Import OpenSSL 1.0.2n.vendor/openssl/1.0.2n

38 files changed, 280 insertions, 84 deletions

diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index e3d57b328c58..f2fc31a25c54 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -7,6 +7,51 @@
  https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
  release branch.
 
+ Changes between 1.0.2m and 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017]
+
+  *) Read/write after SSL object in error state
+
+     OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
+     mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake
+     then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if
+     you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the
+     explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and
+     SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if
+     SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
+     handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function
+     call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application
+     for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without
+     being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer.
+
+     In order to exploit this issue an application bug would have to be present
+     that resulted in a call to SSL_read()/SSL_write() being issued after having
+     already received a fatal error.
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google).
+     (CVE-2017-3737)
+     [Matt Caswell]
+
+  *) rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64
+
+     There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
+     used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
+     Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this
+     defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely.
+     Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the
+     work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed
+     offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be
+     significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server
+     would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is
+     no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701.
+
+     This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
+     like Intel Haswell (4th generation).
+
+     This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue
+     was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project.
+     (CVE-2017-3738)
+     [Andy Polyakov]
+
  Changes between 1.0.2l and 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017]
 
   *) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64
diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index fd7988e2b3d9..60386d395987 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -592,9 +592,9 @@ my %table=(
 "debug-VC-WIN64A","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN64A::SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN:".eval{my $asm=$x86_64_asm;$asm=~s/x86_64-gcc\.o/bn_asm.o/;$asm}.":auto:win32",
 # x86 Win32 target defaults to ANSI API, if you want UNICODE, complement
 # 'perl Configure VC-WIN32' with '-DUNICODE -D_UNICODE'
-"VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
+"VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -WX -Gs0 -GF -Gy -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE -D_WINSOCK_DEPRECATED_NO_WARNINGS:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
 # Unified CE target
-"debug-VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
+"debug-VC-WIN32","cl:-W3 -WX -Gs0 -GF -Gy -Zi -nologo -DOPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -D_CRT_SECURE_NO_DEPRECATE -D_WINSOCK_DEPRECATED_NO_WARNINGS:::WIN32::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:win32n:win32",
 "VC-CE","cl::::WINCE::BN_LLONG RC4_INDEX EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN ${x86_gcc_opts}:${no_asm}:win32",
 
 # Borland C++ 4.5
diff --git a/FREEBSD-upgrade b/FREEBSD-upgrade
index 3b42f5aeb6e9..a9cd999dae3e 100644
--- a/FREEBSD-upgrade
+++ b/FREEBSD-upgrade
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports
 # Xlist
 setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist
 setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://repo.freebsd.org/base"
-setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2m
-# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2m
+setenv OSSLVER 1.0.2n
+# OSSLTAG format: v1_0_2n
 
 ###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _`
 
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 484f2f45f776..9212c2885278 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 ## Makefile for OpenSSL
 ##
 
-VERSION=1.0.2m
+VERSION=1.0.2n
 MAJOR=1
 MINOR=0.2
 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 1b72013ad186..6f0c5c47b654 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -5,6 +5,11 @@
   This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
   release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
 
+  Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2m and OpenSSL 1.0.2n [7 Dec 2017]
+
+      o Read/write after SSL object in error state (CVE-2017-3737)
+      o rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738)
+
   Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2l and OpenSSL 1.0.2m [2 Nov 2017]
 
       o bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736)
diff --git a/README b/README
index b5aae6260ce8..80de6886a766 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 
- OpenSSL 1.0.2m 2 Nov 2017
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2n 7 Dec 2017
 
  Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
  Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c
index c487bd92db2a..29de1b75dd60 100644
--- a/apps/apps.c
+++ b/apps/apps.c
@@ -148,6 +148,10 @@
 #ifdef _WIN32
 static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to);
 # define rename(from,to) WIN32_rename((from),(to))
+# ifdef fileno
+#  undef fileno
+# endif
+# define fileno(a) (int)_fileno(a)
 #endif
 
 typedef struct {
@@ -2788,13 +2792,13 @@ unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen, const char *in)
                 OPENSSL_free(out);
                 return NULL;
             }
-            out[start] = i - start;
+            out[start] = (unsigned char)(i - start);
             start = i + 1;
         } else
             out[i + 1] = in[i];
     }
 
