diff options
| author | Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2001-10-23 19:11:31 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2001-10-23 19:11:31 +0000 |
| commit | b5c05ddcb8f7d0ebe86a4e7c4857f0a87d89666d (patch) | |
| tree | a46c4ab936cbaed265bbce47add8c66fab5148da | |
| parent | fc2749a40cd0814c89ca4e647c6797aec307d453 (diff) | |
Notes
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/nfsclient/nfs_lock.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/nfsclient/nfs_lock.c b/sys/nfsclient/nfs_lock.c index ce047ba6ca8f..dfca164a4358 100644 --- a/sys/nfsclient/nfs_lock.c +++ b/sys/nfsclient/nfs_lock.c @@ -145,6 +145,10 @@ nfs_dolock(struct vop_advlock_args *ap) * file error message for the user, otherwise the application will * complain that the user's file is missing, which isn't the case. * Note that we use proc0's cred, so the fifo is opened as root. + * + * XXX: Note that this behavior is relative to the root directory + * of the current process, and this may result in a variety of + * {functional, security} problems in chroot() environments. */ NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_SYSSPACE, _PATH_LCKFIFO, td); @@ -153,6 +157,9 @@ nfs_dolock(struct vop_advlock_args *ap) * to open the fifo we need to write to. vn_open() really should * take a ucred (and once it does, this code should be fixed to use * proc0's ucred. + * + * XXX: This introduces an exploitable race condition allowing + * a local attacker to gain root privilege. */ saved_uid = p->p_ucred->cr_uid; p->p_ucred->cr_uid = 0; /* temporarly run the vn_open as root */ |
