<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>src, branch releng/12.2</title>
<subtitle>FreeBSD source tree</subtitle>
<id>https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/atom?h=releng%2F12.2</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/atom?h=releng%2F12.2'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/'/>
<updated>2022-03-22T16:20:05Z</updated>
<entry>
<title>Add UPDATING entries and bump version.</title>
<updated>2022-03-22T16:20:05Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gordon Tetlow</name>
<email>gordon@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-22T16:20:05Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=7dac93b9215ee061b5bf4c3a756d119fdb14de42'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7dac93b9215ee061b5bf4c3a756d119fdb14de42</id>
<content type='text'>
Approved by:	so
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>contrib/tzdata: import tzdata 2022a</title>
<updated>2022-03-22T15:54:07Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Philip Paeps</name>
<email>philip@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-22T15:54:07Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=69c6703ee2d74403a1b48d008f2c47cf41f31ca1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69c6703ee2d74403a1b48d008f2c47cf41f31ca1</id>
<content type='text'>
Merge commit '971fa603f2bdf16273135a00ff16c5585520c53f'

Changes: https://github.com/eggert/tz/blob/2022a/NEWS

With this merge, we return to our previous long-standing practice of
distributing the IANA Time Zone Database unmodified.

Releases of tzdb since 2021b have merged some time zones where clocks
have agreed since 1970.  The overwhelming majority of users will not be
affected by this change.  A port of the newly created global-tz fork of
the IANA Time Zone database (misc/global-tz) is available for users who
need more granular pre-1970 time zone history.

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-EN-22:14.tzdata

(cherry picked from commit 8ea5af2b77f2b43c250cacb257f42c0a54d644c4)
(cherry picked from commit 803b4b7f22ef9be408d81480cf70ca3afb7c7c53)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add UPDATING entries and bump version</title>
<updated>2022-03-15T17:42:16Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mark Johnston</name>
<email>markj@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-15T17:42:16Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=717ed842180a5b9a65ffeec916cacb9fedaf2d7b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:717ed842180a5b9a65ffeec916cacb9fedaf2d7b</id>
<content type='text'>
Approved by:	so
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net80211: prevent plaintext injection by A-MSDU RFC1042/EAPOL frames</title>
<updated>2022-03-15T17:40:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathy Vanhoef</name>
<email>Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-06T22:10:56Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=409819ae9998eed7ef852e4b392d76ab01416864'/>
<id>urn:sha1:409819ae9998eed7ef852e4b392d76ab01416864</id>
<content type='text'>
No longer accept plaintext A-MSDU frames that start with an RFC1042
header with EtherType EAPOL.  This is done by only accepting EAPOL
packets that are included in non-aggregated 802.11 frames.

Note that before this patch, FreeBSD also only accepted EAPOL frames
that are sent in a non-aggregated 802.11 frame due to bugs in
processing EAPOL packets inside A-MSDUs. In other words,
compatibility with legitimate devices remains the same.

This relates to section 6.5 in the 2021 Usenix "FragAttacks" (Fragment
and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation)
paper.

Submitted by:	Mathy Vanhoef (Mathy.Vanhoef kuleuven.be)
Security:	CVE-2020-26144
PR:		256120

(cherry picked from commit ffc19cf52da5546973965f78cf32aa0f2c9657f8)
(cherry picked from commit 8b2ba742cc2c732bc4bc1d43f8256adce06657d0)
(cherry picked from commit 2d09e4366b67dd719ebae5390436868e5430d833)

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net80211: reject mixed plaintext/encrypted fragments</title>
<updated>2022-03-15T17:40:34Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathy Vanhoef</name>
<email>Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-06T22:10:41Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=a780210457fe7448c6f4cdd81578f377974b2925'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a780210457fe7448c6f4cdd81578f377974b2925</id>
<content type='text'>
ieee80211_defrag() accepts fragmented 802.11 frames in a protected Wi-Fi
network even when some of the fragments are not encrypted.
Track whether the fragments are encrypted or not and only accept
successive ones if they match the state of the first fragment.

This relates to section 6.3 in the 2021 Usenix "FragAttacks" (Fragment
and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation)
paper.

Submitted by:	Mathy Vanhoef (Mathy.Vanhoef kuleuven.be)
Security:	CVE-2020-26147
PR:		256118

(cherry picked from commit 11572d7d7fb9802ceb46ea9dc6cbe3bb95373e55)
(cherry picked from commit e13d483c5677d12b52f1c81537d54faa85ed43b9)
(cherry picked from commit 00cd5a2f614ae2cf1daa30cde7f91de9cdde2393)

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net80211: proper ssid length check in setmlme_assoc_adhoc()</title>
<updated>2022-03-15T17:39:55Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Bjoern A. Zeeb</name>
<email>bz@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-06T18:41:37Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=b2107e60f62ed2a232900d77ec54804228d1bfc8'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b2107e60f62ed2a232900d77ec54804228d1bfc8</id>
<content type='text'>
A user supplied SSID length is used without proper checks in
setmlme_assoc_adhoc() which can lead to copies beyond the end
of the user supplied buffer.
The ssid is a fixed size array for the ioctl and the argument
to setmlme_assoc_adhoc().
In addition to an ssid_len check of 0 also error in case the
ssid_len is larger than the size of the ssid array to prevent
problems.

