diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/s3_srvr.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/s3_srvr.c | 3699 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 3699 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c deleted file mode 100644 index 96d973cd02bb..000000000000 --- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3699 +0,0 @@ -/* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ -/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) - * All rights reserved. - * - * This package is an SSL implementation written - * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). - * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * - * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as - * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions - * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, - * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation - * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms - * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in - * the code are not to be removed. - * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution - * as the author of the parts of the library used. - * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or - * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software - * must display the following acknowledgement: - * "This product includes cryptographic software written by - * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" - * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library - * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from - * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: - * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND - * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE - * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE - * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL - * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS - * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT - * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY - * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF - * SUCH DAMAGE. - * - * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or - * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be - * copied and put under another distribution licence - * [including the GNU Public Licence.] - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * openssl-core@openssl.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. - * - * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by - * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. - * - * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license provided above. - * - * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by - * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. - * - */ -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. - * - * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by - * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source - * license. - * - * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of - * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites - * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. - * - * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in - * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received - * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. - * - * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not - * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third - * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights - * to make use of the Contribution. - * - * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN - * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA - * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY - * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR - * OTHERWISE. - */ - -#define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG -#define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG - -#include <stdio.h> -#include "ssl_locl.h" -#include "kssl_lcl.h" -#include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" -#include <openssl/buffer.h> -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include <openssl/objects.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#include <openssl/hmac.h> -#include <openssl/x509.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -# include <openssl/dh.h> -#endif -#include <openssl/bn.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 -# include <openssl/krb5_asn.h> -#endif -#include <openssl/md5.h> - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3_METHOD -static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); - -static const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) -{ - if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) - return (SSLv3_server_method()); - else - return (NULL); -} - -IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, - ssl3_accept, - ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP -static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) -{ - int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; - - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - - if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && - (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { - if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { - /* - * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp - * login name - */ - ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; - *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - } else { - ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); - } - } - return ret; -} -#endif - -int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) -{ - BUF_MEM *buf; - unsigned long alg_k, Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); - void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; - int ret = -1; - int new_state, state, skip = 0; - - RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); - ERR_clear_error(); - clear_sys_error(); - - if (s->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->info_callback; - else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) - cb = s->ctx->info_callback; - - /* init things to blank */ - s->in_handshake++; - if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) - SSL_clear(s); - - if (s->cert == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); - return (-1); - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS - /* - * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and - * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during - * handshakes anyway. - */ - if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { - s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; - s->tlsext_hb_seq++; - } -#endif - - for (;;) { - state = s->state; - - switch (s->state) { - case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: - s->renegotiate = 1; - /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ - - case SSL_ST_BEFORE: - case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: - - s->server = 1; - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); - - if ((s->version >> 8) != 3) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; - - if (s->init_buf == NULL) { - if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { - ret = -1; - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - goto end; - } - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { - BUF_MEM_free(buf); - ret = -1; - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - goto end; - } - s->init_buf = buf; - } - - if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { - ret = -1; - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - goto end; - } - - s->init_num = 0; - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY; - s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - /* - * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. - */ - s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; - - if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { - /* - * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the - * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) - */ - if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { - ret = -1; - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - goto end; - } - - if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { - ret = -1; - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - goto end; - } - - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; - } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && - !(s->options & - SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { - /* - * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't - * support secure renegotiation. - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); - ret = -1; - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - goto end; - } else { - /* - * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a - * HelloRequest - */ - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: - - s->shutdown = 0; - ret = ssl3_send_hello_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->init_num = 0; - - if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { - ret = -1; - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - goto end; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: - s->state = SSL_ST_OK; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: - - s->shutdown = 0; - ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D; - case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_D: - { - int al; - if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { - /* - * callback indicates firther work to be done - */ - s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - goto end; - } - if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - /* - * This is not really an error but the only means to for - * a client to detect whether srp is supported. - */ - if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - ret = -1; - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - goto end; - } - } -#endif - - s->renegotiate = 2; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: - ret = ssl3_send_server_hello(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->hit) { - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - } -#else - if (s->hit) - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; -#endif - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: - /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ - /* normal PSK or KRB5 or SRP */ - if (! - (s->s3->tmp. - new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aKRB5 | - SSL_aSRP)) -&& !