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-rw-r--r--crypto/openssh/auth.c566
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 566 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth.c b/crypto/openssh/auth.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 1268accb1ba1..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,566 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.46 2002/11/04 10:07:53 markus Exp $");
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
-#include <login.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
-#include <shadow.h>
-#endif /* defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) */
-
-#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
-#include <libgen.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "match.h"
-#include "groupaccess.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "uidswap.h"
-#include "tildexpand.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-
-/* Debugging messages */
-Buffer auth_debug;
-int auth_debug_init;
-
-/*
- * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
- * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
- * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
- * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
- * listed there, false will be returned.
- * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
- * Otherwise true is returned.
- */
-int
-allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
-{
- struct stat st;
- const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
- char *shell;
- int i;
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
- char *loginmsg;
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
-#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
- !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
- struct spwd *spw;
- time_t today;
-#endif
-
- /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
- if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
- return 0;
-
-#if !defined(USE_PAM) && defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && \
- !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
-#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
- if ((spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL) {
- today = time(NULL) / DAY;
- debug3("allowed_user: today %d sp_expire %d sp_lstchg %d"
- " sp_max %d", (int)today, (int)spw->sp_expire,
- (int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max);
-
- /*
- * We assume account and password expiration occurs the
- * day after the day specified.
- */
- if (spw->sp_expire != -1 && today > spw->sp_expire) {
- log("Account %.100s has expired", pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) {
- log("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)",
- pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (spw->sp_max != -1 &&
- today > spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max) {
- log("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)",
- pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-#endif
-
- /*
- * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
- * legal, and means /bin/sh.
- */
- shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
-
- /* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
- if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
- log("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
- pw->pw_name, shell);
- return 0;
- }
- if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
- (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
- log("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
- pw->pw_name, shell);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0) {
- hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping);
- ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
- }
-
- /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
- if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
- if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
- options.deny_users[i])) {
- log("User %.100s not allowed because listed in DenyUsers",
- pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
- if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
- for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
- if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
- options.allow_users[i]))
- break;
- /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
- if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
- log("User %.100s not allowed because not listed in AllowUsers",
- pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
- /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
- if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
- log("User %.100s not allowed because not in any group",
- pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
- if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
- if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
- options.num_deny_groups)) {
- ga_free();
- log("User %.100s not allowed because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
- pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
- * isn't listed there
- */
- if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
- if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
- options.num_allow_groups)) {
- ga_free();
- log("User %.100s not allowed because none of user's groups are listed in AllowGroups",
- pw->pw_name);
- return 0;
- }
- ga_free();
- }
-
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
- /*
- * Don't check loginrestrictions() for root account (use
- * PermitRootLogin to control logins via ssh), or if running as
- * non-root user (since loginrestrictions will always fail).
- */
- if ((pw->pw_uid != 0) && (geteuid() == 0) &&
- loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &loginmsg) != 0) {
- int loginrestrict_errno = errno;
-
- if (loginmsg && *loginmsg) {
- /* Remove embedded newlines (if any) */
- char *p;
- for (p = loginmsg; *p; p++) {
- if (*p == '\n')
- *p = ' ';
- }
- /* Remove trailing newline */
- *--p = '\0';
- log("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name,
- loginmsg);
- }
- /* Don't fail if /etc/nologin set */
- if (!(loginrestrict_errno == EPERM &&
- stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0))
- return 0;
- }
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
-
- /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
- return 1;
-}
-
-Authctxt *
-authctxt_new(void)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = xmalloc(sizeof(*authctxt));
- memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
- return authctxt;
-}
-
-void
-auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
-{
- void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
- char *authmsg;
-
- /* Raise logging level */
- if (authenticated == 1 ||
- !authctxt->valid ||
- authctxt->failures >= AUTH_FAIL_LOG ||
- strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
- authlog = log;
-
- if (authctxt->postponed)
- authmsg = "Postponed";
- else
- authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
-
- authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
- authmsg,
- method,
- authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
- authctxt->user,
- get_remote_ipaddr(),
- get_remote_port(),
- info);
-
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
- if (authenticated == 0 && strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
- loginfailed(authctxt->user,
- get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping),
- "ssh");
-#endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
-
-}
-
-/*
- * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
- */
-int
-auth_root_allowed(char *method)
-{
- switch (options.permit_root_login) {
- case PERMIT_YES:
- return 1;
- break;
- case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
- if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
- return 1;
- break;
- case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
- if (forced_command) {
- log("Root login accepted for forced command.");
- return 1;
- }
- break;
- }
- log("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
- * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
- * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
- *
- * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
- */
-char *
-expand_filename(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
-{
- Buffer buffer;
- char *file;
- const char *cp;
-
- /*
- * Build the filename string in the buffer by making the appropriate
- * substitutions to the given file name.
