diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c | 269 |
1 files changed, 269 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..713044c67d69 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c @@ -0,0 +1,269 @@ +/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */ +/* lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c */ +/* + * Copyright 2008, 2009 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. + * All Rights Reserved. + * + * Export of this software from the United States of America may + * require a specific license from the United States Government. + * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating + * export to obtain such a license before exporting. + * + * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and + * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and + * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright + * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and + * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that + * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining + * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior + * permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label + * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a + * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software. + * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of + * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express + * or implied warranty. + */ + + +#include "crypto_int.h" + +#define K5CLENGTH 5 /* 32 bit net byte order integer + one byte seed */ + +/* AEAD */ + +unsigned int +krb5int_dk_crypto_length(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_cryptotype type) +{ + switch (type) { + case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER: + case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING: + return ktp->enc->block_size; + case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER: + case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_CHECKSUM: + return ktp->hash->hashsize; + default: + assert(0 && "invalid cryptotype passed to krb5int_dk_crypto_length"); + return 0; + } +} + +unsigned int +krb5int_aes_crypto_length(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, + krb5_cryptotype type) +{ + switch (type) { + case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER: + return ktp->enc->block_size; + case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING: + return 0; + case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER: + case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_CHECKSUM: + return 96 / 8; + default: + assert(0 && "invalid cryptotype passed to krb5int_aes_crypto_length"); + return 0; + } +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5int_dk_encrypt(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key, + krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec, + krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data) +{ + const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc = ktp->enc; + const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash = ktp->hash; + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned char constantdata[K5CLENGTH]; + krb5_data d1, d2; + krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer, *padding; + krb5_key ke = NULL, ki = NULL; + size_t i; + unsigned int blocksize, hmacsize, plainlen = 0, padsize = 0; + unsigned char *cksum = NULL; + + /* E(Confounder | Plaintext | Pad) | Checksum */ + + blocksize = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING); + hmacsize = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER); + + for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) { + krb5_crypto_iov *iov = &data[i]; + + if (iov->flags == KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA) + plainlen += iov->data.length; + } + + /* Validate header and trailer lengths. */ + + header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER); + if (header == NULL || header->data.length < enc->block_size) + return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; + + trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER); + if (trailer == NULL || trailer->data.length < hmacsize) + return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; + + if (blocksize != 0) { + /* Check that the input data is correctly padded. */ + if (plainlen % blocksize) + padsize = blocksize - (plainlen % blocksize); + } + + padding = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING); + if (padsize && (padding == NULL || padding->data.length < padsize)) + return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; + + if (padding != NULL) { + memset(padding->data.data, 0, padsize); + padding->data.length = padsize; + } + + cksum = k5alloc(hash->hashsize, &ret); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + /* Derive the keys. */ + + d1.data = (char *)constantdata; + d1.length = K5CLENGTH; + + store_32_be(usage, constantdata); + + d1.data[4] = 0xAA; + + ret = krb5int_derive_key(enc, NULL, key, &ke, &d1, DERIVE_RFC3961); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + d1.data[4] = 0x55; + + ret = krb5int_derive_key(enc, NULL, key, &ki, &d1, DERIVE_RFC3961); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + /* Generate confounder. */ + + header->data.length = enc->block_size; + + ret = krb5_c_random_make_octets(/* XXX */ NULL, &header->data); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + /* Hash the plaintext. */ + d2.length = hash->hashsize; + d2.data = (char *)cksum; + + ret = krb5int_hmac(hash, ki, data, num_data, &d2); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + /* Encrypt the plaintext (header | data | padding) */ + ret = enc->encrypt(ke, ivec, data, num_data); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + /* Possibly truncate the hash */ + assert(hmacsize <= d2.length); + + memcpy(trailer->data.data, cksum, hmacsize); + trailer->data.length = hmacsize; + +cleanup: + krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ke); + krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ki); + free(cksum); + return ret; +} + +krb5_error_code +krb5int_dk_decrypt(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key, + krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec, + krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data) +{ + const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc = ktp->enc; + const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash = ktp->hash; + krb5_error_code ret; + unsigned char constantdata[K5CLENGTH]; + krb5_data d1; + krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer; + krb5_key ke = NULL, ki = NULL; + size_t i; + unsigned int blocksize; /* enc block size, not confounder len */ + unsigned int hmacsize, cipherlen = 0; + unsigned char *cksum = NULL; + + /* E(Confounder | Plaintext | Pad) | Checksum */ + + blocksize = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING); + hmacsize = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER); + + if (blocksize != 0) { + /* Check that the input data is correctly padded. */ + for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) { + const krb5_crypto_iov *iov = &data[i]; + + if (ENCRYPT_DATA_IOV(iov)) + cipherlen += iov->data.length; + } + if (cipherlen % blocksize != 0) + return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; + } + + /* Validate header and trailer lengths */ + + header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER); + if (header == NULL || header->data.length != enc->block_size) + return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; + + trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER); + if (trailer == NULL || trailer->data.length != hmacsize) + return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE; + + cksum = k5alloc(hash->hashsize, &ret); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + /* Derive the keys. */ + + d1.data = (char *)constantdata; + d1.length = K5CLENGTH; + + store_32_be(usage, constantdata); + + d1.data[4] = 0xAA; + + ret = krb5int_derive_key(enc, NULL, key, &ke, &d1, DERIVE_RFC3961); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + d1.data[4] = 0x55; + + ret = krb5int_derive_key(enc, NULL, key, &ki, &d1, DERIVE_RFC3961); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + /* Decrypt the plaintext (header | data | padding). */ + ret = enc->decrypt(ke, ivec, data, num_data); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + /* Verify the hash. */ + d1.length = hash->hashsize; /* non-truncated length */ + d1.data = (char *)cksum; + + ret = krb5int_hmac(hash, ki, data, num_data, &d1); + if (ret != 0) + goto cleanup; + + /* Compare only the possibly truncated length. */ + if (k5_bcmp(cksum, trailer->data.data, hmacsize) != 0) { + ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY; + goto cleanup; + } + +cleanup: + krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ke); + krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ki); + free(cksum); + return ret; +} |