-    *outlen = len + 1;
+    *outlen = (unsigned char)(len + 1);
     return out;
 }
 #endif                          /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */
diff --git a/apps/dsa.c b/apps/dsa.c
index 4ed21d891e86..82a870eb2910 100644
--- a/apps/dsa.c
+++ b/apps/dsa.c
@@ -327,6 +327,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
     } else if (outformat == FORMAT_MSBLOB || outformat == FORMAT_PVK) {
         EVP_PKEY *pk;
         pk = EVP_PKEY_new();
+        if (pk == NULL)
+           goto end;
+
         EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pk, dsa);
         if (outformat == FORMAT_PVK)
             i = i2b_PVK_bio(out, pk, pvk_encr, 0, passout);
diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c
index dc467994f8e2..2a0ead7beffb 100644
--- a/apps/s_client.c
+++ b/apps/s_client.c
@@ -630,10 +630,11 @@ static int serverinfo_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type,
     unsigned char ext_buf[4 + 65536];
 
     /* Reconstruct the type/len fields prior to extension data */
-    ext_buf[0] = ext_type >> 8;
-    ext_buf[1] = ext_type & 0xFF;
-    ext_buf[2] = inlen >> 8;
-    ext_buf[3] = inlen & 0xFF;
+    inlen &= 0xffff; /* for formal memcpy correctness */
+    ext_buf[0] = (unsigned char)(ext_type >> 8);
+    ext_buf[1] = (unsigned char)(ext_type);
+    ext_buf[2] = (unsigned char)(inlen >> 8);
+    ext_buf[3] = (unsigned char)(inlen);
     memcpy(ext_buf + 4, in, inlen);
 
     BIO_snprintf(pem_name, sizeof(pem_name), "SERVERINFO FOR EXTENSION %d",
diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c
index 5259c16f1218..5383678b9864 100644
--- a/apps/speed.c
+++ b/apps/speed.c
@@ -2829,8 +2829,8 @@ static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher)
 
                 RAND_bytes(out, 16);
                 len += 16;
-                aad[11] = len >> 8;
-                aad[12] = len;
+                aad[11] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
+                aad[12] = (unsigned char)(len);
                 pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&ctx,
                                           EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD,
                                           EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, aad);
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl
index 4f8917089f6c..c1b5e352d76f 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/aes-armv4.pl
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ AES_encrypt:
 #if __ARM_ARCH__<7
 	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ AES_encrypt
 #else
-	adr	r3,AES_encrypt
+	adr	r3,.
 #endif
 	stmdb   sp!,{r1,r4-r12,lr}
 	mov	$rounds,r0		@ inp
@@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ _armv4_AES_set_encrypt_key:
 #if __ARM_ARCH__<7
 	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ AES_set_encrypt_key
 #else
-	adr	r3,private_AES_set_encrypt_key
+	adr	r3,.
 #endif
 	teq	r0,#0
 #if __ARM_ARCH__>=7
@@ -952,7 +952,7 @@ AES_decrypt:
 #if __ARM_ARCH__<7
 	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ AES_decrypt
 #else
-	adr	r3,AES_decrypt
+	adr	r3,.
 #endif
 	stmdb   sp!,{r1,r4-r12,lr}
 	mov	$rounds,r0		@ inp
diff --git a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl
index 70b3f9656f4f..ec66b0502a64 100755
--- a/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl
+++ b/crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-armv7.pl
@@ -724,7 +724,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .type	_bsaes_decrypt8,%function
 .align	4
 _bsaes_decrypt8:
-	adr	$const,_bsaes_decrypt8
+	adr	$const,.
 	vldmia	$key!, {@XMM[9]}		@ round 0 key
 	add	$const,$const,#.LM0ISR-_bsaes_decrypt8
 
@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ _bsaes_const:
 .type	_bsaes_encrypt8,%function
 .align	4
 _bsaes_encrypt8:
-	adr	$const,_bsaes_encrypt8
+	adr	$const,.
 	vldmia	$key!, {@XMM[9]}		@ round 0 key
 	sub	$const,$const,#_bsaes_encrypt8-.LM0SR
 
