diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/kerberosIV/kadmin/kadm_ser_wrap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/kerberosIV/kadmin/kadm_ser_wrap.c | 213 |
1 files changed, 213 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/kerberosIV/kadmin/kadm_ser_wrap.c b/crypto/kerberosIV/kadmin/kadm_ser_wrap.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..6909a9f0e0cc --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/kerberosIV/kadmin/kadm_ser_wrap.c @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +/* + Copyright (C) 1989 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology + + Export of this software from the United States of America is assumed + to require a specific license from the United States Government. + It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + export to obtain such a license before exporting. + +WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and +distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and +without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright +notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and +this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that +the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining +to distribution of the software without specific, written prior +permission. M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of +this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express +or implied warranty. + + */ + +/* + * Kerberos administration server-side support functions + */ + +/* +kadm_ser_wrap.c +unwraps wrapped packets and calls the appropriate server subroutine +*/ + +#include "kadm_locl.h" + +RCSID("$Id: kadm_ser_wrap.c,v 1.20 1997/05/02 10:29:14 joda Exp $"); + +/* GLOBAL */ +Kadm_Server server_parm; + +/* +kadm_ser_init +set up the server_parm structure +*/ +int +kadm_ser_init(int inter, char *realm) + /* interactive or from file */ + +{ + struct hostent *hp; + char hostname[MaxHostNameLen]; + + init_kadm_err_tbl(); + init_krb_err_tbl(); + if (k_gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname))) + return KADM_NO_HOSTNAME; + + strcpy(server_parm.sname, PWSERV_NAME); + strcpy(server_parm.sinst, KRB_MASTER); + strcpy(server_parm.krbrlm, realm); + + server_parm.admin_fd = -1; + /* setting up the addrs */ + memset(&server_parm.admin_addr,0, sizeof(server_parm.admin_addr)); + + server_parm.admin_addr.sin_port = k_getportbyname (KADM_SNAME, + "tcp", + htons(751)); + server_parm.admin_addr.sin_family = AF_INET; + if ((hp = gethostbyname(hostname)) == NULL) + return KADM_NO_HOSTNAME; + server_parm.admin_addr.sin_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; + /* setting up the database */ + if (kdb_get_master_key((inter==1), &server_parm.master_key, + server_parm.master_key_schedule) != 0) + return KADM_NO_MAST; + if ((server_parm.master_key_version = + kdb_verify_master_key(&server_parm.master_key, + server_parm.master_key_schedule,stderr))<0) + return KADM_NO_VERI; + return KADM_SUCCESS; +} + +static void errpkt(u_char **dat, int *dat_len, int code) +{ + u_int32_t retcode; + char *pdat; + + free(*dat); /* free up req */ + *dat_len = KADM_VERSIZE + sizeof(u_int32_t); + *dat = (u_char *) malloc((unsigned)*dat_len); + pdat = (char *) *dat; + retcode = htonl((u_int32_t) code); + strncpy(pdat, KADM_ULOSE, KADM_VERSIZE); + memcpy(&pdat[KADM_VERSIZE], &retcode, sizeof(u_int32_t)); + return; +} + +/* +kadm_ser_in +unwrap the data stored in dat, process, and return it. +*/ +int +kadm_ser_in(u_char **dat, int *dat_len) +{ + u_char *in_st; /* pointer into the