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { - ret = ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } else { - skip = 1; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - } -#else - } else - skip = 1; - - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; -#endif - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - - /* - * clear this, it may get reset by - * send_server_key_exchange - */ - s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; - - /* - * only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or RSA but we have a - * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For - * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if - * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, - * the server certificate contains the server's public key for - * key exchange. - */ - if (0 - /* - * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if - * provided - */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ - || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) -#endif - || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) - || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) - || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) - && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL - || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) - && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys - [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * - 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) - ) - ) - ) - ) { - ret = ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - } else - skip = 1; - - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: - if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ - !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || - /* - * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert - * during re-negotiation: - */ - (s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len != 0 && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || - /* - * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see - * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in - * RFC 2246): - */ - ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && - /* - * ... except when the application insists on - * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts - * this for SSL 3) - */ - !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || - /* - * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites - */ - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) || - /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) - /* - * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests - * are omitted - */ - || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { - /* no cert request */ - skip = 1; - s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - } - } else { - s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; - ret = ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; -#ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; -#else - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; -#endif - s->init_num = 0; - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: - ret = ssl3_send_server_done(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: - - /* - * This code originally checked to see if any data was pending - * using BIO_CTRL_INFO and then flushed. This caused problems as - * documented in PR#1939. The proposed fix doesn't completely - * resolve this issue as buggy implementations of - * BIO_CTRL_PENDING still exist. So instead we just flush - * unconditionally. - */ - - s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; - if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - - s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: - if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { - ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - } - s->init_num = 0; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: - ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (ret == 2) { - /* - * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH - * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is - * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses - * its key from the certificate for key exchange. - */ -#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -#else - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -#endif - s->init_num = 0; - } else if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; - s->init_num = 0; - if (!s->session->peer) - break; - /* - * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer at this point and - * digest cached records. - */ - if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - } else { - int offset = 0; - int dgst_num; - - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; - s->init_num = 0; - - /* - * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, - * it can be verified FIXME - digest processing for - * CertificateVerify should be generalized. But it is next - * step - */ - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - } - for (dgst_num = 0; dgst_num < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; dgst_num++) - if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]) { - int dgst_size; - - s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, - EVP_MD_CTX_type - (s-> - s3->handshake_dgst - [dgst_num]), - &(s->s3-> - tmp.cert_verify_md - [offset])); - dgst_size = - EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->s3->handshake_dgst[dgst_num]); - if (dgst_size < 0) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - ret = -1; - goto end; - } - offset += dgst_size; - } - } - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: - ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - -#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -#else - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -#endif - s->init_num = 0; - break; - -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B: - /* - * Enable CCS for NPN. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make - * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the - * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be - * cautious. - * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is - * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until - * the client's Finished message is read. - */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - - ret = ssl3_get_next_proto(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->init_num = 0; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; - break; -#endif - - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: - /* - * Enable CCS for handshakes without NPN. In NPN the CCS flag has - * already been set. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make - * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. - * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is - * processed in s3_pkt.c, and remains set until - * the client's Finished message is read. - */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) - s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; - ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - if (s->hit) - s->state = SSL_ST_OK; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; -#endif - else - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: - ret = ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: - ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - -#endif - - case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: - - s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { - ret = -1; - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - goto end; - } - - ret = ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, - SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, - SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); - - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; - s->init_num = 0; - - if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, - SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) - { - ret = -1; - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - goto end; - } - - break; - - case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: - case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: - ret = ssl3_send_finished(s, - SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, - SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, - s->method-> - ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, - s->method-> - ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); - if (ret <= 0) - goto end; - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; - if (s->hit) { -#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -#else - if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A; - } else - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; -#endif - } else - s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; - s->init_num = 0; - break; - - case SSL_ST_OK: - /* clean a few things up */ - ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); - - BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); - s->init_buf = NULL; - - /* remove buffering on output */ - ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); - - s->init_num = 0; - - if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a - * HelloRequest */ - s->renegotiate = 0; - s->new_session = 0; - - ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); - - s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; - /* s->server=1; */ - s->handshake_func = ssl3_accept; - - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); - } - - ret = 1; - goto end; - /* break; */ - - case SSL_ST_ERR: - default: - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); - ret = -1; - goto end; - /* break; */ - } - - if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { - if (s->debug) { - if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) - goto end; - } - - if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { - new_state = s->state; - s->state = state; - cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); - s->state = new_state; - } - } - skip = 0; - } - end: - /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ - - s->in_handshake--; - if (cb != NULL) - cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); - return (ret); -} - -int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) -{ - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0); - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ - return ssl_do_write(s); -} - -int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) -{ - int i, j, ok, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = -1, cookie_valid = 0; - unsigned int cookie_len; - long n; - unsigned long id; - unsigned char *p, *d; - SSL_CIPHER *c; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - unsigned char *q; - SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; -#endif - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C && !s->first_packet) - goto retry_cert; - - /* - * We do this so that we will respond with our native type. If we are - * TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, This down - * switching should be handled by a different method. If we are SSLv3, we - * will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with TLSv1. - */ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { - s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; - } - s->first_packet = 1; - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, - SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, - SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); - - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - s->first_packet = 0; - d = p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - /* - * 2 bytes for client version, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE bytes for random, 1 byte - * for session id length - */ - if (n < 2 + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + 1) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may - * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) - */ - s->client_version = (((int)p[0]) << 8) | (int)p[1]; - p += 2; - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? (s->client_version > s->version && - s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION) - : (s->client_version < s->version)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - if ((s->client_version >> 8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && - !