output);
+cleanup:
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &sam_key);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ output->length = 0;
+ free(output->data);
+ output->data = NULL;
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static krb5_error_code
+securid_encrypt_track_data_2(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
+ krb5_data *track_data, krb5_data *output)
+{
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+ size_t olen;
+ krb5_keyblock sam_key;
+ krb5_enc_data tmp_enc_data;
+
+ output->data = NULL;
+
+ retval = get_securid_key(context,client, &sam_key);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ return retval;
+
+ retval = krb5_c_encrypt_length(context, sam_key.enctype,
+ track_data->length, &olen);
+ if (retval != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+ assert(olen <= 65536);
+ output->length = olen;
+ output->data = k5alloc(output->length, &retval);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ tmp_enc_data.ciphertext = *output;
+ tmp_enc_data.enctype = sam_key.enctype;
+ tmp_enc_data.kvno = 0;
+
+ retval = krb5_c_encrypt(context, &sam_key,
+ KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_CHALLENGE_TRACKID, 0,
+ track_data, &tmp_enc_data);
+cleanup:
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &sam_key);
+
+ if (retval) {
+ output->length = 0;
+ free(output->data);
+ output->data = NULL;
+ return retval;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+krb5_error_code
+get_securid_edata_2(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
+ krb5_keyblock *client_key, krb5_sam_challenge_2 *sc2)
+{
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+ krb5_data scratch, track_id = empty_data();
+ char *user = NULL;
+ char *def_user = "<unknown user>";
+ struct securid_track_data sid_track_data;
+ krb5_data tmp_data;
+ krb5_sam_challenge_2_body sc2b;
+
+ scratch.data = NULL;
+
+ retval = krb5_unparse_name(context, client->princ, &user);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ memset(&sc2b, 0, sizeof(sc2b));
+ sc2b.magic = KV5M_SAM_CHALLENGE_2;
+ sc2b.sam_flags = KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD;
+ sc2b.sam_type_name.length = 0;
+ sc2b.sam_challenge_label.length = 0;
+ sc2b.sam_challenge.length = 0;
+ sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data = PASSCODE_message;
+ sc2b.sam_response_prompt.length = strlen(sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data);
+ sc2b.sam_pk_for_sad.length = 0;
+ sc2b.sam_type = PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID;
+
+ sid_track_data.state = SECURID_STATE_INITIAL;
+ sid_track_data.hostid = gethostid();
+ tmp_data.data = (char *)&sid_track_data;
+ tmp_data.length = sizeof(sid_track_data);
+ retval = securid_encrypt_track_data_2(context, client, &tmp_data,
+ &track_id);
+ if (retval != 0) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval, "while encrypting nonce track data");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ sc2b.sam_track_id = track_id;
+
+ scratch.data = (char *)&sc2b.sam_nonce;
+ scratch.length = sizeof(sc2b.sam_nonce);
+ retval = krb5_c_random_make_octets(context, &scratch);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while generating nonce data in get_securid_edata_2 (%s)",
+ user ? user : def_user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Get the client's key */
+ sc2b.sam_etype = client_key->enctype;
+
+ retval = sam_make_challenge(context, &sc2b, client_key, sc2);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while making SAM_CHALLENGE_2 checksum (%s)",
+ user ? user : def_user);
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ free(user);
+ krb5_free_data_contents(context, &track_id);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+verify_securid_data_2(krb5_context context, krb5_db_entry *client,
+ krb5_sam_response_2 *sr2,
+ krb5_enc_tkt_part *enc_tkt_reply, krb5_pa_data *pa,
+ krb5_sam_challenge_2 **sc2_out)
+{
+ krb5_error_code retval;
+ int new_pin = 0;
+ krb5_key_data *client_key_data = NULL;
+ krb5_keyblock client_key;
+ krb5_data scratch;
+ krb5_enc_sam_response_enc_2 *esre2 = NULL;
+ struct securid_track_data sid_track_data, *trackp = NULL;
+ krb5_data tmp_data;
+ SDI_HANDLE sd_handle = SDI_HANDLE_NONE;
+ krb5_sam_challenge_2 *sc2p = NULL;
+ char *cp, *user = NULL;
+ char *securid_user = NULL;
+ char passcode[LENPRNST+1];
+ char max_pin_len, min_pin_len, alpha_pin;
+
+ memset(&client_key, 0, sizeof(client_key));
+ memset(&scratch, 0, sizeof(scratch));
+ *sc2_out = NULL;
+
+ retval = krb5_unparse_name(context, client->princ, &user);
+ if (retval != 0) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while unparsing client name in verify_securid_data_2");
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ if ((sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.data == NULL) ||
+ (sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.length <= 0)) {
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ k5_setmsg(context, retval,
+ "No preauth data supplied in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
+ user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ retval = krb5_dbe_find_enctype(context, client,
+ sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.enctype,
+ KRB5_KDB_SALTTYPE_NORMAL,
+ sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.kvno,
+ &client_key_data);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while getting client key in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
+ user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ retval = krb5_dbe_decrypt_key_data(context, NULL, client_key_data,
+ &client_key, NULL);
