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Diffstat (limited to 'auth.c')
-rw-r--r--auth.c165
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 116 deletions
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index 6ee6116dfb2f..a449061741af 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.119 2016/12/15 21:29:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.124 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -43,9 +43,6 @@
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
#include <shadow.h>
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
-#include <libgen.h>
-#endif
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -267,21 +264,41 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
return 1;
}
-void
-auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
+/*
+ * Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in
+ * auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present.
+ */
+static char *
+format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
- va_list ap;
- int i;
-
- free(authctxt->info);
- authctxt->info = NULL;
+ const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key;
+ const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info;
+ char *fp, *ret = NULL;
- va_start(ap, fmt);
- i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap);
- va_end(ap);
+ if (key == NULL)
+ return NULL;
- if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL)
- fatal("vasprintf failed");
+ if (key_is_cert(key)) {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ xasprintf(&ret, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
+ sshkey_type(key), key->cert->key_id,
+ (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+ sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key),
+ fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+ methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
+ methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
+ free(fp);
+ } else {
+ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+ xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key),
+ fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+ methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
+ methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ return ret;
}
void
@@ -290,7 +307,8 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
- char *authmsg;
+ const char *authmsg;
+ char *extra = NULL;
if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
return;
@@ -309,6 +327,11 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
else
authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
+ if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) {
+ if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL)
+ extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info);
+ }
+
authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s",
authmsg,
method,
@@ -317,10 +340,10 @@ auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial,
authctxt->user,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
- authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "",
- authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : "");
- free(authctxt->info);
- authctxt->info = NULL;
+ extra != NULL ? ": " : "",
+ extra != NULL ? extra : "");
+
+ free(extra);
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
@@ -428,7 +451,7 @@ authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
HostStatus
-check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
+check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
{
char *user_hostfile;
@@ -472,98 +495,6 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
return host_status;
}
-/*
- * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
- * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
- * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
- *
- * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
- *
- * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
- * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
- * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
- */
-int
-auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
- uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
-{
- char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
- char *cp;
- int comparehome = 0;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
- strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
- comparehome = 1;
-
- if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
- return -1;
- }
- if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
- (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
- buf);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
- for (;;) {
- if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
- return -1;
- }
- strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
-
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
- (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
- snprintf(err, errlen,
- "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
- if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
- break;
-
- /*
- * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
- * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
- */
- if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
- break;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
- * avoid races.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
- */
-static int
-secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
- char *err, size_t errlen)
-{
- struct stat st;
-
- /* check the open file to avoid races */
- if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
- file, strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
-}
-
static FILE *
auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
int log_missing, char *file_type)
@@ -596,7 +527,7 @@ auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
return NULL;
}
if (strict_modes &&
- secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
+ safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
fclose(f);
logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
@@ -635,6 +566,8 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
ci->user = user;
parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
+ log_change_level(options.log_level);
+ process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
aix_setauthdb(user);
@@ -694,7 +627,7 @@ getpwnamallow(const char *user)
/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
int
-auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key)
+auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key)
{
char *fp = NULL;
int r;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-10-12 03:25:12 +0000