diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/t1_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_lib.c | 2031 |
1 files changed, 988 insertions, 1043 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c index 68c527dfdf5f..dd02c933c307 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_lib.c +++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c @@ -5,21 +5,21 @@ * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. - * + * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * + * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. - * + * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: @@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). - * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from + * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" - * + * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. - * + * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence @@ -63,289 +63,288 @@ #include <openssl/ocsp.h> #include "ssl_locl.h" -const char tls1_version_str[]="TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; +const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, - SSL_SESSION **psess); + const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, + SSL_SESSION **psess); #endif -SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data={ - tls1_enc, - tls1_mac, - tls1_setup_key_block, - tls1_generate_master_secret, - tls1_change_cipher_state, - tls1_final_finish_mac, - TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, - tls1_cert_verify_mac, - TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST,TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, - tls1_alert_code, - }; +SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { + tls1_enc, + tls1_mac, + tls1_setup_key_block, + tls1_generate_master_secret, + tls1_change_cipher_state, + tls1_final_finish_mac, + TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, + tls1_cert_verify_mac, + TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, + TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, + tls1_alert_code, +}; long tls1_default_timeout(void) - { - /* 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec - * is way too long for http, the cache would over fill */ - return(60*60*2); - } +{ + /* + * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for + * http, the cache would over fill + */ + return (60 * 60 * 2); +} IMPLEMENT_tls1_meth_func(tlsv1_base_method, - ssl_undefined_function, - ssl_undefined_function, - ssl_bad_method) + ssl_undefined_function, + ssl_undefined_function, ssl_bad_method) int tls1_new(SSL *s) - { - if (!ssl3_new(s)) return(0); - s->method->ssl_clear(s); - return(1); - } +{ + if (!ssl3_new(s)) + return (0); + s->method->ssl_clear(s); + return (1); +} void tls1_free(SSL *s) - { - ssl3_free(s); - } +{ + ssl3_free(s); +} void tls1_clear(SSL *s) - { - ssl3_clear(s); - s->version=TLS1_VERSION; - } +{ + ssl3_clear(s); + s->version = TLS1_VERSION; +} #if 0 long tls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, char *parg) - { - return(0); - } - -long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void *(*fp)()) - { - return(0); - } +{ + return (0); +} + +long tls1_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void *(*fp) ()) +{ + return (0); +} #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT -unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) - { - int extdatalen=0; - unsigned char *ret = p; - - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION - && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return p; - - ret+=2; - - if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) - { - /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ - unsigned long size_str; - long lenmax; - - /* check for enough space. - 4 for the servername type and entension length - 2 for servernamelist length - 1 for the hostname type - 2 for hostname length - + hostname length - */ - - if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 - || (size_str = strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) - return NULL; - - /* extension type and length */ - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); - s2n(size_str+5,ret); - - /* length of servername list */ - s2n(size_str+3,ret); - - /* hostname type, length and hostname */ - *(ret++) = (unsigned char) TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; - s2n(size_str,ret); - memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); - ret+=size_str; - - } - - /* Add RI if renegotiating */ - if (s->new_session) - { - int el; - - if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); - s2n(el,ret); - - if(!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; +unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, + unsigned char *limit) +{ + int extdatalen = 0; + unsigned char *ret = p; + + /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ + if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) + return p; + + ret += 2; + + if (ret >= limit) + return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ + + if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { + /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ + unsigned long size_str; + long lenmax; + + /*- + * check for enough space. + * 4 for the servername type and entension length + * 2 for servernamelist length + * 1 for the hostname type + * 2 for hostname length + * + hostname length + */ + + if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 + || (size_str = + strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) + return NULL; + + /* extension type and length */ + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); + s2n(size_str + 5, ret); + + /* length of servername list */ + s2n(size_str + 3, ret); + + /* hostname type, length and hostname */ + *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; + s2n(size_str, ret); + memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); + ret += size_str; + + } + + /* Add RI if renegotiating */ + if (s->new_session) { + int el; + + if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + if ((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) + return NULL; + + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); + s2n(el, ret); + + if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + ret += el; + } + + if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { + int ticklen; + if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) + ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; + else + ticklen = 0; + /* + * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for + * ticket + */ + if (limit - ret - 4 - ticklen < 0) + return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); + s2n(ticklen, ret); + if (ticklen) { + memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); + ret += ticklen; + } + } + + if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && + s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { + int i; + long extlen, idlen, itmp; + OCSP_RESPID *id; + + idlen = 0; + for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { + id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); + itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); + if (itmp <= 0) + return NULL; + idlen += itmp + 2; } - - if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) - { - int ticklen; - if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) - ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; - else - ticklen = 0; - /* Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len - * rest for ticket - */ - if (limit - ret - 4 - ticklen < 0) - return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); - s2n(ticklen,ret); - if (ticklen) - { - memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); - ret += ticklen; - } - } - - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - int i; - long extlen, idlen, itmp; - OCSP_RESPID *id; - - idlen = 0; - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) - { - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); - if (itmp <= 0) - return NULL; - idlen += itmp + 2; - } - - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) - { - extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); - if (extlen < 0) - return NULL; - } - else - extlen = 0; - - if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); - if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) - return