+ if (retval != 0) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while decrypting client key in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
+ user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ scratch.length = sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad.ciphertext.length;
+ scratch.data = k5alloc(scratch.length, &retval);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ retval = krb5_c_decrypt(context, &client_key,
+ KRB5_KEYUSAGE_PA_SAM_RESPONSE, 0,
+ &sr2->sam_enc_nonce_or_sad, &scratch);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while decrypting SAD in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ retval = decode_krb5_enc_sam_response_enc_2(&scratch, &esre2);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while decoding SAD in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
+ esre2 = NULL;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (sr2->sam_nonce != esre2->sam_nonce) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
+ "while checking nonce in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (esre2->sam_sad.length == 0 || esre2->sam_sad.data == NULL) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
+ "No SecurID passcode in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy out SAD to null-terminated buffer */
+ memset(passcode, 0, sizeof(passcode));
+ if (esre2->sam_sad.length > (sizeof(passcode) - 1)) {
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "SecurID passcode/PIN too long (%d bytes) in "
+ "verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
+ esre2->sam_sad.length, user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (esre2->sam_sad.length > 0)
+ memcpy(passcode, esre2->sam_sad.data, esre2->sam_sad.length);
+
+ securid_user = strdup(user);
+ if (!securid_user) {
+ retval = ENOMEM;
+ com_err("krb5kdc", ENOMEM,
+ "while copying user name in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ cp = strchr(securid_user, '@');
+ if (cp != NULL)
+ *cp = '\0';
+
+ /* Check for any track_id data that may have state from a previous attempt
+ * at SecurID authentication. */
+
+ if (sr2->sam_track_id.data && (sr2->sam_track_id.length > 0)) {
+ krb5_data track_id_data;
+
+ memset(&track_id_data, 0, sizeof(track_id_data));
+ retval = securid_decrypt_track_data_2(context, client,
+ &sr2->sam_track_id,
+ &track_id_data);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while decrypting SecurID trackID in "
+ "verify_securid_data_2 (%s)", user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (track_id_data.length < sizeof (struct securid_track_data)) {
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval, "Length of track data incorrect");
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ trackp = (struct securid_track_data *)track_id_data.data;
+
+ if(trackp->hostid != gethostid()) {
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Unexpected challenge response");
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_DISCARD;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ switch(trackp->state) {
+ case SECURID_STATE_INITIAL:
+ goto initial;
+ break;
+ case SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN_AGAIN:
+ {
+ int pin1_len, pin2_len;
+
+ trackp->handle = ntohl(trackp->handle);
+ pin2_len = strlen(passcode);
+ pin1_len = strlen(trackp->passcode);
+
+ if ((pin1_len != pin2_len) ||
+ (memcmp(passcode, trackp->passcode, pin1_len) != 0)) {
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "New SecurID PIN Failed for user "
+ "%s: PIN mis-match", user);
+ break;
+ }
+ retval = SD_Pin(trackp->handle, passcode);
+ SD_Close(trackp->handle);
+ if (retval == ACM_NEW_PIN_ACCEPTED) {
+ enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH;
+ enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "SecurID PIN Accepted for %s in "
+ "verify_securid_data_2",
+ securid_user);
+ retval = 0;
+ } else {
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
+ "SecurID PIN Failed for user %s (AceServer "
+ "returns %d) in verify_securid_data_2",
+ user, retval);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ case SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN: {
+ krb5_sam_challenge_2_body sc2b;
+ sc2p = k5alloc(sizeof *sc2p, &retval);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+ memset(sc2p, 0, sizeof(*sc2p));
+ memset(&sc2b, 0, sizeof(sc2b));
+ sc2b.sam_type = PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID;
+ sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data = NEW_PIN_AGAIN_message;
+ sc2b.sam_response_prompt.length =
+ strlen(sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data);
+ sc2b.sam_flags = KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD;
+ sc2b.sam_etype = client_key.enctype;
+
+ tmp_data.data = (char *)&sc2b.sam_nonce;
+ tmp_data.length = sizeof(sc2b.sam_nonce);
+ if ((retval = krb5_c_random_make_octets(context, &tmp_data))) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while making nonce for SecurID new "
+ "PIN2 SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)", user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ sid_track_data.state = SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN_AGAIN;
+ sid_track_data.handle = trackp->handle;
+ sid_track_data.hostid = gethostid();
+ /* Should we complain if sizes don't work ?? */
+ memcpy(sid_track_data.passcode, passcode,
+ sizeof(sid_track_data.passcode));
+ tmp_data.data = (char *)&sid_track_data;
+ tmp_data.length = sizeof(sid_track_data);
+ if ((retval = securid_encrypt_track_data_2(context, client,
+ &tmp_data,
+ &sc2b.sam_track_id))) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while encrypting NEW PIN2 SecurID "
