diff options
| author | cvs2svn <cvs2svn@FreeBSD.org> | 2001-07-24 09:05:01 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | cvs2svn <cvs2svn@FreeBSD.org> | 2001-07-24 09:05:01 +0000 |
| commit | 169285e67baae4a0fdb27d78bd659fe50a26bb93 (patch) | |
| tree | a30aa9b663d1ed8734ece42bad186ac9ffe04c51 | |
| parent | 7c79d50ee7f8468dcf210a772e79cfbf6259eb88 (diff) | |
| download | src-vendor/tcp_wrappers/7.6-2001-06-01.tar.gz src-vendor/tcp_wrappers/7.6-2001-06-01.zip | |
This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create tagvendor/tcp_wrappers/7.6-2001-06-01
'tcp_wrappers-vendor-v_7_6_2001_06_01'.
55 files changed, 0 insertions, 9715 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/BLURB b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/BLURB deleted file mode 100644 index 69178c1ae253..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/BLURB +++ /dev/null @@ -1,36 +0,0 @@ -@(#) BLURB 1.28 97/03/21 19:27:18 - -With this package you can monitor and filter incoming requests for the -SYSTAT, FINGER, FTP, TELNET, RLOGIN, RSH, EXEC, TFTP, TALK, and other -network services. - -The package provides tiny daemon wrapper programs that can be installed -without any changes to existing software or to existing configuration -files. The wrappers report the name of the client host and of the -requested service; the wrappers do not exchange information with the -client or server applications, and impose no overhead on the actual -conversation between the client and server applications. - -This patch upgrades the tcp wrappers version 7.5 source code to -version 7.6. The source-routing protection in version 7.5 was not -as strong as it could be. And all this effort was not needed with -modern UNIX systems that can already stop source-routed traffic in -the kernel. Examples are 4.4BSD derivatives, Solaris 2.x, and Linux. - -This release does not introduce new features. Do not bother applying -this patch when you built your version 7.x tcp wrapper without -enabling the KILL_IP_OPTIONS compiler switch; when you can disable -IP source routing options in the kernel; when you run a UNIX version -that pre-dates 4.4BSD, such as SunOS 4. Such systems are unable to -receive source-routed connections and are therefore not vulnerable -to IP spoofing attacks with source-routed TCP connections. - -A complete change log is given in the CHANGES document. As always, -problem reports and suggestions for improvement are welcome. - - Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl), - Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, - Eindhoven University of Technology, - The Netherlands. - - Currently visiting IBM T.J. Watson Research, Hawthorne NY, USA. diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/Banners.Makefile b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/Banners.Makefile deleted file mode 100644 index 915e3dd96774..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/Banners.Makefile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -# @(#) Banners.Makefile 1.3 97/02/12 02:13:18 -# -# Install this file as the Makefile in your directory with banner files. -# It will convert a prototype banner text to a form that is suitable for -# the ftp, telnet, rlogin, and other services. -# -# You'll have to comment out the IN definition below if your daemon -# names don't start with `in.'. -# -# The prototype text should live in the banners directory, as a file with -# the name "prototype". In the prototype text you can use %<character> -# sequences as described in the hosts_access.5 manual page (`nroff -man' -# format). The sequences will be expanded while the banner message is -# sent to the client. For example: -# -# Hello %u@%h, what brings you here? -# -# Expands to: Hello username@hostname, what brings you here? Note: the -# use of %u forces a client username lookup. -# -# In order to use banners, build the tcp wrapper with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS -# and use hosts.allow rules like this: -# -# daemons ... : clients ... : banners /some/directory ... -# -# Of course, nothing prevents you from using multiple banner directories. -# For example, one banner directory for clients that are granted service, -# one banner directory for rejected clients, and one banner directory for -# clients with a hostname problem. -# -SHELL = /bin/sh -IN = in. -BANNERS = $(IN)telnetd $(IN)ftpd $(IN)rlogind # $(IN)fingerd $(IN)rshd - -all: $(BANNERS) - -$(IN)telnetd: prototype - cp prototype $@ - chmod 644 $@ - -$(IN)ftpd: prototype - sed 's/^/220-/' prototype > $@ - chmod 644 $@ - -$(IN)rlogind: prototype nul - ( ./nul ; cat prototype ) > $@ - chmod 644 $@ - -# Other services: banners may interfere with normal operation -# so they should probably be used only when refusing service. -# In particular, banners don't work with standard rsh daemons. -# You would have to use an rshd that has built-in tcp wrapper -# support, for example the rshd that is part of the logdaemon -# utilities. - -$(IN)fingerd: prototype - cp prototype $@ - chmod 644 $@ - -$(IN)rshd: prototype nul - ( ./nul ; cat prototype ) > $@ - chmod 644 $@ - -# In case no /dev/zero available, let's hope they have at least -# a C compiler of some sort. - -nul: - echo 'main() { write(1,"",1); return(0); }' >nul.c - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -s -o nul nul.c - rm -f nul.c diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/CHANGES b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/CHANGES deleted file mode 100644 index e68ee750e015..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/CHANGES +++ /dev/null @@ -1,451 +0,0 @@ -Request: after building the programs, please run the `tcpdchk' wrapper -configuration checker. See the `tcpdchk.8' manual page (`nroff -man' -format) for instructions. `tcpdchk' automatically identifies the most -common configuration problems, and will save you and me a lot of time. - -Changes per release 7.6 (Mar 1997) -================================== - -- Improved the anti source-routing protection. The code in version -7.5 was not as strong as it could be, because I tried to be compatible -with Linux. That was a mistake. Sorry for the inconvenience. - -- The program no longer terminates case of a source-routed connection, -making the IP-spoofing code more usable for long-running daemons. - -- When syslogging DNS hostname problems, always stop after a limited -number of characters. - -Changes per release 7.5 (Feb 1997) -================================== - -- Optionally refuse source-routed TCP connections requests altogether. -Credits to Niels Provos of Universitaet Hamburg. File: fix_options.c. - -- Support for IRIX 6 (Lael Tucker). - -- Support for Amdahl UTS 2.1.5 (Richard E. Richmond). - -- Support for SINIX 5.42 (Klaus Nielsen). - -- SCO 5 now has vsyslog() (Bill Golden). - -- Hints and tips for dealing with IRIX inetd (Niko Makila, Aaron -M Lee). - -- Support for BSD/OS (Paul Borman). - -- Support for Tandem (Emad Qawas). - -- Support for ISC (Frederick B. Cohen). - -- Workaround for UNICOS - it would choke on a setjmp() expression -(Bruce Kelly). File: hosts_access.c, tcpdchk.c. - -- Increased the level of buffer overflow paranoia when printing -unwanted IP options. File: fix_options.c. - -Changes per release 7.4 (Mar 1996) -================================== - -- IRIX 5.3 (and possibly, earlier releases, too) library routines call -the non-reentrant strtok() routine. The result is that hosts may slip -through allow/deny filters. Workaround is to not rely on the vendor's -strtok() routine (#ifdef LIBC_CALLS_STRTOK). Credits to Th. Eifert -(Aachen University) for spotting this one. This fix supersedes the -earlier workaround for a similar problem in FreeBSD 2.0. - -Changes per release 7.3 (Feb 1996) -================================== - -- More tests added to tcpdchk and tcpdmatch: make sure that the -REAL_DAEMON_DIR actually is a directory and not a regular file; -detect if tcpd recursively calls itself. - -- Edwin Kremer found an amusing fencepost error in the xgets() -routine: lines longer than BUFLEN characters would be garbled. - -- The access control routines now refuse to execute "dangerous" actions -such as `twist' when they are called from within a resident process. -This prevents you from shooting yourself into the foot with critical -systems programs such as, e.g., portmap or rpcbind. - -- Support for Unicos 8.x (Bruce Kelly). The program now closes the -syslog client socket before running the real daemon: Cray UNICOS -refuses to checkpoint processes with open network ports. - -- Support for MachTen UNIX (Albert M.C Tam). - -- Support for Interactive UNIX R3.2 V4.0 (Bobby D. Wright). - -- Support for SCO 3.2v5.0.0 OpenServer 5 (bob@odt.handy.com) - -- Support for Unixware 1.x and Unixware 2.x. The old Unixware Makefile -rule was broken. Sorry about that. - -- Some FreeBSD 2.0 libc routines call strtok() and severely mess up the -allow/deny rule processing. This is very bad. Workaround: call our own -strtok() clone (#ifdef USE_STRSEP). - -- The programs now log a warning when they detect that a non-existent -banner directory is specified. - -- The hosts_access.3 manual page used obsolete names for the RQ_* -constants. - -Changes per release 7.2 (Jan 1995) -================================== - -- Added a note to the README and manpages on using the IDENT service to -detect sequence number spoofing and other host impersonation attacks. - -- Portability: ConvexOS puts RPC version numbers before the daemon path -name (Jukka Ukkonen). - -- Portability: the AIX compiler disliked the strchr() declaration -in socket.c. I should have removed it when I included <string.h>. - -- Backwards compatibility: some people relied on the old leading dot or -trailing dot magic in daemon process names. - -- Backwards compatibility: hostname lookup remains enabled when --DPARANOID is turned off. In order to disable hostname lookups you -must turn off -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME. - -- Eliminated false complaints from the tcpdmatch/tcpdchk configuration -checking programs about process names not in inetd.conf or about KNOWN -username patterns. - -Changes per release 7.1 (Jan 1995) -================================== - -- Portability: HP-UX permits you to break inetd.conf entries with -backslash-newline. - -- Portability: EP/IX has no putenv() and some inetd.conf entries are -spread out over two lines. - -- Portability: SCO with NIS support has no *netgrent() routines. - -Changes per release 7.0 (Jan 1995) -================================== - -- Added a last-minute workaround for a Solaris 2.4 gethostbyname() -foulup with multi-homed hosts in DNS through NIS mode. - -- Added a last-minute defense against TLI weirdness: address lookups -apparently succeed but the result netbuf is empty (ticlts transport). - -- Dropped several new solutions that were in need of a problem. Beta -testers may recognize what new features were kicked out during the last -weeks before release 7.0 came out. Such is life. - -- Got rid of out the environment replacement routines, at least for -most architectures. One should not have to replace working system -software when all that is needed is a 4.4BSD setenv() emulator. - -- By popular request I have added an option to send banner messages to -clients. There is a Banners.Makefile that gives some aid for sites that -are going to use this feature. John C. Wingenbach did some pioneering -work here. I used to think that banners are frivolous. Now that I had -a personal need for them I know that banners can be useful. - -- At last: an extensible functional interface to the pattern matching -engine. request_init() and request_set() accept a variable-length -name-value argument list. The result can be passed to hosts_access(). - -- When PARANOID mode is disabled (compile time), the wrapper does no -hostname lookup or hostname double checks unless required by %letter -expansions, or by access control rules that match host names. This is -useful for sites that don't care about internet hostnames anyway. -Inspired by the authors of the firewalls and internet security book. - -- When PARANOID mode is disabled (compile time), hosts with a name/name -or name/address conflict can be matched with the PARANOID host wildcard -pattern, so that you can take some intelligent action instead of just -dropping clients. Like showing a banner that explains the problem. - -- New percent escapes: %A expands to the server address; %H expands to -the corresponding hostname (or address if no name is available); %n and -%N expand to the client and server hostname (or "unknown"); %s expands -to everything we know about the server endpoint (the opposite of the %c -sequence for client information). - -- Symmetry: server and client host information is now treated on equal -footing, so that we can reuse a lot of code. - -- Lazy evaluation of host names, host addresses, usernames, and so on, -to avoid doing unnecessary work. - -- Dropping #ifdefs for some archaic systems made the code simpler. - -- Dropping the FAIL pattern made the pattern matcher much simpler. Run -the "tcpdchk" program to scan your access control files for any uses of -this obscure language feature. - -- Moving host-specific pattern matching from string_match() to the -host_match() routine made the code more accurate. Run the "tcpdchk" -program to scan your access control files for any dependencies on -undocumented or obscure language features that are gone. - -- daemon@host patterns trigger on clients that connect to a specific -internet address. This can be useful for service providers that offer -multiple ftp or www archives on different internet addresses, all -belonging to one and the same host (www.foo.com, ftp.bar.com, you get -the idea). Inspired by a discussion with Rop Gonggrijp, Cor Bosman, -and Casper Dik, and earlier discussions with Adrian van Bloois. - -- The new "tcpdchk" program critcizes all your access control rules and -inetd.conf entries. Great for spotting obscure bugs in my own hosts.xxx -files. This program also detects hosts with name/address conflicts and -with other DNS-related problems. See the "tcpdchk.8" manual page. - -- The "tcpdmatch" program replaces the poor old "try" command. The new -program looks in your inetd.conf file and therefore produces much more -accurate predictions. In addition, it detects hosts with name/address -conflicts and with other DNS-related problems. See the "tcpdmatch.8" -manual page. The inetd.conf lookup was suggested by Everett F Batey. - -- In the access control tables, the `=' between option name and value -is no longer required. - -- Added 60-second timeout to the safe_finger command, to cover another -potential problem. Suggested by Peter Wemm. - -- Andrew Maffei provided code that works with WIN-TCP on NCR System V.4 -UNIX. It reportedly works with versions 02.02.01 and 02.03.00. The code -pops off all streams modules above the device driver, pushes the timod -module to get at the peer address, and then restores the streams stack -to the initial state. - -Changes per release 6.3 (Mar 1994) -================================== - -- Keepalives option, to get rid of stuck daemons when people turn off -their PC while still connected. Files: options.c, hosts_options.5. - -- Nice option, to calm down network daemons that take away too much CPU -time. Files: options.c, hosts_options.5. - -- Ultrix perversion: the environ global pointer may be null. The -environment replacement routines now check for this. File: environ.c. - -- Fixed a few places that still assumed the socket is on standard -input. Fixed some error messages that did not provide access control -file name and line number. File: options.c. - -- Just when I was going to release 6.2 I received code for Dynix/PTX. -That code is specific to PTX 2.x, so I'll keep around my generic -PTX code just in case. The difference is in the handling of UDP -services. Files: tli_sequent.[hc]. - -Changes per release 6.2 (Feb 1994) -================================== - -- Resurrected my year-old code to reduce DNS load by appending a dot to -the gethostbyname() argument. This feature is still experimental and it -may go away if it causes more problems than it solves. File: socket.c. - -- Auxiliary code for the Pyramid, BSD universe. Karl Vogel figured out -what was missing: yp_get_default_domain() and vfprintf(). Files: -workarounds.c, vfprintf.c. - -- Improved support for Dynix/PTX. The wrapper should now be able to -deal with all TLI over IP services. File: ptx.c. - -- The try command now uses the hostname that gethostbyaddr() would -return, instead of the hostname returned by gethostbyname(). This can -be significant on systems with NIS that have short host names in the -hosts map. For example, gethostbyname("wzv.win.tue.nl") returns -"wzv.win.tue.nl"; gethostbyaddr(131.155.210.17) returns "wzv", and -that is what we should test with. File: try.c. - -Changes per release 6.1 (Dec 1993) -================================== - -- Re-implemented all environment access routines. Most systems have -putenv() but no setenv(), some systems have setenv() but no putenv(), -and there are even systems that have neither setenv() nor putenv(). The -benefit of all this is that more systems can now be treated in the same -way. File: environ.c. - -- Workaround for a weird problem with DG/UX when the wrapper is run as -nobody (i.e. fingerd). For some reason the ioctl(fd, I_FIND, "sockmod") -call fails even with socket-based applications. The "fix" is to always -assume sockets when the ioctl(fd, I_FIND, "timod") call fails. File: -fromhost.c. Thanks to Paul de Vries (vries@dutentb.et.tudelft.nl) for -helping me to figure out this one. - -- Implemented a workaround for Dynix/PTX and other systems with TLI -that lack some essential support routines. Thanks to Bugs Brouillard -(brouill@hsuseq.humboldt.edu) for the hospitality to try things out. -The trick is to temporarily switch to the socket API to identify the -client, and to switch back to TLI when done. It still does not work -right for basic network services such as telnet. File: fromhost.c. - -- Easy-to-build procedures for SCO UNIX, ConvexOS with UltraNet, EP/IX, -Dynix 3.2, Dynix/PTX. File: Makefile. - -- Variable rfc931 timeout. Files: rfc931.c, options.c, log_tcp.h, try.c. - -- Further simplification of the rfc931 code. File: rfc931.c. - -- The fromhost() interface stinks: I cannot change that, but at least -the from_sock() and from_tli() functions now accept a file descriptor -argument. - -- Fixed a buglet: fromhost() would pass a garbage file descriptor to -the isastream() call. - -- On some systems the finger client program lives in /usr/bsd. File: -safe_finger.c. - -Changes per release 6.0 (Sept 1993) -=================================== - -- Easy build procedures for common platforms (sun, ultrix, aix, hpux -and others). - -- TLI support, System V.4 style (Solaris, DG/UX). - -- Username lookup integrated with the access control language. -Selective username lookups are now the default (was: no username -lookups). - -- A safer finger command for booby traps. This one solves a host of -possible problems with automatic reverse fingers. Thanks, Borja Marcos -(borjam@we.lc.ehu.es) for some inspiring discussions. - -- KNOWN pattern that matches hosts whose name and address are known. - -- Cleanup of diagnostics. Errors in access-control files are now shown -with file name and line number. - -- With AIX 3.2, hostnames longer than 32 would be truncated. This -caused hostname verification failures, so that service would be refused -when paranoid mode was enabled. Found by: Adrian van Bloois -(A.vanBloois@info.nic.surfnet.nl). - -- With some IRIX versions, remote username lookups failed because the -fgets() library function does not handle partial read()s from sockets. -Found by: Daniel O'Callaghan (danny@austin.unimelb.edu.au). - -- Added a DISCLAIMER document to help you satisfy legal departments. - -The extension language module has undergone major revisions and -extensions. Thanks, John P. Rouillard (rouilj@ra.cs.umb.edu) for -discussions, experiments, and for being a good guinea pig. The -extensions are documented in hosts_options.5, and are enabled by -editing the Makefile STYLE macro definition. - -- (Extension language) The ":" separator may now occur within options -as long as it is protected with a backslash. A warning is issued when -a rule ends on ":". - -- (Extension language) Better verification mode. When the `try' command -is run, each option function now explains what it would do. - -- (Extension language) New "allow" and "deny" keywords so you can now -have all rules within a single file. See "nroff -man hosts_options.5" -for examples. - -- (Extension language) "linger" keyword to set the socket linger time -(SO_LINGER). From: Marc Boucher <marc@cam.org>. - -- (Extension language) "severity" keyword to turn the logging noise up -or down. Many sites wanted a means to shut up the program; other sites -wanted to emphasize specific events. Adapted from code contributed -by Dave Mitchell <D.Mitchell@dcs.shef.ac.uk>. - -Changes per release 5.1 (Mar 1993) -================================== - -- The additional protection against source-routing attacks from hosts -that pretend to have someone elses network address has become optional -because it causes kernel panics with SunOS <= 4.1.3. - -Changes per release 5.0 (Mar 1993) -================================== - -- Additional protection against source-routing attacks from hosts that -pretend to have someone elses network address. For example, the address -of a trusted host within your own network. - -- The access control language has been extended with a simple but -powerful operator that greatly simplifies the design of rule sets (ALL: -.foo.edu EXCEPT dialup.foo.edu). Blank lines are permitted, and long -lines can be continued with backslash-newline. - -- All configurable stuff, including path names, has been moved into the -Makefile so that you no longer have to hack source code to just -configure the programs. - -- Ported to Solaris 2. TLI-based applications not yet supported. -Several workarounds for System V bugs. - -- A small loophole in the netgroup lookup code was closed, and the -remote username lookup code was made more portable. - -- Still more documentation. The README file now provides tutorial -sections with introductions to client, server, inetd and syslogd. - -Changes per release 4.3 (Aug 1992) -================================== - -- Some sites reported that connections would be rejected because -localhost != localhost.domain. The host name checking code now -special-cases localhost (problem reported by several sites). - -- The programs now report an error if an existing access control file -cannot be opened (e.g. due to lack of privileges). Until now, the -programs would just pretend that the access control file does not exist -(reported by Darren Reed, avalon@coombs.anu.edu.au). - -- The timeout period for remote userid lookups was upped to 30 seconds, -in order to cope with slow hosts or networks. If this is too long for -you, adjust the TIMEOUT definition in file rfc931.c (problem reported -by several sites). - -- On hosts with more than one IP network interface, remote userid -lookups could use the IP address of the "wrong" local interface. The -problem and its solution were discussed on the rfc931-users mailing -list. Scott Schwartz (schwartz@cs.psu.edu) folded the fix into the -rfc931.c module. - -- The result of % expansion (in shell commands) is now checked for -stuff that may confuse the shell; it is replaced by underscores -(problem reported by Icarus Sparry, I.Sparry@gdr.bath.ac.uk). - -- A portability problem was fixed that caused compile-time problems -on a CRAY (problem reported by Michael Barnett, mikeb@rmit.edu.au). - -Changes per release 4.0 (Jun 1992) -================================== - -1 - network daemons no longer have to live within a common directory -2 - the access control code now uses both the host address and name -3 - an access control pattern that supports netmasks -4 - additional protection against forged host names -5 - a pattern that matches hosts whose name or address lookup fails -6 - an operator that prevents hosts or services from being matched -7 - optional remote username lookup with the RFC 931 protocol -8 - an optional umask to prevent the creation of world-writable files -9 - hooks for access control language extensions -10 - last but not least, thoroughly revised documentation. - -Changes per release 3.0 (Oct 1991) -================================== - -Enhancements over the previous release are: support for datagram (UDP -and RPC) services, and execution of shell commands when a (remote host, -requested service) pair matches a pattern in the access control tables. - -Changes per release 2.0 (May 1991) -================================== - -Enhancements over the previous release are: protection against rlogin -and rsh attacks through compromised domain name servers, optional -netgroup support for systems with NIS (formerly YP), and an extension -of the wild card patterns supported by the access control files. - -Release 1.0 (Jan 1991) diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/Makefile b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/Makefile deleted file mode 100644 index 2906c52ddf37..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/Makefile +++ /dev/null @@ -1,889 +0,0 @@ -# @(#) Makefile 1.23 97/03/21 19:27:20 - -what: - @echo - @echo "Usage: edit the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition in the Makefile then:" - @echo - @echo " make sys-type" - @echo - @echo "If you are in a hurry you can try instead:" - @echo - @echo " make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/foo/bar sys-type" - @echo - @echo "And for a version with language extensions enabled:" - @echo - @echo " make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/foo/bar STYLE=-DPROCESS_OPTIONS sys-type" - @echo - @echo "This Makefile knows about the following sys-types:" - @echo - @echo " generic (most bsd-ish systems with sys5 compatibility)" - @echo " 386bsd aix alpha apollo bsdos convex-ultranet dell-gcc dgux dgux543" - @echo " dynix epix esix freebsd hpux irix4 irix5 irix6 isc iunix" - @echo " linux machten mips(untested) ncrsvr4 netbsd next osf power_unix_211" - @echo " ptx-2.x ptx-generic pyramid sco sco-nis sco-od2 sco-os5 sinix sunos4" - @echo " sunos40 sunos5 sysv4 tandem ultrix unicos7 unicos8 unixware1 unixware2" - @echo " uts215 uxp" - @echo - @echo "If none of these match your environment, edit the system" - @echo "dependencies sections in the Makefile and do a 'make other'." - @echo - -####################################################### -# Choice between easy and advanced installation recipe. -# -# Advanced installation: vendor-provided daemons are left alone, and the -# inetd configuration file is edited. In this case, the REAL_DAEMON_DIR -# macro should reflect the actual directory with (most of) your -# vendor-provided network daemons. These names can be found in the -# inetd.conf file. Usually, the telnet, ftp and finger daemons all live -# in the same directory. -# -# Uncomment the appropriate line if you are going to edit inetd.conf. -# -# Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc -# -# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin -# -# BSD 4.4 -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec -# -# HP-UX SCO Unicos -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/etc - -# Easy installation: vendor-provided network daemons are moved to "some -# other" directory, and the tcpd wrapper fills in the "holes". For this -# mode of operation, the REAL_DAEMON_DIR macro should be set to the "some -# other" directory. The "..." is here for historical reasons only; you -# should probably use some other name. -# -# Uncomment the appropriate line if you are going to move your daemons. -# -# Ultrix 4.x SunOS 4.x ConvexOS 10.x Dynix/ptx -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/etc/... -# -# SysV.4 Solaris 2.x OSF AIX -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/sbin/... -# -# BSD 4.4 -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/usr/libexec/... -# -# HP-UX SCO Unicos -#REAL_DAEMON_DIR=/etc/... - -# End of mandatory section -########################## - -########################################## -# Ready-to-use system-dependent templates. -# -# Ready-to-use templates are available for many systems (see the "echo" -# commands at the start of this Makefile). The templates take care of -# all system dependencies: after editing the REAL_DAEMON_DIR definition -# above, do a "make sunos4" (or whatever system type is appropriate). -# -# If your system is not listed (or something that comes close enough), you -# have to edit the system dependencies section below and do a "make other". -# -# Send templates for other UNIX versions to wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl. - -# This is good for many BSD+SYSV hybrids with NIS (formerly YP). -generic aix osf alpha dynix: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= all - -# Ditto, with vsyslog -sunos4: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP VSYSLOG= TLI= all - -# Generic with resolver library. -generic-resolver: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS=-lresolv RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= all - -# The NeXT loader needs "-m" or it barfs on redefined library functions. -next: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS=-m RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=environ.