summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssh/monitor.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssh/monitor.c1650
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1650 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
deleted file mode 100644
index bcd007e607bf..000000000000
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1650 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
- * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.36 2003/04/01 10:22:21 markus Exp $");
-
-#include <openssl/dh.h>
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-#include <skey.h>
-#endif
-
-#include "ssh.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "kex.h"
-#include "dh.h"
-#include "zlib.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "sshpty.h"
-#include "channels.h"
-#include "session.h"
-#include "sshlogin.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "monitor.h"
-#include "monitor_mm.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "misc.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "bufaux.h"
-#include "compat.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "mpaux.h"
-
-/* Imports */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_int utmp_len;
-extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
-extern z_stream incoming_stream;
-extern z_stream outgoing_stream;
-extern u_char session_id[];
-extern Buffer input, output;
-extern Buffer auth_debug;
-extern int auth_debug_init;
-
-/* State exported from the child */
-
-struct {
- z_stream incoming;
- z_stream outgoing;
- u_char *keyin;
- u_int keyinlen;
- u_char *keyout;
- u_int keyoutlen;
- u_char *ivin;
- u_int ivinlen;
- u_char *ivout;
- u_int ivoutlen;
- u_char *ssh1key;
- u_int ssh1keylen;
- int ssh1cipher;
- int ssh1protoflags;
- u_char *input;
- u_int ilen;
- u_char *output;
- u_int olen;
-} child_state;
-
-/* Functions on the montior that answer unprivileged requests */
-
-int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *);
-int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *);
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *);
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KRB4
-int mm_answer_krb4(int, Buffer *);
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB5
-int mm_answer_krb5(int, Buffer *);
-#endif
-
-static Authctxt *authctxt;
-static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
-
-/* local state for key verify */
-static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
-static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
-static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
-static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
-static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
-static char *auth_method = "unknown";
-static int session_id2_len = 0;
-static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
-
-struct mon_table {
- enum monitor_reqtype type;
- int flags;
- int (*f)(int, Buffer *);
-};
-
-#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
-#define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
-#define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
-
-#define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
-
-#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
-#endif
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-#endif
- {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
- {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB4
- {MONITOR_REQ_KRB4, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTH, mm_answer_krb4},
-#endif
-#ifdef KRB5
- {MONITOR_REQ_KRB5, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTH, mm_answer_krb5},
-#endif
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
- {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
-
-/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
-
-static void
-monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
-{
- while (ent->f != NULL) {
- if (ent->type == type) {
- ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
- ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
- return;
- }
- ent++;
- }
-}
-
-static void
-monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
-{
- struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
-
- while (ent->f != NULL) {
- if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
- ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
- ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
- }
- ent++;
- }
-}
-
-Authctxt *
-monitor_child_preauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- struct mon_table *ent;
- int authenticated = 0;
-
- debug3("preauth child monitor started");
-
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
-
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
- }
-
- authctxt = authctxt_new();
-
- /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
- while (!authenticated) {
- authenticated = monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent);
- if (authenticated) {
- if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
- fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
- __func__, ent->type);
- if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
- !auth_root_allowed(auth_method))
- authenticated = 0;
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- if (!do_pam_account(authctxt->pw->pw_name, NULL))
- authenticated = 0;
-#endif
- }
-
- if (ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE) {
- auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, auth_method,
- compat20 ? " ssh2" : "");
- if (!authenticated)
- authctxt->failures++;
- }
- }
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
-
- debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
- __func__, authctxt->user);
-
- mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
-
- return (authctxt);
-}
-
-void
-monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
-
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
-
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- }
- if (!no_pty_flag) {
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
- }
-
- for (;;)
- monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
-}
-
-void
-monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- if (options.compression) {
- /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
- mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
- }
-}
-
-int
-monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
- struct mon_table **pent)
-{
- Buffer m;
- int ret;
- u_char type;
-
- buffer_init(&m);
-
- mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
- type = buffer_get_char(&m);
-
- debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
-
- while (ent->f != NULL) {
- if (ent->type == type)
- break;
- ent++;
- }
-
- if (ent->f != NULL) {
- if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
- fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
- type);
- ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
- buffer_free(&m);
-
- /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
- if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
- debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
- type);
- ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