+ "track data for SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
+ securid_user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ retval = sam_make_challenge(context, &sc2b, &client_key, sc2p);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while making cksum for "
+ "SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (new PIN2) (%s)", securid_user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
+ "Requesting verification of new PIN for user %s",
+ securid_user);
+ *sc2_out = sc2p;
+ sc2p = NULL;
+ /*sc2_out may be set even on error path*/
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ case SECURID_STATE_NEXT_CODE:
+ trackp->handle = ntohl(trackp->handle);
+ retval = SD_Next(trackp->handle, passcode);
+ SD_Close(trackp->handle);
+ if (retval == ACM_OK) {
+ enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH | TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
+
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Next SecurID Code Accepted for "
+ "user %s", securid_user);
+ retval = 0;
+ } else {
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Next SecurID Code Failed for user "
+ "%s (AceServer returns %d) in "
+ "verify_securid_data_2", user, retval);
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ } else { /* No track data, this is first of N attempts */
+ initial:
+ retval = SD_Init(&sd_handle);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
+ "SD_Init() returns error %d in verify_securid_data_2 (%s)",
+ retval, securid_user);
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ retval = SD_Lock(sd_handle, securid_user);
+ if (retval != ACM_OK) {
+ SD_Close(sd_handle);
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO,
+ "SD_Lock() failed (AceServer returns %d) for %s",
+ retval, securid_user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+ retval = SD_Check(sd_handle, passcode, securid_user);
+ switch (retval) {
+ case ACM_OK:
+ SD_Close(sd_handle);
+ enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_HW_AUTH;
+ enc_tkt_reply->flags|= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "SecurID passcode accepted for user %s",
+ user);
+ retval = 0;
+ break;
+ case ACM_ACCESS_DENIED:
+ SD_Close(sd_handle);
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "AceServer returns Access Denied for "
+ "user %s (SAM2)", user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ case ACM_NEW_PIN_REQUIRED:
+ new_pin = 1;
+ /*fall through*/
+ case ACM_NEXT_CODE_REQUIRED: {
+ krb5_sam_challenge_2_body sc2b;
+ sc2p = k5alloc(sizeof *sc2p, &retval);
+ if (retval)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ memset(sc2p, 0, sizeof(*sc2p));
+ memset(&sc2b, 0, sizeof(sc2b));
+
+ sc2b.sam_type = PA_SAM_TYPE_SECURID;
+ sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data = NEXT_PASSCODE_message;
+ sc2b.sam_response_prompt.length =
+ strlen(sc2b.sam_response_prompt.data);
+ sc2b.sam_flags = KRB5_SAM_SEND_ENCRYPTED_SAD;
+ sc2b.sam_etype = client_key.enctype;
+ if (new_pin) {
+ if ((AceGetMaxPinLen(sd_handle, &max_pin_len) == ACE_SUCCESS)
+ && (AceGetMinPinLen(sd_handle,
+ &min_pin_len) == ACE_SUCCESS)
+ && (AceGetAlphanumeric(sd_handle,
+ &alpha_pin) == ACE_SUCCESS)) {
+ sprintf(PIN_message,
+ "New PIN must contain %d to %d %sdigits",
+ min_pin_len, max_pin_len,
+ (alpha_pin == 0) ? "" : "alphanumeric ");
+ sc2b.sam_challenge_label.data = PIN_message;
+ sc2b.sam_challenge_label.length =
+ strlen(sc2b.sam_challenge_label.data);
+ } else {
+ sc2b.sam_challenge_label.length = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ tmp_data.data = (char *)&sc2b.sam_nonce;
+ tmp_data.length = sizeof(sc2b.sam_nonce);
+ if ((retval = krb5_c_random_make_octets(context, &tmp_data))) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while making nonce for SecurID SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
+ user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ if (new_pin)
+ sid_track_data.state = SECURID_STATE_NEW_PIN;
+ else
+ sid_track_data.state = SECURID_STATE_NEXT_CODE;
+ sid_track_data.handle = htonl(sd_handle);
+ sid_track_data.hostid = gethostid();
+ tmp_data.data = (char *)&sid_track_data;
+ tmp_data.length = sizeof(sid_track_data);
+ retval = securid_encrypt_track_data_2(context, client, &tmp_data,
+ &sc2b.sam_track_id);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while encrypting SecurID track "
+ "data for SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
+ securid_user);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ retval = sam_make_challenge(context, &sc2b, &client_key, sc2p);
+ if (retval) {
+ com_err("krb5kdc", retval,
+ "while making cksum for SAM_CHALLENGE_2 (%s)",
+ securid_user);
+ }
+ if (new_pin)
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "New SecurID PIN required for "
+ "user %s", securid_user);
+ else
+ krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_INFO, "Next SecurID passcode required "
+ "for user %s", securid_user);
+ *sc2_out = sc2p;
+ sc2p = NULL;
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
+ /*sc2_out is permitted as an output on error path*/
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ default:
+ com_err("krb5kdc", KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED,
+ "AceServer returns unknown error code %d "
+ "in verify_securid_data_2\n", retval);
+ retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ } /* no track_id data */
+
+cleanup:
+ krb5_free_keyblock_contents(context, &client_key);
+ free(scratch.data);
+ krb5_free_enc_sam_response_enc_2(context, esre2);
+ free(user);
+ free(securid_user);
+ free(trackp);
+ krb5_free_sam_challenge_2(context, sc2p);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+#endif /* ARL_SECURID_PREAUTH */