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Diffstat (limited to 'sshkey.c')
-rw-r--r--sshkey.c68
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index c9f04cd673a0b..c01da6c39b2e9 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.35 2016/06/19 07:48:02 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.41 2016/10/24 01:09:17 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved.
@@ -27,7 +27,6 @@
#include "includes.h"
-#include <sys/param.h> /* MIN MAX */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
@@ -196,7 +195,7 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
}
char *
-key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only)
+sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, char sep)
{
char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
@@ -208,7 +207,7 @@ key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only)
if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
continue;
if (ret != NULL)
- ret[rlen++] = '\n';
+ ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(kt->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
@@ -513,7 +512,6 @@ sshkey_new(int type)
default:
free(k);
return NULL;
- break;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
@@ -888,9 +886,12 @@ sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
int nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n);
int elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e);
+ if (nlen < 0 || elen < 0 || nlen >= INT_MAX - elen) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
blob_len = nlen + elen;
- if (nlen >= INT_MAX - elen ||
- (blob = malloc(blob_len)) == NULL) {
+ if ((blob = malloc(blob_len)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
@@ -1082,10 +1083,10 @@ fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len,
y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1;
/* assure we are still in bounds */
- x = MAX(x, 0);
- y = MAX(y, 0);
- x = MIN(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
- y = MIN(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
+ x = MAXIMUM(x, 0);
+ y = MAXIMUM(y, 0);
+ x = MINIMUM(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
+ y = MINIMUM(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
/* augment the field */
if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
@@ -1126,7 +1127,7 @@ fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len,
for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) {
*p++ = '|';
for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
- *p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)];
+ *p++ = augmentation_string[MINIMUM(field[x][y], len)];
*p++ = '|';
*p++ = '\n';
}
@@ -2862,6 +2863,14 @@ sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp;
int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+ /*
+ * NB. This assumes OpenSSL has already verified that the public
+ * point lies on the curve. This is done by EC_POINT_oct2point()
+ * implicitly calling EC_POINT_is_on_curve(). If this code is ever
+ * reachable with public points not unmarshalled using
+ * EC_POINT_oct2point then the caller will need to explicitly check.
+ */
+
if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
@@ -3029,13 +3038,11 @@ sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen;
u_int check;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
const char *kdfname = KDFNAME;
struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL;
- memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
-
if (rounds <= 0)
rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS;
if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) {
@@ -3122,7 +3129,7 @@ sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded,
sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
@@ -3154,7 +3161,7 @@ sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
sshbuf_free(kdf);
sshbuf_free(encoded);
sshbuf_free(encrypted);
- cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+ cipher_free(ciphercontext);
explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt));
if (key != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
@@ -3183,12 +3190,11 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0;
struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL;
struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
- struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp, pad, last;
u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2;
- memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext));
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
@@ -3317,7 +3323,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
(r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) {
/* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */
if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
@@ -3371,7 +3377,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
}
out:
pad = 0;
- cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
+ cipher_free(ciphercontext);
free(ciphername);
free(kdfname);
free(comment);
@@ -3405,7 +3411,7 @@ sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL, *encrypted = NULL;
u_char buf[8];
int r, cipher_num;
- struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
u_char *cp;
@@ -3475,16 +3481,14 @@ sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(buffer), sshbuf_len(buffer), 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0)
- goto out;
r = sshbuf_putb(blob, encrypted);
out:
- explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+ cipher_free(ciphercontext);
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
sshbuf_free(buffer);
sshbuf_free(encrypted);
@@ -3654,7 +3658,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase,
struct sshbuf *decrypted = NULL, *copy = NULL;
u_char *cp;
char *comment = NULL;
- struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext;
+ struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
@@ -3712,12 +3716,8 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase,
if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase,
CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp,
- sshbuf_ptr(copy), sshbuf_len(copy), 0, 0)) != 0) {
- cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext);
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0)
+ if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+ sshbuf_ptr(copy), sshbuf_len(copy), 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 ||
@@ -3754,7 +3754,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase,
comment = NULL;
}
out:
- explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext));
+ cipher_free(ciphercontext);
free(comment);
sshkey_free(prv);
sshbuf_free(copy);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-11-04 16:48:58 +0000