- }
-
- if (pent != NULL)
- *pent = ent;
-
- return ret;
- }
-
- fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
-
- /* NOTREACHED */
- return (-1);
-}
-
-/* allowed key state */
-static int
-monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
-{
- /* make sure key is allowed */
- if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
- memcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
- return (0);
- return (1);
-}
-
-static void
-monitor_reset_key_state(void)
-{
- /* reset state */
- if (key_blob != NULL)
- xfree(key_blob);
- if (hostbased_cuser != NULL)
- xfree(hostbased_cuser);
- if (hostbased_chost != NULL)
- xfree(hostbased_chost);
- key_blob = NULL;
- key_bloblen = 0;
- key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
- hostbased_cuser = NULL;
- hostbased_chost = NULL;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_moduli(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- DH *dh;
- int min, want, max;
-
- min = buffer_get_int(m);
- want = buffer_get_int(m);
- max = buffer_get_int(m);
-
- debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
- __func__, min, want, max);
- /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
- if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
- fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
- __func__, min, want, max);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
-
- dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
- if (dh == NULL) {
- buffer_put_char(m, 0);
- return (0);
- } else {
- /* Send first bignum */
- buffer_put_char(m, 1);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g);
-
- DH_free(dh);
- }
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_sign(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key;
- u_char *p;
- u_char *signature;
- u_int siglen, datlen;
- int keyid;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
-
- keyid = buffer_get_int(m);
- p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
-
- if (datlen != 20)
- fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
-
- /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
- if (session_id2_len == 0) {
- session_id2_len = datlen;
- session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
- memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
- }
-
- if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
- if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0)
- fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
-
- debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen);
-
- xfree(p);
- xfree(signature);
-
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
-
-int
-mm_answer_pwnamallow(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *login;
- struct passwd *pwent;
- int allowed = 0;
-
- debug3("%s", __func__);
-
- if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
- fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
-
- login = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-
- pwent = getpwnamallow(login);
-
- authctxt->user = xstrdup(login);
- setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? login : "unknown");
- xfree(login);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
-
- if (pwent == NULL) {
- buffer_put_char(m, 0);
- goto out;
- }
-
- allowed = 1;
- authctxt->pw = pwent;
- authctxt->valid = 1;
-
- buffer_put_char(m, 1);
- buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd));
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, "*");
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos);
-#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class);
-#endif
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
-
- out:
- debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
-
- /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
- if (!compat20)
- monitor_permit_authentications(1);
- else {
- /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
- }
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
-#endif
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *banner;
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- banner = auth2_read_banner();
- buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "");
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
-
- if (banner != NULL)
- xfree(banner);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_authserv(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- monitor_permit_authentications(1);
-
- authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
- __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
-
- if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
- xfree(authctxt->style);
- authctxt->style = NULL;
- }
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_authpassword(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- static int call_count;
- char *passwd;
- int authenticated;
- u_int plen;
-
- passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
- /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
- authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
- authctxt->valid && auth_password(authctxt, passwd);
- memset(passwd, 0, strlen(passwd));
- xfree(passwd);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
-
- debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
-
- call_count++;
- if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
- auth_method = "none";
- else
- auth_method = "password";
-
- /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
- return (authenticated);
-}
-
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
-int
-mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *name, *infotxt;
- u_int numprompts;
- u_int *echo_on;
- char **prompts;
- u_int success;
-
- success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
- &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- if (success)
- buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]);
-
- debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
-
- if (success) {
- xfree(name);
- xfree(infotxt);
- xfree(prompts);
- xfree(echo_on);
- }
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *response;
- int authok;
-
- if (authctxt->as == 0)
- fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
-
- response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
- auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
- authctxt->as = NULL;
- debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
- xfree(response);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authok);
-
- debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
-
- auth_method = "bsdauth";
-
- return (authok != 0);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-int
-mm_answer_skeyquery(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- struct skey skey;
- char challenge[1024];
- u_int success;
-
- success = skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- if (success)
- buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge);
-
- debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_skeyrespond(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *response;
- int authok;
-
- response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-
- authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication &&
