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<title>src, branch release/15.0.0-p8</title>
<subtitle>FreeBSD source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/atom?h=release%2F15.0.0-p8</id>
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<updated>2026-04-30T21:10:49Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Add UPDATING entries and bump version</title>
<updated>2026-04-30T21:10:49Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-30T21:10:49Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=53054229dcb3cb994056da70b6c838c74ea3bb83'/>
<id>urn:sha1:53054229dcb3cb994056da70b6c838c74ea3bb83</id>
<content type='text'>
Approved by:	so
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dhclient: Improve server and filename validation</title>
<updated>2026-04-30T21:09:38Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Dag-Erling Smørgrav</name>
<email>des@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-30T16:45:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=dc8762cfb6e2794ec10873263fa606ff969b1905'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dc8762cfb6e2794ec10873263fa606ff969b1905</id>
<content type='text'>
* Don't iterate over each string three times; once is enough.

* Reject control characters (anything below space) in addition to the
  double quote and backslash.

* If an unsafe character is encountered, discard the string instead of
  rejecting the entire lease.

* If backslashes are encountered in the file name option, convert them
  to forward slashes instead of rejecting the option.

* Tweak the warning messages a bit.  Looking through the rest of the
  code, it seems to me that notes generally end with a period while
  warnings generally don't.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-EN-26:11.dhclient
Fixes:		8008e4b88daf ("dhclient: Check for unexpected characters in some DHCP server options")
PR:		294886
MFC after:	1 week
Reviewed by:	brooks, markj
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D56740

(cherry picked from commit 873a195ba63575e46686cfd6ea9670a0ca340fa0)
(cherry picked from commit 252f603d1704044defb7695e707bc87c7f75483a)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add UPDATING entries and bump version</title>
<updated>2026-04-28T20:09:31Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-28T20:09:31Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=bbfdabc12895ce2538444747684c6a4fe53298ba'/>
<id>urn:sha1:bbfdabc12895ce2538444747684c6a4fe53298ba</id>
<content type='text'>
Approved by:	so
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libnv: fix heap overflow in nvlist_recv()</title>
<updated>2026-04-28T19:27:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mariusz Zaborski</name>
<email>oshogbo@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-28T14:36:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=b345e07c8d71e2c00cabe26ea2f96d65368aa1dd'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b345e07c8d71e2c00cabe26ea2f96d65368aa1dd</id>
<content type='text'>
nvlist_check_header() validated nvlh_size for overflow before
performing conversion. An mallicous user can set
NV_FLAG_BIG_ENDIAN in the header and craft nvlh_size so that
the orginall value passes the check, but after the conversion the
sizeof(nvlist_header) + size can overflow.
This can lead to a heap buffer overflow.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:17.libnv
Security:	CVE-2026-35547
Fixes:		36fa90dbde0060aacb5677d0b113ee168e839071
Reviewed by:	markj
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D56342
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>libnv: switch fd_wait() from select(2) to poll(2)</title>
<updated>2026-04-28T19:27:12Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mariusz Zaborski</name>
<email>oshogbo@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-28T14:35:10Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=7e4d5363ddced9578c42c46d8149e04aa1ab9fa8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7e4d5363ddced9578c42c46d8149e04aa1ab9fa8</id>
<content type='text'>
The previous implementation used FD_SET() on a stack-allocated fd_set,
which is an out-of-bounds write whenever the socket fd is &gt;= FD_SETSIZE
(1024).

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:16.libnv
Security:	CVE-2026-39457
Reported by:	Joshua Rogers of AISLE Research Team (https://aisle.com/)
Reviewed by:	markj
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D56689
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pf: improve SCTP validation</title>
<updated>2026-04-28T19:27:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kristof Provost</name>
<email>kp@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-26T09:34:55Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=c01d9bcf0cf683a0bd074383339980bcf3862be5'/>
<id>urn:sha1:c01d9bcf0cf683a0bd074383339980bcf3862be5</id>
<content type='text'>
As per RFC5061 "4.2.  New Parameter Types" the add/delete IP address
parameters (0xc001, 0xc002) may not be present in an INIT or INIT-ACK
chunk. They are only allowed to be present in an ASCONF chunk.