- */
- buffer_init(&buffer);
- for (cp = filename; *cp; cp++) {
- if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == '%') {
- buffer_append(&buffer, "%", 1);
- cp++;
- continue;
- }
- if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'h') {
- buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_dir, strlen(pw->pw_dir));
- cp++;
- continue;
- }
- if (cp[0] == '%' && cp[1] == 'u') {
- buffer_append(&buffer, pw->pw_name,
- strlen(pw->pw_name));
- cp++;
- continue;
- }
- buffer_append(&buffer, cp, 1);
- }
- buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1);
-
- /*
- * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
- * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
- */
- file = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN);
- cp = buffer_ptr(&buffer);
- if (*cp != '/')
- snprintf(file, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, cp);
- else
- strlcpy(file, cp, MAXPATHLEN);
-
- buffer_free(&buffer);
- return file;
-}
-
-char *
-authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
-}
-
-char *
-authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
-{
- return expand_filename(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
-}
-
-/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
-HostStatus
-check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
- const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
-{
- Key *found;
- char *user_hostfile;
- struct stat st;
- HostStatus host_status;
-
- /* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
- found = key_new(key->type);
- host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
-
- if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
- user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
- if (options.strict_modes &&
- (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
- ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
- log("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
- "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
- pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
- } else {
- temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
- host, key, found, NULL);
- restore_uid();
- }
- xfree(user_hostfile);
- }
- key_free(found);
-
- debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
- "ok" : "not found", host);
- return host_status;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
- * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
- * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
- *
- * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
- *
- * Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
- * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
- *
- * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
- */
-int
-secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
- char *err, size_t errlen)
-{
- uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
- char *cp;
- int comparehome = 0;
- struct stat st;
-
- if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
- strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
- comparehome = 1;
-
- /* check the open file to avoid races */
- if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
- (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
- buf);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
- for (;;) {
- if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
- snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
- return -1;
- }
- strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
-
- debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
- if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
- (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
- (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
- snprintf(err, errlen,
- "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
- if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
- debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
- buf);
- break;
- }
- /*
- * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
- * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
- */
- if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
- break;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-struct passwd *
-getpwnamallow(const char *user)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- extern login_cap_t *lc;
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- auth_session_t *as;
-#endif
-#endif
- struct passwd *pw;
-
- pw = getpwnam(user);
- if (pw == NULL) {
- log("Illegal user %.100s from %.100s",
- user, get_remote_ipaddr());
-#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
- loginfailed(user,
- get_canonical_hostname(options.verify_reverse_mapping),
- "ssh");
-#endif
- return (NULL);
- }
- if (!allowed_user(pw))
- return (NULL);
-#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
- if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
- debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
- return (NULL);
- }
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
- auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
- debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
- pw = NULL;
- }
- if (as != NULL)
- auth_close(as);
-#endif
-#endif
- if (pw != NULL)
- return (pwcopy(pw));
- return (NULL);
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
-{
- char buf[1024];
- va_list args;
-
- if (!auth_debug_init)
- return;
-
- va_start(args, fmt);
- vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
- va_end(args);
- buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_send(void)
-{
- char *msg;
-
- if (!auth_debug_init)
- return;
- while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
- msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
- packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
- xfree(msg);
- }
-}
-
-void
-auth_debug_reset(void)
-{
- if (auth_debug_init)
- buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
- else {
- buffer_init(&auth_debug);
- auth_debug_init = 1;
- }
-}
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