NULL; - s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); - *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; - s2n(idlen, ret); - for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) - { - /* save position of id len */ - unsigned char *q = ret; - id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); - /* skip over id len */ - ret += 2; - itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); - /* write id len */ - s2n(itmp, q); - } - s2n(extlen, ret); - if (extlen > 0) - i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); - } - - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; - - s2n(extdatalen,p); - return ret; - } - -unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned char *limit) - { - int extdatalen=0; - unsigned char *ret = p; - - /* don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation */ - if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) - return p; - - ret+=2; - if (ret>=limit) return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ - - if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) - { - if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name,ret); - s2n(0,ret); - } - - if(s->s3->send_connection_binding) - { - int el; - - if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - if((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) return NULL; - - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate,ret); - s2n(el,ret); - - if(!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) - { - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return NULL; - } - - ret += el; + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { + extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); + if (extlen < 0) + return NULL; + } else + extlen = 0; + + if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) + return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); + if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) + return NULL; + s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); + *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; + s2n(idlen, ret); + for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { + /* save position of id len */ + unsigned char *q = ret; + id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); + /* skip over id len */ + ret += 2; + itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); + /* write id len */ + s2n(itmp, q); } - - if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected - && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) - { - if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket,ret); - s2n(0,ret); - } - - if (s->tlsext_status_expected) - { - if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) return NULL; - s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request,ret); - s2n(0,ret); - } - - if ((extdatalen = ret-p-2)== 0) - return p; - - s2n(extdatalen,p); - return ret; - } - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC -/* ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X + s2n(extlen, ret); + if (extlen > 0) + i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); + } + + if ((extdatalen = ret - p - 2) == 0) + return p; + + s2n(extdatalen, p); + return ret; +} + +unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, + unsigned char *limit) +{ + int extdatalen = 0; + unsigned char *ret = p; + + /* + * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation + */ + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) + return p; + + ret += 2; + if (ret >= limit) + return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ + + if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 + && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { + if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) + return NULL; + + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); + s2n(0, ret); + } + + if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { + int el; + + if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + if ((limit - p - 4 - el) < 0) + return NULL; + + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); + s2n(el, ret); + + if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return NULL; + } + + ret += el; + } + + if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { + if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) + return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); + s2n(0, ret); + } + + if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { + if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) + return NULL; + s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); + s2n(0, ret); + } + + if ((extdatalen = ret - p - 2) == 0) + return p; + + s2n(extdatalen, p); + return ret; +} + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC +/*- + * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: * SNI, @@ -357,797 +356,743 @@ unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, unsigned cha * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). */ -static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, const unsigned char *d, int n) { - unsigned short type, size; - static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { - 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ - 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ - 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ - 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ - 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ - 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ - - 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ - 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ - 0x01, /* 1 point format */ - 0x00, /* uncompressed */ - }; - - /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ - static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { - 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ - 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ - 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ - 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ - 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ - 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ - 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ - 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ - }; - - if (data >= (d+n-2)) - return; - data += 2; - - if (data > (d+n-4)) - return; - n2s(data,type); - n2s(data,size); - - if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - return; - - if (data+size > d+n) - return; - data += size; - - if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) - { - const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); - - if (data + len1 + len2 != d+n) - return; - if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) - return; - if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) - return; - } - else - { - const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); - - if (data + len != d+n) - return; - if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) - return; - } - - s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; +static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, + const unsigned char *d, int n) +{ + unsigned short type, size; + static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { + 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ + 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ + 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ + 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ + 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ + 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ + + 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ + 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ + 0x01, /* 1 point format */ + 0x00, /* uncompressed */ + }; + + /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ + static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { + 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ + 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ + 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ + 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ + 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ + 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ + 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ + 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ + }; + + if (data >= (d + n - 2)) + return; + data += 2; + + if (data > (d + n - 4)) + return; + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + + if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) + return; + + if (data + size > d + n) + return; + data += size; + + if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { + const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); + const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); + + if (data + len1 + len2 != d + n) + return; + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) + return; + if (memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) + return; + } else { + const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); + + if (data + len != d + n) + return; + if (memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) + return; + } + + s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; +} +# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + +int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, + int n, int *al) +{ + unsigned short type; + unsigned short size; + unsigned short len; + unsigned char *data = *p; + int renegotiate_seen = 0; + + s->servername_done = 0; + s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC + if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) + ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); +# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ + + if (data >= (d + n - 2)) + goto ri_check; + + n2s(data, len); + + if (data > (d + n - len)) + goto ri_check; + + while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + + if (data + size > (d + n)) + goto ri_check; + + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) + s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); +/*- + * The servername extension is treated as follows: + * + * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. + * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, + * in which case an fatal alert is generated. + * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. + * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order + * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. + * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when + * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. + * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time + * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the + * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and + * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername + * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches + * the value of the Host: field. + * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION + * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the + * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername + * extension. + * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. + * + */ + + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { + unsigned char *sdata; + int servname_type; + int dsize; + + if (size < 2) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + n2s(data, dsize); + size -= 2; + if (dsize > size) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + sdata = data; + while (dsize > 3) { + servname_type = *(sdata++); + n2s(sdata, len); + dsize -= 3; + + if (len > dsize) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (s->servername_done == 0) + switch (servname_type) { + case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: + if (!s->hit) { + if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = + OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { + *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); + s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; + if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { + OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); + s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + s->servername_done = 1; + + } else + s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname + && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len + && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, + (char *)sdata, len) == 0; + + break; + + default: + break; + } + + dsize -= len; + } + if (dsize != 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { + if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) + return 0; + renegotiate_seen = 1; + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && + s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { + + if (size < 5) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; + size--; + if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { + const unsigned char *sdata; + int dsize; + /* Read in responder_id_list */ + n2s(data, dsize); + size -= 2; + if (dsize > size) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + while (dsize > 0) { + OCSP_RESPID *id; + int idsize; + if (dsize < 4) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + n2s(data, idsize); + dsize -= 2 + idsize; + size -= 2 + idsize; + if (dsize < 0) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + sdata = data; + data += idsize; + id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); + if (!id) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (data != sdata) { + OCSP_RESPID_free(id); + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids + && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = + sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { + OCSP_RESPID_free(id); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { + OCSP_RESPID_free(id); + *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } + + /* Read in request_extensions */ + if (size < 2) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + n2s(data, dsize); + size -= 2; + if (dsize != size) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + sdata = data; + if (dsize > 0) { + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { + sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, + X509_EXTENSION_free); + } + + s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = + d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); + if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } + } + /* + * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. + */ + else + s->tlsext_status_type = -1; + } + + /* session ticket processed earlier */ + + data += size; + } + *p = data; + + ri_check: + + /* Need RI if renegotiating */ + + if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session && + !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, + int n, int *al) +{ + unsigned short length; + unsigned short type; + unsigned short size; + unsigned char *data = *p; + int tlsext_servername = 0; + int renegotiate_seen = 0; + + if (data >= (d + n - 2)) + goto ri_check; + + n2s(data, length); + if (data + length != d + n) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { + n2s(data, type); + n2s(data, size); + + if (data + size > (d + n)) + goto ri_check; + + if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) + s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); + + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { + if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + tlsext_servername = 1; + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { + if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) + || (size > 0)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + return 0; + } + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && + s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { + /* + * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status + * request message. + */ + if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { + *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + return 0; + } + /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ + s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; + } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { + if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) + return 0; + renegotiate_seen = 1; + } + data += size; + } + + if (data != d + n) { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + + if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { + if (s->tlsext_hostname) { + if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { + s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); + if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { + *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + return 0; + } + } else { + *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 0; + } + } + } + + *p = data; + + ri_check: + + /* + * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid + * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello + * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. + * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which + * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on + * initial connect only. + */ + if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) + && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { + *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, + SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); + return 0; + } + + return 1; } -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - -int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) - { - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned short len; - unsigned char *data = *p; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - - s->servername_done = 0; - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC - if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) - ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, d, n); -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ - - if (data >= (d+n-2)) - goto ri_check; - - n2s(data,len); - - if (data > (d+n-len)) - goto ri_check; - - while (data <= (d+n-4)) - { - n2s(data,type); - n2s(data,size); - - if (data+size > (d+n)) - goto ri_check; - - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, - s->tlsext_debug_arg); -/* The servername extension is treated as follows: - - - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. - - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, - in which case an fatal alert is generated. - - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. - - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order - to allow the application to position itself to the right context. - - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when - it is identical to a previously used for the same session. - Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time - set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the - case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and - a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername - presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches - the value of the Host: field. - - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION - if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the session, - i.e. when the session has been established with a servername extension. - - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. - -*/ - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - { - unsigned char *sdata; - int servname_type; - int dsize; - - if (size < 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data,dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size ) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - sdata = data; - while (dsize > 3) - { - servname_type = *(sdata++); - n2s(sdata,len); - dsize -= 3; - - if (len > dsize) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (s->servername_done == 0) - switch (servname_type) - { - case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: - if (!s->hit) - { - if(s->session->tlsext_hostname) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = OPENSSL_malloc(len+1)) == NULL) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); - s->session->tlsext_hostname[len]='\0'; - if (strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { - OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); - s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - s->servername_done = 1; - - } - else - s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname - && strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len - && strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, (char *)sdata, len) == 0; - - break; - - default: - break; - } - - dsize -= len; - } - if (dsize != 0) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) - { - if(!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) - { - - if (size < 5) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; - size--; - if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) - { - const unsigned char *sdata; - int dsize; - /* Read in responder_id_list */ - n2s(data,dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize > size ) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - while (dsize > 0) - { - OCSP_RESPID *id; - int idsize; - if (dsize < 4) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data, idsize); - dsize -= 2 + idsize; - size -= 2 + idsize; - if (dsize < 0) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - sdata = data; - data += idsize; - id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, - &sdata, idsize); - if (!id) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (data != sdata) - { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids - && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = - sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) - { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push( - s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) - { - OCSP_RESPID_free(id); - *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - - /* Read in request_extensions */ - if (size < 2) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - n2s(data,dsize); - size -= 2; - if (dsize != size) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - sdata = data; - if (dsize > 0) - { - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) - { - sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, - X509_EXTENSION_free); - } - - s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = - d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, - &sdata, dsize); - if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts - || (data + dsize != sdata)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } - /* We don't know what to do with any other type - * so ignore it. - */ - else - s->tlsext_status_type = -1; - } - - /* session ticket processed earlier */ - - data+=size; - } - *p = data; - - ri_check: - - /* Need RI if renegotiating */ - - if (!renegotiate_seen && s->new_session && - !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; - } - -int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, int n, int *al) - { - unsigned short length; - unsigned short type; - unsigned short size; - unsigned char *data = *p; - int tlsext_servername = 0; - int renegotiate_seen = 0; - - if (data >= (d+n-2)) - goto ri_check; - - n2s(data,length); - if (data+length != d+n) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - while(data <= (d+n-4)) - { - n2s(data,type); - n2s(data,size); - - if (data+size > (d+n)) - goto ri_check; - - if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) - s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, - s->tlsext_debug_arg); - - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) - { - if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - tlsext_servername = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) - { - if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - || (size > 0)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && - s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) - { - /* MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested - * a status request message. - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) - { - *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; - return 0; - } - /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - } - else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) - { - if(!