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 .type	_bsaes_key_convert,%function
 .align	4
 _bsaes_key_convert:
-	adr	$const,_bsaes_key_convert
+	adr	$const,.
 	vld1.8	{@XMM[7]},  [$inp]!		@ load round 0 key
 	sub	$const,$const,#_bsaes_key_convert-.LM0
 	vld1.8	{@XMM[15]}, [$inp]!		@ load round 1 key
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c b/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c
index 0f56cd4e0745..2e85e041e4cf 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/a_i2d_fp.c
@@ -87,6 +87,9 @@ int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, BIO *out, unsigned char *x)
     int i, j = 0, n, ret = 1;
 
     n = i2d(x, NULL);
+    if (n <= 0)
+        return 0;
+
     b = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(n);
     if (b == NULL) {
         ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_print.c b/crypto/bio/b_print.c
index eb3ab759349c..1c82f53d5a07 100644
--- a/crypto/bio/b_print.c
+++ b/crypto/bio/b_print.c
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ _dopr(char **sbuffer,
                 if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
                     short int *num;
                     num = va_arg(args, short int *);
-                    *num = currlen;
+                    *num = (short int)currlen;
                 } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) { /* XXX */
                     long int *num;
                     num = va_arg(args, long int *);
@@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ fmtint(char **sbuffer,
     if (!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
         if (value < 0) {
             signvalue = '-';
-            uvalue = -(unsigned LLONG)value;
+            uvalue = 0 - (unsigned LLONG)value;
         } else if (flags & DP_F_PLUS)
             signvalue = '+';
         else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
index 712a77fe8ca3..2b3f8b0e21ec 100755
--- a/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
+++ b/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	vmovdqu		32*8-128($ap), $ACC8
 
 	lea	192(%rsp), $tp0			# 64+128=192
-	vpbroadcastq	.Land_mask(%rip), $AND_MASK
+	vmovdqu	.Land_mask(%rip), $AND_MASK
 	jmp	.LOOP_GRANDE_SQR_1024
 
 .align	32
@@ -1070,10 +1070,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	vpmuludq	32*6-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP1
 	vpaddq		$TEMP1,$ACC6,$ACC6
 	vpmuludq	32*7-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP2
-	 vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $ACC9, $ACC9	# correct $ACC3
+	 vpblendd	\$3, $ZERO, $ACC9, $TEMP1	# correct $ACC3
 	vpaddq		$TEMP2,$ACC7,$ACC7
 	vpmuludq	32*8-128($np),$Yi,$TEMP0
-	 vpaddq		$ACC9, $ACC3, $ACC3		# correct $ACC3
+	 vpaddq		$TEMP1, $ACC3, $ACC3		# correct $ACC3
 	vpaddq		$TEMP0,$ACC8,$ACC8
 
 	mov	%rbx, %rax
@@ -1086,7 +1086,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
 	 vmovdqu	-8+32*2-128($ap),$TEMP2
 
 	mov	$r1, %rax
+	 vpblendd	\$0xfc, $ZERO, $ACC9, $ACC9	# correct $ACC3
 	imull	$n0, %eax
+	 vpaddq		$ACC9,$ACC4,$ACC4		# correct $ACC3
 	and	\$0x1fffffff, %eax
 
 	 imulq	16-128($ap),%rbx
@@ -1322,15 +1324,12 @@ ___
 #	But as we underutilize resources, it's possible to correct in
 #	each iteration with marginal performance loss. But then, as
 #	we do it in each iteration, we can correct less digits, and
-#	avoid performance penalties completely. Also note that we
-#	correct only three digits out of four. This works because
-#	most significant digit is subjected to less additions.
+#	avoid performance penalties completely.
 
 $TEMP0 = $ACC9;
 $TEMP3 = $Bi;
 $TEMP4 = $Yi;
 $code.=<<___;
-	vpermq		\$0, $AND_MASK, $AND_MASK
 	vpaddq		(%rsp), $TEMP1, $ACC0
 
 	vpsrlq		\$29, $ACC0, $TEMP1
@@ -1763,7 +1762,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
 
 .align	64
 .Land_mask:
-	.quad	0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff,-1
+	.quad	0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff,0x1fffffff
 .Lscatter_permd:
 	.long	0,2,4,6,7,7,7,7
 .Lgather_permd:
diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
index 35facd213a25..c4b63e44ba36 100644
--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
             || BN_get_flags(a, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
         /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_EXP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
     }
 