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { - /* - * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version - * number - */ - s->version = s->client_version; - } - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, just - * return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. So check - * cookie length... - */ - if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { - unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; - - session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - - if (SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1 - >= (unsigned int)((d + n) - p)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); - - if (cookie_length == 0) - return 1; - } - - /* load the client random */ - memcpy(s->s3->client_random, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /* get the session-id */ - j = *(p++); - - if ((d + n) - p < j) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - - if ((j < 0) || (j > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - s->hit = 0; - /* - * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in - * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally - * ignore resumption requests with flag - * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather - * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on this - * for security won't even compile against older library versions). - * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to - * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains - * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the - * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be ignored. - */ - if ((s->new_session - && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) - goto err; - } else { - i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); - /* - * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated - * version. - * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption - * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but - * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. - * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and - * will abort the handshake with an error. - */ - if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous - * session */ - s->hit = 1; - } else if (i == -1) - goto err; - else { /* i == 0 */ - - if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) - goto err; - } - } - - p += j; - - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - /* cookie stuff */ - if ((d + n) - p < 1) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - cookie_len = *(p++); - - if ((unsigned int)((d + n ) - p) < cookie_len) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the - * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it - * does not cause an overflow. - */ - if (cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { - /* too much data */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ - if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { - memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); - - if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { - if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, - cookie_len) == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - /* else cookie verification succeeded */ - } - /* default verification */ - else if (memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, - s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - cookie_valid = 1; - } - - p += cookie_len; - if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { - /* Select version to use */ - if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_2_VERSION && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1_2)) { - s->version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; - s->method = DTLSv1_2_server_method(); - } else if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_ONLY_DTLS_1_2_ALLOWED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); - s->version = s->client_version; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } else if (s->client_version <= DTLS1_VERSION && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1)) { - s->version = DTLS1_VERSION; - s->method = DTLSv1_server_method(); - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); - s->version = s->client_version; - al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; - goto f_err; - } - s->session->ssl_version = s->version; - } - } - - if ((d + n ) - p < 2) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); - goto f_err; - } - n2s(p, i); - - if (i == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); - goto f_err; - } - - /* i bytes of cipher data + 1 byte for compression length later */ - if ((d + n) - p < i + 1) { - /* not enough data */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, p, i, &(ciphers)) == NULL) { - goto err; - } - p += i; - - /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ - if (s->hit) { - j = 0; - id = s->session->cipher->id; - -#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", - sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); -#endif - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { - c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); -#ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", - i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); -#endif - if (c->id == id) { - j = 1; - break; - } - } - /* - * Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade attack: - * CVE-2010-4180. - */ -#if 0 - if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) - && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { - /* - * Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used - * cipher may not be in the current list, the client instead - * might be trying to continue using a cipher that before wasn't - * chosen due to server preferences. We'll have to reject the - * connection if the cipher is not enabled, though. - */ - c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); - if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { - s->session->cipher = c; - j = 1; - } - } -#endif - if (j == 0) { - /* - * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked - * to reuse it - */ - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); - goto f_err; - } - } - - /* compression */ - i = *(p++); - if ((d + n) - p < i) { - /* not enough data */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - q = p; -#endif - for (j = 0; j < i; j++) { - if (p[j] == 0) - break; - } - - p += i; - if (j >= i) { - /* no compress */ - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); - goto f_err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - /* TLS extensions */ - if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { - if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &p, d + n)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - } - - /* - * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake - * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before - * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket - * processing to use it in key derivation. - */ - { - unsigned char *pos; - pos = s->s3->server_random; - if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { - goto f_err; - } - } - - if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { - SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; - - s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); - if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, - &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, - &pref_cipher, - s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { - s->hit = 1; - s->session->ciphers = ciphers; - s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; - - ciphers = NULL; - - /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ - pref_cipher = - pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, - s-> - session->ciphers, - SSL_get_ciphers - (s)); - if (pref_cipher == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; - } - - s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; - - if (s->cipher_list) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); - - if (s->cipher_list_by_id) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); - - s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); - s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); - } - } -#endif - - /* - * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other - * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression - * algorithms from the client, starting at q. - */ - s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ - if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { - int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; - /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ - /* Can't disable compression */ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; - } - /* Look for resumed compression method */ - for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { - comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); - if (comp_id == comp->id) { - s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; - break; - } - } - if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); - goto f_err; - } - /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ - for (m = 0; m < i; m++) { - if (q[m] == comp_id) - break; - } - if (m >= i) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, - SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); - goto f_err; - } - } else if (s->hit) - comp = NULL; - else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { - /* See if we have a match */ - int m, nn, o, v, done = 0; - - nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); - for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { - comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); - v = comp->id; - for (o = 0; o < i; o++) { - if (v == q[o]) { - done = 1; - break; - } - } - if (done) - break; - } - if (done) - s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; - else - comp = NULL; - } -#else - /* - * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session - * using compression. - */ - if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); - goto f_err; - } -#endif - - /* - * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher - */ - - if (!s->hit) { -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - s->session->compress_meth = 0; -#else - s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; -#endif - if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); - s->session->ciphers = ciphers; - if (ciphers == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - ciphers = NULL; - if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto err; - } - /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ - retry_cert: - if (s->cert->cert_cb) { - int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); - if (rv == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - if (rv < 0) { - s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; - return -1; - } - s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; - } - c = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); - - if (c == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = c; - } else { - /* Session-id reuse */ -#ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG - STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; - SSL_CIPHER *nc = NULL; - SSL_CIPHER *ec = NULL; - - if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { - sk = s->session->ciphers; - for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { - c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); - if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_eNULL) - nc = c; - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) - ec = c; - } - if (nc != NULL) - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = nc; - else if (ec != NULL) - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = ec; - else - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; - } else -#endif - s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; - } - - if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { - if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) - goto f_err; - } - - /*- - * we now have the following setup. - * client_random - * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers - * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers - * compression - basically ignored right now - * ssl version is set - sslv3 - * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. - * s->hit - session reuse flag - * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. - */ - - /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ - if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { - if (!ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s, &al)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); - goto f_err; - } - } - - ret = cookie_valid ? 2 : 1; - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - } - - if (ciphers != NULL) - sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); - return ret; -} - -int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *buf; - unsigned char *p, *d; - int i, sl; - int al = 0; - unsigned long l; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { - buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - p = s->s3->server_random; - if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } -#endif - /* Do the message type and length last */ - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - - *(p++) = s->version >> 8; - *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; - - /* Random stuff */ - memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); - p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; - - /*- - * There are several cases for the session ID to send - * back in the server hello: - * - For session reuse from the session cache, - * we send back the old session ID. - * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) - * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" - * (which doesn't actually identify the session). - * - If it is a new session, we send back the new - * session ID. - * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, - * we send back a 0-length session ID. - * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, - * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed - * to send back. - */ - if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) - && !s->hit) - s->session->session_id_length = 0; - - sl = s->session->session_id_length; - if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - *(p++) = sl; - memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); - p += sl; - - /* put the cipher */ - i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); - p += i; - - /* put the compression method */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - *(p++) = 0; -#else - if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) - *(p++) = 0; - else - *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT - if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - if ((p = - ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, - &al)) == NULL) { - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } -#endif - /* do the header */ - l = (p - d); - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l); - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ - return ssl_do_write(s); -} - -int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) -{ - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0); - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ - return ssl_do_write(s); -} - -int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) -{ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - unsigned char *q; - int j, num; - RSA *rsa; - unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; - unsigned int u; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH -# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - int j; -# endif - DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; - unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; - int encodedlen = 0; - int curve_id = 0; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; -#endif - EVP_PKEY *pkey; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - unsigned char *p, *d; - int al, i; - unsigned long type; - int n; - CERT *cert; - BIGNUM *r[4]; - int nr[4], kn; - BUF_MEM *buf; - EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; - - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { - type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - cert = s->cert; - - buf = s->init_buf; - - r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; - n = 0; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (type & SSL_kRSA) { - rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; - if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { - rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, - SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> - tmp.new_cipher), - SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> - tmp.new_cipher)); - if (rsa == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - RSA_up_ref(rsa); - cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; - } - if (rsa == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - r[0] = rsa->n; - r[1] = rsa->e; - s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; - } else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (type & SSL_kEDH) { - dhp = cert->dh_tmp; - if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) - dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, - SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> - tmp.new_cipher), - SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> - tmp.new_cipher)); - if (dhp == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; - if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - goto err; - } - r[0] = dh->p; - r[1] = dh->g; - r[2] = dh->pub_key; - } else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { - const EC_GROUP *group; - - if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) { - /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ - int nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); - if (nid != NID_undef) - ecdhp = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(nid); - } else if ((ecdhp == NULL) && s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb) { - ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, - SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> - tmp.new_cipher), - SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> - s3->tmp.new_cipher)); - } - if (ecdhp == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - - /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ - if (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_auto) - ecdh = ecdhp; - else if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; - if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || - (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || - (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { - if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - } - - if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || - (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || - (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && - (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); - goto err; - } - - /* - * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named - * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is - * non-zero. - */ - if ((curve_id = - tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) - == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and - * allocate memory accordingly. - */ - encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - NULL, 0, NULL); - - encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) - OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); - bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); - if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); - - if (encodedlen == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - bn_ctx = NULL; - - /* - * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in - * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four - * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams - * structure. - */ - n = 4 + encodedlen; - - /* - * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we - * can set these to NULLs - */ - r[0] = NULL; - r[1] = NULL; - r[2] = NULL; - r[3] = NULL; - } else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (type & SSL_kPSK) { - /* - * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint - */ - n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - } else -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (type & SSL_kSRP) { - if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || - (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || - (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); - goto err; - } - r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; - r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; - r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; - r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; - } else -#endif - { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { - nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) - n += 1 + nr[i]; - else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - /* - * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS - * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length - * as the prime, so use the length of the prime here - */ - if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH))) - n += 2 + nr[0]; - else -#endif - n += 2 + nr[i]; - } - - if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) - && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { - if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) - == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - /* Allow space for signature algorithm */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - kn += 2; - /* Allow space for signature length */ - kn += 2; - } else { - pkey = NULL; - kn = 0; - } - - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); - goto err; - } - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - - for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { - *p = nr[i]; - p++; - } else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - /* - * for interoperability with some versions of the Microsoft TLS - * stack, we need to zero pad the DHE pub key to the same length - * as the prime - */ - if ((i == 2) && (type & (SSL_kEDH))) { - s2n(nr[0], p); - for (j = 0; j < (nr[0] - nr[2]); ++j) { - *p = 0; - ++p; - } - } else -#endif - s2n(nr[i], p); - BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); - p += nr[i]; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { - /* - * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In - * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte - * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded - * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself - */ - *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; - p += 1; - *p = 0; - p += 1; - *p = curve_id; - p += 1; - *p = encodedlen; - p += 1; - memcpy((unsigned char *)p, - (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - encodedPoint = NULL; - p += encodedlen; - } -#endif - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (type & SSL_kPSK) { - /* copy PSK identity hint */ - s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); - strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, - strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); - p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - } -#endif - - /* not anonymous */ - if (pkey != NULL) { - /* - * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p - * points to the space at the end. - */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && !SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - q = md_buf; - j = 0; - for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { - EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, - EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); - if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, - (num == 2) ? s->ctx->md5 - : s->ctx->sha1, - NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 - || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, - (unsigned int *)&i) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_LIB_EVP); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - q += i; - j += i; - } - if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, - &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); - goto err; - } - s2n(u, p); - n += u + 2; - } else -#endif - if (md) { - /* send signature algorithm */ - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { - /* Should never happen */ - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - p += 2; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - if (EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), - SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 - || EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 - || EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), - (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - s2n(i, p); - n += i + 2; - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) - n += 2; - } else { - /* Is this error check actually needed? */ - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - } - - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n); - } - - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - return ssl_do_write(s); - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (encodedPoint != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); -#endif - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return (-1); -} - -int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *p, *d; - int i, j, nl, off, n; - STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; - X509_NAME *name; - BUF_MEM *buf; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { - buf = s->init_buf; - - d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - - /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ - p++; - n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); - d[0] = n; - p += n; - n++; - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - const unsigned char *psigs; - nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &psigs); - s2n(nl, p); - memcpy(p, psigs, nl); - p += nl; - n += nl + 2; - } - - off = n; - p += 2; - n += 2; - - sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); - nl = 0; - if (sk != NULL) { - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { - name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); - j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean - (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, - ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { - s2n(j, p); - i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); - n += 2 + j; - nl += 2 + j; - } else { - d = p; - i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); - j -= 2; - s2n(j, d); - j += 2; - n += j; - nl += j; - } - } - } - /* else no CA names */ - p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; - s2n(nl, p); - - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n); - -#ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); - goto err; - } - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; - /* do the header */ - *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; - *(p++) = 0; - *(p++) = 0; - *(p++) = 0; - s->init_num += 4; - } -#endif - - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ - return ssl_do_write(s); - err: - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return (-1); -} - -int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) -{ - int i, al, ok; - long n; - unsigned long alg_k; - unsigned char *p; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - RSA *rsa = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - BIGNUM *pub = NULL; - DH *dh_srvr, *dh_clnt = NULL; -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - KSSL_ERR kssl_err; -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; - EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; - EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; - BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; -#endif - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, - SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, &ok); - - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) { - unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; - int decrypt_len; - unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; - size_t j, padding_len; - - /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ - if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { - if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) - rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp; - /* - * Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should be sent already - */ - if (rsa == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); - goto f_err; - - } - } else { - pkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; - if ((pkey == NULL) || - (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); - goto f_err; - } - rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa; - } - - /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS{0xFEFF} */ - if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { - n2s(p, i); - if (n != i + 2) { - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - goto f_err; - } else - p -= 2; - } else - n = i; - } - - /* - * Reject overly short RSA ciphertext because we want to be sure - * that the buffer size makes it safe to iterate over the entire - * size of a premaster secret (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). The - * actual expected size is larger due to RSA padding, but the - * bound is sufficient to be safe. - */ - if (n < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - goto f_err; - } - - /* - * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of - * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, - * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and - * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt - * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 - */ - - if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, - sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) - goto err; - - /* - * Decrypt with no padding. PKCS#1 padding will be removed as part of - * the timing-sensitive code below. - */ - decrypt_len = - RSA_private_decrypt((int)n, p, p, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); - if (decrypt_len < 0) - goto err; - - /* Check the padding. See RFC 3447, section 7.2.2. */ - - /* - * The smallest padded premaster is 11 bytes of overhead. Small keys - * are publicly invalid, so this may return immediately. This ensures - * PS is at least 8 bytes. - */ - if (decrypt_len < 11 + SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto f_err; - } - - padding_len = decrypt_len - SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH; - decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(p[0], 0) & - constant_time_eq_int_8(p[1], 2); - for (j = 2; j < padding_len - 1; j++) { - decrypt_good &= ~constant_time_is_zero_8(p[j]); - } - decrypt_good &= constant_time_is_zero_8(p[padding_len - 1]); - p += padding_len; - - /* - * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then - * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The - * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack - * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number - * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in - * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. - */ - version_good = - constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); - version_good &= - constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); - - /* - * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the - * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the - * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). - * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol - * version instead if the server does not support the requested - * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such - * clients. - */ - if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { - unsigned char workaround_good; - workaround_good = - constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); - workaround_good &= - constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); - version_good |= workaround_good; - } - - /* - * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to - * remain non-zero (0xff). - */ - decrypt_good &= version_good; - - /* - * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using - * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not - * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees - * it is still sufficiently large to read from. - */ - for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { - p[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[j], - rand_premaster_secret[j]); - } - - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s-> - session->master_key, - p, - sizeof - (rand_premaster_secret)); - OPENSSL_cleanse(p, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)); - } else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH - if (alg_k & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) { - int idx = -1; - EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; - if (n > 1) { - n2s(p, i); - } else { - if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - goto f_err; - } - i = 0; - } - if (n && n != i + 2) { - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; - } else { - p -= 2; - i = (int)n; - } - } - if (alg_k & SSL_kDHr) - idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; - else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHd) - idx = SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; - if (idx >= 0) { - skey = s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey; - if ((skey == NULL) || - (skey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH) || (skey->pkey.dh == NULL)) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); - goto f_err; - } - dh_srvr = skey->pkey.dh; - } else if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } else - dh_srvr = s->s3->tmp.dh; - - if (n == 0L) { - /* Get pubkey from cert */ - EVP_PKEY *clkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (clkey) { - if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, skey) == 1) - dh_clnt = EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(clkey); - } - if (dh_clnt == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - EVP_PKEY_free(clkey); - pub = dh_clnt->pub_key; - } else - pub = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL); - if (pub == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - - i = DH_compute_key(p, pub, dh_srvr); - - if (i <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); - BN_clear_free(pub); - goto f_err; - } - - DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); - s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; - if (dh_clnt) - DH_free(dh_clnt); - else - BN_clear_free(pub); - pub = NULL; - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s-> - session->master_key, - p, i); - OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); - if (dh_clnt) - return 2; - } else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - if (alg_k & SSL_kKRB5) { - krb5_error_code krb5rc; - krb5_data enc_ticket; - krb5_data authenticator; - krb5_data enc_pms; - KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; - const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; - int padl, outl; - krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; - krb5_ticket_times ttimes; - int kerr = 0; - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); - - if (!kssl_ctx) - kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); - - n2s(p, i); - enc_ticket.length = i; - - if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + 6)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; - p += enc_ticket.length; - - n2s(p, i); - authenticator.length = i; - - if (n < (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + 6)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - authenticator.data = (char *)p; - p += authenticator.length; - - n2s(p, i); - enc_pms.length = i; - enc_pms.data = (char *)p; - p += enc_pms.length; - - /* - * Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption - */ - if (enc_pms.length > sizeof(pms)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + - enc_pms.length + 6)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, - &kssl_err)) != 0) { -# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", - krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); - if (kssl_err.text) - fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); -# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); - goto err; - } - - /* - * Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will - * return authtime == 0. - */ - if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, - &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { -# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", - krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); - if (kssl_err.text) - fprintf(stderr, "kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); -# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); - goto err; - } - - if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); - goto err; - } -# ifdef KSSL_DEBUG - kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); -# endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ - - enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); - if (enc == NULL) - goto err; - - memset(iv, 0, sizeof(iv)); /* per RFC 1510 */ - - if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx, enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key, iv)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto err; - } - if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms, &outl, - (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - kerr = 1; - goto kclean; - } - if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - kerr = 1; - goto kclean; - } - if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx, &(pms[outl]), &padl)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - kerr = 1; - goto kclean; - } - outl += padl; - if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - kerr = 1; - goto kclean; - } - if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version >> 8)) - && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { - /* - * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as - * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, - * the protocol does not offer such protection for DH - * ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send random - * bytes instead of the protocol version. If - * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. - * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos - * cipher) - */ - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); - kerr = 1; - goto kclean; - } - } - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); - - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s-> - session->master_key, - pms, outl); - - if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { - size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); - if (len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH) { - s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; - memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ, kssl_ctx->client_princ, - len); - } - } - - /*- Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, - * but it caused problems for apache. - * kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); - * if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; - */ - - kclean: - OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, sizeof(pms)); - if (kerr) - goto err; - } else -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - if (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { - int ret = 1; - int field_size = 0; - const EC_KEY *tkey; - const EC_GROUP *group; - const BIGNUM *priv_key; - - /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ - if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Let's get server private key and group information */ - if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { - /* use the certificate */ - tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; - } else { - /* - * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the - * ServerKeyExchange msg. - */ - tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; - } - - group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); - priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); - - if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || - !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - - /* Let's get client's public key */ - if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if (n == 0L) { - /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ - - if (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); - goto f_err; - } - if (((clnt_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) - == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { - /* - * XXX: For now, we do not support client authentication - * using ECDH certificates so this branch (n == 0L) of the - * code is never executed. When that support is added, we - * ought to ensure the key received in the certificate is - * authorized for key agreement. ECDH_compute_key implicitly - * checks that the two ECDH shares are for the same group. - */ - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); - goto f_err; - } - - if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey-> - pkey.ec)) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - goto err; - } - ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ - } else { - /* - * Get client's public key from encoded point in the - * ClientKeyExchange message. - */ - if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - /* Get encoded point length */ - i = *p; - p += 1; - if (n != 1 + i) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; - } - /* - * p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer currently, so set it - * to the start - */ - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; - } - - /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ - field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); - if (field_size <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size + 7) / 8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, - NULL); - if (i <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); - goto err; - } - - EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); - EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); - EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); - EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); - s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; - - /* Compute the master secret */ - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s-> - session->master_key, - p, i); - - OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); - return (ret); - } else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK - if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { - unsigned char *t = NULL; - unsigned char psk_or_pre_ms[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN * 2 + 4]; - unsigned int pre_ms_len = 0, psk_len = 0; - int psk_err = 1; - char tmp_id[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; - - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - - n2s(p, i); - if (n != i + 2) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto psk_err; - } - if (i > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); - goto psk_err; - } - if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); - goto psk_err; - } - - /* - * Create guaranteed NULL-terminated identity string for the callback - */ - memcpy(tmp_id, p, i); - memset(tmp_id + i, 0, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1 - i); - psk_len = s->psk_server_callback(s, tmp_id, - psk_or_pre_ms, - sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); - OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_id, PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1); - - if (psk_len > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto psk_err; - } else if (psk_len == 0) { - /* - * PSK related to the given identity not found - */ - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); - al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; - goto psk_err; - } - - /* create PSK pre_master_secret */ - pre_ms_len = 2 + psk_len + 2 + psk_len; - t = psk_or_pre_ms; - memmove(psk_or_pre_ms + psk_len + 4, psk_or_pre_ms, psk_len); - s2n(psk_len, t); - memset(t, 0, psk_len); - t += psk_len; - s2n(psk_len, t); - - if (s->session->psk_identity != