diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fips/dsa/fips_dsa_ossl.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | fips/dsa/fips_dsa_ossl.c | 691 |
1 files changed, 354 insertions, 337 deletions
diff --git a/fips/dsa/fips_dsa_ossl.c b/fips/dsa/fips_dsa_ossl.c index 50a6c133185f..3659a3da5d7a 100644 --- a/fips/dsa/fips_dsa_ossl.c +++ b/fips/dsa/fips_dsa_ossl.c @@ -5,21 +5,21 @@ * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: @@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence @@ -65,371 +65,388 @@ #include <openssl/asn1.h> #include <openssl/err.h> #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE -#include <openssl/engine.h> +# include <openssl/engine.h> #endif #include <openssl/fips.h> #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T dlen, DSA *dsa); -static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp); -static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, - DSA *dsa); +static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T dlen, + DSA *dsa); +static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, + BIGNUM **rp); +static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa); static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa); static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa); static int dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1, - BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, - BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont); + BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, + BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont); static int dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, - const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, - BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx); static const DSA_METHOD openssl_dsa_meth = { -"OpenSSL FIPS DSA method", -dsa_do_sign, -dsa_sign_setup, -dsa_do_verify, -dsa_mod_exp, -dsa_bn_mod_exp, -dsa_init, -dsa_finish, -DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, -NULL + "OpenSSL FIPS DSA method", + dsa_do_sign, + dsa_sign_setup, + dsa_do_verify, + dsa_mod_exp, + dsa_bn_mod_exp, + dsa_init, + dsa_finish, + DSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, + NULL }; -#if 0 + +# if 0 int FIPS_dsa_check(struct dsa_st *dsa) - { - if(dsa->meth != &openssl_dsa_meth || dsa->meth->dsa_do_sign != dsa_do_sign - || dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup != dsa_sign_setup - || dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp != dsa_mod_exp - || dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp != dsa_bn_mod_exp - || dsa->meth->init != dsa_init - || dsa->meth->finish != dsa_finish) - { - FIPSerr(FIPS_F_FIPS_DSA_CHECK,FIPS_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD); - return 0; - } - return 1; +{ + if (dsa->meth != &openssl_dsa_meth + || dsa->meth->dsa_do_sign != dsa_do_sign + || dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup != dsa_sign_setup + || dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp != dsa_mod_exp + || dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp != dsa_bn_mod_exp + || dsa->meth->init != dsa_init || dsa->meth->finish != dsa_finish) { + FIPSerr(FIPS_F_FIPS_DSA_CHECK, FIPS_R_NON_FIPS_METHOD); + return 0; } -#endif + return 1; +} +# endif const DSA_METHOD *DSA_OpenSSL(void) { - return &openssl_dsa_meth; + return &openssl_dsa_meth; } -static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T dlen, DSA *dsa) - { - BIGNUM *kinv=NULL,*r=NULL,*s=NULL; - BIGNUM m; - BIGNUM xr; - BN_CTX *ctx=NULL; - int i,reason=ERR_R_BN_LIB; - DSA_SIG *ret=NULL; - - if(FIPS_selftest_failed()) - { - FIPSerr(FIPS_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); - return NULL; - } - - if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) - { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, DSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); - return NULL; - } - - BN_init(&m); - BN_init(&xr); - - if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) - { - reason=DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS; - goto err; - } - - s=BN_new(); - if (s == NULL) goto err; - - i=BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ - if ((dlen > i) || (dlen > 50)) - { - reason=DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE; - goto err; - } - - ctx=BN_CTX_new(); - if (ctx == NULL) goto err; - - if (!dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup(dsa,ctx,&kinv,&r)) goto err; - - if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dlen,&m) == NULL) goto err; - - /* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr,dsa->priv_key,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err;/* s = xr */ - if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) goto err; /* s = m + xr */ - if (BN_cmp(s,dsa->q) > 0) - BN_sub(s,s,dsa->q); - if (!BN_mod_mul(s,s,kinv,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - - ret= DSA_SIG_new(); - if (ret == NULL) goto err; - ret->r = r; - ret->s = s; - -err: - if (!ret) - { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN,reason); - BN_free(r); - BN_free(s); - } - if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); - BN_clear_free(&m); - BN_clear_free(&xr); - if (kinv != NULL) /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */ - BN_clear_free(kinv); - return(ret); - } - -static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp) - { - BN_CTX *ctx; - BIGNUM k,kq,*K,*kinv=NULL,*r=NULL; - int ret=0; - - if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) - { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); - return 0; - } - - BN_init(&k); - BN_init(&kq); - - if (ctx_in == NULL) - { - if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - } - else - ctx=ctx_in; - - if ((r=BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; - - /* Get random k */ - do - if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) goto err; - while (BN_is_zero(&k)); - if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) - { - BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); - } - - if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) - { - if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p, - CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, - dsa->p, ctx)) - goto err; - } - - /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */ - - if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) - { - if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k)) goto err; - - /* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, - * so we compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. - * - * (This is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont() - * does