- authctxt->valid &&
- skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
- skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1);
-
- xfree(response);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, authok);
-
- debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
-
- auth_method = "skey";
-
- return (authok != 0);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-int
-mm_answer_pam_start(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- char *user;
-
- user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
-
- start_pam(user);
-
- xfree(user);
-
- return (0);
-}
-#endif
-
-static void
-mm_append_debug(Buffer *m)
-{
- if (auth_debug_init && buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
- debug3("%s: Appending debug messages for child", __func__);
- buffer_append(m, buffer_ptr(&auth_debug),
- buffer_len(&auth_debug));
- buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
- }
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key;
- char *cuser, *chost;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int bloblen;
- enum mm_keytype type = 0;
- int allowed = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- type = buffer_get_int(m);
- cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
-
- key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
-
- if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
- (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
- fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
-
- debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
-
- if (key != NULL && authctxt->pw != NULL) {
- switch(type) {
- case MM_USERKEY:
- allowed = options.pubkey_authentication &&
- user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key);
- break;
- case MM_HOSTKEY:
- allowed = options.hostbased_authentication &&
- hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
- cuser, chost, key);
- break;
- case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
- key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
- allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
- auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
- cuser, chost, key);
- break;
- default:
- fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
-
- /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- if (allowed) {
- /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
- key_blob = blob;
- key_bloblen = bloblen;
- key_blobtype = type;
- hostbased_cuser = cuser;
- hostbased_chost = chost;
- }
-
- debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
- __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "disallowed");
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
- mm_append_debug(m);
-
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
-
- if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-static int
-monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
-{
- Buffer b;
- char *p;
- u_int len;
- int fail = 0;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
-
- if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
- p = buffer_ptr(&b);
- len = buffer_len(&b);
- if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
- (len < session_id2_len) ||
- (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
- fail++;
- buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
- } else {
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
- (len != session_id2_len) ||
- (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
- fail++;
- xfree(p);
- }
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
- fail++;
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
- log("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- authctxt->user, p);
- fail++;
- }
- xfree(p);
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
- if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
- if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
- fail++;
- } else {
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
- fail++;
- xfree(p);
- if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
- fail++;
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
- }
- buffer_skip_string(&b);
- if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
- fail++;
- buffer_free(&b);
- return (fail == 0);
-}
-
-static int
-monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
- char *chost)
-{
- Buffer b;
- char *p;
- u_int len;
- int fail = 0;
-
- buffer_init(&b);
- buffer_append(&b, data, datalen);
-
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
- if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
- (len != session_id2_len) ||
- (memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
- fail++;
- xfree(p);
-
- if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
- fail++;
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(authctxt->user, p) != 0) {
- log("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- authctxt->user, p);
- fail++;
- }
- xfree(p);
- buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0)
- fail++;
- xfree(p);
- buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */
- buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */
-
- /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.')
- p[len - 1] = '\0';
- if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0)
- fail++;
- xfree(p);
-
- /* verify client user */
- p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0)
- fail++;
- xfree(p);
-
- if (buffer_len(&b) != 0)
- fail++;
- buffer_free(&b);
- return (fail == 0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_keyverify(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key;
- u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
- u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
- int verified = 0;
- int valid_data = 0;
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen);
- data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen);
-
- if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
- !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
-
- key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- if (key == NULL)
- fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__);
-
- switch (key_blobtype) {
- case MM_USERKEY:
- valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
- break;
- case MM_HOSTKEY:
- valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
- hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
- break;
- default:
- valid_data = 0;
- break;
- }
- if (!valid_data)
- fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
-
- verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
- debug3("%s: key %p signature %s",
- __func__, key, verified ? "verified" : "unverified");
-
- key_free(key);
- xfree(blob);
- xfree(signature);
- xfree(data);
-
- auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
-
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, verified);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
-
- return (verified);
-}
-
-static void
-mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
-{
- socklen_t fromlen;
- struct sockaddr_storage from;
-
- /*
- * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
- * the address be 0.0.0.0.