This also prevents unbounded recursion while parsing an SCTP packet.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:14.pf
Security:	CVE-2026-7164
PR:		294799
Reported by:	Igor Gabriel Sousa e Souza
Sponsored by:	Orange Business Services
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dhclient: Fix reallocation of dhclient script environments</title>
<updated>2026-04-28T19:27:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-27T20:56:21Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=66d6c32ce7b84172e4c6069ce3acf8f5c422d1fa'/>
<id>urn:sha1:66d6c32ce7b84172e4c6069ce3acf8f5c422d1fa</id>
<content type='text'>
When the number of DHCP options exceeds a threshold, script_set_env()
will reallocate the environment, stored as an array of pointers.  The
calculation of the array size failed to multiply by the pointer size,
resulting in a smaller than expected buffer which admits out-of-bounds
writes.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:15.dhclient
Security:	CVE-2026-42511
Reported by:	Joshua Rogers of AISLE Research Team (https://aisle.com/)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>dhclient: Check for unexpected characters in some DHCP server options</title>
<updated>2026-04-28T19:27:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-27T20:03:09Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=e7b4fb41aafaf6ccb4ff14684416223c1f6f92e8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e7b4fb41aafaf6ccb4ff14684416223c1f6f92e8</id>
<content type='text'>
Some options are written directly to the lease file, which may be parsed
by subsequent dhclient invocations.  We must make sure that a malicious
server can't control the "medium" field of a lease definition, otherwise
they can achieve RCE by injecting one into the lease file, whereupon it
will be passed to dhclient-script, which passes it through eval.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:12.dhclient
Security:	CVE-2026-42511
Reported by:	Joshua Rogers of AISLE Research Team (https://aisle.com/)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>execve: Fix an operator precedence bug</title>
<updated>2026-04-28T19:27:11Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-22T17:58:35Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=934b48683c4f140cafd225518d9e056a00b46ee8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:934b48683c4f140cafd225518d9e056a00b46ee8</id>
<content type='text'>
The buggy version allowed userspace to overflow the copy into adjacent
execve KVA regions, which enables, among other things, injecting
environment variables into privileged processes.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-26:13.exec
Security:	CVE-2026-7270
Reported by:	Ryan Austin of Calif.io
Reviewed by:	brooks, kib
Fixes:		f373437a01a3 ("Add helper functions to copy strings into struct image_args.")
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D56665
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>amd64: fix INVLPGB range invalidation</title>
<updated>2026-04-28T19:26:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Kyle Evans</name>
<email>kevans@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-04-20T20:18:17Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=182c59658218d9b0a889eaad56ad4c31d99323e9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:182c59658218d9b0a889eaad56ad4c31d99323e9</id>
<content type='text'>
AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 3 says the following:

&gt; ECX[15:0] contains a count of the number of sequential pages to
&gt; invalidate in addition to the original virtual address, starting from
&gt; the virtual address specified in rAX. A count of 0 invalidates a
&gt; single page. ECX[31]=0 indicates to increment the virtual address at
&gt; the 4K boundary. ECX[31]=1 indicates to increment the virtual address
&gt; at the 2M boundary. The maximum count supported is reported in
&gt; CPUID function 8000_0008h, EDX[15:0].

ECX[31] being what we call INVLPGB_2M_CNT, signaling to increment the
VA by 2M.

&gt; This instruction invalidates the TLB entry or entries, regardless of
&gt; the page size (4 Kbytes, 2 Mbytes, 4 Mbytes, or 1 Gbyte). [...]

Combined with this, my interpretation of the current code is: if
&lt;va&gt; is aligned on a PDE boundary, we'll use INVLPGB_2M_CNT to try and
invalidate &lt;cnt&gt; PDEs with a single call, but that only works if &lt;va&gt; is
the start of at least &lt;cnt&gt; 2M pages.  Otherwise, if &lt;va&gt; or any of the
subsequent PDEs isn't actually a superpage, then we would actually only
invalidate the *first* page within the PDE before skipping to the next
PDE, leaving the remainder of the 4K pages in between as they were.

The implication would seem to be that we would need to inspect the range
that we're trying to invalidate if we're planning on using
INVLPGB_2M_CNT at all, so this patch just simplifies it to a series of
4K invalidations.  My gut feeling is that we likely still come out on
top vs. the TLB shootdown we're avoiding.

This seems to explain some issues we've seen lately with fdgrowtable()
and kqueue on recent Zen4/Zen5 EPYC hardware, where we'd experience
corruption that we can't explain.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-EN-26:10.amd64
PR:		293382
Reviewed by:	alc, kib, markj

(cherry picked from commit 1b8e5c02f5c07521129e06ff8ab7c660238fd75c)
(cherry picked from commit 280cfe2264d7bf2199e5a41bdcbb9acb49d059c1)
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