sent packet */ + int in_len,retc; /* where in packet we are, for + returns */ + u_int32_t r_len; /* length of the actual packet */ + KTEXT_ST authent; /* the authenticator */ + AUTH_DAT ad; /* who is this, klink */ + u_int32_t ncksum; /* checksum of encrypted data */ + des_key_schedule sess_sched; /* our schedule */ + MSG_DAT msg_st; + u_char *retdat, *tmpdat; + int retval, retlen; + + if (strncmp(KADM_VERSTR, (char *)*dat, KADM_VERSIZE)) { + errpkt(dat, dat_len, KADM_BAD_VER); + return KADM_BAD_VER; + } + in_len = KADM_VERSIZE; + /* get the length */ + if ((retc = stv_long(*dat, &r_len, in_len, *dat_len)) < 0) + return KADM_LENGTH_ERROR; + in_len += retc; + authent.length = *dat_len - r_len - KADM_VERSIZE - sizeof(u_int32_t); + memcpy(authent.dat, (char *)(*dat) + in_len, authent.length); + authent.mbz = 0; + /* service key should be set before here */ + if ((retc = krb_rd_req(&authent, server_parm.sname, server_parm.sinst, + server_parm.recv_addr.sin_addr.s_addr, &ad, NULL))) + { + errpkt(dat, dat_len,retc + krb_err_base); + return retc + krb_err_base; + } + +#define clr_cli_secrets() {memset(sess_sched, 0, sizeof(sess_sched)); memset(ad.session, 0,sizeof(ad.session));} + + in_st = *dat + *dat_len - r_len; +#ifdef NOENCRYPTION + ncksum = 0; +#else + ncksum = des_quad_cksum((des_cblock *)in_st, (des_cblock *)0, (long) r_len, 0, &ad.session); +#endif + if (ncksum!=ad.checksum) { /* yow, are we correct yet */ + clr_cli_secrets(); + errpkt(dat, dat_len,KADM_BAD_CHK); + return KADM_BAD_CHK; + } +#ifdef NOENCRYPTION + memset(sess_sched, 0, sizeof(sess_sched)); +#else + des_key_sched(&ad.session, sess_sched); +#endif + if ((retc = (int) krb_rd_priv(in_st, r_len, sess_sched, &ad.session, + &server_parm.recv_addr, + &server_parm.admin_addr, &msg_st))) { + clr_cli_secrets(); + errpkt(dat, dat_len,retc + krb_err_base); + return retc + krb_err_base; + } + switch (msg_st.app_data[0]) { + case CHANGE_PW: + retval = kadm_ser_cpw(msg_st.app_data+1,(int) msg_st.app_length - 1, + &ad, &retdat, &retlen); + break; + case ADD_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_add(msg_st.app_data+1,(int) msg_st.app_length - 1, + &ad, &retdat, &retlen); + break; + case GET_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_get(msg_st.app_data+1,(int) msg_st.app_length - 1, + &ad, &retdat, &retlen); + break; + case MOD_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_mod(msg_st.app_data+1,(int) msg_st.app_length - 1, + &ad, &retdat, &retlen); + break; + case DEL_ENT: + retval = kadm_ser_delete(msg_st.app_data + 1, msg_st.app_length - 1, + &ad, &retdat, &retlen); + break; + default: + clr_cli_secrets(); + errpkt(dat, dat_len, KADM_NO_OPCODE); + return KADM_NO_OPCODE; + } + /* Now seal the response back into a priv msg */ + free(*dat); + tmpdat = (u_char *) malloc((unsigned)(retlen + KADM_VERSIZE + + sizeof(u_int32_t))); + strncpy((char *)tmpdat, KADM_VERSTR, KADM_VERSIZE); + retval = htonl((u_int32_t)retval); + memcpy((char *)tmpdat + KADM_VERSIZE, &retval, sizeof(u_int32_t)); + if (retlen) { + memcpy((char *)tmpdat + KADM_VERSIZE + sizeof(u_int32_t), retdat, + retlen); + free(retdat); + } + /* slop for mk_priv stuff */ + *dat = (u_char *) malloc((unsigned) (retlen + KADM_VERSIZE + + sizeof(u_int32_t) + 200)); + if ((*dat_len = krb_mk_priv(tmpdat, *dat, + (u_int32_t) (retlen + KADM_VERSIZE + + sizeof(u_int32_t)), + sess_sched, + &ad.session, &server_parm.admin_addr, + &server_parm.recv_addr)) < 0) { + clr_cli_secrets(); + errpkt(dat, dat_len, KADM_NO_ENCRYPT); + return KADM_NO_ENCRYPT; + } + clr_cli_secrets(); + return KADM_SUCCESS; +} |