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-rw-r--r--src/lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c269
1 files changed, 269 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c b/src/lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..713044c67d69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+/* -*- mode: c; c-basic-offset: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil -*- */
+/* lib/crypto/krb/enc_dk_hmac.c */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2008, 2009 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
+ * All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Export of this software from the United States of America may
+ * require a specific license from the United States Government.
+ * It is the responsibility of any person or organization contemplating
+ * export to obtain such a license before exporting.
+ *
+ * WITHIN THAT CONSTRAINT, permission to use, copy, modify, and
+ * distribute this software and its documentation for any purpose and
+ * without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appear in all copies and that both that copyright notice and
+ * this permission notice appear in supporting documentation, and that
+ * the name of M.I.T. not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining
+ * to distribution of the software without specific, written prior
+ * permission. Furthermore if you modify this software you must label
+ * your software as modified software and not distribute it in such a
+ * fashion that it might be confused with the original M.I.T. software.
+ * M.I.T. makes no representations about the suitability of
+ * this software for any purpose. It is provided "as is" without express
+ * or implied warranty.
+ */
+
+
+#include "crypto_int.h"
+
+#define K5CLENGTH 5 /* 32 bit net byte order integer + one byte seed */
+
+/* AEAD */
+
+unsigned int
+krb5int_dk_crypto_length(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_cryptotype type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER:
+ case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING:
+ return ktp->enc->block_size;
+ case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER:
+ case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_CHECKSUM:
+ return ktp->hash->hashsize;
+ default:
+ assert(0 && "invalid cryptotype passed to krb5int_dk_crypto_length");
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+unsigned int
+krb5int_aes_crypto_length(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp,
+ krb5_cryptotype type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER:
+ return ktp->enc->block_size;
+ case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING:
+ return 0;
+ case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER:
+ case KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_CHECKSUM:
+ return 96 / 8;
+ default:
+ assert(0 && "invalid cryptotype passed to krb5int_aes_crypto_length");
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5int_dk_encrypt(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key,
+ krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec,
+ krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data)
+{
+ const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc = ktp->enc;
+ const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash = ktp->hash;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ unsigned char constantdata[K5CLENGTH];
+ krb5_data d1, d2;
+ krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer, *padding;
+ krb5_key ke = NULL, ki = NULL;
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned int blocksize, hmacsize, plainlen = 0, padsize = 0;
+ unsigned char *cksum = NULL;
+
+ /* E(Confounder | Plaintext | Pad) | Checksum */
+
+ blocksize = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING);
+ hmacsize = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) {
+ krb5_crypto_iov *iov = &data[i];
+
+ if (iov->flags == KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_DATA)
+ plainlen += iov->data.length;
+ }
+
+ /* Validate header and trailer lengths. */
+
+ header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER);
+ if (header == NULL || header->data.length < enc->block_size)
+ return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
+
+ trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
+ if (trailer == NULL || trailer->data.length < hmacsize)
+ return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
+
+ if (blocksize != 0) {
+ /* Check that the input data is correctly padded. */
+ if (plainlen % blocksize)
+ padsize = blocksize - (plainlen % blocksize);
+ }
+
+ padding = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING);
+ if (padsize && (padding == NULL || padding->data.length < padsize))
+ return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
+
+ if (padding != NULL) {
+ memset(padding->data.data, 0, padsize);
+ padding->data.length = padsize;
+ }
+
+ cksum = k5alloc(hash->hashsize, &ret);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Derive the keys. */
+
+ d1.data = (char *)constantdata;
+ d1.length = K5CLENGTH;
+
+ store_32_be(usage, constantdata);
+
+ d1.data[4] = 0xAA;
+
+ ret = krb5int_derive_key(enc, NULL, key, &ke, &d1, DERIVE_RFC3961);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ d1.data[4] = 0x55;
+
+ ret = krb5int_derive_key(enc, NULL, key, &ki, &d1, DERIVE_RFC3961);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Generate confounder. */
+
+ header->data.length = enc->block_size;
+
+ ret = krb5_c_random_make_octets(/* XXX */ NULL, &header->data);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Hash the plaintext. */
+ d2.length = hash->hashsize;
+ d2.data = (char *)cksum;
+
+ ret = krb5int_hmac(hash, ki, data, num_data, &d2);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Encrypt the plaintext (header | data | padding) */
+ ret = enc->encrypt(ke, ivec, data, num_data);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Possibly truncate the hash */
+ assert(hmacsize <= d2.length);
+
+ memcpy(trailer->data.data, cksum, hmacsize);
+ trailer->data.length = hmacsize;
+
+cleanup:
+ krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ke);
+ krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ki);
+ free(cksum);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5int_dk_decrypt(const struct krb5_keytypes *ktp, krb5_key key,
+ krb5_keyusage usage, const krb5_data *ivec,
+ krb5_crypto_iov *data, size_t num_data)
+{
+ const struct krb5_enc_provider *enc = ktp->enc;
+ const struct krb5_hash_provider *hash = ktp->hash;
+ krb5_error_code ret;
+ unsigned char constantdata[K5CLENGTH];
+ krb5_data d1;
+ krb5_crypto_iov *header, *trailer;
+ krb5_key ke = NULL, ki = NULL;
+ size_t i;
+ unsigned int blocksize; /* enc block size, not confounder len */
+ unsigned int hmacsize, cipherlen = 0;
+ unsigned char *cksum = NULL;
+
+ /* E(Confounder | Plaintext | Pad) | Checksum */
+
+ blocksize = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_PADDING);
+ hmacsize = ktp->crypto_length(ktp, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
+
+ if (blocksize != 0) {
+ /* Check that the input data is correctly padded. */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_data; i++) {
+ const krb5_crypto_iov *iov = &data[i];
+
+ if (ENCRYPT_DATA_IOV(iov))
+ cipherlen += iov->data.length;
+ }
+ if (cipherlen % blocksize != 0)
+ return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* Validate header and trailer lengths */
+
+ header = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_HEADER);
+ if (header == NULL || header->data.length != enc->block_size)
+ return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
+
+ trailer = krb5int_c_locate_iov(data, num_data, KRB5_CRYPTO_TYPE_TRAILER);
+ if (trailer == NULL || trailer->data.length != hmacsize)
+ return KRB5_BAD_MSIZE;
+
+ cksum = k5alloc(hash->hashsize, &ret);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Derive the keys. */
+
+ d1.data = (char *)constantdata;
+ d1.length = K5CLENGTH;
+
+ store_32_be(usage, constantdata);
+
+ d1.data[4] = 0xAA;
+
+ ret = krb5int_derive_key(enc, NULL, key, &ke, &d1, DERIVE_RFC3961);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ d1.data[4] = 0x55;
+
+ ret = krb5int_derive_key(enc, NULL, key, &ki, &d1, DERIVE_RFC3961);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Decrypt the plaintext (header | data | padding). */
+ ret = enc->decrypt(ke, ivec, data, num_data);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Verify the hash. */
+ d1.length = hash->hashsize; /* non-truncated length */
+ d1.data = (char *)cksum;
+
+ ret = krb5int_hmac(hash, ki, data, num_data, &d1);
+ if (ret != 0)
+ goto cleanup;
+
+ /* Compare only the possibly truncated length. */
+ if (k5_bcmp(cksum, trailer->data.data, hmacsize) != 0) {
+ ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ke);
+ krb5_k_free_key(NULL, ki);
+ free(cksum);
+ return ret;
+}