diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3')
| -rw-r--r-- | secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3 | 61 |
1 files changed, 34 insertions, 27 deletions
diff --git a/secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3 b/secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3 index 2e7a8d065a99..8937e092181c 100644 --- a/secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3 +++ b/secure/lib/libssl/man/SSL_CTX_set_options.3 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.25 (Pod::Simple 3.23) +.\" Automatically generated by Pod::Man 2.27 (Pod::Simple 3.28) .\" .\" Standard preamble: .\" ======================================================================== @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ . ds PI \(*p . ds L" `` . ds R" '' +. ds C` +. ds C' 'br\} .\" .\" Escape single quotes in literal strings from groff's Unicode transform. @@ -48,17 +50,24 @@ .\" titles (.TH), headers (.SH), subsections (.SS), items (.Ip), and index .\" entries marked with X<> in POD. Of course, you'll have to process the .\" output yourself in some meaningful fashion. -.ie \nF \{\ -. de IX -. tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2" +.\" +.\" Avoid warning from groff about undefined register 'F'. +.de IX .. -. nr % 0 -. rr F -.\} -.el \{\ -. de IX +.nr rF 0 +.if \n(.g .if rF .nr rF 1 +.if (\n(rF:(\n(.g==0)) \{ +. if \nF \{ +. de IX +. tm Index:\\$1\t\\n%\t"\\$2" .. +. if !\nF==2 \{ +. nr % 0 +. nr F 2 +. \} +. \} .\} +.rr rF .\" .\" Accent mark definitions (@(#)ms.acc 1.5 88/02/08 SMI; from UCB 4.2). .\" Fear. Run. Save yourself. No user-serviceable parts. @@ -124,7 +133,7 @@ .\" ======================================================================== .\" .IX Title "SSL_CTX_set_options 3" -.TH SSL_CTX_set_options 3 "2013-02-11" "1.0.1e" "OpenSSL" +.TH SSL_CTX_set_options 3 "2015-01-15" "1.0.1l" "OpenSSL" .\" For nroff, turn off justification. Always turn off hyphenation; it makes .\" way too many mistakes in technical documents. .if n .ad l @@ -207,9 +216,10 @@ As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect. .IP "\s-1SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER" \&... -.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING\s0" 4 -.IX Item "SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING" -As of OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8a, this option has no effect. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG" +Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on \s-1OS X. +OS X 10.8..10.8.3\s0 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers. .IP "\s-1SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG" \&... @@ -221,10 +231,15 @@ As of OpenSSL 0.9.7h and 0.9.8a, this option has no effect. \&... .IP "\s-1SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS" -Disables a countermeasure against a \s-1SSL\s0 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol +Disables a countermeasure against a \s-1SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0\s0 protocol vulnerability affecting \s-1CBC\s0 ciphers, which cannot be handled by some broken \s-1SSL\s0 implementations. This option has no effect for connections using other ciphers. +.IP "\s-1SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING\s0" 4 +.IX Item "SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING" +Adds a padding extension to ensure the ClientHello size is never between +256 and 511 bytes in length. This is needed as a workaround for some +implementations. .IP "\s-1SSL_OP_ALL\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_OP_ALL" All of the above bug workarounds. @@ -258,15 +273,7 @@ a new \s-1DH\s0 key during each handshake but it is also recommended. temporary/ephemeral \s-1DH\s0 parameters are used. .IP "\s-1SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA" -Always use ephemeral (temporary) \s-1RSA\s0 key when doing \s-1RSA\s0 operations -(see \fISSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback\fR\|(3)). -According to the specifications this is only done, when a \s-1RSA\s0 key -can only be used for signature operations (namely under export ciphers -with restricted \s-1RSA\s0 keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral -\&\s-1RSA\s0 keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the -\&\s-1SSL/TLS\s0 specifications and may lead to interoperability problems with -clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with \s-1EDH\s0 (ephemeral -Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used instead. +This option is no longer implemented and is treated as no op. .IP "\s-1SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE" When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the client @@ -312,16 +319,16 @@ not be used by clients or servers. .IP "\s-1SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION" Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or -servers. See the \fB\s-1SECURE\s0 \s-1RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR section for more details. +servers. See the \fB\s-1SECURE RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR section for more details. .IP "\s-1SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT\s0" 4 .IX Item "SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT" Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched servers \&\fBonly\fR: this option is currently set by default. See the -\&\fB\s-1SECURE\s0 \s-1RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR section for more details. +\&\fB\s-1SECURE RENEGOTIATION\s0\fR section for more details. .SH "SECURE RENEGOTIATION" .IX Header "SECURE RENEGOTIATION" OpenSSL 0.9.8m and later always attempts to use secure renegotiation as -described in \s-1RFC5746\s0. This counters the prefix attack described in +described in \s-1RFC5746.\s0 This counters the prefix attack described in \&\s-1CVE\-2009\-3555\s0 and elsewhere. .PP The deprecated and highly broken SSLv2 protocol does not support @@ -339,7 +346,7 @@ renegotiation implementation. Connections and renegotiation are always permitted by OpenSSL implementations. .SS "Unpatched client and patched OpenSSL server" .IX Subsection "Unpatched client and patched OpenSSL server" -The initial connection suceeds but client renegotiation is denied by the +The initial connection succeeds but client renegotiation is denied by the server with a \fBno_renegotiation\fR warning alert if \s-1TLS\s0 v1.0 is used or a fatal \&\fBhandshake_failure\fR alert in \s-1SSL\s0 v3.0. .PP |