     BN_CTX_start(ctx);
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_recp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
             || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
         /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_RECP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
     }
 
     bits = BN_num_bits(p);
@@ -1228,7 +1228,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
             || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
         /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_WORD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
     }
 
     bn_check_top(p);
@@ -1361,7 +1361,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_simple(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
             || BN_get_flags(m, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME) != 0) {
         /* BN_FLG_CONSTTIME only supported by BN_mod_exp_mont() */
         BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_SIMPLE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
-        return -1;
+        return 0;
     }
 
     bits = BN_num_bits(p);
diff --git a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
index aac253095141..e22627f85152 100644
--- a/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
+++ b/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
     unsigned char *penc = NULL;
     int penclen;
     ASN1_STRING *str = NULL;
+    ASN1_OBJECT *aobj;
 
     dsa = pkey->pkey.dsa;
     if (pkey->save_parameters && dsa->p && dsa->q && dsa->g) {
@@ -159,8 +160,11 @@ static int dsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
         goto err;
     }
 
-    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA),
-                               ptype, str, penc, penclen))
+    aobj = OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_DSA);
+    if (aobj == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, aobj, ptype, str, penc, penclen))
         return 1;
 
  err:
diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c b/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
index 4279dd94b135..55d3858bb1c6 100644
--- a/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
+++ b/crypto/engine/eng_fat.c
@@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e)
 #endif
     ENGINE_register_RAND(e);
     ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(e);
+    ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(e);
     return 1;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
index f3798872598a..51bb258e74b8 100644
--- a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
+++ b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@
  * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_hashing
  *
  * Litwin, Witold (1980), "Linear hashing: A new tool for file and table
- * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212–223
+ * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212-223
  * http://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf
  *
  * From the wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley
diff --git a/crypto/opensslv.h b/crypto/opensslv.h
index c944d562dae0..baee2d0865fd 100644
--- a/crypto/opensslv.h
+++ b/crypto/opensslv.h
@@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ extern "C" {
  * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
  *  major minor fix final patch/beta)
  */
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x100020dfL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER  0x100020efL
 # ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2m-fips  2 Nov 2017"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2n-fips  7 Dec 2017"
 # else
-#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2m  2 Nov 2017"
+#  define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT    "OpenSSL 1.0.2n  7 Dec 2017"
 # endif
 # define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT   " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
 
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
index 082c8da2efc2..a85493d6097b 100644
--- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
+++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
@@ -110,6 +110,16 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
     int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 
+    /*
+     * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
+     * continually regenerating the same prime values.
+     */
+    if (bits < 16) {
+        ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
     if (ctx == NULL)
         goto err;
@@ -161,21 +171,10 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
     if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
         goto err;
     for (;;) {
-        /*
-         * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
-         * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for this and
-         * bail if it happens 3 times.
-         */
-        unsigned int degenerate = 0;
         do {
             if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
                 goto err;
-        } while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
-        if (degenerate == 3) {
-            ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-            goto err;
-        }
+        } while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
         if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
             goto err;
         if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
diff --git a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl
index 4fee74d832d1..750216eb4267 100755
--- a/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl
+++ b/crypto/sha/asm/sha256-armv4.pl
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ sha256_block_data_order:
 #if __ARM_ARCH__<7
 	sub	r3,pc,#8		@ sha256_block_data_order
 #else
-	adr	r3,sha256_block_data_order
+	adr	r3,.
 #endif
 #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__>=7 && !defined(__KERNEL__)
 	ldr	r12,.LOPENSSL_armcap
diff --git a/crypto/symhacks.h b/crypto/symhacks.h
index 239fa4fb1b77..3001957988f7 100644
--- a/crypto/symhacks.h
+++ b/crypto/symhacks.h
@@ -280,6 +280,8 @@
 #  define OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf         OPENSSL_add_all_algo_conf
 #  undef EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover
 #  define EVP_PKEY_meth_set_verify_recover        EVP_PKEY_meth_set_vrfy_recover
+#  undef EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover
+#  define EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover        EVP_PKEY_meth_get_vrfy_recover
 
 /* Hack some long EC names */
 #  undef EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c
index 8350429aafbe..1112802483a1 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_lib.c
@@ -286,9 +286,9 @@ void *X509V3_get_d2i(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int *crit,
 int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value,
                     int crit, unsigned long flags)
 {
-    int extidx = -1;
-    int errcode;
-    X509_EXTENSION *ext, *extmp;
+    int errcode, extidx = -1;
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext = NULL, *extmp;
+    STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *ret = NULL;
     unsigned long ext_op = flags & X509V3_ADD_OP_MASK;
 
