src-test2/sys/modules/random, branch release/5.2.1_cvsFreeBSD source treehttps://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src-test2/atom?h=release%2F5.2.1_cvs2004-02-23T15:32:56ZThis commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create tag2004-02-23T15:32:56Zcvs2svncvs2svn@FreeBSD.org2004-02-23T15:32:56Zurn:sha1:84a7b99b4e02a260bf7ff9b540032f4cb7bc612a
'RELENG_5_2_1_RELEASE'.
This commit was manufactured to restore the state of the 5.2.1-RELEASE image.
Releases prior to 5.3-RELEASE are omitting the secure/ and crypto/ subdirs.
Upgrade the random device to use a "real" hash instead of building2002-07-15T13:58:35ZMark Murraymarkm@FreeBSD.org2002-07-15T13:58:35Zurn:sha1:bbf09ad887f1ebc18052ee12f5074c05d69a4e46
one out of a block cipher. This has 2 advantages:
1) The code is _much_ simpler
2) We aren't committing our security to one algorithm (much as we
may think we trust AES).
While I'm here, make an explicit reseed do a slow reseed instead
of a fast; this is in line with what the original paper suggested.
Drop <bsd.man.mk> support from <bsd.kmod.mk>.2002-01-11T15:49:02ZRuslan Ermilovru@FreeBSD.org2002-01-11T15:49:02Zurn:sha1:17d6c636720d00f77e5d098daf4c278f89d84f7b
Not objected to by: -current
The /dev/random driver used Rijndael, not Blowfish, now.2001-03-10T12:57:08ZMark Murraymarkm@FreeBSD.org2001-03-10T12:57:08Zurn:sha1:add3f7f3dfa1947efff4e74b418f2e885b5ed1b0Clean up Makefile, and remove the last vestiges of NOBLOCKRANDOM.2001-01-15T19:35:00ZMark Murraymarkm@FreeBSD.org2001-01-15T19:35:00Zurn:sha1:c202cd74f8da7a4d07046577410322914f91a2d6Use a consistent style and one much closer to the rest of /usr/src2001-01-06T14:00:42ZDavid E. O'Brienobrien@FreeBSD.org2001-01-06T14:00:42Zurn:sha1:c68159a6d8eede11766cf13896d0f7670dbd51aaDefault the /dev/random loadable module to blocking-on-bootup,2000-12-02T18:29:18ZMark Murraymarkm@FreeBSD.org2000-12-02T18:29:18Zurn:sha1:5f7f65f12441ecd1d99c40032fb750b9e206cf9f
but leave a commented-out macro to change this.
As the blocking model has seems to be troublesome for many, disable2000-10-27T06:06:04ZMark Murraymarkm@FreeBSD.org2000-10-27T06:06:04Zurn:sha1:5f3431b5ade253e5ea547b3bff5c61145da6c741
it for now with an option.
This option is already deprecated, and will be removed when the
entropy-harvesting code is fast enough to warrant it.
After some complaints about the dir names, the random device is2000-10-14T10:59:56ZMark Murraymarkm@FreeBSD.org2000-10-14T10:59:56Zurn:sha1:a6278a2a42fc77094f356a290336a0fc395feb05
now in dirs called sys/*/random/ instead of sys/*/randomdev/*.
Introduce blocking, but only at startup; the random device will
block until the first reseed happens to prevent clients from
using untrustworthy output.
Provide a read_random() call for the rest of the kernel so that
the entropy device does not need to be present. This means that
things like IPX no longer need to have "device random" hardcoded
into thir kernel config. The downside is that read_random() will
provide very poor output until the entropy device is loaded and
reseeded. It is recommended that developers do NOT use the
read_random() call; instead, they should use arc4random() which
internally uses read_random().
Clean up the mutex and locking code a bit; this makes it possible
to unload the module again.
Large upgrade to the entropy device; mainly inspired by feedback2000-09-10T13:52:19ZMark Murraymarkm@FreeBSD.org2000-09-10T13:52:19Zurn:sha1:4d87a031c0106945da094f3ea770ea9b4b5fcd6b
from many folk.
o The reseed process is now a kthread. With SMPng, kthreads are
pre-emptive, so the annoying jerkiness of the mouse is gone.
o The data structures are protected by mutexes now, not splfoo()/splx().
o The cryptographic routines are broken out into their own subroutines.
this facilitates review, and possible replacement if that is ever
found necessary.
Thanks to: kris, green, peter, jasone, grog, jhb
Forgotten to thank: You know who you are; no offense intended.