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= all - -# SunOS for the 386 was frozen at release 4.0.x. -sunos40: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ="setenv.o strcasecmp.o" \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP VSYSLOG= TLI= all - -# Ultrix is like aix, next, etc., but has miscd and setenv(). -ultrix: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= all miscd - -# This works on EP/IX 1.4.3 and will likely work on Mips (reggers@julian.uwo.ca) -epix: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=environ.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= SYSTYPE="-systype bsd43" all - -# Freebsd and linux by default have no NIS. -386bsd netbsd bsdos: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ - EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all - -freebsd: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= \ - EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DSYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED VSYSLOG= all - -linux: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP= TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBROKEN_SO_LINGER" all - -# This is good for many SYSV+BSD hybrids with NIS, probably also for HP-UX 7.x. -hpux hpux8 hpux9 hpux10: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= all - -# ConvexOS-10.x with UltraNet support (ukkonen@csc.fi). -convex-ultranet: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS=-lulsock RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=environ.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= all - -# Generic support for the Dynix/PTX version of TLI. -ptx-generic: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -linet -lnsl" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - AUX_OBJ="setenv.o strcasecmp.o ptx.o" NETGROUP= TLI=-DPTX all - -# With UDP support optimized for PTX 2.x (timw@sequent.com). -ptx-2.x: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -linet -lnsl" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - AUX_OBJ="setenv.o strcasecmp.o tli-sequent.o" NETGROUP= \ - TLI=-DTLI_SEQUENT all - -# IRIX 4.0.x has a special ar(1) flag. -irix4: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lc -lsun" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rvs AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= all - -# IRIX 5.2 is SYSV4 with several broken things (such as -lsocket -lnsl). -irix5: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS=-lsun RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv VSYSLOG= \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI= all - -# IRIX 6.2 (tucker@math.unc.edu). Must find a better value than 200000. -irix6: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv VSYSLOG= \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DBSD=200000" TLI= all - -# SunOS 5.x is another SYSV4 variant. -sunos5: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -lnsl" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv VSYSLOG= \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI=-DTLI \ - BUGS="$(BUGS) -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG" all - -# Generic SYSV40 -esix sysv4: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -lnsl" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI=-DTLI all - -# DG/UX 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 have an unusual inet_addr() interface. -dgux: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS=-lnsl RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI=-DTLI \ - BUGS="$(BUGS) -DINET_ADDR_BUG" all - -dgux543: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS=-lnsl RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI=-DTLI all - -# NCR UNIX 02.02.01 and 02.03.00 (Alex Chircop, msu@unimt.mt) -ncrsvr4: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lresolv -lnsl -lsocket" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - AUX_OBJ="setenv.o strcasecmp.o" NETGROUP= TLI=-DTLI \ - EXTRA_CFLAGS="" FROM_OBJ=ncr.o all - -# Tandem SYSV4 (eqawas@hedgehog.ac.cowan.edu.au) -tandem: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -lnsl" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - NETGROUP= AUX_OBJ="setenv.o strcasecmp.o" TLI=-DTLI all - -# Amdahl UTS 2.1.5 (Richard.Richmond@bridge.bst.bls.com) -uts215: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket" RANLIB=echo \ - ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o NETGROUP=-DNO_NETGROUP TLI= all - -# UXP/DS System V.4 clone (vic@uida0.uida.es). -uxp: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-L/usr/ucblib -lsocket -lnsl -lucb" \ - RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP \ - AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI="-DTLI -DDRS_XTI" all - -# DELL System V.4 Issue 2.2 using gcc (kim@tac.nyc.ny.us, jurban@norden1.com) -dell-gcc: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -lnsl" RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv CC=gcc \ - AUX_OBJ="setenv.o strcasecmp.o" TLI=-DTLI all - -# SCO 3.2v4.1 no frills (jedwards@sol1.solinet.net). -sco: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -lnsl_s" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - NETGROUP= AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI= all - -# SCO OpenDesktop 2.0, release 3.2 (peter@midnight.com). Please simplify. -sco-od2: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lrpcsvc -lrpc -lyp -lrpc -lrpcsvc -lsocket" \ - RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= all - -# SCO 3.2v4.2 with TCP/IP 1.2.1 (Eduard.Vopicka@vse.cz). Please simplify. -sco-nis: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lyp -lrpc -lsocket -lyp -lc_s -lc" \ - RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= EXTRA_CFLAGS="-nointl -DNO_NETGRENT" all - -# SCO 3.2v5.0.0 OpenServer 5 (bob@odt.handy.com, bill@razorlogic.com) -sco-os5: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lrpcsvc -lsocket" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv VSYSLOG= \ - AUX_OBJ=setenv.o NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= all - -# sinix 5.42 setjmp workaround (szrzs023@ub3.ub.uni-kiel.de) -sinix: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -lnsl -L/usr/ccs/lib -lc -L/usr/ucblib -lucb" \ - RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI=-DTLI all - -# Domain SR10.4. Build under bsd, run under either sysv3 or bsd43. -apollo: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=setenv.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= SYSTYPE="-A run,any -A sys,any" all - -# Pyramid OSx 5.1, using the BSD universe. -pyramid: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ="environ.o vfprintf.o" \ - STRINGS="-Dstrchr=index -Dstrrchr=rindex -Dmemcmp=bcmp -Dno_memcpy" \ - NETGROUP="-DNETGROUP -DUSE_GETDOMAIN" TLI= all - -# Untested. -mips: - @echo "Warning: some definitions may be wrong." - make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=environ.o \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP TLI= SYSTYPE="-sysname bsd43" all - -# Cray (tested with UNICOS 7.0.4). -unicos7: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS=-lnet RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - EXTRA_CFLAGS=-DINADDR_NONE="\"((unsigned long) -1)\"" \ - AUX_OBJ="setenv.o strcasecmp.o" NETGROUP= TLI= all - -# Unicos 8.x, Cray-YMP (Bruce Kelly). -unicos8: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=echo AR=bld ARFLAGS=rv \ - AUX_OBJ= NETGROUP= TLI= all - -# Power_UNIX 2.1.1 (amantel@lerc.nasa.gov) -power_unix_211: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lnsl -lsocket -lgen -lresolv" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - NETGROUP= AUX_OBJ=setenv.o TLI=-DTLI BUGS="$(BUGS)" all - -# ISC (fc@all.net) -isc: - make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-linet -lnsl_s -ldbm" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - AUX_OBJ="setenv.o strcasecmp.o" EXTRA_CFLAGS="-DENOTCONN=ENAVAIL" \ - NETGROUP= TLI= all - -# Interactive UNIX R3.2 version 4.0 (Bobby D. Wright). -iunix: - make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-linet -lnsl_s -ldbm" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - AUX_OBJ=environ.o strcasecmp.o NETGROUP= TLI= all - -# RTU 6.0 on a Masscomp 5400 (ben@piglet.cr.usgs.gov). When using the -# advanced installation, increment argv before actually looking at it. -rtu: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=environ.o \ - NETGROUP= TLI= all - -# Unixware sans NIS (mc@telebase.com). Compiler dislikes strcasecmp.c. -unixware1: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -lnsl -lc -L/usr/ucblib -lucb" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - NETGROUP=$(NETGROUP) AUX_OBJ=environ.o TLI=-DTLI all - -unixware2: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -lnsl -lgen -lc -L/usr/ucblib -lucb" RANLIB=echo \ - ARFLAGS=rv NETGROUP=$(NETGROUP) AUX_OBJ=environ.o TLI=-DTLI all - -u6000: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS="-lsocket -lnsl" RANLIB=echo ARFLAGS=rv \ - NETGROUP=-DNETGROUP AUX_OBJ="setenv.o strcasecmp.o" TLI=-DTLI all - -# MachTen -machten: - @make REAL_DAEMON_DIR=$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR) STYLE=$(STYLE) \ - LIBS= RANLIB=ranlib ARFLAGS=rv AUX_OBJ=environ.o \ - NETGROUP= TLI= all - -############################################################### -# System dependencies: TLI (transport-level interface) support. -# -# Uncomment the following macro if your system has System V.4-style TLI -# support (/usr/include/sys/timod.h, /etc/netconfig, and the netdir(3) -# routines). -# -#TLI = -DTLI - -############################################################################### -# System dependencies: differences between ranlib(1) and ar(1) implementations. -# -# Some C compilers (Ultrix 4.x) insist that ranlib(1) be run on an object -# library; some don't care as long as the modules are in the right order; -# some systems don't even have a ranlib(1) command. Make your choice. - -RANLIB = ranlib # have ranlib (BSD-ish UNIX) -#RANLIB = echo # no ranlib (SYSV-ish UNIX) - -ARFLAGS = rv # most systems -#ARFLAGS= rvs # IRIX 4.0.x - -AR = ar -#AR = bld # Unicos 8.x - -############################################################################# -# System dependencies: routines that are not present in the system libraries. -# -# If your system library does not have set/putenv() or strcasecmp(), use -# the ones provided with this source distribution. The environ.c module -# implements setenv(), getenv(), and putenv(). - -AUX_OBJ= setenv.o -#AUX_OBJ= environ.o -#AUX_OBJ= environ.o strcasecmp.o - -# Uncomment the following if your C library does not provide the -# strchr/strrchr/memcmp routines, but comes with index/rindex/bcmp. -# -#STRINGS= -Dstrchr=index -Dstrrchr=rindex -Dmemcmp=bcmp -Dno_memcpy - -################################################################# -# System dependencies: selection of non-default object libraries. -# -# Most System V implementations require that you explicitly specify the -# networking libraries. There is no general consensus, though. -# -#LIBS = -lsocket -lnsl # SysV.4 Solaris 2.x -#LIBS = -lsun # IRIX -#LIBS = -lsocket -linet -lnsl -lnfs # PTX -#LIBS = -linet -lnsl_s -ldbm # ISC -#LIBS = -lnet # Unicos 7 -#LIBS = -linet -lsyslog -ldbm -#LIBS = -lsyslog -lsocket -lnsl - -###################################################### -# System dependencies: system-specific compiler flags. -# -# Apollo Domain/OS offers both bsd and sys5 environments, sometimes -# on the same machine. If your Apollo is primarily sys5.3 and also -# has bsd4.3, uncomment the following to build under bsd and run under -# either environment. -# -#SYSTYPE= -A run,any -A sys,any - -# For MIPS RISC/os 4_52.p3, uncomment the following definition. -# -#SYSTYPE= -sysname bsd43 - -################################################## -# System dependencies: working around system bugs. -# -# -DGETPEERNAME_BUG works around a getpeername(2) bug in some versions of -# Apollo or SYSV.4 UNIX: the wrapper would report that all UDP requests -# come from address 0.0.0.0. The workaround does no harm on other systems. -# -# -DBROKEN_FGETS works around an fgets(3) bug in some System V versions -# (IRIX): fgets() gives up too fast when reading from a network socket. -# The workaround does no harm on other systems. -# -# Some UNIX systems (IRIX) make the error of calling the strtok() library -# routine from other library routines such as, e.g., gethostbyname/addr(). -# The result is that hosts can slip through the wrapper allow/deny filters. -# Compile with -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK to avoid the vendor's strtok() routine. -# The workaround does no harm on other systems. -# -# DG/UX 5.4.1 comes with an inet_ntoa() function that returns a structure -# instead of a long integer. Compile with -DINET_ADDR_BUG to work around -# this mutant behavour. Fixed in 5.4R3. -# -# Solaris 2.4 gethostbyname(), in DNS through NIS mode, puts only one -# address in the host address list; all other addresses are treated as -# host name aliases. Compile with -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG to work -# around this. The workaround does no harm on other Solaris versions. - -BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DLIBC_CALLS_STRTOK -#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DINET_ADDR_BUG -#BUGS = -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DBROKEN_FGETS -DSOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG - -########################################################################## -# System dependencies: whether or not your system has NIS (or YP) support. -# -# If your system supports NIS or YP-style netgroups, enable the following -# macro definition. Netgroups are used only for host access control. -# -#NETGROUP= -DNETGROUP - -############################################################### -# System dependencies: whether or not your system has vsyslog() -# -# If your system supports vsyslog(), comment out the following definition. -# If in doubt leave it in, it won't harm. - -VSYSLOG = -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog - -# End of the system dependencies. -################################# - -############################## -# Start of the optional stuff. - -########################################### -# Optional: Turning on language extensions -# -# Instead of the default access control language that is documented in -# the hosts_access.5 document, the wrappers can be configured to -# implement an extensible language documented in the hosts_options.5 -# document. This language is implemented by the "options.c" source -# module, which also gives hints on how to add your own extensions. -# Uncomment the next definition to turn on the language extensions -# (examples: allow, deny, banners, twist and spawn). -# -#STYLE = -DPROCESS_OPTIONS # Enable language extensions. - -################################################################ -# Optional: Changing the default disposition of logfile records -# -# By default, logfile entries are written to the same file as used for -# sendmail transaction logs. See your /etc/syslog.conf file for actual -# path names of logfiles. The tutorial section in the README file -# gives a brief introduction to the syslog daemon. -# -# Change the FACILITY definition below if you disagree with the default -# disposition. Some syslog versions (including Ultrix 4.x) do not provide -# this flexibility. -# -# If nothing shows up on your system, it may be that the syslog records -# are sent to a dedicated loghost. It may also be that no syslog daemon -# is running at all. The README file gives pointers to surrogate syslog -# implementations for systems that have no syslog library routines or -# no syslog daemons. When changing the syslog.conf file, remember that -# there must be TABs between fields. -# -# The LOG_XXX names below are taken from the /usr/include/syslog.h file. - -FACILITY= LOG_MAIL # LOG_MAIL is what most sendmail daemons use - -# The syslog priority at which successful connections are logged. - -SEVERITY= LOG_INFO # LOG_INFO is normally not logged to the console - -########################### -# Optional: Reduce DNS load -# -# When looking up the address for a host.domain name, the typical DNS -# code will first append substrings of your own domain, so it tries -# host.domain.your.own.domain, then host.domain.own.domain, and then -# host.domain. The APPEND_DOT feature stops this waste of cycles. It is -# off by default because it causes problems on sites that don't use DNS -# and with Solaris < 2.4. APPEND_DOT will not work with hostnames taken -# from /etc/hosts or from NIS maps. It does work with DNS through NIS. -# -# DOT= -DAPPEND_DOT - -################################################## -# Optional: Always attempt remote username lookups -# -# By default, the wrappers look up the remote username only when the -# access control rules require them to do so. -# -# Username lookups require that the remote host runs a daemon that -# supports an RFC 931 like protocol. Remote user name lookups are not -# possible for UDP-based connections, and can cause noticeable delays -# with connections from non-UNIX PCs. On some systems, remote username -# lookups can trigger a kernel bug, causing loss of service. The README -# file describes how to find out if your UNIX kernel has that problem. -# -# Uncomment the following definition if the wrappers should always -# attempt to get the remote user name. If this is not enabled you can -# still do selective username lookups as documented in the hosts_access.5 -# and hosts_options.5 manual pages (`nroff -man' format). -# -#AUTH = -DALWAYS_RFC931 -# -# The default username lookup timeout is 10 seconds. This may not be long -# enough for slow hosts or networks, but is enough to irritate PC users. - -RFC931_TIMEOUT = 10 - -###################################################### -# Optional: Changing the default file protection mask -# -# On many systems, network daemons and other system processes are started -# with a zero umask value, so that world-writable files may be produced. -# It is a good idea to edit your /etc/rc* files so that they begin with -# an explicit umask setting. On our site we use `umask 022' because it -# does not break anything yet gives adequate protection against tampering. -# -# The following macro specifies the default umask for processes run under -# control of the daemon wrappers. Comment it out only if you are certain -# that inetd and its children are started with a safe umask value. - -UMASK = -DDAEMON_UMASK=022 - -####################################### -# Optional: Turning off access control -# -# By default, host access control is enabled. To disable host access -# control, comment out the following definition. Host access control -# can also be turned off at runtime by providing no or empty access -# control tables. - -ACCESS = -DHOSTS_ACCESS - -######################################################## -# Optional: Changing the access control table pathnames -# -# The HOSTS_ALLOW and HOSTS_DENY macros define where the programs will -# look for access control information. Watch out for the quotes and -# backslashes when you make changes. - -TABLES = -DHOSTS_DENY=\"/etc/hosts.deny\" -DHOSTS_ALLOW=\"/etc/hosts.allow\" - -#################################################### -# Optional: dealing with host name/address conflicts -# -# By default, the software tries to protect against hosts that claim to -# have someone elses host name. This is relevant for network services -# whose authentication depends on host names, such as rsh and rlogin. -# -# With paranoid mode on, connections will be rejected when the host name -# does not match the host address. Connections will also be rejected when -# the host name is available but cannot be verified. -# -# Comment out the following definition if you want more control over such -# requests. When paranoid mode is off and a host name double check fails, -# the client can be matched with the PARANOID access control pattern. -# -# Paranoid mode implies hostname lookup. In order to disable hostname -# lookups altogether, see the next section. - -PARANOID= -DPARANOID - -######################################## -# Optional: turning off hostname lookups -# -# By default, the software always attempts to look up the client -# hostname. With selective hostname lookups, the client hostname -# lookup is postponed until the name is required by an access control -# rule or by a %letter expansion. -# -# In order to perform selective hostname lookups, disable paranoid -# mode (see previous section) and comment out the following definition. - -HOSTNAME= -DALWAYS_HOSTNAME - -############################################# -# Optional: Turning on host ADDRESS checking -# -# Optionally, the software tries to protect against hosts that pretend to -# have someone elses host address. This is relevant for network services -# whose authentication depends on host names, such as rsh and rlogin, -# because the network address is used to look up the remote host name. -# -# The protection is to refuse TCP connections with IP source routing -# options. -# -# This feature cannot be used with SunOS 4.x because of a kernel bug in -# the implementation of the getsockopt() system call. Kernel panics have -# been observed for SunOS 4.1.[1-3]. Symptoms are "BAD TRAP" and "Data -# fault" while executing the tcp_ctloutput() kernel function. -# -# Reportedly, Sun patch 100804-03 or 101790 fixes this for SunOS 4.1.x. -# -# Uncomment the following macro definition if your getsockopt() is OK. -# -# -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS is not needed on modern UNIX systems that can stop -# source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples: 4.4BSD derivatives, -# Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system documentation for details. -# -# KILL_OPT= -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS - -## End configuration options -############################ - -# Protection against weird shells or weird make programs. - -SHELL = /bin/sh -.c.o:; $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c - -CFLAGS = -O -DFACILITY=$(FACILITY) $(ACCESS) $(PARANOID) $(NETGROUP) \ - $(BUGS) $(SYSTYPE) $(AUTH) $(UMASK) \ - -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" $(STYLE) $(KILL_OPT) \ - -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) \ - $(UCHAR) $(TABLES) $(STRINGS) $(TLI) $(EXTRA_CFLAGS) $(DOT) \ - $(VSYSLOG) $(HOSTNAME) - -LIB_OBJ= hosts_access.o options.o shell_cmd.o rfc931.o eval.o \ - hosts_ctl.o refuse.o percent_x.o clean_exit.o $(AUX_OBJ) \ - $(FROM_OBJ) fix_options.o socket.o tli.o workarounds.o \ - update.o misc.o diag.o percent_m.o myvsyslog.o - -FROM_OBJ= fromhost.o - -KIT = README miscd.c tcpd.c fromhost.c hosts_access.c shell_cmd.c \ - tcpd.h tcpdmatch.c Makefile hosts_access.5 strcasecmp.c BLURB rfc931.c \ - tcpd.8 eval.c hosts_access.3 hosts_ctl.c percent_x.c options.c \ - clean_exit.c environ.c patchlevel.h fix_options.c workarounds.c \ - socket.c tli.c DISCLAIMER fakelog.c safe_finger.c hosts_options.5 \ - CHANGES try-from.c update.c ptx.c vfprintf.c tli-sequent.c \ - tli-sequent.h misc.c diag.c ncr.c tcpdchk.c percent_m.c \ - myvsyslog.c mystdarg.h printf.ck README.IRIX Banners.Makefile \ - refuse.c tcpdchk.8 setenv.c inetcf.c inetcf.h scaffold.c \ - scaffold.h tcpdmatch.8 README.NIS - -LIB = libwrap.a - -all other: config-check tcpd tcpdmatch try-from safe_finger tcpdchk - -# Invalidate all object files when the compiler options (CFLAGS) have changed. - -config-check: - @set +e; test -n "$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)" || { make; exit 1; } - @set +e; echo $(CFLAGS) >/tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ - if cmp cflags /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ - then rm /tmp/cflags.$$$$ ; \ - else mv /tmp/cflags.$$$$ cflags ; \ - fi >/dev/null 2>/dev/null - -$(LIB): $(LIB_OBJ) - rm -f $(LIB) - $(AR) $(ARFLAGS) $(LIB) $(LIB_OBJ) - -$(RANLIB) $(LIB) - -tcpd: tcpd.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ tcpd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) - -miscd: miscd.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ miscd.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) - -safe_finger: safe_finger.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ safe_finger.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) - -TCPDMATCH_OBJ = tcpdmatch.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o - -tcpdmatch: $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDMATCH_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) - -try-from: try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ try-from.o fakelog.o $(LIB) $(LIBS) - -TCPDCHK_OBJ = tcpdchk.o fakelog.o inetcf.o scaffold.o - -tcpdchk: $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(TCPDCHK_OBJ) $(LIB) $(LIBS) - -shar: $(KIT) - @shar $(KIT) - -kit: $(KIT) - @makekit $(KIT) - -files: - @echo $(KIT) - -archive: - $(ARCHIVE) $(KIT) - -clean: - rm -f tcpd miscd safe_finger tcpdmatch tcpdchk try-from *.