- */
- memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
- fromlen = sizeof(from);
- if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
- if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(),
- (struct sockaddr *) & from, &fromlen) < 0) {
- debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- fatal_cleanup();
- }
- }
- /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
- record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
- get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.verify_reverse_mapping),
- (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
-}
-
-static void
-mm_session_close(Session *s)
-{
- debug3("%s: session %d pid %d", __func__, s->self, s->pid);
- if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
- fatal_remove_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup2, (void *)s);
- session_pty_cleanup2(s);
- }
- s->used = 0;
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_pty(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
- Session *s;
- int res, fd0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- s = session_new();
- if (s == NULL)
- goto error;
- s->authctxt = authctxt;
- s->pw = authctxt->pw;
- s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
- res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
- if (res == 0)
- goto error;
- fatal_add_cleanup(session_pty_cleanup2, (void *)s);
- pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
-
- buffer_put_int(m, 1);
- buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
-
- mm_send_fd(socket, s->ptyfd);
- mm_send_fd(socket, s->ttyfd);
-
- /* We need to trick ttyslot */
- if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
- fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
-
- mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw);
-
- /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
- close(0);
-
- /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
- if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0)
- fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- if (fd0 != 0)
- error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
-
- /* slave is not needed */
- close(s->ttyfd);
- s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
- /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
- s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
-
- debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
-
- return (0);
-
- error:
- if (s != NULL)
- mm_session_close(s);
- buffer_put_int(m, 0);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- Session *s;
- char *tty;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
- mm_session_close(s);
- buffer_clear(m);
- xfree(tty);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_sesskey(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- BIGNUM *p;
- int rsafail;
-
- /* Turn off permissions */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
-
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
-
- rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
-
- BN_clear_free(p);
-
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_sessid(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- int i;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
- fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- BIGNUM *client_n;
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob = NULL;
- u_int blen = 0;
- int allowed = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
- if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
- allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
- BN_clear_free(client_n);
- }
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
- /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- if (allowed && key != NULL) {
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
- buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
-
- /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
- key_blob = blob;
- key_bloblen = blen;
- key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
- }
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
-
- mm_append_debug(m);
-
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
- if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
-
- if (ssh1_challenge)
- BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
- ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
-
- debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
-
- xfree(blob);
- key_free(key);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_response(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob, *response;
- u_int blen, len;
- int success;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
- if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
- if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
- response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- if (len != 16)
- fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
- success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
-
- xfree(blob);
- key_free(key);
- xfree(response);
-
- auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
-
- /* reset state */
- BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
- ssh1_challenge = NULL;
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
-
- return (success);
-}
-
-#ifdef KRB4
-int
-mm_answer_krb4(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- KTEXT_ST auth, reply;
- char *client, *p;
- int success;
- u_int alen;
-
- reply.length = auth.length = 0;
-
- p = buffer_get_string(m, &alen);
- if (alen >= MAX_KTXT_LEN)
- fatal("%s: auth too large", __func__);
- memcpy(auth.dat, p, alen);
- auth.length = alen;
- memset(p, 0, alen);
- xfree(p);
-
- success = options.kerberos_authentication &&
- authctxt->valid &&
- auth_krb4(authctxt, &auth, &client, &reply);
-
- memset(auth.dat, 0, alen);
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
-
- if (success) {
- buffer_put_cstring(m, client);
- buffer_put_string(m, reply.dat, reply.length);
- if (client)
- xfree(client);
- if (reply.length)
- memset(reply.dat, 0, reply.length);
- }
-
- debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, success);
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KRB4, m);
-
- auth_method = "kerberos";
-
- /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
- return (success);
-}
-#endif
-
-#ifdef KRB5
-int
-mm_answer_krb5(int socket, Buffer *m)
-{
- krb5_data tkt, reply;
- char *client_user;
- u_int len;
- int success;
-
- /* use temporary var to avoid size issues on 64bit arch */
- tkt.data = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- tkt.length = len;
-
- success = options.kerberos_authentication &&
- authctxt->valid &&
- auth_krb5(authctxt, &tkt, &client_user, &reply);
-
- if (tkt.length)
- xfree(tkt.data);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
-
- if (success) {
- buffer_put_cstring(m, client_user);
- buffer_put_string(m, reply.data, reply.length);
- if (client_user)
- xfree(client_user);
- if (reply.length)
- xfree(reply.data);
- }
- mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KRB5, m);
-
- return success;
-}
-#endif
-
-int
-mm_answer_term(int socket, Buffer *req)
-{
- extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
- int res, status;
-
- debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
-
- /* The child is terminating */
- session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close);
-
- while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
- if (errno != EINTR)
- exit(1);
-
