4 files changed, 2 insertions, 41 deletions

diff --git a/sys/dev/drm/drmP.h b/sys/dev/drm/drmP.h
index 6ea4af1bfc7f..bf5feedc7e6e 100644
--- a/sys/dev/drm/drmP.h
+++ b/sys/dev/drm/drmP.h
@@ -227,9 +227,7 @@ enum {
 
 #define PAGE_ALIGN(addr) round_page(addr)
 /* DRM_SUSER returns true if the user is superuser */
-#if __FreeBSD_version >= 1000000
-#define DRM_SUSER(p)		(priv_check(p, PRIV_KMEM_WRITE) == 0)
-#elif __FreeBSD_version >= 700000
+#if __FreeBSD_version >= 700000
 #define DRM_SUSER(p)		(priv_check(p, PRIV_DRIVER) == 0)
 #else
 #define DRM_SUSER(p)		(suser(p) == 0)
diff --git a/sys/kern/kern_jail.c b/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
index 9e19acddd052..700b7d6c9ad4 100644
--- a/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
+++ b/sys/kern/kern_jail.c
@@ -208,7 +208,6 @@ static char *pr_allow_names[] = {
 	"allow.mount.zfs",
 	"allow.mount.procfs",
 	"allow.mount.tmpfs",
-	"allow.kmem",
 };
 const size_t pr_allow_names_size = sizeof(pr_allow_names);
 
@@ -225,7 +224,6 @@ static char *pr_allow_nonames[] = {
 	"allow.mount.nozfs",
 	"allow.mount.noprocfs",
 	"allow.mount.notmpfs",
-	"allow.nokmem",
 };
 const size_t pr_allow_nonames_size = sizeof(pr_allow_nonames);
 
@@ -3953,27 +3951,6 @@ prison_priv_check(struct ucred *cred, int priv)
 		return (0);
 
 		/*
-		 * Allow access to /dev/io in a jail if the non-jailed admin
-		 * requests this and if /dev/io exists in the jail. This
-		 * allows Xorg to probe a card.
-		 */
-	case PRIV_IO:
-		if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_KMEM)
-			return (0);
-		else
-			return (EPERM);
-
-		/*
-		 * Allow low level access to KMEM-like devices (e.g. to
-		 * allow Xorg to use DRI).
-		 */
-	case PRIV_KMEM_WRITE:
-		if (cred->cr_prison->pr_allow & PR_ALLOW_KMEM)
-			return (0);
-		else
-			return (EPERM);
-
-		/*
 		 * Allow jailed root to set loginclass.
 		 */
 	case PRIV_PROC_SETLOGINCLASS:
@@ -4407,8 +4384,6 @@ SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, quotas, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
     "B", "Jail may set file quotas");
 SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, socket_af, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
     "B", "Jail may create sockets other than just UNIX/IPv4/IPv6/route");
-SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow, kmem, CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
-    "B", "Jail may access kmem-like devices (io, dri) if they exist");
 
 SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SUBNODE(allow, mount, "Jail mount/unmount permission flags");
 SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM(_allow_mount, , CTLTYPE_INT | CTLFLAG_RW,
diff --git a/sys/sys/jail.h b/sys/sys/jail.h
index b86186c885c0..59d791ca2a94 100644
--- a/sys/sys/jail.h
+++ b/sys/sys/jail.h
@@ -228,8 +228,7 @@ struct prison_racct {
 #define	PR_ALLOW_MOUNT_ZFS		0x0200
 #define	PR_ALLOW_MOUNT_PROCFS		0x0400
 #define	PR_ALLOW_MOUNT_TMPFS		0x0800
-#define	PR_ALLOW_KMEM			0x1000
-#define	PR_ALLOW_ALL			0x1fff
+#define	PR_ALLOW_ALL			0x0fff
 
 /*
  * OSD methods
diff --git a/usr.sbin/jail/jail.8 b/usr.sbin/jail/jail.8
index d5aa4d3382e8..4a16e9aba5e8 100644
--- a/usr.sbin/jail/jail.8
+++ b/usr.sbin/jail/jail.8
@@ -573,17 +573,6 @@ with non-jailed parts of the system.
 Sockets within a jail are normally restricted to IPv4, IPv6, local
 (UNIX), and route.  This allows access to other protocol stacks that
 have not had jail functionality added to them.
-.It Va allow.kmem
-Jailed processes may access
-.Pa /dev/kmem
-and similar devices (e.g. io, dri) if they have sufficient permission
-(via the usual file permissions).
-Note that the device files must exist within the jail for this parameter
-to be of any use;
-the default devfs ruleset for jails does not include any such devices.
-Giving a jail access to kernel memory obviates much of the security that
-jails offer, but can still be useful for other purposes.
-For example, this would allow the Xorg server to run inside a jail.
 .El
 .El
 .Pp