[oa] core \ - cflags - -tidy: clean - chmod -R a+r . - chmod 755 . - -# Enable all bells and whistles for linting. - -lint: tcpd_lint miscd_lint match_lint chk_lint - -tcpd_lint: - lint -DFACILITY=LOG_MAIL -DHOSTS_ACCESS -DPARANOID -DNETGROUP \ - -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DDAEMON_UMASK=022 -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) \ - $(TABLES) -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS -DPROCESS_OPTIONS \ - -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) -DALWAYS_RFC931 \ - -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" \ - -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog \ - tcpd.c fromhost.c socket.c tli.c hosts_access.c \ - shell_cmd.c refuse.c rfc931.c eval.c percent_x.c clean_exit.c \ - options.c setenv.c fix_options.c workarounds.c update.c misc.c \ - diag.c myvsyslog.c percent_m.c - -miscd_lint: - lint -DFACILITY=LOG_MAIL -DHOSTS_ACCESS -DPARANOID -DNETGROUP \ - -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DDAEMON_UMASK=022 -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) \ - $(TABLES) -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS -DPROCESS_OPTIONS \ - -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) -DALWAYS_RFC931 \ - -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" \ - -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog \ - miscd.c fromhost.c socket.c tli.c hosts_access.c \ - shell_cmd.c refuse.c rfc931.c eval.c percent_x.c clean_exit.c \ - options.c setenv.c fix_options.c workarounds.c update.c misc.c \ - diag.c myvsyslog.c percent_m.c - -match_lint: - lint -DFACILITY=LOG_MAIL -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DHOSTS_ACCESS \ - -DPARANOID $(TABLES) -DNETGROUP -DPROCESS_OPTIONS -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=10 \ - -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" \ - -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog \ - tcpdmatch.c hosts_access.c eval.c percent_x.c options.c workarounds.c \ - update.c socket.c misc.c diag.c myvsyslog.c percent_m.c setenv.c \ - inetcf.c scaffold.c - -chk_lint: - lint -DFACILITY=LOG_MAIL -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DHOSTS_ACCESS \ - -DPARANOID $(TABLES) -DNETGROUP -DPROCESS_OPTIONS -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=10 \ - -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" \ - -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog \ - tcpdchk.c eval.c percent_x.c options.c update.c workarounds.c \ - setenv.c misc.c diag.c myvsyslog.c percent_m.c inetcf.c scaffold.c - -printfck: - printfck -f printf.ck \ - tcpd.c fromhost.c socket.c tli.c hosts_access.c \ - shell_cmd.c refuse.c rfc931.c eval.c percent_x.c clean_exit.c \ - options.c setenv.c fix_options.c workarounds.c update.c misc.c \ - diag.c myvsyslog.c percent_m.c >aap.c - lint -DFACILITY=LOG_MAIL -DHOSTS_ACCESS -DPARANOID -DNETGROUP \ - -DGETPEERNAME_BUG -DDAEMON_UMASK=022 -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) \ - $(TABLES) -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS -DPROCESS_OPTIONS \ - -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=$(RFC931_TIMEOUT) -DALWAYS_RFC931 \ - -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog aap.c - printfck -f printf.ck \ - tcpdchk.c eval.c percent_x.c options.c update.c workarounds.c \ - setenv.c misc.c diag.c myvsyslog.c percent_m.c inetcf.c scaffold.c \ - >aap.c - lint -DFACILITY=LOG_MAIL -DSEVERITY=$(SEVERITY) -DHOSTS_ACCESS \ - -DPARANOID $(TABLES) -DNETGROUP -DPROCESS_OPTIONS -DRFC931_TIMEOUT=10 \ - -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog -DREAL_DAEMON_DIR=\"$(REAL_DAEMON_DIR)\" - -# Internal compilation dependencies. - -clean_exit.o: cflags -clean_exit.o: tcpd.h -diag.o: cflags -diag.o: mystdarg.h -diag.o: tcpd.h -environ.o: cflags -eval.o: cflags -eval.o: tcpd.h -fakelog.o: cflags -fakelog.o: mystdarg.h -fix_options.o: cflags -fix_options.o: tcpd.h -fromhost.o: cflags -fromhost.o: tcpd.h -hosts_access.o: cflags -hosts_access.o: tcpd.h -hosts_ctl.o: cflags -hosts_ctl.o: tcpd.h -inetcf.o: cflags -inetcf.o: inetcf.h -inetcf.o: tcpd.h -misc.o: cflags -misc.o: tcpd.h -miscd.o: cflags -miscd.o: patchlevel.h -miscd.o: tcpd.h -myvsyslog.o: cflags -myvsyslog.o: mystdarg.h -myvsyslog.o: tcpd.h -ncr.o: cflags -ncr.o: tcpd.h -options.o: cflags -options.o: tcpd.h -percent_m.o: cflags -percent_m.o: mystdarg.h -percent_x.o: cflags -percent_x.o: tcpd.h -ptx.o: cflags -ptx.o: tcpd.h -refuse.o: cflags -refuse.o: tcpd.h -rfc931.o: cflags -rfc931.o: tcpd.h -safe_finger.o: cflags -scaffold.o: cflags -scaffold.o: scaffold.h -scaffold.o: tcpd.h -setenv.o: cflags -shell_cmd.o: cflags -shell_cmd.o: tcpd.h -socket.o: cflags -socket.o: tcpd.h -strcasecmp.o: cflags -tcpd.o: cflags -tcpd.o: patchlevel.h -tcpd.o: tcpd.h -tcpdchk.o: cflags -tcpdchk.o: inetcf.h -tcpdchk.o: scaffold.h -tcpdchk.o: tcpd.h -tcpdmatch.o: cflags -tcpdmatch.o: scaffold.h -tcpdmatch.o: tcpd.h -tli-sequent.o: cflags -tli-sequent.o: tcpd.h -tli-sequent.o: tli-sequent.h -tli.o: cflags -tli.o: tcpd.h -try-from.o: cflags -try-from.o: tcpd.h -update.o: cflags -update.o: mystdarg.h -update.o: tcpd.h -vfprintf.o: cflags -workarounds.o: cflags -workarounds.o: tcpd.h diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/README b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/README deleted file mode 100644 index 98b6b472a4d5..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/README +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1038 +0,0 @@ -@(#) README 1.30 97/03/21 19:27:21 - -This is the 7.6 version of the TCP/IP daemon wrapper package. - -Thank you for using this program. If you like it, send me a postcard. -My postal address is at the bottom of this file. - -Read the BLURB file for a brief summary of what is new. The CHANGES -file gives a complete account of differences with respect to previous -releases. - -Announcements of new releases of this software are posted to Usenet -(comp.security.unix, comp.unix.admin), to the cert-tools mailing list, -and to a dedicated mailing list. You can subscribe to the dedicated -mailing list by sending an email message to majordomo@wzv.win.tue.nl -with in the body (not subject): subscribe tcp-wrappers-announce. - -Table of contents ------------------ - - 1 - Introduction - 2 - Disclaimer - 3 - Tutorials - 3.1 - How it works - 3.2 - Where the logging information goes - 4 - Features - 4.1 - Access control - 4.2 - Host name spoofing - 4.3 - Host address spoofing - 4.4 - Client username lookups - 4.5 - Language extensions - 4.6 - Multiple ftp/gopher/www archives on one host - 4.7 - Banner messages - 4.8 - Sequence number guessing - 5 - Other works - 5.1 - Related documents - 5.2 - Related software - 6 - Limitations - 6.1 - Known wrapper limitations - 6.2 - Known system software bugs - 7 - Configuration and installation - 7.1 - Easy configuration and installation - 7.2 - Advanced configuration and installation - 7.3 - Daemons with arbitrary path names - 7.4 - Building and testing the access control rules - 7.5 - Other applications - 8 - Acknowledgements - -1 - Introduction ----------------- - -With this package you can monitor and filter incoming requests for the -SYSTAT, FINGER, FTP, TELNET, RLOGIN, RSH, EXEC, TFTP, TALK, and other -network services. - -It supports both 4.3BSD-style sockets and System V.4-style TLI. Praise -yourself lucky if you don't know what that means. - -The package provides tiny daemon wrapper programs that can be installed -without any changes to existing software or to existing configuration -files. The wrappers report the name of the client host and of the -requested service; the wrappers do not exchange information with the -client or server applications, and impose no overhead on the actual -conversation between the client and server applications. - -Optional features are: access control to restrict what systems can -connect to what network daemons; client user name lookups with the RFC -931 etc. protocol; additional protection against hosts that pretend to -have someone elses host name; additional protection against hosts that -pretend to have someone elses host address. - -The programs are very portable. Build procedures are provided for many -common (and not so common) environments, and guidelines are provided in -case your environment is not among them. - -Requirements are that network daemons are spawned by a super server -such as the inetd; a 4.3BSD-style socket programming interface and/or -System V.4-style TLI programming interface; and the availability of a -syslog(3) library and of a syslogd(8) daemon. The wrappers should run -without modification on any system that satisfies these requirements. -Workarounds have been implemented for several common bugs in systems -software. - -What to do if this is your first encounter with the wrapper programs: -1) read the tutorial sections for an introduction to the relevant -concepts and terminology; 2) glance over the security feature sections -in this document; 3) follow the installation instructions (easy or -advanced). I recommend that you first use the default security feature -settings. Run the wrappers for a few days to become familiar with -their logs, before doing anything drastic such as cutting off access or -installing booby traps. - -2 - Disclaimer --------------- - -The wrapper programs rely on source address information obtained from -network packets. This information is provided by the client host. It is -not 100 percent reliable, although the wrappers do their best to expose -forgeries. - -In the absence of cryptographic protection of message contents, and of -cryptographic authentication of message originators, all data from the -network should be treated with sound scepticism. - -THIS RESTRICTION IS BY NO MEANS SPECIFIC TO THE TCP/IP PROTOCOLS. - -3 - Tutorials -------------- - -The tutorial sections give a gentle introduction to the operation of -the wrapper programs, and introduce some of the terminology that is -used in the remainder of the document: client, server, the inetd and -syslogd daemons, and their configuration files. - -3.1 - How it works ------------------- - -Almost every application of the TCP/IP protocols is based on a client- -server model. For example, when a user invokes the telnet command to -connect to one of your systems, a telnet server process is executed on -the target host. The telnet server process connects the user to a login -process. A few examples of client and server programs are shown in the -table below: - - client server application - -------------------------------- - telnet telnetd remote login - ftp ftpd file transfer - finger fingerd show users - -The usual approach is to run one single daemon process that waits for -all kinds of incoming network connections. Whenever a connection is -established, this daemon (usually called inetd) runs the appropriate -server program and goes back to sleep, waiting for other connections. - -The wrapper programs rely on a simple, but powerful mechanism. Instead -of directly running the desired server program, the inetd is tricked -into running a small wrapper program. The wrapper logs the client host -name or address and performs some additional checks. When all is well, -the wrapper executes the desired server program and goes away. - -The wrapper programs have no interaction with the client user (or with -the client process). Nor do the wrappers interact with the server -application. This has two major advantages: 1) the wrappers are -application-independent, so that the same program can protect many -kinds of network services; 2) no interaction also means that the -wrappers are invisible from outside (at least for authorized users). - -Another important property is that the wrapper programs are active only -when the initial contact between client and server is established. Once -a wrapper has done its work there is no overhead on the client-server -conversation. - -The simple mechanism has one major drawback: the wrappers go away after -the initial contact between client and server processes, so the -wrappers are of little use with network daemons that service more than -one client. The wrappers would only see the first client attempt to -contact such a server. The NFS mount daemon is a typical example of a -daemon that services requests from multiple clients. See the section on -related software for ways to deal with such server programs. - -There are two ways to use the wrapper programs: - -1) The easy way: move network daemons to some other directory and fill - the resulting holes with copies of the wrapper programs. This - approach involves no changes to system configuration files, so there - is very little risk of breaking things. - -2) The advanced way: leave the network daemons alone and modify the - inetd configuration file. For example, an entry such as: - - tftp dgram udp wait root /usr/etc/tcpd in.tftpd -s /tftpboot - - When a tftp request arrives, inetd will run the wrapper program - (tcpd) with a process name `in.tftpd'. This is the name that the - wrapper will use when logging the request and when scanning the - optional access control tables. `in.tftpd' is also the name of the - server program that the wrapper will attempt to run when all is - well. Any arguments (`-s /tftpboot' in this particular example) are - transparently passed on to the server program. - -For an account of the history of the wrapper programs, with real-life -examples, see the section below on related documents. - -3.2 - Where the logging information goes ----------------------------------------- - -The wrapper programs send their logging information to the syslog -daemon (syslogd). The disposition of the wrapper logs is determined by -the syslog configuration file (usually /etc/syslog.conf). Messages are -written to files, to the console, or are forwarded to a @loghost. Some -syslogd versions can even forward messages down a |pipeline. - -Older syslog implementations (still found on Ultrix systems) only -support priority levels ranging from 9 (debug-level messages) to 0 -(alerts). All logging information of the specified priority level or -more urgent is written to the same destination. In the syslog.conf -file, priority levels are specified in numerical form. For example, - - 8/usr/spool/mqueue/syslog - -causes all messages with priority 8 (informational messages), and -anything that is more urgent, to be appended to the file -/usr/spool/mqueue/syslog. - -Newer syslog implementations support message classes in addition to -priority levels. Examples of message classes are: mail, daemon, auth -and news. In the syslog.conf file, priority levels are specified with -symbolic names: debug, info, notice, ..., emerg. For example, - - mail.debug /var/log/syslog - -causes all messages of class mail with priority debug (or more urgent) -to be appended to the /var/log/syslog file. - -By default, the wrapper logs go to the same place as the transaction -logs of the sendmail daemon. The disposition can be changed by editing -the Makefile and/or the syslog.conf file. Send a `kill -HUP' to the -syslogd after changing its configuration file. Remember that syslogd, -just like sendmail, insists on one or more TABs between the left-hand -side and the right-hand side expressions in its configuration file. - -Solaris 2.x note: the syslog daemon depends on the m4 macro processor. -The m4 program is installed as part of the software developer packages. - -Trouble shooting note: when the syslogging does not work as expected, -run the program by hand (`syslogd -d') and see what really happens. - -4 - Features ------------- - -4.1 - Access control --------------------- - -When compiled with -DHOSTS_ACCESS, the wrapper programs support a -simple form of access control. Access can be controlled per host, per -service, or combinations thereof. The software provides hooks for the -execution of shell commands when an access control rule fires; this -feature may be used to install "booby traps". For details, see the -hosts_access.5 manual page, which is in `nroff -man' format. A later -section describes how you can test your access control rules. - -Access control can also be used to connect clients to the "right" -service. What is right may depend on the requested service, the origin -of the request, and what host address the client connects to. Examples: - -(1) A gopher or www database speaks native language when contacted from - within the country, otherwise it speaks English. - -(2) A service provider offers different ftp, gopher or www services - with different internet hostnames from one host (section 4.6). - -Access control is enabled by default. It can be turned off by editing -the Makefile, or by providing no access control tables. The install -instructions below describe the Makefile editing process. - -The hosts_options.5 manual page (`nroff -man' format) documents an -extended version of the access control language. The extensions are -disabled by default. See the section below on language extensions. - -Later System V implementations provide the Transport Level Interface -(TLI), a network programming interface that performs functions similar -to the Berkeley socket programming interface. Like Berkeley sockets, -TLI was designed to cover multiple protocols, not just Internet. - -When the wrapper discovers that the TLI interface sits on top of a -TCP/IP or UDP/IP conversation it uses this knowledge to provide the -same functions as with traditional socket-based applications. When -some other protocol is used underneath TLI, the host address will be -some universal magic cookie that may not even be usable for access -control purposes. - -4.2 - Host name spoofing ------------------------- - -With some network applications, such as RSH or RLOGIN, the client host -name plays an important role in the authentication process. Host name -information can be reliable when lookups are done from a _local_ hosts -table, provided that the client IP address can be trusted. - -With _distributed_ name services, authentication schemes that rely on -host names become more problematic. The security of your system now may -depend on some far-away DNS (domain name server) outside your own -control. - -The wrapper programs verify the client host name that is returned by -the address->name DNS server, by asking for a second opinion. To this -end, the programs look at the name and addresses that are returned by -the name->address DNS server, which may be an entirely different host. - -If any name or address discrepancies are found, or if the second DNS -opinion is not available, the wrappers assume that one of the two name -servers is lying, and assume that the client host pretends to have -someone elses host name. - -When compiled with -DPARANOID, the wrappers will always attempt to look -up and double check the client host name, and will always refuse -service in case of a host name/address discrepancy. This is a -reasonable policy for most systems. - -When compiled without -DPARANOID, the wrappers by default still perform -hostname lookup. You can match hosts with a name/address discrepancy -with the PARANOID wildcard and decide whether or not to grant service. - -Automatic hostname verification is enabled by default. Automatic -hostname lookups and verification can be turned off by editing the -Makefile. The configuration and installation section below describes -the Makefile editing process. - -4.3 - Host address spoofing ---------------------------- - -While host name spoofing can be found out by asking a second opinion, -it is much harder to find out that a host claims to have someone elses -network address. And since host names are deduced from network -addresses, address spoofing is at least as effective as name spoofing. - -The wrapper programs can give additional protection against hosts that -claim to have an address that lies outside their own network. For -example, some far-away host that claims to be a trusted host within -your own network. Such things are possible even while the impersonated -system is up and running. - -This additional protection is not an invention of my own; it has been -present for at least five years in the BSD rsh and rlogin daemons. -Unfortunately, that feature was added *after* 4.3 BSD came out, so that -very few, if any, UNIX vendors have adopted it. Our site, and many -other ones, has been running these enhanced daemons for several years, -and without any ill effects. - -When the wrapper programs are compiled with -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS, the -programs refuse to service TCP connections with IP source routing -options. -DKILL_IP_OPTIONS is not needed on modern UNIX systems -that can stop source-routed traffic in the kernel. Examples are -4.4BSD derivatives, Solaris 2.x, and Linux. See your system manuals -for details. - -If you are going to use this feature on SunOS 4.1.x you should apply -patch 100804-03+ or 101790-something depending on your SunOS version. -Otherwise you may experience "BAD TRAP" and "Data fault" panics when -the getsockopt() system call is executed after a TCP RESET has been -received. This is a kernel bug, it is not the fault of the wrappers. - -The feature is disabled by default. It can be turned on by editing the -Makefile. The configuration and installation section below describes -the Makefile editing process. - -UDP services do not benefit from this additional protection. With UDP, -all you can be certain of is the network packet's destination address. - -4.4 - Client username lookups ------------------------------ - -The protocol proposed in RFC 931 provides a means to obtain the client -user name from the client host. The requirement is that the client -host runs an RFC 931-compliant daemon. The information provided by such -a daemon is not intended to be used for authentication purposes, but it -can provide additional information about the owner of a TCP connection. - -The RFC 931 protocol has diverged into different directions (IDENT, -TAP, RFC 1413). To add to the confusion, they all use the same network -port. The daemon wrappers implement a common subset of the protocols. - -There are some limitations: the number of hosts that run an RFC 931 (or -compatible) daemon is limited (but growing); client user name lookups -do not work for datagram (UDP) services. More seriously, client user -name lookups can cause noticeable delays with connections from non-UNIX -PCs. Recent PC software seem to have fixed this (for example NCSA -telnet). The wrappers use a 10-second timeout for RFC931 lookups, to -accommodate slow networks and slow hosts. - -By default, the wrappers will do username lookup only when the access -control rules require them to do so (via user@host client patterns, see -the hosts_access.5 manual page) or when the username is needed for -%<letter> expansions. - -You can configure the wrappers to always perform client username -lookups, by editing the Makefile. The client username lookup timeout -period (10 seconds default) can be changed by editing the Makefile. The -installation sections below describe the Makefile editing process. - -On System V with TLI-based network services, client username lookups -will be possible only when the underlying network protocol is TCP/IP. - -4.5 - Language extensions -------------------------- - -The wrappers sport only a limited number of features. This is for a -good reason: programs that run at high privilege levels must be easy to -verify. And the smaller a program, the easier to verify. There is, -however, a provision to add features. - -The options.c module provides a framework for language extensions. -Quite a few extensions have already been implemented; they are -documented in the hosts_options.5 document, which is in `nroff -man' -format. Examples: changing the severity level at which a request for -service is logged; "allow" and "deny" keywords; running a customized -server instead of the standard one; many others. - -The language extensions are not enabled by default because they -introduce an incompatible change to the access control language -syntax. Instructions to enable the extensions are given in the -Makefile. - -4.6 - Multiple ftp/gopher/www archives on one host --------------------------------------------------- - -Imagine one host with multiple internet addresses. These addresses do -not need to have the same internet hostname. Thus, it is possible to -offer services with different internet hostnames from just one host. - -Service providers can use this to offer organizations a presence on the -"net" with their own internet hostname, even when those organizations -aren't connected to the Internet at all. To the end user it makes no -difference, because applications use internet hostnames. - -There are several ways to assign multiple addresses to one machine. -The nice way is to take an existing network interface and to assign -additional internet addresses with the `ifconfig' command. Examples: - - Solaris 2: ifconfig le0:1 <address> netmask <mask> up - 4.4 BSD: ifconfig en0 alias <address> netmask <mask> - -On other systems one has to increase the number of network interfaces: -either with hardware interfaces, or with pseudo interfaces like SLIP or -PPP. The interfaces do not need to be attached to anything. They just -need to be up and to be assigned a suitable internet address and mask. - -With the wrapper software, `daemon@host' access control patterns can be -used to distinguish requests by the network address that they are aimed -at. Judicious use of the `twist' option (see the hosts_options.5 file, -`nroff -man' format) can guide the requests to the right server. These -can be servers that live in separate chroot areas, or servers modified -to take additional context from the command line, or a combination. - -Another way is to modify gopher or www listeners so that they bind to -only one specific network address. Multiple gopher or www servers can -then be run side by side, each taking requests sent to its respective -network address. - -4.7 - Banner messages ---------------------- - -Some sites are required to present an informational message to users -before they attempt to login. Banner messages can also be useful when -denying service: instead of simply dropping the connection a polite -explanation is given first. Finally, banners can be used to give your -system a more personal touch. - -The wrapper software provides easy-to-use tools to generate pre-login -banners for ftp, telnet, rlogin etc. from a single prototype banner -textfile. Details on banners and on-the-fly %<letter> expansions are -given in the hosts_options.5 manual page (`nroff -man' format). An -example is given in the file Banners.Makefile. - -In order to support banner messages the wrappers have to be built with -language extensions enabled. See the section on language extensions. - -4.8 - Sequence number guessing ------------------------------- - -Recently, systems came under attack from intruders that exploited a -well-known weakness in TCP/IP sequence number generators. This -weakness allows intruders to impersonate trusted hosts. Break-ins have -been reported via the rsh service. In fact, any network service can be -exploited that trusts the client host name or address. - -A long-term solution is to stop using network services that trust the -client host name or address, and to use data encryption instead. - -A short-term solution, as outlined in in CERT advisory CA-95:01, is to -configure network routers so that they discard datagrams from "outside" -with an "inside" source address. This approach is most fruitful when -you do not trust any hosts outside your local network. - -The IDENT (RFC931 etc.) client username lookup protocol can help to -detect host impersonation attacks. Before accepting a client request, -the wrappers can query the client's IDENT server and find out that the -client never sent that request. - -When the client host provides IDENT service, a negative IDENT lookup -result (the client matches `UNKNOWN@host') is strong evidence of a host -impersonation attack. - -A positive IDENT lookup result (the client matches `KNOWN@host') is -less trustworthy. It is possible for an attacker to spoof both the -client request and the IDENT lookup connection, although doing so -should be much harder than spoofing just a client request. Another -possibility is that the client's IDENT server is lying. - -Client username lookups are described in more detail in a previous -section. Pointers to IDENT daemon software are described in the section -on related software. - -5 - Other works ---------------- - -5.1 - Related documents ------------------------ - -The war story behind the tcp wrapper tools is described in: - - W.Z. Venema, "TCP WRAPPER, network monitoring, access control and - booby traps", UNIX Security Symposium III Proceedings (Baltimore), - September 1992. - - ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/tcp_wrapper.ps.Z (postscript) - ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/tcp_wrapper.txt.Z (flat text) - -The same cracker is also described in: - - W.R. Cheswick, "An Evening with Berferd, In Which a Cracker is - Lured, Endured, and Studied", Proceedings of the Winter USENIX - Conference (San Francisco), January 1992. - - research.att.com:/dist/internet_security/berferd.ps - -An updated version of the latter paper appeared in: - - W.R. Cheswick, S.M. Bellovin, "Firewalls and Internet Security", - Addison-Wesley, 1994. - -Discussions on internet firewalls are archived on ftp.greatcircle.com. -Subscribe to the mailing list by sending a message to - - majordomo@greatcircle.com - -With in the body (not subject): subscribe firewalls. - -5.2 - Related software ----------------------- - -Network daemons etc. with enhanced logging capabilities can generate -massive amounts of information: our 150+ workstations generate several -hundred kbytes each day. egrep-based filters can help to suppress some -of the noise. A more powerful tool is the Swatch monitoring system by -Stephen E. Hansen and E. Todd Atkins. Swatch can process log files in -real time and can associate arbitrary actions with patterns; its -applications are by no means restricted to security. Swatch is -available ftp.stanford.edu, directory /general/security-tools/swatch. - -Socks, described in the UNIX Security III proceedings, can be used to -control network traffic from hosts on an internal network, through a -firewall host, to the outer world. Socks consists of a daemon that is -run on the firewall host, and of a library with routines that redirect -application socket calls through the firewall daemon. Socks is -available from s1.gov in /pub/firewalls/socks.tar.Z. - -For a modified Socks version by Ying-Da Lee (ylee@syl.dl.nec.com) try -ftp.nec.com, directory /pub/security/socks.cstc. - -Tcpr is a set of perl scripts by Paul Ziemba that enable you to run ftp -and telnet commands across a firewall. Unlike socks it can be used with -unmodified client software. Available from ftp.alantec.com, /pub/tcpr. - -The TIS firewall toolkit provides a multitude of tools to build your -own internet firewall system. ftp.tis.com, directory /pub/firewalls. - -Versions of rshd and rlogind, modified to report the client user name -in addition to the client host name, are available for anonymous ftp -(ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/logdaemon-XX.tar.Z). These programs are -drop-in replacements for SunOS 4.x, Ultrix 4.x, SunOS 5.x and HP-UX -9.x. This archive also contains ftpd/rexecd/login versions that support -S/Key or SecureNet one-time passwords in addition to traditional UNIX -reusable passwords. - -The securelib shared library by William LeFebvre can be used to control -access to network daemons that are not run under control of the inetd -or that serve more than one client, such as the NFS mount daemon that -runs until the machine goes down. Available from eecs.nwu.edu, file -/pub/securelib.tar. - -xinetd (posted to comp.sources.unix) is an inetd replacement that -provides, among others, logging, username lookup and access control. -However, it does not support the System V TLI services, and involves -much more source code than the daemon wrapper programs. Available -from ftp.uu.net, directory /usenet/comp.sources.unix. - -netlog from Texas A&M relies on the SunOS 4.x /dev/nit interface to -passively watch all TCP and UDP network traffic on a network. The -current version is on net.tamu.edu in /pub/security/TAMU. - -Where shared libraries or router-based packet filtering are not an -option, an alternative portmap daemon can help to prevent hackers -from mounting your NFS file systems using the proxy RPC facility. -ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/portmap-X.shar.Z was tested with SunOS -4.1.X Ultrix 3.0 and Ultrix 4.x, HP-UX 8.x and some version of AIX. The -protection is less effective than that of the securelib library because -portmap is mostly a dictionary service. - -An rpcbind replacement (the Solaris 2.x moral equivalent of portmap) -can be found on ftp.win.tue.nl in /pub/security. It prevents hackers -from mounting your NFS file systems by using the proxy RPC facility. - -Source for a portable RFC 931 (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) daemon by Peter -Eriksson is available from ftp.lysator.liu.se:/pub/ident/servers. - -Some TCP/IP implementations come without syslog library. Some come with -the library but have no syslog daemon. A replacement can be found in -ftp.win.tue.nl:/pub/security/surrogate-syslog.tar.Z. The fakesyslog -library that comes with the nntp sources reportedly works well, too. - -6 - Limitations ---------------- - -6.1 - Known wrapper limitations -------------------------------- - -Many UDP (and rpc/udp) daemons linger around for a while after they -have serviced a request, just in case another request comes in. In the -inetd configuration file these daemons are registered with the `wait' -option. Only the request that started such a daemon will be seen by the -wrappers. Such daemons are better protected with the securelib shared -library (see: Related software). - -The wrappers do not work with RPC services over TCP. These services are -registered as rpc/tcp in the inetd configuration file. The only non- -trivial service that is affected by this limitation is rexd, which is -used by the on(1) command. This is no great loss. On most systems, -rexd is less secure than a wildcard in /etc/hosts.equiv. - -Some RPC requests (for example: rwall, rup, rusers) appear to come from -the server host. What happens is that the client broadcasts its request -to all portmap daemons on its network; each portmap daemon forwards the -request to a daemon on its own system. As far as the rwall etc. daemons -know, the request comes from the local host. - -Portmap and RPC (e.g. NIS and NFS) (in)security is a topic in itself. -See the section in this document on related software. - -6.2 - Known system software bugs --------------------------------- - -Workarounds have been implemented for several bugs in system software. -They are described in the Makefile. Unfortunately, some system software -bugs cannot be worked around. The result is loss of functionality. - -IRIX has so many bugs that it has its own README.IRIX file. - -Older ConvexOS versions come with a broken recvfrom(2) implementation. -This makes it impossible for the daemon wrappers to look up the -client host address (and hence, the name) in case of UDP requests. -A patch is available for ConvexOS 10.1; later releases should be OK. - -With early Solaris (SunOS 5) versions, the syslog daemon will leave -behind zombie processes when writing to logged-in users. Workaround: -increase the syslogd threshold for logging to users, or reduce the -wrapper's logging severity. - -On some systems, the optional RFC 931 etc. client username lookups may -trigger a kernel bug. When a client host connects to your system, and -the RFC 931 connection from your system to that client is rejected by a -router, your kernel may drop all connections with that client. This is -not a bug in the wrapper programs: complain to your vendor, and don't -enable client user name lookups until the bug has been fixed. - -Reportedly, SunOS 4.1.1, Next 2.0a, ISC 3.0 with TCP 1.3, and AIX 3.2.2 -and later are OK. - -Sony News/OS 4.51, HP-UX 8-something and Ultrix 4.3 still have the bug. -Reportedly, a fix for Ultrix is available (CXO-8919). - -The following procedure can be used (from outside the tue.nl domain) to -find out if your kernel has the bug. From the system under test, do: - - % ftp 131.155.70.19 - -This command attempts to make an ftp connection to our anonymous ftp -server (ftp.win.tue.nl). When the connection has been established, run -the following command from the same system under test, while keeping -the ftp connection open: - - % telnet 131.155.70.19 111 - -Do not forget the `111' at the end of the command. This telnet command -attempts to connect to our portmap process. The telnet command should -fail with: "host not reachable", or with a timeout error. If your ftp -connection gets messed up, you have the bug. If the telnet command does -not fail, please let me know a.s.a.p.! - -For those who care, the bug is that the BSD kernel code was not careful -enough with incoming ICMP UNREACHABLE control messages (it ignored the -local and remote port numbers, and therefore zapped *all* connections -with the remote system). The bug is still present in the BSD NET/1 -source release (1989) but apparently has been fixed in BSD NET/2 (1991). - -7 - Configuration and installation ----------------------------------- - -7.1 - Easy configuration and installation ------------------------------------------ - -The "easy" recipe requires no changes to existing software or -configuration files. Basically, you move the daemons that you want to -protect to a different directory and plug the resulting holes with -copies of the wrapper programs. - -If you don't run Ultrix, you won't need the miscd wrapper program. The -miscd daemon implements among others the SYSTAT service, which produces -the same output as the WHO command. - -Type `make' and follow the instructions. The Makefile comes with -ready-to-use templates for many common UNIX implementations (sun, -ultrix, hp-ux, aix, irix,...). - -IRIX has so many bugs that it has its own README.IRIX file. - -When the `make' succeeds the result is five executables (six in case of -Ultrix). - -You can use the `tcpdchk' program to identify the most common problems -in your wrapper and inetd configuration files. - -With the `tcpdmatch' program you can examine how the wrapper would -react to specific requests for service. - -The `safe_finger' command should be used when you implement booby -traps: it gives better protection against nasty stuff that remote -hosts may do in response to your finger probes. - -The `try-from' program tests the host and username lookup code. Run it -from a remote shell command (`rsh host /some/where/try-from') and it -should be able to figure out from what system it is being called. - -The tcpd program can be used to monitor the telnet, finger, ftp, exec, -rsh, rlogin, tftp, talk, comsat and other tcp or udp services that have -a one-to-one mapping onto executable files. - -The tcpd program can also be used for services that are marked as -rpc/udp in the inetd configuration file, but not for rpc/tcp services -such as rexd. You probably do not want to run rexd anyway. On most -systems it is even less secure than a wildcard in /etc/hosts.equiv. - -With System V.4-style systems, the tcpd program can also handle TLI -services. When TCP/IP or UDP/IP is used underneath TLI, tcpd provides -the same functions as with socket-based applications. When some other -protocol is used underneath TLI, functionality will be limited (no -client username lookups, weird network address formats). - -Decide which services you want to monitor. Move the corresponding -vendor-provided daemon programs to the location specified by the -REAL_DAEMON_DIR constant in the Makefile, and fill the holes with -copies of the tcpd program. That is, one copy of (or link to) the tcpd -program for each service that you want to monitor. For example, to -monitor the use of your finger service: - - # mkdir REAL_DAEMON_DIR - # mv /usr/etc/in.fingerd REAL_DAEMON_DIR - # cp tcpd /usr/etc/in.fingerd - -The example applies to SunOS 4. With other UNIX implementations the -network daemons live in /usr/libexec, /usr/sbin or in /etc, or have no -"in." prefix to their names, but you get the idea. - -File protections: the wrapper, all files used by the wrapper, and all -directories in the path leading to those files, should be accessible -but not writable for unprivileged users (mode 755 or mode 555). Do not -install the wrapper set-uid. - -Ultrix only: If you want to monitor the SYSTAT service, move the -vendor-provided miscd daemon to the location specified by the -REAL_DAEMON_DIR macro in the Makefile, and install the miscd wrapper -at the original miscd location. - -In the absence of any access-control tables, the daemon wrappers -will just maintain a record of network connections made to your system. - -7.2 - Advanced configuration and installation ---------------------------------------------- - -The advanced recipe leaves your daemon executables alone, but involves -simple modifications to the inetd configuration file. - -Type `make' and follow the instructions. The Makefile comes with -ready-to-use templates for many common UNIX implementations (sun, -ultrix, hp-ux, aix, irix, ...). - -IRIX users should read the warnings in the README.IRIX file first. - -When the `make' succeeds the result is five executables (six in case of -Ultrix). - -You can use the `tcpdchk' program to identify the most common problems -in your wrapper and inetd configuration files. - -With the `tcpdmatch' program you can examine how the wrapper would -react to specific requests for service. - -The `try-from' program tests the host and username lookup code. Run it -from a remote shell command (`rsh host /some/where/try-from') and it -should be able to figure out from what system it is being called. - -The `safe_finger' command should be used when you implement a booby -trap: it gives better protection against nasty stuff that remote hosts -may do in response to your finger probes. - -The tcpd program can be used to monitor the telnet, finger, ftp, exec, -rsh, rlogin, tftp, talk, comsat and other tcp or udp services that have -a one-to-one mapping onto executable files. - -With System V.4-style systems, the tcpd program can also handle TLI -services. When TCP/IP or UDP/IP is used underneath TLI, tcpd provides -the same functions as with socket-based applications. When some other -protocol is used underneath TLI, functionality will be limited (no -client username lookups, weird network address formats). - -The tcpd program can also be used for services that are marked as -rpc/udp in the inetd configuration file, but not for rpc/tcp services -such as rexd. You probably do not want to run rexd anyway. On most -systems it is even less secure than a wildcard in /etc/hosts.equiv. - -Install the tcpd command in a suitable place. Apollo UNIX users will -want to install it under a different name because the name "tcpd" is -already taken; a suitable name would be "frontd". - -File protections: the wrapper, all files used by the wrapper, and all -directories in the path leading to those files, should be accessible -but not writable for unprivileged users (mode 755 or mode 555). Do not -install the wrapper set-uid. - -Then perform the following edits on the inetd configuration file -(usually /etc/inetd.conf or /etc/inet/inetd.conf): - - finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/etc/in.fingerd in.fingerd - ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ -becomes: - - finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/etc/tcpd in.fingerd - ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ -Send a `kill -HUP' to the inetd process to make the change effective. -Some IRIX inetd implementations require that you first disable the -finger service (comment out the finger service and `kill -HUP' the -inetd) before you can turn on the modified version. Sending a HUP -twice seems to work just as well for IRIX 5.3, 6.0, 6.0.1 and 6.1. - -AIX note: you may have to execute the `inetimp' command after changing -the inetd configuration file. - -The example applies to SunOS 4. With other UNIX implementations the -network daemons live in /usr/libexec, /usr/sbin, or /etc, the network -daemons have no "in." prefix to their names, or the username field in -the inetd configuration file may be missing. - -When the finger service works as expected you can perform similar -changes for other network services. Do not forget the `kill -HUP'. - -The miscd daemon that comes with Ultrix implements several network -services. It decides what to do by looking at its process name. One of -the services is systat, which is a kind of limited finger service. If -you want to monitor the systat service, install the miscd wrapper in a -suitable place and update the inetd configuration file: - - systat stream tcp nowait /suitable/place/miscd systatd - -Ultrix 4.3 allows you to specify a user id under which the daemon will -be executed. This feature is not documented in the manual pages. Thus, -the example would become: - - systat stream tcp nowait nobody /suitable/place/miscd systatd - -Older Ultrix systems still run all their network daemons as root. - -In the absence of any access-control tables, the daemon wrappers -will just maintain a record of network connections made to your system. - -7.3 - Daemons with arbitrary path names ---------------------------------------- - -The above tcpd examples work fine with network daemons that live in a -common directory, but sometimes that is not practical. Having soft -links all over your file system is not a clean solution, either. - -Instead you can specify, in the inetd configuration file, an absolute -path name for the daemon process name. For example, - - ntalk dgram udp wait root /usr/etc/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd - -When the daemon process name is an absolute path name, tcpd ignores the -value of the REAL_DAEMON_DIR constant, and uses the last path component -of the daemon process name for logging and for access control. - -7.4 - Building and testing the access control rules ---------------------------------------------------- - -In order to support access control the wrappers must be compiled with -the -DHOSTS_ACCESS option. The access control policy is given in the -form of two tables (default: /etc/hosts.allow and /etc/hosts.deny). -Access control is disabled when there are no access control tables, or -when the tables are empty. - -If you haven't used the wrappers before I recommend that you first run -them a couple of days without any access control restrictions. The -logfile records should give you an idea of the process names and of the -host names that you will have to build into your access control rules. - -The syntax of the access control rules is documented in the file -hosts_access.5, which is in `nroff -man' format. This is a lengthy -document, and no-one expects you to read it right away from beginning -to end. Instead, after reading the introductory section, skip to the -examples at the end so that you get a general idea of the language. -Then you can appreciate the detailed reference sections near the -beginning of the document. - -The examples in the hosts_access.5 document (`nroff -man' format) show -two specific types of access control policy: 1) mostly closed (only -permitting access from a limited number of systems) and 2) mostly open -(permitting access from everyone except a limited number of trouble -makers). You will have to choose what model suits your situation best. -Implementing a mixed policy should not be overly difficult either. - -Optional extensions to the access control language are described in the -hosts_options.5 document (`nroff -man' format). - -The `tcpdchk' program examines all rules in your access control files -and reports any problems it can find. `tcpdchk -v' writes to standard -output a pretty-printed list of all rules. `tcpdchk -d' examines the -hosts.access and hosts.allow files in the current directory. This -program is described in the tcpdchk.8 document (`nroff -man' format). - -The `tcpdmatch' command can be used to try out your local access -control files. The command syntax is: - - tcpdmatch process_name hostname (e.g.: tcpdmatch in.tftpd localhost) - - tcpdmatch process_name address (e.g.: tcpdmatch in.tftpd 127.0.0.1) - -This way you can simulate what decisions will be made, and what actions -will be taken, when hosts connect to your own system. The program is -described in the tcpdmatch.8 document (`nroff -man' format). - -Note 1: `tcpdmatch -d' will look for hosts.{allow,deny} tables in the -current working directory. This is useful for testing new rules without -bothering your users. - -Note 2: you cannot use the `tcpdmatch' command to simulate what happens -when the local system connects to other hosts. - -In order to find out what process name to use, just use the service and -watch the process name that shows up in the logfile. Alternatively, -you can look up the name from the inetd configuration file. Coming back -to the tftp example in the tutorial section above: - - tftp dgram udp wait root /usr/etc/tcpd in.tftpd -s /tftpboot - -This entry causes the inetd to run the wrapper program (tcpd) with a -process name `in.tftpd'. This is the name that the wrapper will use -when scanning the access control tables. Therefore, `in.tftpd' is the -process name that should be given to the `tcpdmatch' command. On your -system the actual inetd.conf entry may differ (tftpd instead of -in.tftpd, and no `root' field), but you get the idea. - -When you specify a host name, the `tcpdmatch' program will use both the -host name and address. This way you can simulate the most common case -where the wrappers know both the host address and the host name. The -`tcpdmatch' program will iterate over all addresses that it can find -for the given host name. - -When you specify a host address instead of a host name, the `tcpdmatch' -program will pretend that the host name is unknown, so that you can -simulate what happens when the wrapper is unable to look up the client -host name. - -7.5 - Other applications ------------------------- - -The access control routines can easily be integrated with other -programs. The hosts_access.3 manual page (`nroff -man' format) -describes the external interface of the libwrap.a library. - -The tcpd program can even be used to control access to the mail -service. This can be useful when you suspect that someone is trying -out some obscure sendmail bug, or when a remote site is misconfigured -and keeps hammering your mail daemon. - -In that case, sendmail should not be run as a stand-alone network -listener, but it should be registered in the inetd configuration file. -For example: - - smtp stream tcp nowait root /usr/etc/tcpd /usr/lib/sendmail -bs - -You will still need to run one sendmail background process to handle -queued-up outgoing mail. A command like: - - /usr/lib/sendmail -q15m - -(no `-bd' flag) should take care of that. You cannot really prevent -people from posting forged mail this way, because there are many -unprotected smtp daemons on the network. - -8 - Acknowledgements --------------------- - -Many people contributed to the evolution of the programs, by asking -inspiring questions, by suggesting features or bugfixes, or by -submitting source code. Nevertheless, all mistakes and bugs in the -wrappers are my own. - -Thanks to Brendan Kehoe (cs.widener.edu), Heimir Sverrisson (hafro.is) -and Dan Bernstein (kramden.acf.nyu.edu) for feedback on an early -release of this product. The host name/address check was suggested by -John Kimball (src.honeywell.com). Apollo's UNIX environment has some -peculiar quirks: Willem-Jan Withagen (eb.ele.tue.nl), Pieter -Schoenmakers (es.ele.tue.nl) and Charles S. Fuller (wccs.psc.edu) -provided assistance. Hal R. Brand (addvax.llnl.gov) told me how to -get the client IP address in case of datagram-oriented services, and -suggested the optional shell command feature. Shabbir Safdar -(mentor.cc.purdue.edu) provided a first version of a much-needed manual -page. Granville Boman Goza, IV (sei.cmu.edu) suggested to use the -client IP address even when the host name is available. Casper H.S. -Dik (fwi.uva.nl) provided additional insight into DNS spoofing -techniques. The bogus daemon feature was inspired by code from Andrew -Macpherson (BNR Europe Ltd). Steve Bellovin (research.att.com) -confirmed some of my suspicions about the darker sides of TCP/IP -insecurity. Risks of automated fingers were pointed out by Borja Marcos -(we.lc.ehu.es). Brad Plecs (jhuspo.ca.jhu.edu) was kind enough to try -my early TLI code and to work out how DG/UX differs from Solaris. - -John P. Rouillard (cs.umb.edu) deserves special mention for his -persistent, but constructive, nagging about wrong or missing things, -and for trying out and discussing embryonic code or ideas. - -Last but not least, Howard Chu (hanauma.jpl.nasa.gov), Darren Reed -(coombs.anu.edu.au), Icarus Sparry (gdr.bath.ac.uk), Scott Schwartz -(cs.psu.edu), John A. Kunze (violet.berkeley.edu), Daniel Len Schales -(engr.latech.edu), Chris Turbeville (cse.uta.edu), Paul Kranenburg -(cs.few.eur.nl), Marc Boucher (cam.org), Dave Mitchell -(dcs.shef.ac.uk), Andrew Maffei, Adrian van Bloois, Rop Gonggrijp, John -C. Wingenbach, Everett F. Batey and many, many others provided fixes, -code fragments, or ideas for improvements. - - Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) - Department of Mathematics and Computing Science - Eindhoven University of Technology - P.O. Box 513 - 5600 MB Eindhoven - The Netherlands - - Currently visiting IBM T.J. Watson Research, Hawthorne NY, USA. diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/README.IRIX b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/README.IRIX deleted file mode 100644 index 56d2beafaaab..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/README.IRIX +++ /dev/null @@ -1,54 +0,0 @@ -@(#) README.IRIX 1.2 94/12/28 18:45:58 - -In the past few months I received several messages with questions from -people that tried to use my tcp wrapper on IRIX 5.x. Some mysteries -could be solved via email, and then some remained. - -Today I finally had a chance to do some tests on someones IRIX 5.2 -system. Here is my first-hand experience with wrapper release 6.3. - -(1) Inetd is broken. Normally one edits inetd.conf, sends a HUP signal - to inetd and that's it. With IRIX evil things happen: inetd is too - stupid to remember that it is already listening on a port. - - In order to modify an entry in inetd.conf, first comment it out - with a # at the beginning of the line, kill -HUP the inetd, then - uncomment the inetd.conf entry and kill -HUP again. - - Even with this amount of care I have seen inetd messing up, like - calling rusersd when I make a talk connection. Even killing and - restarting inetd does not solve all problems. - - I find it hard to believe, it but the best thing to do with IRIX is - to reboot after changing inetd.conf. - -(2) When tcpd is built according to the irix4 Makefile rules, it - appears to work as expected with TCP-based services such as - fingerd, and with UDP-based services such as ntalk and tftp. - -(3) It does NOT work with RPC over UDP services such as rusersd and - rstatd: the wrapper hangs in the recvfrom() system call, and I - have spent several hours looking for ways to work around it. No - way. After finding that none of the applicable socket primitives - can be made to work (recvfrom recvmsg) I give up. So, the IRIX RPC - services cannot be wrapped until SGI fixes their system so that it - works like everyone elses code (HP Sun Dec AIX and so on). - -(4) I didn't even bother to try the RPC over TCP services. - -(5) When an IRIX 5.2 system is a NIS client, it can have problems with - hosts that have more than one address: the wrapper will see only - one address, and may complain when PARANOID mode is on. The fix is - to change the name service lookup order in /etc/resolv.conf so that - your system tries DNS before NIS (hostresorder bind nis local). - -(6) IRIX 5.2 is not System V.4, and it shows. Do not link with the - -lsocket and -lnsl libraries. They are completely broken, and the - wrapper will be unable to figure out the client internet address. - So, TLI services cannot be wrapped until SGI fixes their system so - that it works the way it is supposed to. - -I am not impressed by the quality of the IRIX system software. There -are many things that work on almost every other system except with IRIX. - - Wietse diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/README.NIS b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/README.NIS deleted file mode 100644 index 34d39e27cf13..