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) - return 0; - renegotiate_seen = 1; - } - data+=size; - } - - if (data != d+n) - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - - if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) - { - if (s->tlsext_hostname) - { - if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) - { - s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); - if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) - { - *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - return 0; - } - } - else - { - *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; - return 0; - } - } - } - - *p = data; - - ri_check: - - /* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to - * avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server - * hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an - * attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server - * which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI - * absence on initial connect only. - */ - if (!renegotiate_seen - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) - && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) - { - *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; - SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, - SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); - return 0; - } - - return 1; - } int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) - { - int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - - switch (ret) - { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done = 0; - - default: - return 1; - } - } +{ + int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + + if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) + ret = + s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, + s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); + else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL + && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) + ret = + s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, + s-> + initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); + + switch (ret) { + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return -1; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); + return 1; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: + s->servername_done = 0; + + default: + return 1; + } +} int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) - { - int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; - int al; - - /* If status request then ask callback what to do. - * Note: this must be called after servername callbacks in case - * the certificate has changed, and must be called after the cipher - * has been chosen because this may influence which certificate is sent - */ - if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) - { - int r; - CERT_PKEY *certpkey; - certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); - /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ - if (certpkey == NULL) - { - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - return 1; - } - /* Set current certificate to one we will use so - * SSL_get_certificate et al can pick it up. - */ - s->cert->key = certpkey; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - switch (r) - { - /* We don't want to send a status request response */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* status request response should be sent */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; - else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; - break; - /* something bad happened */ - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - goto err; - } - } - else - s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; +{ + int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; + int al; + + /* + * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be + * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has + * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because + * this may influence which certificate is sent + */ + if (s->tlsext_status_type != -1 && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { + int r; + CERT_PKEY *certpkey; + certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); + /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ + if (certpkey == NULL) { + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + return 1; + } + /* + * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate + * et al can pick it up. + */ + s->cert->key = certpkey; + r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + switch (r) { + /* We don't want to send a status request response */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + break; + /* status request response should be sent */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) + s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; + else + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; + break; + /* something bad happened */ + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto err; + } + } else + s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; err: - switch (ret) - { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); - return 1; - - default: - return 1; - } - } + switch (ret) { + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return -1; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); + return 1; + + default: + return 1; + } +} int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) - { - int ret=SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; - int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; - - if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) - ret = s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); - - /* If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one - * tell the callback - */ - if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) - && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) - { - int r; - /* Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows - * there is no response. - */ - if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) - { - OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); - s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; - } - s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; - r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); - if (r == 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - if (r < 0) - { - al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; - ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; - } - } - - switch (ret) - { - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); - return -1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: - ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,al); - return 1; - - case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: - s->servername_done=0; - default: - return 1; - } - } - -/* Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client +{ + int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; + int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + + if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) + ret = + s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, + s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); + else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL + && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) + ret = + s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, + s-> + initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); + + /* + * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the + * callback + */ + if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) + && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { + int r; + /* + * Set resp to NULL, resplen to -1 so callback knows there is no + * response. + */ + if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { + OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); + s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; + } + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; + r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); + if (r == 0) { + al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + if (r < 0) { + al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; + } + } + + switch (ret) { + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); + return -1; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: + ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); + return 1; + + case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: + s->servername_done = 0; + default: + return 1; + } +} + +/* + * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of client * hello and other operations depend on the result we need to handle any TLS * session ticket extension at the same time. */ int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, - const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) - { - /* Point after session ID in client hello */ - const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; - unsigned short i; - - /* If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present - * to permit stateful resumption. - */ - if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) - return 1; - - if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) - return 1; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ - if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) - { - i = *(p++); - p+= i; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - } - /* Skip past cipher list */ - n2s(p, i); - p+= i; - if (p >= limit) - return -1; - /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ - i = *(p++); - p += i; - if (p > limit) - return -1; - /* Now at start of extensions */ - if ((p + 2) >= limit) - return 1; - n2s(p, i); - while ((p + 4) <= limit) - { - unsigned short type, size; - n2s(p, type); - n2s(p, size); - if (p + size > limit) - return 1; - if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) - { - /* If zero length note client will accept a ticket - * and indicate cache miss to trigger full handshake - */ - if (size == 0) - { - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 0; /* Cache miss */ - } - return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, - ret); - } - p += size; - } - return 1; - } - -static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, int eticklen, - const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, - SSL_SESSION **psess) - { - SSL_SESSION *sess; - unsigned char *sdec; - const unsigned char *p; - int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; - unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; - HMAC_CTX hctx; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; - SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; - /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ - if (eticklen < 48) - goto tickerr; - /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); - if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) - { - unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; - int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, - &ctx, &hctx, 0); - if (rv < 0) - return -1; - if (rv == 0) - goto tickerr; - if (rv == 2) - renew_ticket = 1; - } - else - { - /* Check key name matches */ - if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) - goto tickerr; - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, - tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); - EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, - tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); - } - /* Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and - * integrity checks on ticket. - */ - mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); - eticklen -= mlen; - /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ - HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); - HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); - if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) - { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - goto tickerr; - } - /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ - /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ - p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); - sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); - if (!sdec) - { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - return -1; - } - EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); - if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) - { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - OPENSSL_free(sdec); - goto tickerr; - } - slen += mlen; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); - p = sdec; - - sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); - OPENSSL_free(sdec); - if (sess) - { - /* The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to - * detect that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to - * the session structure. If it is empty set length to zero - * as required by standard. - */ - if (sesslen) - memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); - sess->session_id_length = sesslen; - *psess = sess; - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket; - return 1; - } - /* If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to - * send a new ticket - */ - tickerr: - s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; - return 0; - } + const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) +{ + /* Point after session ID in client hello */ + const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; + unsigned short i; + + /* + * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful + * resumption. + */ + if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) + return 1; + + if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) + return 1; + if (p >= limit) + return -1; + /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ + if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { + i = *(p++); + p += i; + if (p >= limit) + return -1; + } + /* Skip past cipher list */ + n2s(p, i); + p += i; + if (p >= limit) + return -1; + /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ + i = *(p++); + p += i; + if (p > limit) + return -1; + /* Now at start of extensions */ + if ((p + 2) >= limit) + return 1; + n2s(p, i); + while ((p + 4) <= limit) { + unsigned short type, size; + n2s(p, type); + n2s(p, size); + if (p + size > limit) + return 1; + if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { + /* + * If zero length note client will accept a ticket and indicate + * cache miss to trigger full handshake + */ + if (size == 0) { + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + return 0; /* Cache miss */ + } + return tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); + } + p += size; + } + return 1; +} + +static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, + int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, + int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) +{ + SSL_SESSION *sess; + unsigned char *sdec; + const unsigned char *p; + int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; + unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + HMAC_CTX hctx; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; + SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; + /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ + if (eticklen < 48) + goto tickerr; + /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); + if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { + unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; + int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, + &ctx, &hctx, 0); + if (rv < 0) + return -1; + if (rv == 0) + goto tickerr; + if (rv == 2) + renew_ticket = 1; + } else { + /* Check key name matches */ + if (memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) + goto tickerr; + HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, + tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); + EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, + tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, etick + 16); + } + /* + * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity + * checks on ticket. + */ + mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); + eticklen -= mlen; + /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ + HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen); + HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + goto tickerr; + } + /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ + /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ + p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); + eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); + sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); + if (!sdec) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + return -1; + } + EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen); + if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + OPENSSL_free(sdec); + goto tickerr; + } + slen += mlen; + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); + p = sdec; + + sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); + OPENSSL_free(sdec); + if (sess) { + /* + * The session ID if non-empty is used by some clients to detect that + * the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session + * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by + * standard. + */ + if (sesslen) + memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); + sess->session_id_length = sesslen; + *psess = sess; + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = renew_ticket; + return 1; + } + /* + * If session decrypt failure indicate a cache miss and set state to send + * a new ticket + */ + tickerr: + s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; + return 0; +} #endif |