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity); - s->session->psk_identity = BUF_strndup((char *)p, i); - if (s->session->psk_identity == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto psk_err; - } - - if (s->session->psk_identity_hint != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->psk_identity_hint); - s->session->psk_identity_hint = BUF_strdup(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); - if (s->ctx->psk_identity_hint != NULL && - s->session->psk_identity_hint == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto psk_err; - } - - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s-> - session->master_key, - psk_or_pre_ms, - pre_ms_len); - psk_err = 0; - psk_err: - OPENSSL_cleanse(psk_or_pre_ms, sizeof(psk_or_pre_ms)); - if (psk_err != 0) - goto f_err; - } else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP - if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { - int param_len; - - n2s(p, i); - param_len = i + 2; - if (param_len > n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!(s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(p, i, NULL))) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 - || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); - goto f_err; - } - if (s->session->srp_username != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); - s->session->srp_username = BUF_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); - if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - if ((s->session->master_key_length = - SRP_generate_server_master_secret(s, - s->session->master_key)) < 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - p += i; - } else -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ - if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { - int ret = 0; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; - EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; - unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; - size_t outlen = 32, inlen; - unsigned long alg_a; - int Ttag, Tclass; - long Tlen; - - /* Get our certificate private key */ - alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; - if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST94) - pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST94].privatekey; - else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) - pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; - - pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); - if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto gerr; - } - /* - * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe - * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from - * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a - * client certificate for authorization only. - */ - client_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer); - if (client_pub_pkey) { - if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) - ERR_clear_error(); - } - /* Decrypt session key */ - if (ASN1_get_object - ((const unsigned char **)&p, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, - n) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE - || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto gerr; - } - start = p; - inlen = Tlen; - if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt - (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, - SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); - goto gerr; - } - /* Generate master secret */ - s->session->master_key_length = - s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, - s-> - session->master_key, - premaster_secret, 32); - OPENSSL_cleanse(premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret)); - /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ - if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl - (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) - ret = 2; - else - ret = 1; - gerr: - EVP_PKEY_free(client_pub_pkey); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); - if (ret) - return ret; - else - goto err; - } else { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - - return (1); - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) - err: -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH - EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); - EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); - if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); - BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); -#endif - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return (-1); -} - -int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) -{ - EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; - unsigned char *p; - int al, ok, ret = 0; - long n; - int type = 0, i, j; - X509 *peer; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; - EVP_MD_CTX mctx; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&mctx); - - /* - * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have received - * a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| will be non - * NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is not required even - * if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in the case of static - * DH). In that case the ClientKeyExchange processing will skip the - * CertificateVerify state so we should not arrive here. - */ - if (s->session->peer == NULL) { - ret = 1; - goto end; - } - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, - SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY, - SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); - - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - - peer = s->session->peer; - pkey = X509_get_pubkey(peer); - if (pkey == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); - - if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, - SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; - goto f_err; - } - - /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ - /* - * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without - * length field - */ - if (n == 64 && (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 || - pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001)) { - i = 64; - } else { - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - int rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, p, pkey); - if (rv == -1) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } else if (rv == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - p += 2; - n -= 2; - } - n2s(p, i); - n -= 2; - if (i > n) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } - j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); - if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { - long hdatalen = 0; - void *hdata; - hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); - if (hdatalen <= 0) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "Using TLS 1.2 with client verify alg %s\n", - EVP_MD_name(md)); -#endif - if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&mctx, md, NULL) - || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(&mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - - if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&mctx, p, i, pkey) <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } else -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { - i = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, - MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, - pkey->pkey.rsa); - if (i < 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); - goto f_err; - } - if (i == 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { - j = DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, - &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.dsa); - if (j <= 0) { - /* bad signature */ - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA - if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { - j = ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, - &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.ec); - if (j <= 0) { - /* bad signature */ - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } else -#endif - if (pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_94 - || pkey->type == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { - unsigned char signature[64]; - int idx; - EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); - if (pctx == NULL) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto f_err; - } - if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pctx) <= 0) { - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto f_err; - } - if (i != 64) { -#ifdef SSL_DEBUG - fprintf(stderr, "GOST signature length is %d", i); -#endif - } - for (idx = 0; idx < 64; idx++) { - signature[63 - idx] = p[idx]; - } - j = EVP_PKEY_verify(pctx, signature, 64, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, - 32); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); - if (j <= 0) { - al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); - goto f_err; - } - } else { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - al = SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; - goto f_err; - } - - ret = 1; - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - } - end: - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) { - BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); - s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; - s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE; - } - EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&mctx); - EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); - return (ret); -} - -int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) -{ - int i, ok, al, ret = -1; - X509 *x = NULL; - unsigned long l, nc, llen, n; - const unsigned char *p, *q; - unsigned char *d; - STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; - - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, - -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); - - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { - if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; - } - /* - * If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list - */ - if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - goto f_err; - } - s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; - return (1); - } - - if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { - al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); - goto f_err; - } - p = d = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - - n2l3(p, llen); - if (llen + 3 != n) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - for (nc = 0; nc < llen;) { - if (nc + 3 > llen) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - n2l3(p, l); - if ((l + nc + 3) > llen) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - - q = p; - x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, l); - if (x == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); - goto err; - } - if (p != (q + l)) { - al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); - goto f_err; - } - if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - x = NULL; - nc += l + 3; - } - - if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { - /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); - goto f_err; - } - /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ - else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && - (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); - al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - goto f_err; - } - /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ - if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto f_err; - } - } else { - i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); - if (i <= 0) { - al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, - SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); - goto f_err; - } - } - - if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ - X509_free(s->session->peer); - s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); - s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; - - /* - * With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL when we - * arrive here. - */ - if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { - s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); - if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) - sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); - s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain = sk; - /* - * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own - * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c - */ - - sk = NULL; - - ret = 1; - if (0) { - f_err: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - err: - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - } - - if (x != NULL) - X509_free(x); - if (sk != NULL) - sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); - return (ret); -} - -int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) -{ - CERT_PKEY *cpk; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { - cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); - if (cpk == NULL) { - /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ - if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5) || - (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kKRB5)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, - ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return (0); - } - } - - if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return (0); - } - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ - return ssl_do_write(s); -} - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -/* send a new session ticket (not necessarily for a new session) */ -int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) -{ - unsigned char *senc = NULL; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; - HMAC_CTX hctx; - - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { - unsigned char *p, *macstart; - const unsigned char *const_p; - int len, slen_full, slen; - SSL_SESSION *sess; - unsigned int hlen; - SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; - unsigned char key_name[16]; - - /* get session encoding length */ - slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); - /* - * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too - * long - */ - if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); - if (!senc) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); - - p = senc; - if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) - goto err; - - /* - * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up - */ - const_p = senc; - sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); - if (sess == NULL) - goto err; - sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ - - slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); - if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ - SSL_SESSION_free(sess); - goto err; - } - p = senc; - if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { - SSL_SESSION_free(sess); - goto err; - } - SSL_SESSION_free(sess); - - /*- - * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows handshake_header_length + - * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + - * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + - * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session - * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). - */ - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, - SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + - EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) - goto err; - - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - /* - * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does - * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. - */ - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { - /* if 0 is returned, write en empty ticket */ - int ret = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, - &hctx, 1); - - if (ret == 0) { - l2n(0, p); /* timeout */ - s2n(0, p); /* length */ - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, - p - ssl_handshake_start(s)); - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; - OPENSSL_free(senc); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - return ssl_do_write(s); - } - if (ret < 0) - goto err; - } else { - if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) - goto err; - if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) - goto err; - if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL)) - goto err; - memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); - } - - /* - * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified - * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for - * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. - */ - l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); - - /* Skip ticket length for now */ - p += 2; - /* Output key name */ - macstart = p; - memcpy(p, key_name, 16); - p += 16; - /* output IV */ - memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); - p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - /* Encrypt session data */ - if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) - goto err; - p += len; - if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len)) - goto err; - p += len; - - if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) - goto err; - if (!HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen)) - goto err; - - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - - p += hlen; - /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ - /* Total length */ - len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); - /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ - p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; - s2n(len - 6, p); - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len); - s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; - OPENSSL_free(senc); - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ - return ssl_do_write(s); - err: - if (senc) - OPENSSL_free(senc); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; -} - -int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) -{ - if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { - unsigned char *p; - size_t msglen; - - /*- - * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as - * follows handshake_header_length + - * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) - * + (ocsp response) - */ - msglen = 4 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; - if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + msglen)) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - - p = ssl_handshake_start(s); - - /* status type */ - *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; - /* length of OCSP response */ - l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); - /* actual response */ - memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); - - ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, msglen); - } - - /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ - return (ssl_do_write(s)); -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG -/* - * ssl3_get_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. - * It sets the next_proto member in s if found - */ -int ssl3_get_next_proto(SSL *s) -{ - int ok; - int proto_len, padding_len; - long n; - const unsigned char *p; - - /* - * Clients cannot send a NextProtocol message if we didn't see the - * extension in their ClientHello - */ - if (!s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, - SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_WITHOUT_EXTENSION); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - - /* See the payload format below */ - n = s->method->ssl_get_message(s, - SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_A, - SSL3_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO_B, - SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO, 514, &ok); - - if (!ok) - return ((int)n); - - /* - * s->state doesn't reflect whether ChangeCipherSpec has been received in - * this handshake, but s->s3->change_cipher_spec does (will be reset by - * ssl3_get_finished). - */ - if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_GOT_NEXT_PROTO_BEFORE_A_CCS); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return -1; - } - - if (n < 2) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return 0; /* The body must be > 1 bytes long */ - } - - p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; - - /*- - * The payload looks like: - * uint8 proto_len; - * uint8 proto[proto_len]; - * uint8 padding_len; - * uint8 padding[padding_len]; - */ - proto_len = p[0]; - if (proto_len + 2 > s->init_num) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return 0; - } - padding_len = p[proto_len + 1]; - if (proto_len + padding_len + 2 != s->init_num) { - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return 0; - } - - s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(proto_len); - if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEXT_PROTO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, p + 1, proto_len); - s->next_proto_negotiated_len = proto_len; - - return 1; -} -# endif - -#endif |