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/README.NIS +++ /dev/null @@ -1,207 +0,0 @@ -@(#) README.NIS 1.2 96/02/11 17:24:52 - -> Problem: I have several [machines] with multiple IP addresses, and -> when they try to connect to a daemon with tcp wrapper, they are often -> rejected. I assume this is due to the -DPARANOID option, and depends -> on which IP address is returned first from the nameserver for a given -> name. This behavior seems to be random, may depend on ordering in -> the YP host map? - -[Note: the situation described below no longer exists. Presently, my -internet gateway uses the same IP address on all interfaces. To avoid -confusion I have removed the old name wzv-gw.win.tue.nl from the DNS. I -have kept the discussion below for educational reasons]. - -NIS was not designed to handle multi-homed hosts. With NIS, each -address should have its own hostname. For example, wzv-gw is my -gateway. It has two interfaces: one connected to the local ethernet, -the other to a serial link. In the NIS it is registered as: - - 131.155.210.23 wzv-gw-ether - 131.155.12.78 wzv-gw-slip - -In principle, wzv-gw could be the official name of one of these -interfaces, or it could be an alias for both. - -The DNS was designed to handle multi-homed hosts. In the DNS my gateway -is registered in zone win.tue.nl, with one name that has two A records: - - wzv-gw IN A 131.155.210.23 - IN A 131.155.12.78 - -And of course there are PTR records in zones 210.155.131.in-addr.arpa -and 12.155.131.in-addr.arpa that point to wzv-gw.win.tue.nl. - -This setup does not cause any problems. You can test your name service -with the two programs below. This is what they say on a local NIS client -(both client and server running SunOS 4.1.3_U1): - - % gethostbyname wzv-gw - Hostname: wzv-gw.win.tue.nl - Aliases: - Addresses: 131.155.210.23 131.155.12.78 - - % gethostbyaddr 131.155.210.23 - Hostname: wzv-gw-ether - Aliases: - Addresses: 131.155.210.23 - - % gethostbyaddr 131.155.12.78 - Hostname: wzv-gw-slip - Aliases: - Addresses: 131.155.12.78 - -Things seem less confusing when seen by a NIS client in a different -domain (both client and server running SunOS 4.1.3_U1): - - % gethostbyname wzv-gw.win.tue.nl - Hostname: wzv-gw.win.tue.nl - Aliases: - Addresses: 131.155.210.23 131.155.12.78 - - % gethostbyaddr 131.155.210.23 - Hostname: wzv-gw.win.tue.nl - Aliases: - Addresses: 131.155.12.78 131.155.210.23 - - % gethostbyaddr 131.155.12.78 - Hostname: wzv-gw.win.tue.nl - Aliases: - Addresses: 131.155.210.23 131.155.12.78 - -Alas, Solaris 2.4 still has problems. This is what I get on a Solaris -2.4 NIS client, with a SunOS 4.1.3_U1 NIS server: - - % gethostbyname wzv-gw.win.tue.nl - Hostname: wzv-gw.win.tue.nl - Aliases: 131.155.210.23 wzv-gw.win.tue.nl - Addresses: 131.155.12.78 - -The tcpd source comes with a workaround for this problem. The -workaround is ugly and is not part of the programs attached below. - - -#! /bin/sh -# This is a shell archive. Remove anything before this line, then unpack -# it by saving it into a file and typing "sh file". To overwrite existing -# files, type "sh file -c". You can also feed this as standard input via -# unshar, or by typing "sh <file", e.g.. If this archive is complete, you -# will see the following message at the end: -# "End of shell archive." -# Contents: gethostbyaddr.c gethostbyname.c -# Wrapped by wietse@wzv on Sun Jan 8 17:08:48 1995 -PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb ; export PATH -if test -f gethostbyaddr.c -a "${1}" != "-c" ; then - echo shar: Will not over-write existing file \"gethostbyaddr.c\" -else -echo shar: Extracting \"gethostbyaddr.c\" \(1073 characters\) -sed "s/^X//" >gethostbyaddr.c <<'END_OF_gethostbyaddr.c' -X /* -X * gethostbyaddr tester. compile with: -X * -X * cc -o gethostbyaddr gethostbyaddr.c (SunOS 4.x) -X * -X * cc -o gethostbyaddr gethostbyaddr.c -lnsl (SunOS 5.x) -X * -X * run as: gethostbyaddr address -X * -X * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. -X */ -X -X#include <sys/types.h> -X#include <sys/socket.h> -X#include <netinet/in.h> -X#include <arpa/inet.h> -X#include <netdb.h> -X#include <stdio.h> -X -Xmain(argc, argv) -Xint argc; -Xchar **argv; -X{ -X struct hostent *hp; -X long addr; -X -X if (argc != 2) { -X fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s i.p.addres\n", argv[0]); -X exit(1); -X } -X addr = inet_addr(argv[1]); -X if (hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &addr, sizeof(addr), AF_INET)) { -X printf("Hostname:\t%s\n", hp->h_name); -X printf("Aliases:\t"); -X while (hp->h_aliases[0]) -X printf("%s ", *hp->h_aliases++); -X printf("\n"); -X printf("Addresses:\t"); -X while (hp->h_addr_list[0]) -X printf("%s ", inet_ntoa(*(struct in_addr *) * hp->h_addr_list++)); -X printf("\n"); -X exit(0); -X } -X fprintf(stderr, "host %s not found\n", argv[1]); -X exit(1); -X} -END_OF_gethostbyaddr.c -if test 1073 -ne `wc -c <gethostbyaddr.c`; then - echo shar: \"gethostbyaddr.c\" unpacked with wrong size! -fi -# end of overwriting check -fi -if test -f gethostbyname.c -a "${1}" != "-c" ; then - echo shar: Will not over-write existing file \"gethostbyname.c\" -else -echo shar: Extracting \"gethostbyname.c\" \(999 characters\) -sed "s/^X//" >gethostbyname.c <<'END_OF_gethostbyname.c' -X /* -X * gethostbyname tester. compile with: -X * -X * cc -o gethostbyname gethostbyname.c (SunOS 4.x) -X * -X * cc -o gethostbyname gethostbyname.c -lnsl (SunOS 5.x) -X * -X * run as: gethostbyname hostname -X * -X * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. -X */ -X#include <sys/types.h> -X#include <sys/socket.h> -X#include <netinet/in.h> -X#include <arpa/inet.h> -X#include <netdb.h> -X#include <stdio.h> -X -Xmain(argc, argv) -Xint argc; -Xchar **argv; -X{ -X struct hostent *hp; -X -X if (argc != 2) { -X fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s hostname\n", argv[0]); -X exit(1); -X } -X if (hp = gethostbyname(argv[1])) { -X printf("Hostname:\t%s\n", hp->h_name); -X printf("Aliases:\t"); -X while (hp->h_aliases[0]) -X printf("%s ", *hp->h_aliases++); -X printf("\n"); -X printf("Addresses:\t"); -X while (hp->h_addr_list[0]) -X printf("%s ", inet_ntoa(*(struct in_addr *) * hp->h_addr_list++)); -X printf("\n"); -X exit(0); -X } else { -X fprintf(stderr, "host %s not found\n", argv[1]); -X exit(1); -X } -X} -END_OF_gethostbyname.c -if test 999 -ne `wc -c <gethostbyname.c`; then - echo shar: \"gethostbyname.c\" unpacked with wrong size! -fi -# end of overwriting check -fi -echo shar: End of shell archive. -exit 0 diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/clean_exit.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/clean_exit.c deleted file mode 100644 index cb9d4f5080d9..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/clean_exit.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,42 +0,0 @@ - /* - * clean_exit() cleans up and terminates the program. It should be called - * instead of exit() when for some reason the real network daemon will not or - * cannot be run. Reason: in the case of a datagram-oriented service we must - * discard the not-yet received data from the client. Otherwise, inetd will - * see the same datagram again and again, and go into a loop. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) clean_exit.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:19"; -#endif - -#include <stdio.h> - -extern void exit(); - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* clean_exit - clean up and exit */ - -void clean_exit(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - - /* - * In case of unconnected protocols we must eat up the not-yet received - * data or inetd will loop. - */ - - if (request->sink) - request->sink(request->fd); - - /* - * Be kind to the inetd. We already reported the problem via the syslogd, - * and there is no need for additional garbage in the logfile. - */ - - sleep(5); - exit(0); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/diag.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/diag.c deleted file mode 100644 index e0bd792c319d..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/diag.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,69 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Routines to report various classes of problems. Each report is decorated - * with the current context (file name and line number), if available. - * - * tcpd_warn() reports a problem and proceeds. - * - * tcpd_jump() reports a problem and jumps. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) diag.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:20"; -#endif - -/* System libraries */ - -#include <syslog.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <setjmp.h> - -/* Local stuff */ - -#include "tcpd.h" -#include "mystdarg.h" - -struct tcpd_context tcpd_context; -jmp_buf tcpd_buf; - -/* tcpd_diag - centralize error reporter */ - -static void tcpd_diag(severity, tag, format, ap) -int severity; -char *tag; -char *format; -va_list ap; -{ - char fmt[BUFSIZ]; - - if (tcpd_context.file) - sprintf(fmt, "%s: %s, line %d: %s", - tag, tcpd_context.file, tcpd_context.line, format); - else - sprintf(fmt, "%s: %s", tag, format); - vsyslog(severity, fmt, ap); -} - -/* tcpd_warn - report problem of some sort and proceed */ - -void VARARGS(tcpd_warn, char *, format) -{ - va_list ap; - - VASTART(ap, char *, format); - tcpd_diag(LOG_ERR, "warning", format, ap); - VAEND(ap); -} - -/* tcpd_jump - report serious problem and jump */ - -void VARARGS(tcpd_jump, char *, format) -{ - va_list ap; - - VASTART(ap, char *, format); - tcpd_diag(LOG_ERR, "error", format, ap); - VAEND(ap); - longjmp(tcpd_buf, AC_ERROR); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/environ.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/environ.c deleted file mode 100644 index e7f846ddd6b7..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/environ.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,224 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Many systems have putenv() but no setenv(). Other systems have setenv() - * but no putenv() (MIPS). Still other systems have neither (NeXT). This is a - * re-implementation that hopefully ends all problems. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) environ.c 1.2 94/03/23 16:09:46"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -extern char **environ; -extern char *strchr(); -extern char *strcpy(); -extern char *strncpy(); -extern char *malloc(); -extern char *realloc(); -extern int strncmp(); -extern void free(); - -#ifdef no_memcpy -#define memcpy(d,s,l) bcopy(s,d,l) -#else -extern char *memcpy(); -#endif - -/* Local stuff. */ - -static int addenv(); /* append entry to environment */ - -static int allocated = 0; /* environ is, or is not, allocated */ - -#define DO_CLOBBER 1 - -/* namelength - determine length of name in "name=whatever" */ - -static int namelength(name) -char *name; -{ - char *equal; - - equal = strchr(name, '='); - return ((equal == 0) ? strlen(name) : (equal - name)); -} - -/* findenv - given name, locate name=value */ - -static char **findenv(name, len) -char *name; -int len; -{ - char **envp; - - for (envp = environ; envp && *envp; envp++) - if (strncmp(name, *envp, len) == 0 && (*envp)[len] == '=') - return (envp); - return (0); -} - -/* getenv - given name, locate value */ - -char *getenv(name) -char *name; -{ - int len = namelength(name); - char **envp = findenv(name, len); - - return (envp ? *envp + len + 1 : 0); -} - -/* putenv - update or append environment (name,value) pair */ - -int putenv(nameval) -char *nameval; -{ - char *equal = strchr(nameval, '='); - char *value = (equal ? equal : ""); - - return (setenv(nameval, value, DO_CLOBBER)); -} - -/* unsetenv - remove variable from environment */ - -void unsetenv(name) -char *name; -{ - char **envp; - - if ((envp = findenv(name, namelength(name))) != 0) - while (envp[0] = envp[1]) - envp++; -} - -/* setenv - update or append environment (name,value) pair */ - -int setenv(name, value, clobber) -char *name; -char *value; -int clobber; -{ - char *destination; - char **envp; - int l_name; /* length of name part */ - int l_nameval; /* length of name=value */ - - /* Permit name= and =value. */ - - l_name = namelength(name); - envp = findenv(name, l_name); - if (envp != 0 && clobber == 0) - return (0); - if (*value == '=') - value++; - l_nameval = l_name + strlen(value) + 1; - - /* - * Use available memory if the old value is long enough. Never free an - * old name=value entry because it may not be allocated. - */ - - destination = (envp != 0 && strlen(*envp) >= l_nameval) ? - *envp : malloc(l_nameval + 1); - if (destination == 0) - return (-1); - strncpy(destination, name, l_name); - destination[l_name] = '='; - strcpy(destination + l_name + 1, value); - return ((envp == 0) ? addenv(destination) : (*envp = destination, 0)); -} - -/* cmalloc - malloc and copy block of memory */ - -static char *cmalloc(new_len, old, old_len) -char *old; -int old_len; -{ - char *new = malloc(new_len); - - if (new != 0) - memcpy(new, old, old_len); - return (new); -} - -/* addenv - append environment entry */ - -static int addenv(nameval) -char *nameval; -{ - char **envp; - int n_used; /* number of environment entries */ - int l_used; /* bytes used excl. terminator */ - int l_need; /* bytes needed incl. terminator */ - - for (envp = environ; envp && *envp; envp++) - /* void */ ; - n_used = envp - environ; - l_used = n_used * sizeof(*envp); - l_need = l_used + 2 * sizeof(*envp); - - envp = allocated ? - (char **) realloc((char *) environ, l_need) : - (char **) cmalloc(l_need, (char *) environ, l_used); - if (envp == 0) { - return (-1); - } else { - allocated = 1; - environ = envp; - environ[n_used++] = nameval; /* add new entry */ - environ[n_used] = 0; /* terminate list */ - return (0); - } -} - -#ifdef TEST - - /* - * Stand-alone program for test purposes. - */ - -/* printenv - display environment */ - -static void printenv() -{ - char **envp; - - for (envp = environ; envp && *envp; envp++) - printf("%s\n", *envp); -} - -int main(argc, argv) -int argc; -char **argv; -{ - char *cp; - int changed = 0; - - if (argc < 2) { - printf("usage: %s name[=value]...\n", argv[0]); - return (1); - } - while (--argc && *++argv) { - if (argv[0][0] == '-') { /* unsetenv() test */ - unsetenv(argv[0] + 1); - changed = 1; - } else if (strchr(argv[0], '=') == 0) { /* getenv() test */ - cp = getenv(argv[0]); - printf("%s: %s\n", argv[0], cp ? cp : "not found"); - } else { /* putenv() test */ - if (putenv(argv[0])) { - perror("putenv"); - return (1); - } - changed = 1; - } - } - if (changed) - printenv(); - return (0); -} - -#endif /* TEST */ diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/eval.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/eval.c deleted file mode 100644 index d68358f3b9c3..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/eval.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,136 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Routines for controlled evaluation of host names, user names, and so on. - * They are, in fact, wrappers around the functions that are specific for - * the sockets or TLI programming interfaces. The request_info and host_info - * structures are used for result cacheing. - * - * These routines allows us to postpone expensive operations until their - * results are really needed. Examples are hostname lookups and double - * checks, or username lookups. Information that cannot be retrieved is - * given the value "unknown" ("paranoid" in case of hostname problems). - * - * When ALWAYS_HOSTNAME is off, hostname lookup is done only when required by - * tcpd paranoid mode, by access control patterns, or by %letter expansions. - * - * When ALWAYS_RFC931 mode is off, user lookup is done only when required by - * access control patterns or %letter expansions. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) eval.c 1.3 95/01/30 19:51:45"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - - /* - * When a string has the value STRING_UNKNOWN, it means: don't bother, I - * tried to look up the data but it was unavailable for some reason. When a - * host name has the value STRING_PARANOID it means there was a name/address - * conflict. - */ -char unknown[] = STRING_UNKNOWN; -char paranoid[] = STRING_PARANOID; - -/* eval_user - look up user name */ - -char *eval_user(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - if (request->user[0] == 0) { - strcpy(request->user, unknown); - if (request->sink == 0 && request->client->sin && request->server->sin) - rfc931(request->client->sin, request->server->sin, request->user); - } - return (request->user); -} - -/* eval_hostaddr - look up printable address */ - -char *eval_hostaddr(host) -struct host_info *host; -{ - if (host->addr[0] == 0) { - strcpy(host->addr, unknown); - if (host->request->hostaddr != 0) - host->request->hostaddr(host); - } - return (host->addr); -} - -/* eval_hostname - look up host name */ - -char *eval_hostname(host) -struct host_info *host; -{ - if (host->name[0] == 0) { - strcpy(host->name, unknown); - if (host->request->hostname != 0) - host->request->hostname(host); - } - return (host->name); -} - -/* eval_hostinfo - return string with host name (preferred) or address */ - -char *eval_hostinfo(host) -struct host_info *host; -{ - char *hostname; - -#ifndef ALWAYS_HOSTNAME /* no implicit host lookups */ - if (host->name[0] == 0) - return (eval_hostaddr(host)); -#endif - hostname = eval_hostname(host); - if (HOSTNAME_KNOWN(hostname)) { - return (host->name); - } else { - return (eval_hostaddr(host)); - } -} - -/* eval_client - return string with as much about the client as we know */ - -char *eval_client(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - static char both[2 * STRING_LENGTH]; - char *hostinfo = eval_hostinfo(request->client); - -#ifndef ALWAYS_RFC931 /* no implicit user lookups */ - if (request->user[0] == 0) - return (hostinfo); -#endif - if (STR_NE(eval_user(request), unknown)) { - sprintf(both, "%s@%s", request->user, hostinfo); - return (both); - } else { - return (hostinfo); - } -} - -/* eval_server - return string with as much about the server as we know */ - -char *eval_server(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - static char both[2 * STRING_LENGTH]; - char *host = eval_hostinfo(request->server); - char *daemon = eval_daemon(request); - - if (STR_NE(host, unknown)) { - sprintf(both, "%s@%s", daemon, host); - return (both); - } else { - return (daemon); - } -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/fakelog.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/fakelog.c deleted file mode 100644 index fa9e06e1a20d..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/fakelog.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ - /* - * This module intercepts syslog() library calls and redirects their output - * to the standard output stream. For interactive testing. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) fakelog.c 1.3 94/12/28 17:42:21"; -#endif - -#include <stdio.h> - -#include "mystdarg.h" - -/* openlog - dummy */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -openlog(name, logopt, facility) -char *name; -int logopt; -int facility; -{ - /* void */ -} - -/* vsyslog - format one record */ - -vsyslog(severity, fmt, ap) -int severity; -char *fmt; -va_list ap; -{ - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - - vprintf(percent_m(buf, fmt), ap); - printf("\n"); - fflush(stdout); -} - -/* syslog - format one record */ - -/* VARARGS */ - -VARARGS(syslog, int, severity) -{ - va_list ap; - char *fmt; - - VASTART(ap, int, severity); - fmt = va_arg(ap, char *); - vsyslog(severity, fmt, ap); - VAEND(ap); -} - -/* closelog - dummy */ - -closelog() -{ - /* void */ -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/fix_options.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/fix_options.c deleted file mode 100644 index b5e81b89bccb..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/fix_options.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,109 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Routine to disable IP-level socket options. This code was taken from 4.4BSD - * rlogind and kernel source, but all mistakes in it are my fault. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) fix_options.c 1.6 97/04/08 02:29:19"; -#endif - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <netinet/in_systm.h> -#include <netinet/ip.h> -#include <netdb.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> - -#ifndef IPOPT_OPTVAL -#define IPOPT_OPTVAL 0 -#define IPOPT_OLEN 1 -#endif - -#include "tcpd.h" - -#define BUFFER_SIZE 512 /* Was: BUFSIZ */ - -/* fix_options - get rid of IP-level socket options */ - -fix_options(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ -#ifdef IP_OPTIONS - unsigned char optbuf[BUFFER_SIZE / 3], *cp; - char lbuf[BUFFER_SIZE], *lp; - int optsize = sizeof(optbuf), ipproto; - struct protoent *ip; - int fd = request->fd; - unsigned int opt; - int optlen; - struct in_addr dummy; - - if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != 0) - ipproto = ip->p_proto; - else - ipproto = IPPROTO_IP; - - if (getsockopt(fd, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, (char *) optbuf, &optsize) == 0 - && optsize != 0) { - - /* - * Horror! 4.[34] BSD getsockopt() prepends the first-hop destination - * address to the result IP options list when source routing options - * are present (see <netinet/ip_var.h>), but produces no output for - * other IP options. Solaris 2.x getsockopt() does produce output for - * non-routing IP options, and uses the same format as BSD even when - * the space for the destination address is unused. The code below - * does the right thing with 4.[34]BSD derivatives and Solaris 2, but - * may occasionally miss source routing options on incompatible - * systems such as Linux. Their choice. - * - * Look for source routing options. Drop the connection when one is - * found. Just wiping the IP options is insufficient: we would still - * help the attacker by providing a real TCP sequence number, and the - * attacker would still be able to send packets (blind spoofing). I - * discussed this attack with Niels Provos, half a year before the - * attack was described in open mailing lists. - * - * It would be cleaner to just return a yes/no reply and let the caller - * decide how to deal with it. Resident servers should not terminate. - * However I am not prepared to make changes to internal interfaces - * on short notice. - */ -#define ADDR_LEN sizeof(dummy.s_addr) - - for (cp = optbuf + ADDR_LEN; cp < optbuf + optsize; cp += optlen) { - opt = cp[IPOPT_OPTVAL]; - if (opt == IPOPT_LSRR || opt == IPOPT_SSRR) { - syslog(LOG_WARNING, - "refused connect from %s with IP source routing options", - eval_client(request)); - shutdown(fd, 2); - return; - } - if (opt == IPOPT_EOL) - break; - if (opt == IPOPT_NOP) { - optlen = 1; - } else { - optlen = cp[IPOPT_OLEN]; - if (optlen <= 0) /* Do not loop! */ - break; - } - } - lp = lbuf; - for (cp = optbuf; optsize > 0; cp++, optsize--, lp += 3) - sprintf(lp, " %2.2x", *cp); - syslog(LOG_NOTICE, - "connect from %s with IP options (ignored):%s", - eval_client(request), lbuf); - if (setsockopt(fd, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, (char *) 0, optsize) != 0) { - syslog(LOG_ERR, "setsockopt IP_OPTIONS NULL: %m"); - shutdown(fd, 2); - } - } -#endif -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/fromhost.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/fromhost.c deleted file mode 100644 index a46c506e7915..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/fromhost.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ - /* - * On socket-only systems, fromhost() is nothing but an alias for the - * socket-specific sock_host() function. - * - * On systems with sockets and TLI, fromhost() determines the type of API - * (sockets, TLI), then invokes the appropriate API-specific routines. - * - * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) fromhost.c 1.17 94/12/28 17:42:23"; -#endif - -#if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/tiuser.h> -#include <stropts.h> - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* fromhost - find out what network API we should use */ - -void fromhost(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - - /* - * On systems with streams support the IP network protocol family may be - * accessible via more than one programming interface: Berkeley sockets - * and the Transport Level Interface (TLI). - * - * Thus, we must first find out what programming interface to use: sockets - * or TLI. On some systems, sockets are not part of the streams system, - * so if request->fd is not a stream we simply assume sockets. - */ - - if (ioctl(request->fd, I_FIND, "timod") > 0) { - tli_host(request); - } else { - sock_host(request); - } -} - -#endif /* TLI || PTX || TLI_SEQUENT */ diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.3 b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.3 deleted file mode 100644 index 1485337ff66e..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.3 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,93 +0,0 @@ -.TH HOSTS_ACCESS 3 -.SH NAME -hosts_access, hosts_ctl, request_init, request_set \- access control library -.SH SYNOPSIS -.nf -#include "tcpd.h" - -extern int allow_severity; -extern int deny_severity; - -struct request_info *request_init(request, key, value, ..., 0) -struct request_info *request; - -struct request_info *request_set(request, key, value, ..., 0) -struct request_info *request; - -int hosts_access(request) -struct request_info *request; - -int hosts_ctl(daemon, client_name, client_addr, client_user) -char *daemon; -char *client_name; -char *client_addr; -char *client_user; -.fi -.SH DESCRIPTION -The routines described in this document are part of the \fIlibwrap.a\fR -library. They implement a rule-based access control language with -optional shell commands that are executed when a rule fires. -.PP -request_init() initializes a structure with information about a client -request. request_set() updates an already initialized request -structure. Both functions take a variable-length list of key-value -pairs and return their first argument. The argument lists are -terminated with a zero key value. All string-valued arguments are -copied. The expected keys (and corresponding value types) are: -.IP "RQ_FILE (int)" -The file descriptor associated with the request. -.IP "RQ_CLIENT_NAME (char *)" -The client host name. -.IP "RQ_CLIENT_ADDR (char *)" -A printable representation of the client network address. -.IP "RQ_CLIENT_SIN (struct sockaddr_in *)" -An internal representation of the client network address and port. The -contents of the structure are not copied. -.IP "RQ_SERVER_NAME (char *)" -The hostname associated with the server endpoint address. -.IP "RQ_SERVER_ADDR (char *)" -A printable representation of the server endpoint address. -.IP "RQ_SERVER_SIN (struct sockaddr_in *)" -An internal representation of the server endpoint address and port. -The contents of the structure are not copied. -.IP "RQ_DAEMON (char *)" -The name of the daemon process running on the server host. -.IP "RQ_USER (char *)" -The name of the user on whose behalf the client host makes the request. -.PP -hosts_access() consults the access control tables described in the -\fIhosts_access(5)\fR manual page. When internal endpoint information -is available, host names and client user names are looked up on demand, -using the request structure as a cache. hosts_access() returns zero if -access should be denied. -.PP -hosts_ctl() is a wrapper around the request_init() and hosts_access() -routines with a perhaps more convenient interface (though it does not -pass on enough information to support automated client username -lookups). The client host address, client host name and username -arguments should contain valid data or STRING_UNKNOWN. hosts_ctl() -returns zero if access should be denied. -.PP -The \fIallow_severity\fR and \fIdeny_severity\fR variables determine -how accepted and rejected requests may be logged. They must be provided -by the caller and may be modified by rules in the access control -tables. -.SH DIAGNOSTICS -Problems are reported via the syslog daemon. -.SH SEE ALSO -hosts_access(5), format of the access control tables. -hosts_options(5), optional extensions to the base language. -.SH FILES -/etc/hosts.allow, /etc/hosts.deny, access control tables. -.SH BUGS -hosts_access() uses the strtok() library function. This may interfere -with other code that relies on strtok(). -.SH AUTHOR -.na -.nf -Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) -Department of Mathematics and Computing Science -Eindhoven University of Technology -Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, -5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands -\" @(#) hosts_access.3 1.8 96/02/11 17:01:26 diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.5 b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.5 deleted file mode 100644 index 5fe1f2969b8c..