diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sshd.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sshd.c | 441 |
1 files changed, 205 insertions, 236 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.516 2018/09/21 12:23:17 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.533 2019/03/01 02:32:39 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland @@ -151,45 +151,38 @@ int debug_flag = 0; * configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the * "-C" flag. */ -int test_flag = 0; +static int test_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ -int inetd_flag = 0; +static int inetd_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ -int no_daemon_flag = 0; +static int no_daemon_flag = 0; /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ -int log_stderr = 0; +static int log_stderr = 0; /* Saved arguments to main(). */ -char **saved_argv; -int saved_argc; +static char **saved_argv; +static int saved_argc; /* re-exec */ -int rexeced_flag = 0; -int rexec_flag = 1; -int rexec_argc = 0; -char **rexec_argv; +static int rexeced_flag = 0; +static int rexec_flag = 1; +static int rexec_argc = 0; +static char **rexec_argv; /* * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP * signal handler. */ #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 -int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; -int num_listen_socks = 0; - -/* - * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, - * sshd will skip the version-number exchange - */ -char *client_version_string = NULL; -char *server_version_string = NULL; +static int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; +static int num_listen_socks = 0; /* Daemon's agent connection */ int auth_sock = -1; -int have_agent = 0; +static int have_agent = 0; /* * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this @@ -220,9 +213,26 @@ u_int session_id2_len = 0; /* record remote hostname or ip */ u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1; -/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ -int *startup_pipes = NULL; -int startup_pipe; /* in child */ +/* + * startup_pipes/flags are used for tracking children of the listening sshd + * process early in their lifespans. This tracking is needed for three things: + * + * 1) Implementing the MaxStartups limit of concurrent unauthenticated + * connections. + * 2) Avoiding a race condition for SIGHUP processing, where child processes + * may have listen_socks open that could collide with main listener process + * after it restarts. + * 3) Ensuring that rexec'd sshd processes have received their initial state + * from the parent listen process before handling SIGHUP. + * + * Child processes signal that they have completed closure of the listen_socks + * and (if applicable) received their rexec state by sending a char over their + * sock. Child processes signal that authentication has completed by closing + * the sock (or by exiting). + */ +static int *startup_pipes = NULL; +static int *startup_flags = NULL; /* Indicates child closed listener */ +static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */ /* variables used for privilege separation */ int use_privsep = -1; @@ -230,8 +240,9 @@ struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL; int privsep_is_preauth = 1; static int privsep_chroot = 1; -/* global authentication context */ +/* global connection state and authentication contexts */ Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL; +struct ssh *the_active_state; /* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */ struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL; @@ -248,7 +259,7 @@ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void); void demote_sensitive_data(void); -static void do_ssh2_kex(void); +static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *); /* * Close all listening sockets @@ -358,111 +369,11 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig) kill(0, SIGTERM); } + /* XXX pre-format ipaddr/port so we don't need to access active_state */ /* Log error and exit. */ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(active_state), ssh_remote_port(active_state)); -} - -static void -sshd_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int sock_in, int sock_out) -{ - u_int i; - int remote_major, remote_minor; - char *s; - char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ - char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ - - xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n", - PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION, - *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ", - options.version_addendum); - - /* Send our protocol version identification. */ - if (atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string, - strlen(server_version_string)) - != strlen(server_version_string)) { - logit("Could not write ident string to %s port %d", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); - cleanup_exit(255); - } - - /* Read other sides version identification. */ - memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); - for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { - if (atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { - logit("Did not receive identification string " - "from %s port %d", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); - cleanup_exit(255); - } - if (buf[i] == '\r') { - buf[i] = 0; - /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ - if (i == 12 && - strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) - break; - continue; - } - if (buf[i] == '\n') { - buf[i] = 0; - break; - } - } - buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; - client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); - - /* - * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept - * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. - */ - if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", - &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { - s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; - (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); - logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' " - "from %s port %d", client_version_string, - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); - close(sock_in); - close(sock_out); - cleanup_exit(255); - } - debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", - remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); - - ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); - - if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) { - logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), - client_version_string); - cleanup_exit(255); - } - if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) { - logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), - client_version_string); - cleanup_exit(255); - } - if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { - logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " - "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); - } - - chop(server_version_string); - debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); - - if (remote_major != 2 && - !(remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99)) { - s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; - (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); - close(sock_in); - close(sock_out); - logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s port %d: " - "%.200s vs. %.200s", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), - server_version_string, client_version_string); - cleanup_exit(255); - } + ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state), + ssh_remote_port(the_active_state)); } /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ @@ -564,7 +475,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void) } static int -privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) +privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh) { int status, r; pid_t pid; @@ -573,7 +484,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ pmonitor = monitor_init(); /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ - pmonitor->m_pkex = &active_state->kex; + pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex; if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); @@ -594,7 +505,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) } if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid); - monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor); + monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor); /* Wait for the child's exit status */ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) { @@ -633,7 +544,7 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) } static void -privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) +privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt) { #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING if (1) { @@ -654,8 +565,8 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); sshbuf_reset(loginmsg); - monitor_clear_keystate(pmonitor); - monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); + monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); + monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ exit(0); @@ -676,13 +587,13 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) skip: /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ - monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); + monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); /* * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since * this information is not part of the key state. */ - packet_set_authenticated(); + ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh); } static void @@ -849,7 +760,7 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) char *fp; /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */ - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS) + if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS) return; if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) @@ -865,21 +776,29 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp); free(fp); if (nkeys == 0) { - packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring("hostkeys-00@openssh.com"); - packet_put_char(0); /* want-reply */ + /* + * Start building the request when we find the + * first usable key. + */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */ + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__); } + /* Append the key to the request */ sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s", __func__, i, ssh_err(r)); - packet_put_string(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); + if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__); nkeys++; } debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys); if (nkeys == 0) fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__); - packet_send(); + if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__); sshbuf_free(buf); } @@ -917,7 +836,7 @@ usage(void) fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) + OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION) #else "without OpenSSL" #endif @@ -999,14 +918,9 @@ server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out) { int fd; - startup_pipe = -1; if (rexeced_flag) { close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO); - if (!debug_flag) { - startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); - close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); - } } else { *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); @@ -1131,8 +1045,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) { fd_set *fdset; int i, j, ret, maxfd; - int startups = 0; + int startups = 0, listening = 0, lameduck = 0; int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }; + char c = 0; struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; pid_t pid; @@ -1146,6 +1061,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) maxfd = listen_socks[i]; /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); + startup_flags = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) startup_pipes[i] = -1; @@ -1154,8 +1070,15 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) * the daemon is killed with a signal. */ for (;;) { - if (received_sighup) - sighup_restart(); + if (received_sighup) { + if (!lameduck) { + debug("Received SIGHUP; waiting for children"); + close_listen_socks(); + lameduck = 1; + } + if (listening <= 0) + sighup_restart(); + } free(fdset); fdset = xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); @@ -1181,19 +1104,37 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) if (ret < 0) continue; - for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) - if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && - FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { - /* - * the read end of the pipe is ready - * if the child has closed the pipe - * after successful authentication - * or if the child has died - */ + for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) { + if (startup_pipes[i] == -1 || + !FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) + continue; + switch (read(startup_pipes[i], &c, sizeof(c))) { + case -1: + if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) + continue; + if (errno != EPIPE) { + error("%s: startup pipe %d (fd=%d): " + "read %s", __func__, i, + startup_pipes[i], strerror(errno)); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case 0: + /* child exited or completed auth */ close(startup_pipes[i]); startup_pipes[i] = -1; startups--; + if (startup_flags[i]) + listening--; + break; + case 1: + /* child has finished preliminaries */ + if (startup_flags[i]) { + listening--; + startup_flags[i] = 0; + } + break; } + } for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) continue; @@ -1247,6 +1188,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) maxfd = startup_p[0]; startups++; + startup_flags[j] = 1; break; } @@ -1272,7 +1214,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg); close(config_s[0]); } - break; + return; } /* @@ -1281,13 +1223,14 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) * parent continues listening. */ platform_pre_fork(); + listening++; if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* * Child. Close the listening and * max_startup sockets. Start using * the accepted socket. Reinitialize * logging (since our pid has changed). - * We break out of the loop to handle + * We return from this function to handle * the connection. */ platform_post_fork_child(); @@ -1302,7 +1245,18 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) log_stderr); if (rexec_flag) close(config_s[0]); - break; + else { + /* + * Signal parent that the preliminaries + * for this child are complete. For the + * re-exec case, this happens after the + * child has received the rexec state + * from the server. + */ + (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, + "\0", 1); + } + return; } /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ @@ -1334,10 +1288,6 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); } - - /* child process check (or debug mode) */ - if (num_listen_socks < 0) - break; } } @@ -1510,6 +1460,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); + seed_rng(); + /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ initialize_server_options(&options); @@ -1588,7 +1540,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) break; case 'h': servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0, - &options, optarg); + &options, optarg, 1); break; case 't': test_flag = 1; @@ -1597,7 +1549,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) test_flag = 2; break; case 'C': - connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0); + connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0); if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info, optarg) == -1) exit(1); @@ -1624,17 +1576,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) rexec_flag = 0; - if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))) + if (!test_flag && rexec_flag && !path_absolute(av[0])) fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); if (rexeced_flag) closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); else closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); -#endif - /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ if (logfile != NULL) log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); @@ -1669,16 +1617,24 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* Fetch our configuration */ if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); - if (rexeced_flag) + if (rexeced_flag) { recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg); + if (!debug_flag) { + startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); + /* + * Signal parent that this child is at a point where + * they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending. + */ + (void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1); + } + } else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0) load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg); parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, cfg, NULL); - seed_rng(); - /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ fill_default_server_options(&options); @@ -1723,7 +1679,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) + OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION) #else "without OpenSSL" #endif @@ -1760,15 +1716,18 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { + int ll = options.host_key_file_userprovided[i] ? + SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL) continue; if ((r = sshkey_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) - error("Error loading host key \"%s\": %s", + do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\": %s", options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], &pubkey, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) - error("Error loading host key \"%s\": %s", + do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\": %s", options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r)); if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0) @@ -1785,7 +1744,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) keytype = key->type; accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, key); } else { - error("Could not load host key: %s", + do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key: %s", options.host_key_files[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL; @@ -1883,7 +1842,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) * use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match. */ if (connection_info == NULL) - connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0); + connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0); parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info); dump_config(&options); } @@ -2058,9 +2017,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do * not have a key. */ - packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); - packet_set_server(); - ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ + if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL) + fatal("Unable to create connection"); + the_active_state = ssh; + ssh_packet_set_server(ssh); check_ip_options(ssh); @@ -2070,7 +2030,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) process_permitopen(ssh, &options); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ - if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() && + if (options.tcp_keep_alive && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) && setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); @@ -2116,11 +2076,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av) if (!debug_flag) alarm(options.login_grace_time); - sshd_exchange_identification(ssh, sock_in, sock_out); - packet_set_nonblocking(); + if (kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1, options.version_addendum) != 0) + cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */ + + ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh); /* allocate authentication context */ authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt)); + ssh->authctxt = authctxt; authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg; @@ -2137,7 +2100,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) auth_debug_reset(); if (use_privsep) { - if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1) + if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1) goto authenticated; } else if (have_agent) { if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { @@ -2148,16 +2111,16 @@ main(int ac, char **av) /* perform the key exchange */ /* authenticate user and start session */ - do_ssh2_kex(); - do_authentication2(authctxt); + do_ssh2_kex(ssh); + do_authentication2(ssh); /* * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers * the current keystate and exits */ if (use_privsep) { - mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); - packet_clear_keys(); + mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor); + ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh); exit(0); } @@ -2175,7 +2138,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); + audit_event(ssh, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI @@ -2197,11 +2160,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av) * file descriptor passing. */ if (use_privsep) { - privsep_postauth(authctxt); + privsep_postauth(ssh, authctxt); /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ } - packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, + ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.client_alive_interval, options.client_alive_count_max); /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */ @@ -2211,7 +2174,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av) do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ - packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); + ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); @@ -2223,10 +2186,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) #endif /* USE_PAM */ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS - PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE)); + PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE)); #endif - packet_close(); + ssh_packet_close(ssh); if (use_privsep) mm_terminate(); @@ -2235,32 +2198,42 @@ main(int ac, char **av) } int -sshd_hostkey_sign(struct sshkey *privkey, struct sshkey *pubkey, - u_char **signature, size_t *slenp, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, - const char *alg, u_int flag) +sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey, + struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp, + const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg) { int r; - if (privkey) { - if (PRIVSEP(sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, - alg, datafellows)) < 0) - fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__); - } else if (use_privsep) { - if (mm_sshkey_sign(pubkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, - alg, datafellows) < 0) - fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__); + if (use_privsep) { + if (privkey) { + if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp, + data, dlen, alg, ssh->compat) < 0) + fatal("%s: privkey sign failed", __func__); + } else { + if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp, + data, dlen, alg, ssh->compat) < 0) + fatal("%s: pubkey sign failed", __func__); + } } else { - if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, slenp, - data, dlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) - fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s", - __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (privkey) { + if (sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen, + alg, ssh->compat) < 0) + fatal("%s: privkey sign failed", __func__); + } else { + if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, + signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg, + ssh->compat)) != 0) { + fatal("%s: agent sign failed: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + } } return 0; } /* SSH2 key exchange */ static void -do_ssh2_kex(void) +do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER }; struct kex *kex; @@ -2281,38 +2254,36 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) } if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) - packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit, + ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit, options.rekey_interval); myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( list_hostkey_types()); /* start key exchange */ - if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0) + if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); - kex = active_state->kex; + kex = ssh->kex; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server; - kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; + kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server; # endif #endif - kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; - kex->server = 1; - kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; - kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; + kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server; + kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; - ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(active_state, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); session_id2 = kex->session_id; session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; @@ -2331,10 +2302,8 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) void cleanup_exit(int i) { - struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ - - if (the_authctxt) { - do_cleanup(ssh, the_authctxt); + if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) { + do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt); if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid); @@ -2346,8 +2315,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i) } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ - if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) - audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); + if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())) + audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif _exit(i); } |