PR:		254737
Reported by:	Tommaso (cutesmilee.research protonmail.com)

(cherry picked from commit 526370fb85db4b659cff4625eb2f379acaa4a1a8)
(cherry picked from commit 0525ece3554edce14fa68a7fb61078ae2110c44b)
(cherry picked from commit ab5678c6c0d0b28feafdb2fd397866d6088f37d8)
(cherry picked from commit f4d0e8787a09f4cdfb856924aaca97f1c78b65b1)

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net80211: correct length check in ieee80211_ies_expand()</title>
<updated>2022-03-15T17:39:17Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Bjoern A. Zeeb</name>
<email>bz@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2021-10-06T18:09:39Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=a4c0d14bbc9bfe8e7dff3657d4b4bb1705d8668b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:a4c0d14bbc9bfe8e7dff3657d4b4bb1705d8668b</id>
<content type='text'>
In ieee80211_ies_expand() we are looping over Elements
(also known as Information Elements or IEs).
The comment suggests that we assume well-formedness of
the IEs themselves.
Checking the buffer length being least 2 (1 byte Element ID and
1 byte Length fields) rather than just 1 before accessing ie[1]
is still good practise and can prevent and out-of-bounds read in
case the input is not behaving according to the comment.

Reported by:	(coypu sdf.org)
admbugs:	857
MFC after:	3 days
Reviewed by:	adrian, markj
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D32340

(cherry picked from commit 09dd08f167812a5fdb516fc98f14dbb43221432f)
(cherry picked from commit 8dc4c0a922b7e7a0ee682f4e1426f876692c0828)

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>net80211: mitigation against A-MSDU design flaw</title>
<updated>2022-03-15T17:39:02Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Mathy Vanhoef</name>
<email>Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be</email>
</author>
<published>2021-06-06T22:10:52Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=ae6d654f4fa167f473a40417479e607029670679'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ae6d654f4fa167f473a40417479e607029670679</id>
<content type='text'>
Mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks by detecting if the destination address
of a subframe equals an RFC1042 (i.e., LLC/SNAP) header, and if so
dropping the complete A-MSDU frame.  This mitigates known attacks,
although new (unknown) aggregation-based attacks may remain possible.

This defense works because in A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, a
normal encrypted Wi-Fi frame is turned into an A-MSDU frame. This means
the first 6 bytes of the first A-MSDU subframe correspond to an RFC1042
header. In other words, the destination MAC address of the first A-MSDU
subframe contains the start of an RFC1042 header during an aggregation
attack. We can detect this and thereby prevent this specific attack.

This relates to section 7.2 in the 2021 Usenix "FragAttacks" (Fragment
and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation)
paper.

Submitted by:	Mathy Vanhoef (Mathy.Vanhoef kuleuven.be)
Security:	CVE-2020-24588
PR:		256119

(cherry picked from commit f024bdf1155f36d2d8c4caa533b66e4040c4c469)
(cherry picked from commit 41ca1d50a8657959df2009daa300dda56a090d5e)
(cherry picked from commit 76ee776f4d9f146f7a97ac9bab388c51a1c787c9)

Approved by:	so
Security:	FreeBSD-SA-22:02.wifi
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Fix a bug in BN_mod_sqrt() that can cause it to loop forever.</title>
<updated>2022-03-15T17:36:40Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gordon Tetlow</name>
<email>gordon@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-15T16:48:59Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=d35c456500515b1b3e6f3be478da6be9869aa1af'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d35c456500515b1b3e6f3be478da6be9869aa1af</id>
<content type='text'>
Approved by:	so
Obtained from:	OpenSSL Project
Security:	CVE-2022-0778
Security:       FreeBSD-SA-22:03.openssl

(cherry picked from commit fdc418f15e92732a3551832bcb625ba9b47242df)
(cherry picked from commit c2a7d6e643bbc8801b1b83c9e64d57e726eeed98)
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add UPDATING entries and bump version.</title>
<updated>2022-02-01T17:54:20Z</updated>
<author>
<name>Gordon Tetlow</name>
<email>gordon@FreeBSD.org</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-01T17:54:20Z</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/commit/?id=054503caa96ba6349d82fe2b9ed6f43f7141eaf9'/>
<id>urn:sha1:054503caa96ba6349d82fe2b9ed6f43f7141eaf9</id>
<content type='text'>
Approved by:	so
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