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.5 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,378 +0,0 @@ -.TH HOSTS_ACCESS 5 -.SH NAME -hosts_access \- format of host access control files -.SH DESCRIPTION -This manual page describes a simple access control language that is -based on client (host name/address, user name), and server (process -name, host name/address) patterns. Examples are given at the end. The -impatient reader is encouraged to skip to the EXAMPLES section for a -quick introduction. -.PP -An extended version of the access control language is described in the -\fIhosts_options\fR(5) document. The extensions are turned on at -program build time by building with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS. -.PP -In the following text, \fIdaemon\fR is the the process name of a -network daemon process, and \fIclient\fR is the name and/or address of -a host requesting service. Network daemon process names are specified -in the inetd configuration file. -.SH ACCESS CONTROL FILES -The access control software consults two files. The search stops -at the first match: -.IP \(bu -Access will be granted when a (daemon,client) pair matches an entry in -the \fI/etc/hosts.allow\fR file. -.IP \(bu -Otherwise, access will be denied when a (daemon,client) pair matches an -entry in the \fI/etc/hosts.deny\fR file. -.IP \(bu -Otherwise, access will be granted. -.PP -A non-existing access control file is treated as if it were an empty -file. Thus, access control can be turned off by providing no access -control files. -.SH ACCESS CONTROL RULES -Each access control file consists of zero or more lines of text. These -lines are processed in order of appearance. The search terminates when a -match is found. -.IP \(bu -A newline character is ignored when it is preceded by a backslash -character. This permits you to break up long lines so that they are -easier to edit. -.IP \(bu -Blank lines or lines that begin with a `#\' character are ignored. -This permits you to insert comments and whitespace so that the tables -are easier to read. -.IP \(bu -All other lines should satisfy the following format, things between [] -being optional: -.sp -.ti +3 -daemon_list : client_list [ : shell_command ] -.PP -\fIdaemon_list\fR is a list of one or more daemon process names -(argv[0] values) or wildcards (see below). -.PP -\fIclient_list\fR is a list -of one or more host names, host addresses, patterns or wildcards (see -below) that will be matched against the client host name or address. -.PP -The more complex forms \fIdaemon@host\fR and \fIuser@host\fR are -explained in the sections on server endpoint patterns and on client -username lookups, respectively. -.PP -List elements should be separated by blanks and/or commas. -.PP -With the exception of NIS (YP) netgroup lookups, all access control -checks are case insensitive. -.ne 4 -.SH PATTERNS -The access control language implements the following patterns: -.IP \(bu -A string that begins with a `.\' character. A host name is matched if -the last components of its name match the specified pattern. For -example, the pattern `.tue.nl\' matches the host name -`wzv.win.tue.nl\'. -.IP \(bu -A string that ends with a `.\' character. A host address is matched if -its first numeric fields match the given string. For example, the -pattern `131.155.\' matches the address of (almost) every host on the -Eind\%hoven University network (131.155.x.x). -.IP \(bu -A string that begins with an `@\' character is treated as an NIS -(formerly YP) netgroup name. A host name is matched if it is a host -member of the specified netgroup. Netgroup matches are not supported -for daemon process names or for client user names. -.IP \(bu -An expression of the form `n.n.n.n/m.m.m.m\' is interpreted as a -`net/mask\' pair. A host address is matched if `net\' is equal to the -bitwise AND of the address and the `mask\'. For example, the net/mask -pattern `131.155.72.0/255.255.254.0\' matches every address in the -range `131.155.72.0\' through `131.155.73.255\'. -.SH WILDCARDS -The access control language supports explicit wildcards: -.IP ALL -The universal wildcard, always matches. -.IP LOCAL -Matches any host whose name does not contain a dot character. -.IP UNKNOWN -Matches any user whose name is unknown, and matches any host whose name -\fIor\fR address are unknown. This pattern should be used with care: -host names may be unavailable due to temporary name server problems. A -network address will be unavailable when the software cannot figure out -what type of network it is talking to. -.IP KNOWN -Matches any user whose name is known, and matches any host whose name -\fIand\fR address are known. This pattern should be used with care: -host names may be unavailable due to temporary name server problems. A -network address will be unavailable when the software cannot figure out -what type of network it is talking to. -.IP PARANOID -Matches any host whose name does not match its address. When tcpd is -built with -DPARANOID (default mode), it drops requests from such -clients even before looking at the access control tables. Build -without -DPARANOID when you want more control over such requests. -.ne 6 -.SH OPERATORS -.IP EXCEPT -Intended use is of the form: `list_1 EXCEPT list_2\'; this construct -matches anything that matches \fIlist_1\fR unless it matches -\fIlist_2\fR. The EXCEPT operator can be used in daemon_lists and in -client_lists. The EXCEPT operator can be nested: if the control -language would permit the use of parentheses, `a EXCEPT b EXCEPT c\' -would parse as `(a EXCEPT (b EXCEPT c))\'. -.br -.ne 6 -.SH SHELL COMMANDS -If the first-matched access control rule contains a shell command, that -command is subjected to %<letter> substitutions (see next section). -The result is executed by a \fI/bin/sh\fR child process with standard -input, output and error connected to \fI/dev/null\fR. Specify an `&\' -at the end of the command if you do not want to wait until it has -completed. -.PP -Shell commands should not rely on the PATH setting of the inetd. -Instead, they should use absolute path names, or they should begin with -an explicit PATH=whatever statement. -.PP -The \fIhosts_options\fR(5) document describes an alternative language -that uses the shell command field in a different and incompatible way. -.SH % EXPANSIONS -The following expansions are available within shell commands: -.IP "%a (%A)" -The client (server) host address. -.IP %c -Client information: user@host, user@address, a host name, or just an -address, depending on how much information is available. -.IP %d -The daemon process name (argv[0] value). -.IP "%h (%H)" -The client (server) host name or address, if the host name is -unavailable. -.IP "%n (%N)" -The client (server) host name (or "unknown" or "paranoid"). -.IP %p -The daemon process id. -.IP %s -Server information: daemon@host, daemon@address, or just a daemon name, -depending on how much information is available. -.IP %u -The client user name (or "unknown"). -.IP %% -Expands to a single `%\' character. -.PP -Characters in % expansions that may confuse the shell are replaced by -underscores. -.SH SERVER ENDPOINT PATTERNS -In order to distinguish clients by the network address that they -connect to, use patterns of the form: -.sp -.ti +3 -process_name@host_pattern : client_list ... -.sp -Patterns like these can be used when the machine has different internet -addresses with different internet hostnames. Service providers can use -this facility to offer FTP, GOPHER or WWW archives with internet names -that may even belong to different organizations. See also the `twist' -option in the hosts_options(5) document. Some systems (Solaris, -FreeBSD) can have more than one internet address on one physical -interface; with other systems you may have to resort to SLIP or PPP -pseudo interfaces that live in a dedicated network address space. -.sp -The host_pattern obeys the same syntax rules as host names and -addresses in client_list context. Usually, server endpoint information -is available only with connection-oriented services. -.SH CLIENT USERNAME LOOKUP -When the client host supports the RFC 931 protocol or one of its -descendants (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) the wrapper programs can retrieve -additional information about the owner of a connection. Client username -information, when available, is logged together with the client host -name, and can be used to match patterns like: -.PP -.ti +3 -daemon_list : ... user_pattern@host_pattern ... -.PP -The daemon wrappers can be configured at compile time to perform -rule-driven username lookups (default) or to always interrogate the -client host. In the case of rule-driven username lookups, the above -rule would cause username lookup only when both the \fIdaemon_list\fR -and the \fIhost_pattern\fR match. -.PP -A user pattern has the same syntax as a daemon process pattern, so the -same wildcards apply (netgroup membership is not supported). One -should not get carried away with username lookups, though. -.IP \(bu -The client username information cannot be trusted when it is needed -most, i.e. when the client system has been compromised. In general, -ALL and (UN)KNOWN are the only user name patterns that make sense. -.IP \(bu -Username lookups are possible only with TCP-based services, and only -when the client host runs a suitable daemon; in all other cases the -result is "unknown". -.IP \(bu -A well-known UNIX kernel bug may cause loss of service when username -lookups are blocked by a firewall. The wrapper README document -describes a procedure to find out if your kernel has this bug. -.IP \(bu -Username lookups may cause noticeable delays for non-UNIX users. The -default timeout for username lookups is 10 seconds: too short to cope -with slow networks, but long enough to irritate PC users. -.PP -Selective username lookups can alleviate the last problem. For example, -a rule like: -.PP -.ti +3 -daemon_list : @pcnetgroup ALL@ALL -.PP -would match members of the pc netgroup without doing username lookups, -but would perform username lookups with all other systems. -.SH DETECTING ADDRESS SPOOFING ATTACKS -A flaw in the sequence number generator of many TCP/IP implementations -allows intruders to easily impersonate trusted hosts and to break in -via, for example, the remote shell service. The IDENT (RFC931 etc.) -service can be used to detect such and other host address spoofing -attacks. -.PP -Before accepting a client request, the wrappers can use the IDENT -service to find out that the client did not send the request at all. -When the client host provides IDENT service, a negative IDENT lookup -result (the client matches `UNKNOWN@host') is strong evidence of a host -spoofing attack. -.PP -A positive IDENT lookup result (the client matches `KNOWN@host') is -less trustworthy. It is possible for an intruder to spoof both the -client connection and the IDENT lookup, although doing so is much -harder than spoofing just a client connection. It may also be that -the client\'s IDENT server is lying. -.PP -Note: IDENT lookups don\'t work with UDP services. -.SH EXAMPLES -The language is flexible enough that different types of access control -policy can be expressed with a minimum of fuss. Although the language -uses two access control tables, the most common policies can be -implemented with one of the tables being trivial or even empty. -.PP -When reading the examples below it is important to realize that the -allow table is scanned before the deny table, that the search -terminates when a match is found, and that access is granted when no -match is found at all. -.PP -The examples use host and domain names. They can be improved by -including address and/or network/netmask information, to reduce the -impact of temporary name server lookup failures. -.SH MOSTLY CLOSED -In this case, access is denied by default. Only explicitly authorized -hosts are permitted access. -.PP -The default policy (no access) is implemented with a trivial deny -file: -.PP -.ne 2 -/etc/hosts.deny: -.in +3 -ALL: ALL -.PP -This denies all service to all hosts, unless they are permitted access -by entries in the allow file. -.PP -The explicitly authorized hosts are listed in the allow file. -For example: -.PP -.ne 2 -/etc/hosts.allow: -.in +3 -ALL: LOCAL @some_netgroup -.br -ALL: .foobar.edu EXCEPT terminalserver.foobar.edu -.PP -The first rule permits access from hosts in the local domain (no `.\' -in the host name) and from members of the \fIsome_netgroup\fP -netgroup. The second rule permits access from all hosts in the -\fIfoobar.edu\fP domain (notice the leading dot), with the exception of -\fIterminalserver.foobar.edu\fP. -.SH MOSTLY OPEN -Here, access is granted by default; only explicitly specified hosts are -refused service. -.PP -The default policy (access granted) makes the allow file redundant so -that it can be omitted. The explicitly non-authorized hosts are listed -in the deny file. For example: -.PP -/etc/hosts.deny: -.in +3 -ALL: some.host.name, .some.domain -.br -ALL EXCEPT in.fingerd: other.host.name, .other.domain -.PP -The first rule denies some hosts and domains all services; the second -rule still permits finger requests from other hosts and domains. -.SH BOOBY TRAPS -The next example permits tftp requests from hosts in the local domain -(notice the leading dot). Requests from any other hosts are denied. -Instead of the requested file, a finger probe is sent to the offending -host. The result is mailed to the superuser. -.PP -.ne 2 -/etc/hosts.allow: -.in +3 -.nf -in.tftpd: LOCAL, .my.domain -.PP -.ne 2 -/etc/hosts.deny: -.in +3 -.nf -in.tftpd: ALL: (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | \\ - /usr/ucb/mail -s %d-%h root) & -.fi -.PP -The safe_finger command comes with the tcpd wrapper and should be -installed in a suitable place. It limits possible damage from data sent -by the remote finger server. It gives better protection than the -standard finger command. -.PP -The expansion of the %h (client host) and %d (service name) sequences -is described in the section on shell commands. -.PP -Warning: do not booby-trap your finger daemon, unless you are prepared -for infinite finger loops. -.PP -On network firewall systems this trick can be carried even further. -The typical network firewall only provides a limited set of services to -the outer world. All other services can be "bugged" just like the above -tftp example. The result is an excellent early-warning system. -.br -.ne 4 -.SH DIAGNOSTICS -An error is reported when a syntax error is found in a host access -control rule; when the length of an access control rule exceeds the -capacity of an internal buffer; when an access control rule is not -terminated by a newline character; when the result of %<letter> -expansion would overflow an internal buffer; when a system call fails -that shouldn\'t. All problems are reported via the syslog daemon. -.SH FILES -.na -.nf -/etc/hosts.allow, (daemon,client) pairs that are granted access. -/etc/hosts.deny, (daemon,client) pairs that are denied access. -.ad -.fi -.SH SEE ALSO -.nf -tcpd(8) tcp/ip daemon wrapper program. -tcpdchk(8), tcpdmatch(8), test programs. -.SH BUGS -If a name server lookup times out, the host name will not be available -to the access control software, even though the host is registered. -.PP -Domain name server lookups are case insensitive; NIS (formerly YP) -netgroup lookups are case sensitive. -.SH AUTHOR -.na -.nf -Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) -Department of Mathematics and Computing Science -Eindhoven University of Technology -Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, -5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands -\" @(#) hosts_access.5 1.20 95/01/30 19:51:46 diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.c deleted file mode 100644 index 9bdc7bcd66e9..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_access.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,331 +0,0 @@ - /* - * This module implements a simple access control language that is based on - * host (or domain) names, NIS (host) netgroup names, IP addresses (or - * network numbers) and daemon process names. When a match is found the - * search is terminated, and depending on whether PROCESS_OPTIONS is defined, - * a list of options is executed or an optional shell command is executed. - * - * Host and user names are looked up on demand, provided that suitable endpoint - * information is available as sockaddr_in structures or TLI netbufs. As a - * side effect, the pattern matching process may change the contents of - * request structure fields. - * - * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). - * - * Compile with -DNETGROUP if your library provides support for netgroups. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) hosts_access.c 1.21 97/02/12 02:13:22"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <arpa/inet.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <ctype.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <setjmp.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern char *fgets(); -extern int errno; - -#ifndef INADDR_NONE -#define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ -#endif - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* Error handling. */ - -extern jmp_buf tcpd_buf; - -/* Delimiters for lists of daemons or clients. */ - -static char sep[] = ", \t\r\n"; - -/* Constants to be used in assignments only, not in comparisons... */ - -#define YES 1 -#define NO 0 - - /* - * These variables are globally visible so that they can be redirected in - * verification mode. - */ - -char *hosts_allow_table = HOSTS_ALLOW; -char *hosts_deny_table = HOSTS_DENY; -int hosts_access_verbose = 0; - - /* - * In a long-running process, we are not at liberty to just go away. - */ - -int resident = (-1); /* -1, 0: unknown; +1: yes */ - -/* Forward declarations. */ - -static int table_match(); -static int list_match(); -static int server_match(); -static int client_match(); -static int host_match(); -static int string_match(); -static int masked_match(); - -/* Size of logical line buffer. */ - -#define BUFLEN 2048 - -/* hosts_access - host access control facility */ - -int hosts_access(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - int verdict; - - /* - * If the (daemon, client) pair is matched by an entry in the file - * /etc/hosts.allow, access is granted. Otherwise, if the (daemon, - * client) pair is matched by an entry in the file /etc/hosts.deny, - * access is denied. Otherwise, access is granted. A non-existent - * access-control file is treated as an empty file. - * - * After a rule has been matched, the optional language extensions may - * decide to grant or refuse service anyway. Or, while a rule is being - * processed, a serious error is found, and it seems better to play safe - * and deny service. All this is done by jumping back into the - * hosts_access() routine, bypassing the regular return from the - * table_match() function calls below. - */ - - if (resident <= 0) - resident++; - verdict = setjmp(tcpd_buf); - if (verdict != 0) - return (verdict == AC_PERMIT); - if (table_match(hosts_allow_table, request)) - return (YES); - if (table_match(hosts_deny_table, request)) - return (NO); - return (YES); -} - -/* table_match - match table entries with (daemon, client) pair */ - -static int table_match(table, request) -char *table; -struct request_info *request; -{ - FILE *fp; - char sv_list[BUFLEN]; /* becomes list of daemons */ - char *cl_list; /* becomes list of clients */ - char *sh_cmd; /* becomes optional shell command */ - int match = NO; - struct tcpd_context saved_context; - - saved_context = tcpd_context; /* stupid compilers */ - - /* - * Between the fopen() and fclose() calls, avoid jumps that may cause - * file descriptor leaks. - */ - - if ((fp = fopen(table, "r")) != 0) { - tcpd_context.file = table; - tcpd_context.line = 0; - while (match == NO && xgets(sv_list, sizeof(sv_list), fp) != 0) { - if (sv_list[strlen(sv_list) - 1] != '\n') { - tcpd_warn("missing newline or line too long"); - continue; - } - if (sv_list[0] == '#' || sv_list[strspn(sv_list, " \t\r\n")] == 0) - continue; - if ((cl_list = split_at(sv_list, ':')) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("missing \":\" separator"); - continue; - } - sh_cmd = split_at(cl_list, ':'); - match = list_match(sv_list, request, server_match) - && list_match(cl_list, request, client_match); - } - (void) fclose(fp); - } else if (errno != ENOENT) { - tcpd_warn("cannot open %s: %m", table); - } - if (match) { - if (hosts_access_verbose > 1) - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "matched: %s line %d", - tcpd_context.file, tcpd_context.line); - if (sh_cmd) { -#ifdef PROCESS_OPTIONS - process_options(sh_cmd, request); -#else - char cmd[BUFSIZ]; - shell_cmd(percent_x(cmd, sizeof(cmd), sh_cmd, request)); -#endif - } - } - tcpd_context = saved_context; - return (match); -} - -/* list_match - match a request against a list of patterns with exceptions */ - -static int list_match(list, request, match_fn) -char *list; -struct request_info *request; -int (*match_fn) (); -{ - char *tok; - - /* - * Process tokens one at a time. We have exhausted all possible matches - * when we reach an "EXCEPT" token or the end of the list. If we do find - * a match, look for an "EXCEPT" list and recurse to determine whether - * the match is affected by any exceptions. - */ - - for (tok = strtok(list, sep); tok != 0; tok = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) { - if (STR_EQ(tok, "EXCEPT")) /* EXCEPT: give up */ - return (NO); - if (match_fn(tok, request)) { /* YES: look for exceptions */ - while ((tok = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) && STR_NE(tok, "EXCEPT")) - /* VOID */ ; - return (tok == 0 || list_match((char *) 0, request, match_fn) == 0); - } - } - return (NO); -} - -/* server_match - match server information */ - -static int server_match(tok, request) -char *tok; -struct request_info *request; -{ - char *host; - - if ((host = split_at(tok + 1, '@')) == 0) { /* plain daemon */ - return (string_match(tok, eval_daemon(request))); - } else { /* daemon@host */ - return (string_match(tok, eval_daemon(request)) - && host_match(host, request->server)); - } -} - -/* client_match - match client information */ - -static int client_match(tok, request) -char *tok; -struct request_info *request; -{ - char *host; - - if ((host = split_at(tok + 1, '@')) == 0) { /* plain host */ - return (host_match(tok, request->client)); - } else { /* user@host */ - return (host_match(host, request->client) - && string_match(tok, eval_user(request))); - } -} - -/* host_match - match host name and/or address against pattern */ - -static int host_match(tok, host) -char *tok; -struct host_info *host; -{ - char *mask; - - /* - * This code looks a little hairy because we want to avoid unnecessary - * hostname lookups. - * - * The KNOWN pattern requires that both address AND name be known; some - * patterns are specific to host names or to host addresses; all other - * patterns are satisfied when either the address OR the name match. - */ - - if (tok[0] == '@') { /* netgroup: look it up */ -#ifdef NETGROUP - static char *mydomain = 0; - if (mydomain == 0) - yp_get_default_domain(&mydomain); - return (innetgr(tok + 1, eval_hostname(host), (char *) 0, mydomain)); -#else - tcpd_warn("netgroup support is disabled"); /* not tcpd_jump() */ - return (NO); -#endif - } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* check address and name */ - char *name = eval_hostname(host); - return (STR_NE(eval_hostaddr(host), unknown) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); - } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "LOCAL")) { /* local: no dots in name */ - char *name = eval_hostname(host); - return (strchr(name, '.') == 0 && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(name)); - } else if ((mask = split_at(tok, '/')) != 0) { /* net/mask */ - return (masked_match(tok, mask, eval_hostaddr(host))); - } else { /* anything else */ - return (string_match(tok, eval_hostaddr(host)) - || (NOT_INADDR(tok) && string_match(tok, eval_hostname(host)))); - } -} - -/* string_match - match string against pattern */ - -static int string_match(tok, string) -char *tok; -char *string; -{ - int n; - - if (tok[0] == '.') { /* suffix */ - n = strlen(string) - strlen(tok); - return (n > 0 && STR_EQ(tok, string + n)); - } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "ALL")) { /* all: match any */ - return (YES); - } else if (STR_EQ(tok, "KNOWN")) { /* not unknown */ - return (STR_NE(string, unknown)); - } else if (tok[(n = strlen(tok)) - 1] == '.') { /* prefix */ - return (STRN_EQ(tok, string, n)); - } else { /* exact match */ - return (STR_EQ(tok, string)); - } -} - -/* masked_match - match address against netnumber/netmask */ - -static int masked_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string) -char *net_tok; -char *mask_tok; -char *string; -{ - unsigned long net; - unsigned long mask; - unsigned long addr; - - /* - * Disallow forms other than dotted quad: the treatment that inet_addr() - * gives to forms with less than four components is inconsistent with the - * access control language. John P. Rouillard <rouilj@cs.umb.edu>. - */ - - if ((addr = dot_quad_addr(string)) == INADDR_NONE) - return (NO); - if ((net = dot_quad_addr(net_tok)) == INADDR_NONE - || (mask = dot_quad_addr(mask_tok)) == INADDR_NONE) { - tcpd_warn("bad net/mask expression: %s/%s", net_tok, mask_tok); - return (NO); /* not tcpd_jump() */ - } - return ((addr & mask) == net); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_ctl.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_ctl.c deleted file mode 100644 index e57f30aaa4a4..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_ctl.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,38 +0,0 @@ - /* - * hosts_ctl() combines common applications of the host access control - * library routines. It bundles its arguments then calls the hosts_access() - * access control checker. The host name and user name arguments should be - * empty strings, STRING_UNKNOWN or real data. If a match is found, the - * optional shell command is executed. - * - * Restriction: this interface does not pass enough information to support - * selective remote username lookups or selective hostname double checks. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) hosts_ctl.