     /*
@@ -347,13 +347,21 @@ int X509V3_add1_i2d(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, int nid, void *value,
         return 1;
     }
 
-    if (!*x && !(*x = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()))
-        return -1;
-    if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(*x, ext))
-        return -1;
+    if ((ret = *x) == NULL
+         && (ret = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto m_fail;
+    if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(ret, ext))
+        goto m_fail;
 
+    *x = ret;
     return 1;
 
+ m_fail:
+    if (ret != *x)
+        sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(ret);
+    X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+    return -1;
+
  err:
     if (!(flags & X509V3_ADD_SILENT))
         X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD1_I2D, errcode);
diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
index 0b7c68180e78..87a6ae1da982 100644
--- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
+++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_scts.c
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static void timestamp_print(BIO *out, SCT_TIMESTAMP timestamp)
     gen = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new();
     ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(gen, (time_t)0,
                              (int)(timestamp / 86400000),
-                             (timestamp % 86400000) / 1000);
+                             (int)(timestamp % 86400000) / 1000);
     /*
      * Note GeneralizedTime from ASN1_GENERALIZETIME_adj is always 15
      * characters long with a final Z. Update it with fractional seconds.
diff --git a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
index dc9a2d76c5f6..4cd24d7e0169 100644
--- a/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
+++ b/doc/crypto/EVP_EncryptInit.pod
@@ -40,14 +40,14 @@ EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256, EVP_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256
  int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
 	 ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
  int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-         int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl);
+         int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
  int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
          int *outl);
 
  int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
 	 ENGINE *impl, unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv);
  int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
-         int *outl, unsigned char *in, int inl);
+         int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl);
  int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm,
          int *outl);
 
diff --git a/ssl/Makefile b/ssl/Makefile
index dd1296225006..7866a3ccd77b 100644
--- a/ssl/Makefile
+++ b/ssl/Makefile
@@ -15,7 +15,8 @@ KRB5_INCLUDES=
 CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
 
 GENERAL=Makefile README ssl-lib.com install.com
-TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c clienthellotest.c sslv2conftest.c dtlstest.c bad_dtls_test.c
+TEST=ssltest.c heartbeat_test.c clienthellotest.c sslv2conftest.c dtlstest.c \
+	bad_dtls_test.c fatalerrtest.c
 APPS=
 
 LIB=$(TOP)/libssl.a
diff --git a/ssl/bad_dtls_test.c b/ssl/bad_dtls_test.c
index 70d8578b5883..34af37d9a9f4 100644
--- a/ssl/bad_dtls_test.c
+++ b/ssl/bad_dtls_test.c
@@ -590,13 +590,13 @@ static int send_record(BIO *rbio, unsigned char type, unsigned long seqnr,
     unsigned char *enc;
 
 #ifdef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
-    seq[0] = (seqnr >> 40) & 0xff;
-    seq[1] = (seqnr >> 32) & 0xff;
+    seq[0] = (unsigned char)(seqnr >> 40);
+    seq[1] = (unsigned char)(seqnr >> 32);
 #endif
-    seq[2] = (seqnr >> 24) & 0xff;
-    seq[3] = (seqnr >> 16) & 0xff;
-    seq[4] = (seqnr >> 8) & 0xff;
-    seq[5] = seqnr & 0xff;
+    seq[2] = (unsigned char)(seqnr >> 24);
+    seq[3] = (unsigned char)(seqnr >> 16);
+    seq[4] = (unsigned char)(seqnr >> 8);
+    seq[5] = (unsigned char)(seqnr);
 
     pad = 15 - ((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) % 16);
     enc = OPENSSL_malloc(len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1 + pad);
@@ -612,8 +612,8 @@ static int send_record(BIO *rbio, unsigned char type, unsigned long seqnr,
     HMAC_Update(&ctx, seq, 6);
     HMAC_Update(&ctx, &type, 1);
     HMAC_Update(&ctx, ver, 2); /* Version */
-    lenbytes[0] = len >> 8;
-    lenbytes[1] = len & 0xff;
+    lenbytes[0] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8);
+    lenbytes[1] = (unsigned char)(len);
     HMAC_Update(&ctx, lenbytes, 2); /* Length */
     HMAC_Update(&ctx, enc, len); /* Finally the data itself */
     HMAC_Final(&ctx, enc + len, NULL);
@@ -637,8 +637,8 @@ static int send_record(BIO *rbio, unsigned char type, unsigned long seqnr,
     BIO_write(rbio, ver, 2);
     BIO_write(rbio, epoch, 2);
     BIO_write(rbio, seq, 6);
-    lenbytes[0] = (len + sizeof(iv)) >> 8;
-    lenbytes[1] = (len + sizeof(iv)) & 0xff;
+    lenbytes[0] = (unsigned char)((len + sizeof(iv)) >> 8);
+    lenbytes[1] = (unsigned char)(len + sizeof(iv));
     BIO_write(rbio, lenbytes, 2);
 
