src/etc/ttys, branch release/2.2.8_cvsFreeBSD source treehttps://cgit-dev.freebsd.org/src/atom?h=release%2F2.2.8_cvs1999-01-21T00:55:30ZThis commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create tag1999-01-21T00:55:30Zcvs2svncvs2svn@FreeBSD.org1999-01-21T00:55:30Zurn:sha1:a9e2dc176f709713f9565ed1711c958f0707eb36
'RELENG_2_2_8_RELEASE'.
This commit was manufactured to restore the state of the 2.2.8-RELEASE image.
Releases prior to 5.3-RELEASE are omitting the secure/ and crypto/ subdirs.
MFC: Add Id keyword1998-09-03T22:14:39ZBrian Somersbrian@FreeBSD.org1998-09-03T22:14:39Zurn:sha1:066035190bf90defc170ee5e5fc740035fc4f152MFC: selected improvements for etc files *not* including periodic changes,1998-02-15T14:24:59ZJordan K. Hubbardjkh@FreeBSD.org1998-02-15T14:24:59Zurn:sha1:221b016f8662763fceffa76a22febdb1856454dd
security tweaks or other kerberbos related stuff. I expect that
stuff to occur as a side-effect of what others will be doing in etc,
if at all.
Fixes:1996-10-22T21:17:05ZMarc G. Fournierscrappy@FreeBSD.org1996-10-22T21:17:05Zurn:sha1:e9aa958593b50f003c7c2029e25304f7449a6f14
>Description:
Applications that rely on getttyent and related calls will
not find entries that are not listed in /etc/ttys. Screen
and xterm (rxvt, color_xterm) will not be able to obtain
unique utmp slots as a result. This isn't a critical problem
but it will keep utilities such as 'finger', 'who' and 'w'
from displaying the correct information.
Closes PR#conf/1270
Submitted by: winter@jurai.net
ttyq[0-9a-f] -> ttyp[g-v]1995-05-05T10:06:34ZSatoshi Asamiasami@FreeBSD.org1995-05-05T10:06:34Zurn:sha1:884a677900834a62040d3d7922d6d21e0bd800eaRename tty0* -> ttyd*. Comment about "serial" terminals instead of1994-12-06T19:59:24ZBruce Evansbde@FreeBSD.org1994-12-06T19:59:24Zurn:sha1:600caea8b25596cf0a5fa2aaf7bf3b50ee54d7cd
"hardwired" or "dialin" terminals.
Only comment added to console entry:1994-06-16T12:34:53ZAndrey A. Chernovache@FreeBSD.org1994-06-16T12:34:53Zurn:sha1:5ac66a038bfbc4034ef3ecbe655f694c75cadb4b
# If you want to be asked for password, change "secure" to "insecure" here
I'll leave the addition of the line, but there's just absolutely no1994-06-16T12:14:08ZJordan K. Hubbardjkh@FreeBSD.org1994-06-16T12:14:08Zurn:sha1:911491d727540b995cb8b574da03d6177d0d22fa
way I'm going to allow this to be set to secure. People blow their
password files away all the time, and I am not at all keen to lose the
ability to get them recovered with the simple expedient of a single-user
boot.
Choose secure single-user mode by default1994-06-16T11:13:44ZAndrey A. Chernovache@FreeBSD.org1994-06-16T11:13:44Zurn:sha1:e4e14c13aaea772bd3cac8907d1bdfc18712e8b3
Without this entry init.bsdi don't ask root password when it goes
to sigle-user. This entry must present here in any case,
subject of arguing can be only default mode, I mean
"secure" or "insecure" here. Please consider this entry
like template and change "insecure" to "secure" if you
are _shure_, but not back out whole line.
# This entry needed for asking password when init goes to single-user mode
console none unknown off insecure
Use "cons25" for console too since we're now syscons. Turn on two1994-05-19T11:07:56ZJordan K. Hubbardjkh@FreeBSD.org1994-05-19T11:07:56Zurn:sha1:7838b155ee21d312471cf9eecba71145cfcaff2a
VTY's by default; give user a couple of vty's to play with out of the box
(leave 4th entry turned off for X).