not let us specify the desired timing behaviour.) */ - - if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) goto err; - if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) - { - if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) goto err; - } - - K = &kq; - } - else - { - K = &k; - } - if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r,dsa->g,K,dsa->p,ctx, - (BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p)) goto err; - if (!BN_mod(r,r,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - - /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ - if ((kinv=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,&k,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err; - - if (*kinvp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*kinvp); - *kinvp=kinv; - kinv=NULL; - if (*rp != NULL) BN_clear_free(*rp); - *rp=r; - ret=1; -err: - if (!ret) - { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv); - if (r != NULL) BN_clear_free(r); - } - if (ctx_in == NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); - if (kinv != NULL) BN_clear_free(kinv); - BN_clear_free(&k); - BN_clear_free(&kq); - return(ret); - } - -static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T dgst_len, DSA_SIG *sig, - DSA *dsa) - { - BN_CTX *ctx; - BIGNUM u1,u2,t1; - BN_MONT_CTX *mont=NULL; - int ret = -1; - - if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) - { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); - return -1; - } - - if(FIPS_selftest_failed()) - { - FIPSerr(FIPS_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); - return -1; - } - - if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160) - { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE); - return -1; - } - - if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) - { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); - return -1; - } - - if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) - { - DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); - return -1; - } - - BN_init(&u1); - BN_init(&u2); - BN_init(&t1); - - if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; - - if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) - { - ret = 0; - goto err; - } - if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) - { - ret = 0; - goto err; - } - - /* Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q - * save W in u2 */ - if ((BN_mod_inverse(&u2,sig->s,dsa->q,ctx)) == NULL) goto err; - - /* save M in u1 */ - if (BN_bin2bn(dgst,dgst_len,&u1) == NULL) goto err; - - /* u1 = M * w mod q */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1,&u1,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - - /* u2 = r * w mod q */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2,sig->r,&u2,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - - - if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) - { - mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked( - (BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p, - CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx); - if (!mont) - goto err; - } - -#if 0 - { - BIGNUM t2; - - BN_init(&t2); - /* v = ( g^u1 * y^u2 mod p ) mod q */ - /* let t1 = g ^ u1 mod p */ - if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t1,dsa->g,&u1,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err; - /* let t2 = y ^ u2 mod p */ - if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t2,dsa->pub_key,&u2,dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err; - /* let u1 = t1 * t2 mod p */ - if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1,&t1,&t2,dsa->p,ctx)) goto err_bn; - BN_free(&t2); - } - /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ - if (!BN_mod(&u1,&u1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; -#else - { - if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, &t1,dsa->g,&u1,dsa->pub_key,&u2, - dsa->p,ctx,mont)) goto err; - /* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */ - /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ - if (!BN_mod(&u1,&t1,dsa->q,ctx)) goto err; - } -#endif - /* V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be - * equal to R. */ - ret=(BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0); - - err: - if (ret != 1) DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY,ERR_R_BN_LIB); - if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx); - BN_free(&u1); - BN_free(&u2); - BN_free(&t1); - return(ret); - } +static DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T dlen, + DSA *dsa) +{ + BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL, *s = NULL; + BIGNUM m; + BIGNUM xr; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + int i, reason = ERR_R_BN_LIB; + DSA_SIG *ret = NULL; + + if (FIPS_selftest_failed()) { + FIPSerr(FIPS_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); + return NULL; + } + + if (FIPS_mode() + && (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, DSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + return NULL; + } + + BN_init(&m); + BN_init(&xr); + + if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { + reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS; + goto err; + } + + s = BN_new(); + if (s == NULL) + goto err; + + i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */ + if ((dlen > i) || (dlen > 50)) { + reason = DSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE; + goto err; + } + + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto err; + + if (!dsa->meth->dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &r)) + goto err; + + if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, &m) == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Compute s = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(&xr, dsa->priv_key, r, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; /* s = xr */ + if (!BN_add(s, &xr, &m)) + goto err; /* s = m + xr */ + if (BN_cmp(s, dsa->q) > 0) + BN_sub(s, s, dsa->q); + if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + + ret = DSA_SIG_new(); + if (ret == NULL) + goto err; + ret->r = r; + ret->s = s; + + err: + if (!ret) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_SIGN, reason); + BN_free(r); + BN_free(s); + } + if (ctx != NULL) + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + BN_clear_free(&m); + BN_clear_free(&xr); + if (kinv != NULL) /* dsa->kinv is NULL now if we used it */ + BN_clear_free(kinv); + return (ret); +} + +static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, + BIGNUM **rp) +{ + BN_CTX *ctx; + BIGNUM k, kq, *K, *kinv = NULL, *r = NULL; + int ret = 0; + + if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); + return 