     BIO_write(rbio, iv, sizeof(iv));
diff --git a/ssl/fatalerrtest.c b/ssl/fatalerrtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0288c33fa2eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssl/fatalerrtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "ssltestlib.h"
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    SSL_CTX *sctx, *cctx;
+    SSL *sssl, *cssl;
+    const char *msg = "Dummy";
+    BIO *err = NULL, *wbio = NULL;
+    int ret = 1, len;
+    char buf[80];
+    unsigned char dummyrec[] = {
+        0x17, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x05, 'D', 'u', 'm', 'm', 'y'
+    };
+
+    if (argc != 3) {
+        printf("Incorrect number of parameters\n");
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    SSL_library_init();
+    SSL_load_error_strings();
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | BIO_FP_TEXT);
+    CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init();
+    CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options(V_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL);
+    CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON);
+
+    if (!create_ssl_ctx_pair(SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_method(), &sctx, &cctx,
+                             argv[1], argv[2])) {
+        printf("Failed to create SSL_CTX pair\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Deliberately set the cipher lists for client and server to be different
+     * to force a handshake failure.
+     */
+    if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(sctx, "AES128-SHA")
+            || !SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(cctx, "AES256-SHA")) {
+        printf("Failed to set cipher lists\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &sssl, &cssl, NULL, NULL)) {
+        printf("Failed to create SSL objectx\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    wbio = SSL_get_wbio(cssl);
+    if (wbio == NULL) {
+        printf("Unexpected NULL bio received\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (create_ssl_connection(sssl, cssl)) {
+        printf("Unexpected success creating a connection\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ERR_clear_error();
+
+    /* Inject a plaintext record from client to server */
+    if (BIO_write(wbio, dummyrec, sizeof(dummyrec)) <= 0) {
+        printf("Unexpected failure injecting dummy record\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* SSL_read()/SSL_write should fail because of a previous fatal error */
+    if ((len = SSL_read(sssl, buf, sizeof(buf - 1))) > 0) {
+        buf[len] = '\0';
+        printf("Unexpected success reading data: %s\n", buf);
+        goto err;
+    }
+    if (SSL_write(sssl, msg, strlen(msg)) > 0) {
+        printf("Unexpected success writing data\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+ err:
+    SSL_free(sssl);
+    SSL_free(cssl);
+    SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
+    SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
+    ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+    if (ret) {
+        printf("Fatal err test: FAILED\n");
+    }
+
+    ERR_free_strings();
+    ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
+    EVP_cleanup();
+    CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
+    CRYPTO_mem_leaks(err);
+    BIO_free(err);
+
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/ssl/s23_clnt.c b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
index 92f41dd549ad..add8c9916c8f 100644
--- a/ssl/s23_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s23_clnt.c
@@ -757,10 +757,12 @@ static int ssl23_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
                 s->version = TLS1_VERSION;
                 s->method = TLSv1_client_method();
                 break;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3
             case SSL3_VERSION:
                 s->version = SSL3_VERSION;
                 s->method = SSLv3_client_method();
                 break;
+#endif
             }
             SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
             ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION);
diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
index 04212c51e726..b91456843041 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
@@ -1324,10 +1324,16 @@ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek)
         }
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS
         else if (rr->type == TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT) {
-            tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
+            i = tls1_process_heartbeat(s);
+
+            if (i < 0)
+                return i;
 
-            /* Exit and notify application to read again */
             rr->length = 0;
+            if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)
+                goto start;
+
+            /* Exit and notify application to read again */
             s->rwstate = SSL_READING;
             BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s));
             BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s));
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index 90aeb0ce4e1e..3cf96a239bab 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ extern "C" {
 # define SSL_ST_BEFORE                   0x4000
 # define SSL_ST_OK                       0x03
 # define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE              (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT)
-# define SSL_ST_ERR                      0x05
+# define SSL_ST_ERR                      (0x05|SSL_ST_INIT)
 
