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-rw-r--r--crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c266
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 266 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c b/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 843242875aea..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth-rhosts.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
-/*
- *
- * auth-rhosts.c
- *
- * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
- *
- * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
- * All rights reserved
- *
- * Created: Fri Mar 17 05:12:18 1995 ylo
- *
- * Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit
- * the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes
- * /etc/hosts.equiv.
- *
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.12 1999/12/27 10:46:11 markus Exp $");
-
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-
-/*
- * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
- * /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted
- * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise.
- */
-
-int
-check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
- const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user,
- const char *server_user)
-{
- FILE *f;
- char buf[1024]; /* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
-
- /* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */
- f = fopen(filename, "r");
- if (!f)
- return 0;
-
- while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
- /* All three must be at least as big as buf to avoid overflows. */
- char hostbuf[1024], userbuf[1024], dummy[1024], *host, *user, *cp;
- int negated;
-
- for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
- ;
- if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp)
- continue;
-
- /*
- * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we
- * don't ever support the plus syntax).
- */
- if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0)
- continue;
-
- /*
- * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the
- * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten.
- */
- switch (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %s", hostbuf, userbuf, dummy)) {
- case 0:
- packet_send_debug("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename);
- continue;
- case 1:
- /* Host name only. */
- strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf));
- break;
- case 2:
- /* Got both host and user name. */
- break;
- case 3:
- packet_send_debug("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename);
- continue;
- default:
- /* Weird... */
- continue;
- }
-
- host = hostbuf;
- user = userbuf;
- negated = 0;
-
- /* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */
- if (host[0] == '-') {
- negated = 1;
- host++;
- } else if (host[0] == '+')
- host++;
-
- if (user[0] == '-') {
- negated = 1;
- user++;
- } else if (user[0] == '+')
- user++;
-
- /* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
- if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
- /* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
- packet_send_debug("Ignoring wild host/user names in %.100s.",
- filename);
- continue;
- }
- /* Verify that host name matches. */
- if (host[0] == '@') {
- if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
- !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
- continue;
- } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
- continue; /* Different hostname. */
-
- /* Verify that user name matches. */
- if (user[0] == '@') {
- if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL))
- continue;
- } else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0)
- continue; /* Different username. */
-
- /* Found the user and host. */
- fclose(f);
-
- /* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
- if (negated) {
- packet_send_debug("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
- filename);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Accept authentication. */
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* Authentication using this file denied. */
- fclose(f);
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns
- * true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only
- * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
- */
-
-int
-auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user)
-{
- extern ServerOptions options;
- char buf[1024];
- const char *hostname, *ipaddr;
- struct stat st;
- static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL};
- unsigned int rhosts_file_index;
-
- /* Switch to the user's uid. */
- temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
- /*
- * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files, return
- * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
- * servers.
- */
- for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
- rhosts_file_index++) {
- /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
- pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
- if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
- break;
- }
- /* Switch back to privileged uid. */
- restore_uid();
-
- /* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there are no system-wide files. */
- if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
- stat("/etc/hosts.equiv", &st) < 0 &&
- stat(SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0)
- return 0;
-
- hostname = get_canonical_hostname();
- ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
-
- /* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */
- if (pw->pw_uid != 0) {
- if (check_rhosts_file("/etc/hosts.equiv", hostname, ipaddr, client_user,
- pw->pw_name)) {
- packet_send_debug("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.",
- hostname, ipaddr);
- return 1;
- }
- if (check_rhosts_file(SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user,
- pw->pw_name)) {
- packet_send_debug("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.",
- hostname, ipaddr, SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
- return 1;
- }
- }
- /*
- * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
- * not group or world writable.
- */
- if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) {
- log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: no home directory %.200s",
- pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
- packet_send_debug("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: no home directory %.200s",
- pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
- return 0;
- }
- if (options.strict_modes &&
- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
- log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad ownership or modes for home directory.",
- pw->pw_name);
- packet_send_debug("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad ownership or modes for home directory.",
- pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
- temporarily_use_uid(pw->pw_uid);
-
- /* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
- for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
- rhosts_file_index++) {
- /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
- snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
- pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
- continue;
-
- /*
- * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by
- * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the
- * owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally
- * allowing access to their account by anyone.
- */
- if (options.strict_modes &&
- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
- log("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s",
- pw->pw_name, buf);
- packet_send_debug("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf);
- continue;
- }
- /* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts and .shosts files. */
- if (options.ignore_rhosts) {
- packet_send_debug("Server has been configured to ignore %.100s.",
- rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
- continue;
- }
- /* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
- if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
- packet_send_debug("Accepted by %.100s.",
- rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
- /* Restore the privileged uid. */
- restore_uid();
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- /* Restore the privileged uid. */
- restore_uid();
- return 0;
-}
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