- res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
-
- /* Terminate process */
- exit (res);
-}
-
-void
-monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- if (compat20) {
- set_newkeys(MODE_IN);
- set_newkeys(MODE_OUT);
- } else {
- packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags);
- packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key,
- child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher);
- xfree(child_state.ssh1key);
- }
-
- /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */
- packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout);
- xfree(child_state.keyout);
- packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin);
- xfree(child_state.keyin);
-
- if (!compat20) {
- packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout);
- xfree(child_state.ivout);
- packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin);
- xfree(child_state.ivin);
- }
-
- memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming,
- sizeof(incoming_stream));
- memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing,
- sizeof(outgoing_stream));
-
- /* Update with new address */
- if (options.compression)
- mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib);
-
- /* Network I/O buffers */
- /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */
- buffer_clear(&input);
- buffer_append(&input, child_state.input, child_state.ilen);
- memset(child_state.input, 0, child_state.ilen);
- xfree(child_state.input);
-
- buffer_clear(&output);
- buffer_append(&output, child_state.output, child_state.olen);
- memset(child_state.output, 0, child_state.olen);
- xfree(child_state.output);
-}
-
-static Kex *
-mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
-{
- Kex *kex;
- void *blob;
- u_int bloblen;
-
- kex = xmalloc(sizeof(*kex));
- memset(kex, 0, sizeof(*kex));
- kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
- if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
- (kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len) ||
- (memcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
- fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
- kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
- kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
- kex->server = 1;
- kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- buffer_init(&kex->my);
- buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen);
- xfree(blob);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen);
- buffer_init(&kex->peer);
- buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen);
- xfree(blob);
- kex->done = 1;
- kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m);
- kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
- kex->load_host_key=&get_hostkey_by_type;
- kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
-
- return (kex);
-}
-
-/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
-
-void
-mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- Buffer m;
- u_char *blob, *p;
- u_int bloblen, plen;
-
- debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
-
- buffer_init(&m);
- mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m);
- if (!compat20) {
- child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m);
- child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m);
- child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m,
- &child_state.ssh1keylen);
- child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m,
- &child_state.ivoutlen);
- child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen);
- goto skip;
- } else {
- /* Get the Kex for rekeying */
- *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m);
- }
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- xfree(blob);
-
- debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
- blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
- current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- xfree(blob);
-
- /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
- packet_set_seqnr(MODE_OUT, buffer_get_int(&m));
- packet_set_seqnr(MODE_IN, buffer_get_int(&m));
-
- skip:
- /* Get the key context */
- child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen);
- child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen);
-
- debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__);
- /* Get compression state */
- p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
- if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing))
- fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
- memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing));
- xfree(p);
-
- p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen);
- if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming))
- fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__);
- memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming));
- xfree(p);
-
- /* Network I/O buffers */
- debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__);
- child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen);
- child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen);
-
- buffer_free(&m);
-}
-
-
-/* Allocation functions for zlib */
-void *
-mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
-{
- size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
- void *address;
-
- if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size)
- fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
-
- address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
-
- return (address);
-}
-
-void
-mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
-{
- mm_free(mm, address);
-}
-
-void
-mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm)
-{
- outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
- outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
- outgoing_stream.opaque = mm;
-
- incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc;
- incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree;
- incoming_stream.opaque = mm;
-}
-
-/* XXX */
-
-#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
- if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) \
- fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
-} while (0)
-
-static void
-monitor_socketpair(int *pair)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
- if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
- fatal("%s: socketpair", __func__);
-#else
- fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes not supported",
- __func__);
-#endif
- FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
- FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
-}
-
-#define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
-
-struct monitor *
-monitor_init(void)
-{
- struct monitor *mon;
- int pair[2];
-
- mon = xmalloc(sizeof(*mon));
-
- monitor_socketpair(pair);
-
- mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
- mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
-
- /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
- if (options.compression) {
- mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
- mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
-
- /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
- mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib);
- }
-
- return mon;
-}
-
-void
-monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
-{
- int pair[2];
-
- monitor_socketpair(pair);
-
- mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
- mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
-}