0; + } + + BN_init(&k); + BN_init(&kq); + + if (ctx_in == NULL) { + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + } else + ctx = ctx_in; + + if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + /* Get random k */ + do + if (!BN_rand_range(&k, dsa->q)) + goto err; + while (BN_is_zero(&k)) ; + if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { + BN_set_flags(&k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME); + } + + if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { + if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p, + CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx)) + goto err; + } + + /* Compute r = (g^k mod p) mod q */ + + if ((dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME) == 0) { + if (!BN_copy(&kq, &k)) + goto err; + + /* + * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k, so we + * compute g^k using an equivalent exponent of fixed length. (This + * is a kludge that we need because the BN_mod_exp_mont() does not + * let us specify the desired timing behaviour.) + */ + + if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) + goto err; + if (BN_num_bits(&kq) <= BN_num_bits(dsa->q)) { + if (!BN_add(&kq, &kq, dsa->q)) + goto err; + } + + K = &kq; + } else { + K = &k; + } + if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, K, dsa->p, ctx, + (BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p)) + goto err; + if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */ + if ((kinv = BN_mod_inverse(NULL, &k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (*kinvp != NULL) + BN_clear_free(*kinvp); + *kinvp = kinv; + kinv = NULL; + if (*rp != NULL) + BN_clear_free(*rp); + *rp = r; + ret = 1; + err: + if (!ret) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + if (kinv != NULL) + BN_clear_free(kinv); + if (r != NULL) + BN_clear_free(r); + } + if (ctx_in == NULL) + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + if (kinv != NULL) + BN_clear_free(kinv); + BN_clear_free(&k); + BN_clear_free(&kq); + return (ret); +} + +static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, FIPS_DSA_SIZE_T dgst_len, + DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa) +{ + BN_CTX *ctx; + BIGNUM u1, u2, t1; + BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; + int ret = -1; + + if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); + return -1; + } + + if (FIPS_selftest_failed()) { + FIPSerr(FIPS_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_num_bits(dsa->q) != 160) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE); + return -1; + } + + if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE); + return -1; + } + + if (FIPS_mode() + && (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) < OPENSSL_DSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) { + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); + return -1; + } + + BN_init(&u1); + BN_init(&u2); + BN_init(&t1); + + if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + goto err; + + if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0) { + ret = 0; + goto err; + } + if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0) { + ret = 0; + goto err; + } + + /* + * Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q save W in u2 + */ + if ((BN_mod_inverse(&u2, sig->s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL) + goto err; + + /* save M in u1 */ + if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dgst_len, &u1) == NULL) + goto err; + + /* u1 = M * w mod q */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &u1, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + + /* u2 = r * w mod q */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(&u2, sig->r, &u2, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + + if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) { + mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked((BN_MONT_CTX **)&dsa->method_mont_p, + CRYPTO_LOCK_DSA, dsa->p, ctx); + if (!mont) + goto err; + } +# if 0 + { + BIGNUM t2; + + BN_init(&t2); + /* v = ( g^u1 * y^u2 mod p ) mod q */ + /* let t1 = g ^ u1 mod p */ + if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->p, ctx, mont)) + goto err; + /* let t2 = y ^ u2 mod p */ + if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(&t2, dsa->pub_key, &u2, dsa->p, ctx, mont)) + goto err; + /* let u1 = t1 * t2 mod p */ + if (!BN_mod_mul(&u1, &t1, &t2, dsa->p, ctx)) + goto err_bn; + BN_free(&t2); + } + /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ + if (!BN_mod(&u1, &u1, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; +# else + { + if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, &t1, dsa->g, &u1, dsa->pub_key, &u2, + dsa->p, ctx, mont)) + goto err; + /* BN_copy(&u1,&t1); */ + /* let u1 = u1 mod q */ + if (!BN_mod(&u1, &t1, dsa->q, ctx)) + goto err; + } +# endif + /* + * V is now in u1. If the signature is correct, it will be equal to R. + */ + ret = (BN_ucmp(&u1, sig->r) == 0); + + err: + if (ret != 1) + DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + if (ctx != NULL) + BN_CTX_free(ctx); + BN_free(&u1); + BN_free(&u2); + BN_free(&t1); + return (ret); +} static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa) { - FIPS_selftest_check(); - dsa->flags|=DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; - return(1); + FIPS_selftest_check(); + dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P; + return (1); } static int dsa_finish(DSA *dsa) { - if(dsa->method_mont_p) - BN_MONT_CTX_free((BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p); - return(1); + if (dsa->method_mont_p) + BN_MONT_CTX_free((BN_MONT_CTX *)dsa->method_mont_p); + return (1); } static int dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1, BIGNUM *p1, - BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, - BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) + BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, + BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) { - return BN_mod_exp2_mont(rr, a1, p1, a2, p2, m, ctx, in_mont); + return BN_mod_exp2_mont(rr, a1, p1, a2, p2, m, ctx, in_mont); } - + static int dsa_bn_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, - const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, - BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx) { - return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx); + return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx); } -#else /* ndef OPENSSL_FIPS */ +#else /* ndef OPENSSL_FIPS */ -static void *dummy=&dummy; +static void *dummy = &dummy; -#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_FIPS */ +#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_FIPS */ |