 # define SSL_CB_LOOP                     0x01
 # define SSL_CB_EXIT                     0x02
diff --git a/ssl/ssltest.c b/ssl/ssltest.c
index 2d6141cd954e..f6a8f195eeb7 100644
--- a/ssl/ssltest.c
+++ b/ssl/ssltest.c
@@ -423,13 +423,13 @@ static unsigned char *next_protos_parse(unsigned short *outlen,
                 OPENSSL_free(out);
                 return NULL;
             }
-            out[start] = i - start;
+            out[start] = (unsigned char)(i - start);
             start = i + 1;
         } else
             out[i + 1] = in[i];
     }
 
-    *outlen = len + 1;
+    *outlen = (unsigned char)(len + 1);
     return out;
 }
 
@@ -554,6 +554,7 @@ static int cb_ticket2(SSL* s, unsigned char* key_name, unsigned char *iv, EVP_CI
 {
     fprintf(stderr, "ticket callback for SNI context should never be called\n");
     EXIT(1);
+    return 0;
 }
 #endif
 
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 6587e8bb685c..1a4387b78eb9 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -1916,7 +1916,7 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf,
         s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, ret);
         s2n(3 + len, ret);
         s2n(1 + len, ret);
-        *ret++ = len;
+        *ret++ = (unsigned char)len;
         memcpy(ret, selected, len);
         ret += len;
     }
diff --git a/util/copy-if-different.pl b/util/copy-if-different.pl
index e1245f54aff1..5420f3f2bd30 100755
--- a/util/copy-if-different.pl
+++ b/util/copy-if-different.pl
@@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ my @filelist;
 
 foreach my $arg (@ARGV) {
 	$arg =~ s|\\|/|g;	# compensate for bug/feature in cygwin glob...
-	foreach (glob qq("$arg"))
+	$arg = qq("$arg") if ($arg =~ /\s/);	# compensate for bug in 5.10...
+	foreach (glob $arg)
 		{
 		push @filelist, $_;
 		}
diff --git a/util/copy.pl b/util/copy.pl
index a6b2a54ec6f0..9c0e68c41467 100644
--- a/util/copy.pl
+++ b/util/copy.pl
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ foreach $arg (@ARGV) {
 		next;
 		}
 	$arg =~ s|\\|/|g;	# compensate for bug/feature in cygwin glob...
-	foreach (glob qq("$arg"))
+	$arg = qq("$arg") if ($arg =~ /\s/);	# compensate for bug in 5.10...
+	foreach (glob $arg)
 		{
 		push @filelist, $_;
 		}
diff --git a/util/libeay.num b/util/libeay.num
index fddfe1cbb202..f5b4f215098e 100755
--- a/util/libeay.num
+++ b/util/libeay.num
@@ -4417,7 +4417,8 @@ EC_GROUP_get_mont_data                  4772	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
 i2d_re_X509_tbs                         4773	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item                  4774	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_meth_get_init                  4775	EXIST::FUNCTION:
-EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover        4776	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verify_recover        4776	EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_meth_get_vrfy_recover          4776	EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_meth_get_keygen                4777	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_meth_get_derive                4778	EXIST::FUNCTION:
 EVP_PKEY_meth_get_verifyctx             4779	EXIST::FUNCTION:
diff --git a/util/mk1mf.pl b/util/mk1mf.pl
index 6b31496ed1e6..ee14dafea6e0 100755
--- a/util/mk1mf.pl
+++ b/util/mk1mf.pl
@@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ foreach (split(/\s+/,$test))
 	{
 	$t=&bname($_);
 	$tt="\$(OBJ_D)${o}$t${obj}";
-	$tt.=" \$(OBJ_D)${o}ssltestlib${obj}" if $t eq "dtlstest";
+	$tt.=" \$(OBJ_D)${o}ssltestlib${obj}" if $t eq "dtlstest" or $t eq "fatalerrtest";
 	$rules.=&do_link_rule("\$(TEST_D)$o$t$exep",$tt,"\$(LIBS_DEP)","\$(L_LIBS) \$(EX_LIBS)");
 	}