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:27"; -#endif - -#include <stdio.h> - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* hosts_ctl - limited interface to the hosts_access() routine */ - -int hosts_ctl(daemon, name, addr, user) -char *daemon; -char *name; -char *addr; -char *user; -{ - struct request_info request; - - return (hosts_access(request_init(&request, - RQ_DAEMON, daemon, - RQ_CLIENT_NAME, name, - RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, addr, - RQ_USER, user, - 0))); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_options.5 b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_options.5 deleted file mode 100644 index 3bd189ee0541..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/hosts_options.5 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,172 +0,0 @@ -.TH HOSTS_OPTIONS 5 -.SH NAME -hosts_options \- host access control language extensions -.SH DESCRIPTION -This document describes optional extensions to the language described -in the hosts_access(5) document. The extensions are enabled at program -build time. For example, by editing the Makefile and turning on the -PROCESS_OPTIONS compile-time option. -.PP -The extensible language uses the following format: -.sp -.ti +3 -daemon_list : client_list : option : option ... -.PP -The first two fields are described in the hosts_access(5) manual page. -The remainder of the rules is a list of zero or more options. Any ":" -characters within options should be protected with a backslash. -.PP -An option is of the form "keyword" or "keyword value". Options are -processed in the specified order. Some options are subjected to -%<letter> substitutions. For the sake of backwards compatibility with -earlier versions, an "=" is permitted between keyword and value. -.SH LOGGING -.IP "severity mail.info" -.IP "severity notice" -Change the severity level at which the event will be logged. Facility -names (such as mail) are optional, and are not supported on systems -with older syslog implementations. The severity option can be used -to emphasize or to ignore specific events. -.SH ACCESS CONTROL -.IP "allow" -.IP "deny" -Grant (deny) service. These options must appear at the end of a rule. -.PP -The \fIallow\fR and \fIdeny\fR keywords make it possible to keep all -access control rules within a single file, for example in the -\fIhosts.allow\fR file. -.sp -To permit access from specific hosts only: -.sp -.ne 2 -.ti +3 -ALL: .friendly.domain: ALLOW -.ti +3 -ALL: ALL: DENY -.sp -To permit access from all hosts except a few trouble makers: -.sp -.ne 2 -.ti +3 -ALL: .bad.domain: DENY -.ti +3 -ALL: ALL: ALLOW -.sp -Notice the leading dot on the domain name patterns. -.SH RUNNING OTHER COMMANDS -.IP "spawn shell_command" -Execute, in a child process, the specified shell command, after -performing the %<letter> expansions described in the hosts_access(5) -manual page. The command is executed with stdin, stdout and stderr -connected to the null device, so that it won\'t mess up the -conversation with the client host. Example: -.sp -.nf -.ti +3 -spawn (/some/where/safe_finger -l @%h | /usr/ucb/mail root) & -.fi -.sp -executes, in a background child process, the shell command "safe_finger --l @%h | mail root" after replacing %h by the name or address of the -remote host. -.sp -The example uses the "safe_finger" command instead of the regular -"finger" command, to limit possible damage from data sent by the finger -server. The "safe_finger" command is part of the daemon wrapper -package; it is a wrapper around the regular finger command that filters -the data sent by the remote host. -.IP "twist shell_command" -Replace the current process by an instance of the specified shell -command, after performing the %<letter> expansions described in the -hosts_access(5) manual page. Stdin, stdout and stderr are connected to -the client process. This option must appear at the end of a rule. -.sp -To send a customized bounce message to the client instead of -running the real ftp daemon: -.sp -.nf -.ti +3 -in.ftpd : ... : twist /bin/echo 421 Some bounce message -.fi -.sp -For an alternative way to talk to client processes, see the -\fIbanners\fR option below. -.sp -To run /some/other/in.telnetd without polluting its command-line -array or its process environment: -.sp -.nf -.ti +3 -in.telnetd : ... : twist PATH=/some/other; exec in.telnetd -.fi -.sp -Warning: in case of UDP services, do not twist to commands that use -the standard I/O or the read(2)/write(2) routines to communicate with -the client process; UDP requires other I/O primitives. -.SH NETWORK OPTIONS -.IP "keepalive" -Causes the server to periodically send a message to the client. The -connection is considered broken when the client does not respond. The -keepalive option can be useful when users turn off their machine while -it is still connected to a server. The keepalive option is not useful -for datagram (UDP) services. -.IP "linger number_of_seconds" -Specifies how long the kernel will try to deliver not-yet delivered -data after the server process closes a connection. -.SH USERNAME LOOKUP -.IP "rfc931 [ timeout_in_seconds ]" -Look up the client user name with the RFC 931 (TAP, IDENT, RFC 1413) -protocol. This option is silently ignored in case of services based on -transports other than TCP. It requires that the client system runs an -RFC 931 (IDENT, etc.) -compliant daemon, and may cause noticeable -delays with connections from non-UNIX clients. The timeout period is -optional. If no timeout is specified a compile-time defined default -value is taken. -.SH MISCELLANEOUS -.IP "banners /some/directory" -Look for a file in `/some/directory' with the same name as the daemon -process (for example in.telnetd for the telnet service), and copy its -contents to the client. Newline characters are replaced by -carriage-return newline, and %<letter> sequences are expanded (see -the hosts_access(5) manual page). -.sp -The tcp wrappers source code distribution provides a sample makefile -(Banners.Makefile) for convenient banner maintenance. -.sp -Warning: banners are supported for connection-oriented (TCP) network -services only. -.IP "nice [ number ]" -Change the nice value of the process (default 10). Specify a positive -value to spend more CPU resources on other processes. -.IP "setenv name value" -Place a (name, value) pair into the process environment. The value is -subjected to %<letter> expansions and may contain whitespace (but -leading and trailing blanks are stripped off). -.sp -Warning: many network daemons reset their environment before spawning a -login or shell process. -.IP "umask 022" -Like the umask command that is built into the shell. An umask of 022 -prevents the creation of files with group and world write permission. -The umask argument should be an octal number. -.IP "user nobody" -.IP "user nobody.kmem" -Assume the privileges of the "nobody" userid (or user "nobody", group -"kmem"). The first form is useful with inetd implementations that run -all services with root privilege. The second form is useful for -services that need special group privileges only. -.SH DIAGNOSTICS -When a syntax error is found in an access control rule, the error -is reported to the syslog daemon; further options will be ignored, -and service is denied. -.SH SEE ALSO -hosts_access(5), the default access control language -.SH AUTHOR -.na -.nf -Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl) -Department of Mathematics and Computing Science -Eindhoven University of Technology -Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, -5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands -\" @(#) hosts_options.5 1.10 94/12/28 17:42:28 diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.c deleted file mode 100644 index 13838db9a4cc..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,317 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Routines to parse an inetd.conf or tlid.conf file. This would be a great - * job for a PERL script. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) inetcf.c 1.7 97/02/12 02:13:23"; -#endif - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern int errno; -extern void exit(); - -#include "tcpd.h" -#include "inetcf.h" - - /* - * Network configuration files may live in unusual places. Here are some - * guesses. Shorter names follow longer ones. - */ -char *inet_files[] = { - "/private/etc/inetd.conf", /* NEXT */ - "/etc/inet/inetd.conf", /* SYSV4 */ - "/usr/etc/inetd.conf", /* IRIX?? */ - "/etc/inetd.conf", /* BSD */ - "/etc/net/tlid.conf", /* SYSV4?? */ - "/etc/saf/tlid.conf", /* SYSV4?? */ - "/etc/tlid.conf", /* SYSV4?? */ - 0, -}; - -static void inet_chk(); -static char *base_name(); - - /* - * Structure with everything we know about a service. - */ -struct inet_ent { - struct inet_ent *next; - int type; - char name[1]; -}; - -static struct inet_ent *inet_list = 0; - -static char whitespace[] = " \t\r\n"; - -/* inet_conf - read in and examine inetd.conf (or tlid.conf) entries */ - -char *inet_cfg(conf) -char *conf; -{ - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - FILE *fp; - char *service; - char *protocol; - char *user; - char *path; - char *arg0; - char *arg1; - struct tcpd_context saved_context; - char *percent_m(); - int i; - struct stat st; - - saved_context = tcpd_context; - - /* - * The inetd.conf (or tlid.conf) information is so useful that we insist - * on its availability. When no file is given run a series of educated - * guesses. - */ - if (conf != 0) { - if ((fp = fopen(conf, "r")) == 0) { - fprintf(stderr, percent_m(buf, "open %s: %m\n"), conf); - exit(1); - } - } else { - for (i = 0; inet_files[i] && (fp = fopen(inet_files[i], "r")) == 0; i++) - /* void */ ; - if (fp == 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "Cannot find your inetd.conf or tlid.conf file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, "Please specify its location.\n"); - exit(1); - } - conf = inet_files[i]; - check_path(conf, &st); - } - - /* - * Process the file. After the 7.0 wrapper release it became clear that - * there are many more inetd.conf formats than the 8 systems that I had - * studied. EP/IX uses a two-line specification for rpc services; HP-UX - * permits long lines to be broken with backslash-newline. - */ - tcpd_context.file = conf; - tcpd_context.line = 0; - while (xgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp)) { - service = strtok(buf, whitespace); /* service */ - if (service == 0 || *service == '#') - continue; - if (STR_NE(service, "stream") && STR_NE(service, "dgram")) - strtok((char *) 0, whitespace); /* endpoint */ - protocol = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace); - (void) strtok((char *) 0, whitespace); /* wait */ - if ((user = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) - continue; - if (user[0] == '/') { /* user */ - path = user; - } else { /* path */ - if ((path = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) - continue; - } - if (path[0] == '?') /* IRIX optional service */ - path++; - if (STR_EQ(path, "internal")) - continue; - if (path[strspn(path, "-0123456789")] == 0) { - - /* - * ConvexOS puts RPC version numbers before path names. Jukka - * Ukkonen <ukkonen@csc.fi>. - */ - if ((path = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) - continue; - } - if ((arg0 = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("incomplete line"); - continue; - } - if (arg0[strspn(arg0, "0123456789")] == 0) { - - /* - * We're reading a tlid.conf file, the format is: - * - * ...stuff... path arg_count arguments mod_count modules - */ - if ((arg0 = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("incomplete line"); - continue; - } - } - if ((arg1 = strtok((char *) 0, whitespace)) == 0) - arg1 = ""; - - inet_chk(protocol, path, arg0, arg1); - } - fclose(fp); - tcpd_context = saved_context; - return (conf); -} - -/* inet_chk - examine one inetd.conf (tlid.conf?) entry */ - -static void inet_chk(protocol, path, arg0, arg1) -char *protocol; -char *path; -char *arg0; -char *arg1; -{ - char daemon[BUFSIZ]; - struct stat st; - int wrap_status = WR_MAYBE; - char *base_name_path = base_name(path); - char *tcpd_proc_name = (arg0[0] == '/' ? base_name(arg0) : arg0); - - /* - * Always warn when the executable does not exist or when it is not - * executable. - */ - if (check_path(path, &st) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("%s: not found: %m", path); - } else if ((st.st_mode & 0100) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("%s: not executable", path); - } - - /* - * Cheat on the miscd tests, nobody uses it anymore. - */ - if (STR_EQ(base_name_path, "miscd")) { - inet_set(arg0, WR_YES); - return; - } - - /* - * While we are here... - */ - if (STR_EQ(tcpd_proc_name, "rexd") || STR_EQ(tcpd_proc_name, "rpc.rexd")) - tcpd_warn("%s may be an insecure service", tcpd_proc_name); - - /* - * The tcpd program gets most of the attention. - */ - if (STR_EQ(base_name_path, "tcpd")) { - - if (STR_EQ(tcpd_proc_name, "tcpd")) - tcpd_warn("%s is recursively calling itself", tcpd_proc_name); - - wrap_status = WR_YES; - - /* - * Check: some sites install the wrapper set-uid. - */ - if ((st.st_mode & 06000) != 0) - tcpd_warn("%s: file is set-uid or set-gid", path); - - /* - * Check: some sites insert tcpd in inetd.conf, instead of replacing - * the daemon pathname. - */ - if (arg0[0] == '/' && STR_EQ(tcpd_proc_name, base_name(arg1))) - tcpd_warn("%s inserted before %s", path, arg0); - - /* - * Check: make sure files exist and are executable. On some systems - * the network daemons are set-uid so we cannot complain. Note that - * tcpd takes the basename only in case of absolute pathnames. - */ - if (arg0[0] == '/') { /* absolute path */ - if (check_path(arg0, &st) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("%s: not found: %m", arg0); - } else if ((st.st_mode & 0100) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("%s: not executable", arg0); - } - } else { /* look in REAL_DAEMON_DIR */ - sprintf(daemon, "%s/%s", REAL_DAEMON_DIR, arg0); - if (check_path(daemon, &st) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("%s: not found in %s: %m", - arg0, REAL_DAEMON_DIR); - } else if ((st.st_mode & 0100) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("%s: not executable", daemon); - } - } - - } else { - - /* - * No tcpd program found. Perhaps they used the "simple installation" - * recipe. Look for a file with the same basename in REAL_DAEMON_DIR. - * Draw some conservative conclusions when a distinct file is found. - */ - sprintf(daemon, "%s/%s", REAL_DAEMON_DIR, arg0); - if (STR_EQ(path, daemon)) { - wrap_status = WR_NOT; - } else if (check_path(daemon, &st) >= 0) { - wrap_status = WR_MAYBE; - } else if (errno == ENOENT) { - wrap_status = WR_NOT; - } else { - tcpd_warn("%s: file lookup: %m", daemon); - wrap_status = WR_MAYBE; - } - } - - /* - * Alas, we cannot wrap rpc/tcp services. - */ - if (wrap_status == WR_YES && STR_EQ(protocol, "rpc/tcp")) - tcpd_warn("%s: cannot wrap rpc/tcp services", tcpd_proc_name); - - inet_set(tcpd_proc_name, wrap_status); -} - -/* inet_set - remember service status */ - -void inet_set(name, type) -char *name; -int type; -{ - struct inet_ent *ip = - (struct inet_ent *) malloc(sizeof(struct inet_ent) + strlen(name)); - - if (ip == 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "out of memory\n"); - exit(1); - } - ip->next = inet_list; - strcpy(ip->name, name); - ip->type = type; - inet_list = ip; -} - -/* inet_get - look up service status */ - -int inet_get(name) -char *name; -{ - struct inet_ent *ip; - - if (inet_list == 0) - return (WR_MAYBE); - - for (ip = inet_list; ip; ip = ip->next) - if (STR_EQ(ip->name, name)) - return (ip->type); - - return (-1); -} - -/* base_name - compute last pathname component */ - -static char *base_name(path) -char *path; -{ - char *cp; - - if ((cp = strrchr(path, '/')) != 0) - path = cp + 1; - return (path); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.h b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.h deleted file mode 100644 index 0f1d77cb3d75..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/inetcf.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,14 +0,0 @@ - /* - * @(#) inetcf.h 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:30 - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -extern char *inet_cfg(); /* read inetd.conf file */ -extern void inet_set(); /* remember internet service */ -extern int inet_get(); /* look up internet service */ - -#define WR_UNKNOWN (-1) /* service unknown */ -#define WR_NOT 1 /* may not be wrapped */ -#define WR_MAYBE 2 /* may be wrapped */ -#define WR_YES 3 /* service is wrapped */ diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/misc.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/misc.c deleted file mode 100644 index 87a765379f43..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/misc.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,87 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Misc routines that are used by tcpd and by tcpdchk. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsic[] = "@(#) misc.c 1.2 96/02/11 17:01:29"; -#endif - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <arpa/inet.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> - -#include "tcpd.h" - -extern char *fgets(); - -#ifndef INADDR_NONE -#define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ -#endif - -/* xgets - fgets() with backslash-newline stripping */ - -char *xgets(ptr, len, fp) -char *ptr; -int len; -FILE *fp; -{ - int got; - char *start = ptr; - - while (fgets(ptr, len, fp)) { - got = strlen(ptr); - if (got >= 1 && ptr[got - 1] == '\n') { - tcpd_context.line++; - if (got >= 2 && ptr[got - 2] == '\\') { - got -= 2; - } else { - return (start); - } - } - ptr += got; - len -= got; - ptr[0] = 0; - } - return (ptr > start ? start : 0); -} - -/* split_at - break string at delimiter or return NULL */ - -char *split_at(string, delimiter) -char *string; -int delimiter; -{ - char *cp; - - if ((cp = strchr(string, delimiter)) != 0) - *cp++ = 0; - return (cp); -} - -/* dot_quad_addr - convert dotted quad to internal form */ - -unsigned long dot_quad_addr(str) -char *str; -{ - int in_run = 0; - int runs = 0; - char *cp = str; - - /* Count the number of runs of non-dot characters. */ - - while (*cp) { - if (*cp == '.') { - in_run = 0; - } else if (in_run == 0) { - in_run = 1; - runs++; - } - cp++; - } - return (runs == 4 ? inet_addr(str) : INADDR_NONE); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/miscd.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/miscd.c deleted file mode 100644 index 1ab835c45061..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/miscd.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,120 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Front end to the ULTRIX miscd service. The front end logs the remote host - * name and then invokes the real miscd daemon. Install as "/usr/etc/miscd", - * after renaming the real miscd daemon to the name defined with the - * REAL_MISCD macro. - * - * Connections and diagnostics are logged through syslog(3). - * - * The Ultrix miscd program implements (among others) the systat service, which - * pipes the output from who(1) to stdout. This information is potentially - * useful to systems crackers. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) miscd.c 1.10 96/02/11 17:01:30"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> - -#ifndef MAXPATHNAMELEN -#define MAXPATHNAMELEN BUFSIZ -#endif - -#ifndef STDIN_FILENO -#define STDIN_FILENO 0 -#endif - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "patchlevel.h" -#include "tcpd.h" - -int allow_severity = SEVERITY; /* run-time adjustable */ -int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; /* ditto */ - -main(argc, argv) -int argc; -char **argv; -{ - struct request_info request; - char path[MAXPATHNAMELEN]; - - /* Attempt to prevent the creation of world-writable files. */ - -#ifdef DAEMON_UMASK - umask(DAEMON_UMASK); -#endif - - /* - * Open a channel to the syslog daemon. Older versions of openlog() - * require only two arguments. - */ - -#ifdef LOG_MAIL - (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, FACILITY); -#else - (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID); -#endif - - /* - * Find out the endpoint addresses of this conversation. Host name - * lookups and double checks will be done on demand. - */ - - request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, argv[0], RQ_FILE, STDIN_FILENO, 0); - fromhost(&request); - - /* - * Optionally look up and double check the remote host name. Sites - * concerned with security may choose to refuse connections from hosts - * that pretend to have someone elses host name. - */ - -#ifdef PARANOID - if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), paranoid)) - refuse(&request); -#endif - - /* - * The BSD rlogin and rsh daemons that came out after 4.3 BSD disallow - * socket options at the IP level. They do so for a good reason. - * Unfortunately, we cannot use this with SunOS 4.1.x because the - * getsockopt() system call can panic the system. - */ - -#ifdef KILL_IP_OPTIONS - fix_options(&request); -#endif - - /* - * Check whether this host can access the service in argv[0]. The - * access-control code invokes optional shell commands as specified in - * the access-control tables. - */ - -#ifdef HOSTS_ACCESS - if (!hosts_access(&request)) - refuse(&request); -#endif - - /* Report request and invoke the real daemon program. */ - - syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s", eval_client(&request)); - sprintf(path, "%s/miscd", REAL_DAEMON_DIR); - closelog(); - (void) execv(path, argv); - syslog(LOG_ERR, "error: cannot execute %s: %m", path); - clean_exit(&request); - /* NOTREACHED */ -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/mystdarg.h b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/mystdarg.h deleted file mode 100644 index 36bdf696f1a5..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/mystdarg.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ - - /* - * What follows is an attempt to unify varargs.h and stdarg.h. I'd rather - * have this than #ifdefs all over the code. - */ - -#ifdef __STDC__ -#include <stdarg.h> -#define VARARGS(func,type,arg) func(type arg, ...) -#define VASTART(ap,type,name) va_start(ap,name) -#define VAEND(ap) va_end(ap) -#else -#include <varargs.h> -#define VARARGS(func,type,arg) func(va_alist) va_dcl -#define VASTART(ap,type,name) {type name; va_start(ap); name = va_arg(ap, type) -#define VAEND(ap) va_end(ap);} -#endif - -extern char *percent_m(); diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/myvsyslog.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/myvsyslog.c deleted file mode 100644 index 20401f1f371b..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/myvsyslog.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ - /* - * vsyslog() for sites without. In order to enable this code, build with - * -Dvsyslog=myvsyslog. We use a different name so that no accidents will - * happen when vsyslog() exists. On systems with vsyslog(), syslog() is - * typically implemented in terms of vsyslog(). - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) myvsyslog.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:33"; -#endif - -#ifdef vsyslog - -#include <stdio.h> - -#include "tcpd.h" -#include "mystdarg.h" - -myvsyslog(severity, format, ap) -int severity; -char *format; -va_list ap; -{ - char fbuf[BUFSIZ]; - char obuf[3 * STRING_LENGTH]; - - vsprintf(obuf, percent_m(fbuf, format), ap); - syslog(severity, "%s", obuf); -} - -#endif diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/ncr.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/ncr.c deleted file mode 100644 index b903fb85a565..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/ncr.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,81 +0,0 @@ - /* - * This part for NCR UNIX with is from Andrew Maffei (arm@aqua.whoi.edu). It - * assumes TLI throughout. In order to look up endpoint address information - * we must talk to the "timod" streams module. For some reason "timod" wants - * to sit directly on top of the device driver. Therefore we pop off all - * streams modules except the driver, install the "timod" module so that we - * can figure out network addresses, and then restore the original state. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) ncr.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:34"; -#endif - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <sys/tiuser.h> -#include <stropts.h> -#include <sys/conf.h> - -#include "tcpd.h" - -#define MAX_MODULE_COUNT 10 /* XXX */ - -/* fromhost - tear down the streams stack then rebuild it */ - -void fromhost(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - int i; - int num_mod; - struct str_list str_list; - struct str_mlist mod_buffer[MAX_MODULE_COUNT]; - int fd = request->fd; - - str_list.sl_nmods = MAX_MODULE_COUNT; - str_list.sl_modlist = &mod_buffer[0]; - - /* - * On systems with WIN streams support we have to be careful about what - * is on the stream we are passed. This code POPs off all modules above - * the pseudo driver, pushes timod, gets the host address information, - * pops timod and then pushes all modules back on the stream. - * - * Some state may be lost in this process. /usr/etc/tlid seems to do special - * things to the stream depending on the TCP port being serviced. (not a - * very nice thing to do!). It is unclear what to do if this code breaks - * - the stream may be left in an unknown condition. - */ - if ((num_mod = ioctl(fd, I_LIST, NULL)) < 0) - tcpd_warn("fromhost: LIST failed: %m"); - if (ioctl(fd, I_LIST, &str_list) < 0) - tcpd_warn("fromhost: LIST failed: %m"); - - /* - * POP stream modules except for the driver. - */ - for (i = 0; i < num_mod - 1; i++) - if (ioctl(fd, I_POP, 0) < 0) - tcpd_warn("fromhost: POP %s: %m", mod_buffer[i].l_name); - - /* - * PUSH timod so that host address ioctls can be executed. - */ - if (ioctl(fd, I_PUSH, "timod") < 0) - tcpd_warn("fromhost: PUSH timod: %m"); - tli_host(request); - - /* - * POP timod, we're done with it now. - */ - if (ioctl(fd, I_POP, 0) < 0) - tcpd_warn("fromhost: POP timod: %m"); - - /* - * Restore stream modules. - */ - for (i = num_mod - 2; i >= 0; i--) - if (ioctl(fd, I_PUSH, mod_buffer[i].l_name) < 0) - tcpd_warn("fromhost: PUSH %s: %m", mod_buffer[i].l_name); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/options.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/options.c deleted file mode 100644 index 4fc6c9468732..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/options.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,621 +0,0 @@ - /* - * General skeleton for adding options to the access control language. The - * features offered by this module are documented in the hosts_options(5) - * manual page (source file: hosts_options.5, "nroff -man" format). - * - * Notes and warnings for those who want to add features: - * - * In case of errors, abort options processing and deny access. There are too - * many irreversible side effects to make error recovery feasible. For - * example, it makes no sense to continue after we have already changed the - * userid. - * - * In case of errors, do not terminate the process: the routines might be - * called from a long-running daemon that should run forever. Instead, call - * tcpd_jump() which does a non-local goto back into the hosts_access() - * routine. - * - * In case of severe errors, use clean_exit() instead of directly calling - * exit(), or the inetd may loop on an UDP request. - * - * In verification mode (for example, with the "tcpdmatch" command) the - * "dry_run" flag is set. In this mode, an option function should just "say" - * what it is going to do instead of really doing it. - * - * Some option functions do not return (for example, the twist option passes - * control to another program). In verification mode (dry_run flag is set) - * such options should clear the "dry_run" flag to inform the caller of this - * course of action. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) options.c 1.17 96/02/11 17:01:31"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <netdb.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <pwd.h> -#include <grp.h> -#include <ctype.h> -#include <setjmp.h> -#include <string.h> - -#ifndef MAXPATHNAMELEN -#define MAXPATHNAMELEN BUFSIZ -#endif - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* Options runtime support. */ - -int dry_run = 0; /* flag set in verification mode */ -extern jmp_buf tcpd_buf; /* tcpd_jump() support */ - -/* Options parser support. */ - -static char whitespace_eq[] = "= \t\r\n"; -#define whitespace (whitespace_eq + 1) - -static char *get_field(); /* chew :-delimited field off string */ -static char *chop_string(); /* strip leading and trailing blanks */ - -/* List of functions that implement the options. Add yours here. */ - -static void user_option(); /* execute "user name.group" option */ -static void group_option(); /* execute "group name" option */ -static void umask_option(); /* execute "umask mask" option */ -static void linger_option(); /* execute "linger time" option */ -static void keepalive_option(); /* execute "keepalive" option */ -static void spawn_option(); /* execute "spawn command" option */ -static void twist_option(); /* execute "twist command" option */ -static void rfc931_option(); /* execute "rfc931" option */ -static void setenv_option(); /* execute "setenv name value" */ -static void nice_option(); /* execute "nice" option */ -static void severity_option(); /* execute "severity value" */ -static void allow_option(); /* execute "allow" option */ -static void deny_option(); /* execute "deny" option */ -static void banners_option(); /* execute "banners path" option */ - -/* Structure of the options table. */ - -struct option { - char *name; /* keyword name, case is ignored */ - void (*func) (); /* function that does the real work */ - int flags; /* see below... */ -}; - -#define NEED_ARG (1<<1) /* option requires argument */ -#define USE_LAST (1<<2) /* option must be last */ -#define OPT_ARG (1<<3) /* option has optional argument */ -#define EXPAND_ARG (1<<4) /* do %x expansion on argument */ - -#define need_arg(o) ((o)->flags & NEED_ARG) -#define opt_arg(o) ((o)->flags & OPT_ARG) -#define permit_arg(o) ((o)->flags & (NEED_ARG | OPT_ARG)) -#define use_last(o) ((o)->flags & USE_LAST) -#define expand_arg(o) ((o)->flags & EXPAND_ARG) - -/* List of known keywords. Add yours here. */ - -static struct option option_table[] = { - "user", user_option, NEED_ARG, - "group", group_option, NEED_ARG, - "umask", umask_option, NEED_ARG, - "linger", linger_option, NEED_ARG, - "keepalive", keepalive_option, 0, - "spawn", spawn_option, NEED_ARG | EXPAND_ARG, - "twist", twist_option, NEED_ARG | EXPAND_ARG | USE_LAST, - "rfc931", rfc931_option, OPT_ARG, - "setenv", setenv_option, NEED_ARG | EXPAND_ARG, - "nice", nice_option, OPT_ARG, - "severity", severity_option, NEED_ARG, - "allow", allow_option, USE_LAST, - "deny", deny_option, USE_LAST, - "banners", banners_option, NEED_ARG, - 0, -}; - -/* process_options - process access control options */ - -void process_options(options, request) -char *options; -struct request_info *request; -{ - char *key; - char *value; - char *curr_opt; - char *next_opt; - struct option *op; - char bf[BUFSIZ]; - - for (curr_opt = get_field(options); curr_opt; curr_opt = next_opt) { - next_opt = get_field((char *) 0); - - /* - * Separate the option into name and value parts. For backwards - * compatibility we ignore exactly one '=' between name and value. - */ - curr_opt = chop_string(curr_opt); - if (*(value = curr_opt + strcspn(curr_opt, whitespace_eq))) { - if (*value != '=') { - *value++ = 0; - value += strspn(value, whitespace); - } - if (*value == '=') { - *value++ = 0; - value += strspn(value, whitespace); - } - } - if (*value == 0) - value = 0; - key = curr_opt; - - /* - * Disallow missing option names (and empty option fields). - */ - if (*key == 0) - tcpd_jump("missing option name"); - - /* - * Lookup the option-specific info and do some common error checks. - * Delegate option-specific processing to the specific functions. - */ - - for (op = option_table; op->name && STR_NE(op->name, key); op++) - /* VOID */ ; - if (op->name == 0) - tcpd_jump("bad option name: \"%s\"", key); - if (!value && need_arg(op)) - tcpd_jump("option \"%s\" requires value", key); - if (value && !permit_arg(op)) - tcpd_jump("option \"%s\" requires no value", key); - if (next_opt && use_last(op)) - tcpd_jump("option \"%s\" must be at end", key); - if (value && expand_arg(op)) - value = chop_string(percent_x(bf, sizeof(bf), value, request)); - if (hosts_access_verbose) - syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "option: %s %s", key, value ? value : ""); - (*(op->func)) (value, request); - } -} - -/* allow_option - grant access */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void allow_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - longjmp(tcpd_buf, AC_PERMIT); -} - -/* deny_option - deny access */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void deny_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - longjmp(tcpd_buf, AC_DENY); -} - -/* banners_option - expand %<char>, terminate each line with CRLF */ - -static void banners_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - char path[MAXPATHNAMELEN]; - char ibuf[BUFSIZ]; - char obuf[2 * BUFSIZ]; - struct stat st; - int ch; - FILE *fp; - - sprintf(path, "%s/%s", value, eval_daemon(request)); - if ((fp = fopen(path, "r")) != 0) { - while ((ch = fgetc(fp)) == 0) - write(request->fd, "", 1); - ungetc(ch, fp); - while (fgets(ibuf, sizeof(ibuf) - 1, fp)) { - if (split_at(ibuf, '\n')) - strcat(ibuf, "\r\n"); - percent_x(obuf, sizeof(obuf), ibuf, request); - write(request->fd, obuf, strlen(obuf)); - } - fclose(fp); - } else if (stat(value, &st) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("%s: %m", value); - } -} - -/* group_option - switch group id */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void group_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - struct group *grp; - struct group *getgrnam(); - - if ((grp = getgrnam(value)) == 0) - tcpd_jump("unknown group: \"%s\"", value); - endgrent(); - - if (dry_run == 0 && setgid(grp->gr_gid)) - tcpd_jump("setgid(%s): %m", value); -} - -/* user_option - switch user id */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void user_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - struct passwd *pwd; - struct passwd *getpwnam(); - char *group; - - if ((group = split_at(value, '.')) != 0) - group_option(group, request); - if ((pwd = getpwnam(value)) == 0) - tcpd_jump("unknown user: \"%s\"", value); - endpwent(); - - if (dry_run == 0 && setuid(pwd->pw_uid)) - tcpd_jump("setuid(%s): %m", value); -} - -/* umask_option - set file creation mask */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void umask_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - unsigned mask; - char junk; - - if (sscanf(value, "%o%c", &mask, &junk) != 1 || (mask & 0777) != mask) - tcpd_jump("bad umask value: \"%s\"", value); - (void) umask(mask); -} - -/* spawn_option - spawn a shell command and wait */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void spawn_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - if (dry_run == 0) - shell_cmd(value); -} - -/* linger_option - set the socket linger time (Marc Boucher <marc@cam.org>) */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void linger_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - struct linger linger; - char junk; - - if (sscanf(value, "%d%c", &linger.l_linger, &junk) != 1 - || linger.l_linger < 0) - tcpd_jump("bad linger value: \"%s\"", value); - if (dry_run == 0) { - linger.l_onoff = (linger.l_linger != 0); - if (setsockopt(request->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, (char *) &linger, - sizeof(linger)) < 0) - tcpd_warn("setsockopt SO_LINGER %d: %m", linger.l_linger); - } -} - -/* keepalive_option - set the socket keepalive option */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void keepalive_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - static int on = 1; - - if (dry_run == 0 && setsockopt(request->fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, - (char *) &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) - tcpd_warn("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %m"); -} - -/* nice_option - set nice value */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void nice_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - int niceval = 10; - char junk; - - if (value != 0 && sscanf(value, "%d%c", &niceval, &junk) != 1) - tcpd_jump("bad nice value: \"%s\"", value); - if (dry_run == 0 && nice(niceval) < 0) - tcpd_warn("nice(%d): %m", niceval); -} - -/* twist_option - replace process by shell command */ - -static void twist_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - char *error; - - if (dry_run != 0) { - dry_run = 0; - } else { - if (resident > 0) - tcpd_jump("twist option in resident process"); - - syslog(deny_severity, "twist %s to %s", eval_client(request), value); - - /* Before switching to the shell, set up stdin, stdout and stderr. */ - -#define maybe_dup2(from, to) ((from == to) ? to : (close(to), dup(from))) - - if (maybe_dup2(request->fd, 0) != 0 || - maybe_dup2(request->fd, 1) != 1 || - maybe_dup2(request->fd, 2) != 2) { - error = "twist_option: dup: %m"; - } else { - if (request->fd > 2) - close(request->fd); - (void) execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", value, (char *) 0); - error = "twist_option: /bin/sh: %m"; - } - - /* Something went wrong: we MUST terminate the process. */ - - tcpd_warn(error); - clean_exit(request); - } -} - -/* rfc931_option - look up remote user name */ - -static void rfc931_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - int timeout; - char junk; - - if (value != 0) { - if (sscanf(value, "%d%c", &timeout, &junk) != 1 || timeout <= 0) - tcpd_jump("bad rfc931 timeout: \"%s\"", value); - rfc931_timeout = timeout; - } - (void) eval_user(request); -} - -/* setenv_option - set environment variable */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void setenv_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - char *var_value; - - if (*(var_value = value + strcspn(value, whitespace))) - *var_value++ = 0; - if (setenv(chop_string(value), chop_string(var_value), 1)) - tcpd_jump("memory allocation failure"); -} - - /* - * The severity option goes last because it comes with a huge amount of ugly - * #ifdefs and tables. - */ - -struct syslog_names { - char *name; - int value; -}; - -static struct syslog_names log_fac[] = { -#ifdef LOG_KERN - "kern", LOG_KERN, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_USER - "user", LOG_USER, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_MAIL - "mail", LOG_MAIL, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_DAEMON - "daemon", LOG_DAEMON, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_AUTH - "auth", LOG_AUTH, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_LPR - "lpr", LOG_LPR, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_NEWS - "news", LOG_NEWS, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_UUCP - "uucp", LOG_UUCP, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_CRON - "cron", LOG_CRON, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_LOCAL0 - "local0", LOG_LOCAL0, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_LOCAL1 - "local1", LOG_LOCAL1, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_LOCAL2 - "local2", LOG_LOCAL2, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_LOCAL3 - "local3", LOG_LOCAL3, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_LOCAL4 - "local4", LOG_LOCAL4, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_LOCAL5 - "local5", LOG_LOCAL5, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_LOCAL6 - "local6", LOG_LOCAL6, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_LOCAL7 - "local7", LOG_LOCAL7, -#endif - 0, -}; - -static struct syslog_names log_sev[] = { -#ifdef LOG_EMERG - "emerg", LOG_EMERG, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_ALERT - "alert", LOG_ALERT, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_CRIT - "crit", LOG_CRIT, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_ERR - "err", LOG_ERR, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_WARNING - "warning", LOG_WARNING, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_NOTICE - "notice", LOG_NOTICE, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_INFO - "info", LOG_INFO, -#endif -#ifdef LOG_DEBUG - "debug", LOG_DEBUG, -#endif - 0, -}; - -/* severity_map - lookup facility or severity value */ - -static int severity_map(table, name) -struct syslog_names *table; -char *name; -{ - struct syslog_names *t; - - for (t = table; t->name; t++) - if (STR_EQ(t->name, name)) - return (t->value); - tcpd_jump("bad syslog facility or severity: \"%s\"", name); - /* NOTREACHED */ -} - -/* severity_option - change logging severity for this event (Dave Mitchell) */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -static void severity_option(value, request) -char *value; -struct request_info *request; -{ - char *level = split_at(value, '.'); - - allow_severity = deny_severity = level ? - severity_map(log_fac, value) | severity_map(log_sev, level) : - severity_map(log_sev, value); -} - -/* get_field - return pointer to next field in string */ - -static char *get_field(string) -char *string; -{ - static char *last = ""; - char *src; - char *dst; - char *ret; - int ch; - - /* - * This function returns pointers to successive fields within a given - * string. ":" is the field separator; warn if the rule ends in one. It - * replaces a "\:" sequence by ":", without treating the result of - * substitution as field terminator. A null argument means resume search - * where the previous call terminated. This function destroys its - * argument. - * - * Work from explicit source or from memory. While processing \: we - * overwrite the input. This way we do not have to maintain buffers for - * copies of input fields. - */ - - src = dst = ret = (string ? string : last); - if (src[0] == 0) - return (0); - - while (ch = *src) { - if (ch == ':') { - if (*++src == 0) - tcpd_warn("rule ends in \":\""); - break; - } - if (ch == '\\' && src[1] == ':') - src++; - *dst++ = *src++; - } - last = src; - *dst = 0; - return (ret); -} - -/* chop_string - strip leading and trailing blanks from string */ - -static char *chop_string(string) -register char *string; -{ - char *start = 0; - char *end; - char *cp; - - for (cp = string; *cp; cp++) { - if (!isspace(*cp)) { - if (start == 0) - start = cp; - end = cp; - } - } - return (start ? (end[1] = 0, start) : cp); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/patchlevel.h b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/patchlevel.h deleted file mode 100644 index c523265e384e..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/patchlevel.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -#ifndef lint -static char patchlevel[] = "@(#) patchlevel 7.6 97/03/21 19:27:23"; -#endif diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/percent_m.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/percent_m.c deleted file mode 100644 index bb11b22dd81f..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/percent_m.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Replace %m by system error message. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) percent_m.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:37"; -#endif - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern int errno; -#ifndef SYS_ERRLIST_DEFINED -extern char *sys_errlist[]; -extern int sys_nerr; -#endif - -#include "mystdarg.h" - -char *percent_m(obuf, ibuf) -char *obuf; -char *ibuf; -{ - char *bp = obuf; - char *cp = ibuf; - - while (*bp = *cp) - if (*cp == '%' && cp[1] == 'm') { - if (errno < sys_nerr && errno > 0) { - strcpy(bp, sys_errlist[errno]); - } else { - sprintf(bp, "Unknown error %d", errno); - } - bp += strlen(bp); - cp += 2; - } else { - bp++, cp++; - } - return (obuf); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/percent_x.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/percent_x.c deleted file mode 100644 index c95a1ea4141e..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/percent_x.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,86 +0,0 @@ - /* - * percent_x() takes a string and performs %<char> expansions. It aborts the - * program when the expansion would overflow the output buffer. The result - * of %<char> expansion may be passed on to a shell process. For this - * reason, characters with a special meaning to shells are replaced by - * underscores. - * - * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) percent_x.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:37"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern void exit(); - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* percent_x - do %<char> expansion, abort if result buffer is too small */ - -char *percent_x(result, result_len, string, request) -char *result; -int result_len; -char *string; -struct request_info *request; -{ - char *bp = result; - char *end = result + result_len - 1; /* end of result buffer */ - char *expansion; - int expansion_len; - static char ok_chars[] = "1234567890!@%-_=+:,./\ -abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz\ -ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"; - char *str = string; - char *cp; - int ch; - - /* - * Warning: we may be called from a child process or after pattern - * matching, so we cannot use clean_exit() or tcpd_jump(). - */ - - while (*str) { - if (*str == '%' && (ch = str[1]) != 0) { - str += 2; - expansion = - ch == 'a' ? eval_hostaddr(request->client) : - ch == 'A' ? eval_hostaddr(request->server) : - ch == 'c' ? eval_client(request) : - ch == 'd' ? eval_daemon(request) : - ch == 'h' ? eval_hostinfo(request->client) : - ch == 'H' ? eval_hostinfo(request->server) : - ch == 'n' ? eval_hostname(request->client) : - ch == 'N' ? eval_hostname(request->server) : - ch == 'p' ? eval_pid(request) : - ch == 's' ? eval_server(request) : - ch == 'u' ? eval_user(request) : - ch == '%' ? "%" : (tcpd_warn("unrecognized %%%c", ch), ""); - for (cp = expansion; *(cp += strspn(cp, ok_chars)); /* */ ) - *cp = '_'; - expansion_len = cp - expansion; - } else { - expansion = str++; - expansion_len = 1; - } - if (bp + expansion_len >= end) { - tcpd_warn("percent_x: expansion too long: %.30s...", result); - sleep(5); - exit(0); - } - memcpy(bp, expansion, expansion_len); - bp += expansion_len; - } - *bp = 0; - return (result); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/printf.ck b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/printf.ck deleted file mode 100644 index d53412b7371b..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/printf.ck +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ -syslog 1 0 -tcpd_warn 0 0 -tcpd_jump 0 0 diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/ptx.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/ptx.c deleted file mode 100644 index b9c312b82cdc..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/ptx.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,103 +0,0 @@ - /* - * The Dynix/PTX TLI implementation is not quite compatible with System V - * Release 4. Some important functions are not present so we are limited to - * IP-based services. - * - * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) ptx.c 1.3 94/12/28 17:42:38"; -#endif - -#ifdef PTX - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/tiuser.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <stropts.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <netdb.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* Forward declarations. */ - -static void ptx_sink(); - -/* tli_host - determine TLI endpoint info, PTX version */ - -void tli_host(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - static struct sockaddr_in client; - static struct sockaddr_in server; - - /* - * getpeerinaddr() was suggested by someone at Sequent. It seems to work - * with connection-oriented (TCP) services such as rlogind and telnetd, - * but it returns 0.0.0.0 with datagram (UDP) services. No problem: UDP - * needs special treatment anyway, in case we must refuse service. - */ - - if (getpeerinaddr(request->fd, &client, sizeof(client)) == 0 - && client.sin_addr.s_addr != 0) { - request->client->sin = &client; - if (getmyinaddr(request->fd, &server, sizeof(server)) == 0) { - request->server->sin = &server; - } else { - tcpd_warn("warning: getmyinaddr: %m"); - } - sock_methods(request); - - } else { - - /* - * Another suggestion was to temporarily switch to the socket - * interface, identify the endpoint addresses with socket calls, then - * to switch back to TLI. This seems to works OK with UDP services, - * which is exactly what we should be looking at right now. - */ - -#define SWAP_MODULE(f, old, new) (ioctl(f, I_POP, old), ioctl(f, I_PUSH, new)) - - if (SWAP_MODULE(request->fd, "timod", "sockmod") != 0) - tcpd_warn("replace timod by sockmod: %m"); - sock_host(request); - if (SWAP_MODULE(request->fd, "sockmod", "timod") != 0) - tcpd_warn("replace sockmod by timod: %m"); - if (request->sink != 0) - request->sink = ptx_sink; - } -} - -/* ptx_sink - absorb unreceived IP datagram */ - -static void ptx_sink(fd) -int fd; -{ - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - struct sockaddr sa; - int size = sizeof(sa); - - /* - * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Where needed, switch to the - * socket programming interface. - */ - - if (ioctl(fd, I_FIND, "timod") != 0) - ioctl(fd, I_POP, "timod"); - if (ioctl(fd, I_FIND, "sockmod") == 0) - ioctl(fd, I_PUSH, "sockmod"); - (void) recvfrom(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0, &sa, &size); -} - -#endif /* PTX */ diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/refuse.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/refuse.c deleted file mode 100644 index ccf80300529e..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/refuse.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ - /* - * refuse() reports a refused connection, and takes the consequences: in - * case of a datagram-oriented service, the unread datagram is taken from - * the input queue (or inetd would see the same datagram again and again); - * the program is terminated. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) refuse.c 1.5 94/12/28 17:42:39"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* refuse - refuse request */ - -void refuse(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - syslog(deny_severity, "refused connect from %s", eval_client(request)); - clean_exit(request); - /* NOTREACHED */ -} - diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/rfc931.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/rfc931.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8176417b8fd6..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/rfc931.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,165 +0,0 @@ - /* - * rfc931() speaks a common subset of the RFC 931, AUTH, TAP, IDENT and RFC - * 1413 protocols. It queries an RFC 931 etc. compatible daemon on a remote - * host to look up the owner of a connection. The information should not be - * used for authentication purposes. This routine intercepts alarm signals. - * - * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) rfc931.c 1.10 95/01/02 16:11:34"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <setjmp.h> -#include <signal.h> -#include <string.h> - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -#define RFC931_PORT 113 /* Semi-well-known port */ -#define ANY_PORT 0 /* Any old port will do */ - -int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT;/* Global so it can be changed */ - -static jmp_buf timebuf; - -/* fsocket - open stdio stream on top of socket */ - -static FILE *fsocket(domain, type, protocol) -int domain; -int type; -int protocol; -{ - int s; - FILE *fp; - - if ((s = socket(domain, type, protocol)) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("socket: %m"); - return (0); - } else { - if ((fp = fdopen(s, "r+")) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("fdopen: %m"); - close(s); - } - return (fp); - } -} - -/* timeout - handle timeouts */ - -static void timeout(sig) -int sig; -{ - longjmp(timebuf, sig); -} - -/* rfc931 - return remote user name, given socket structures */ - -void rfc931(rmt_sin, our_sin, dest) -struct sockaddr_in *rmt_sin; -struct sockaddr_in *our_sin; -char *dest; -{ - unsigned rmt_port; - unsigned our_port; - struct sockaddr_in rmt_query_sin; - struct sockaddr_in our_query_sin; - char user[256]; /* XXX */ - char buffer[512]; /* XXX */ - char *cp; - char *result = unknown; - FILE *fp; - - /* - * Use one unbuffered stdio stream for writing to and for reading from - * the RFC931 etc. server. This is done because of a bug in the SunOS - * 4.1.x stdio library. The bug may live in other stdio implementations, - * too. When we use a single, buffered, bidirectional stdio stream ("r+" - * or "w+" mode) we read our own output. Such behaviour would make sense - * with resources that support random-access operations, but not with - * sockets. - */ - - if ((fp = fsocket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) != 0) { - setbuf(fp, (char *) 0); - - /* - * Set up a timer so we won't get stuck while waiting for the server. - */ - - if (setjmp(timebuf) == 0) { - signal(SIGALRM, timeout); - alarm(rfc931_timeout); - - /* - * Bind the local and remote ends of the query socket to the same - * IP addresses as the connection under investigation. We go - * through all this trouble because the local or remote system - * might have more than one network address. The RFC931 etc. - * client sends only port numbers; the server takes the IP - * addresses from the query socket. - */ - - our_query_sin = *our_sin; - our_query_sin.sin_port = htons(ANY_PORT); - rmt_query_sin = *rmt_sin; - rmt_query_sin.sin_port = htons(RFC931_PORT); - - if (bind(fileno(fp), (struct sockaddr *) & our_query_sin, - sizeof(our_query_sin)) >= 0 && - connect(fileno(fp), (struct sockaddr *) & rmt_query_sin, - sizeof(rmt_query_sin)) >= 0) { - - /* - * Send query to server. Neglect the risk that a 13-byte - * write would have to be fragmented by the local system and - * cause trouble with buggy System V stdio libraries. - */ - - fprintf(fp, "%u,%u\r\n", - ntohs(rmt_sin->sin_port), - ntohs(our_sin->sin_port)); - fflush(fp); - - /* - * Read response from server. Use fgets()/sscanf() so we can - * work around System V stdio libraries that incorrectly - * assume EOF when a read from a socket returns less than - * requested. - */ - - if (fgets(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fp) != 0 - && ferror(fp) == 0 && feof(fp) == 0 - && sscanf(buffer, "%u , %u : USERID :%*[^:]:%255s", - &rmt_port, &our_port, user) == 3 - && ntohs(rmt_sin->sin_port) == rmt_port - && ntohs(our_sin->sin_port) == our_port) { - - /* - * Strip trailing carriage return. It is part of the - * protocol, not part of the data. - */ - - if (cp = strchr(user, '\r')) - *cp = 0; - result = user; - } - } - alarm(0); - } - fclose(fp); - } - STRN_CPY(dest, result, STRING_LENGTH); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.c deleted file mode 100644 index 7b8f3cd638a8..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/safe_finger.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,196 +0,0 @@ - /* - * safe_finger - finger client wrapper that protects against nasty stuff - * from finger servers. Use this program for automatic reverse finger - * probes, not the raw finger command. - * - * Build with: cc -o safe_finger safe_finger.c - * - * The problem: some programs may react to stuff in the first column. Other - * programs may get upset by thrash anywhere on a line. File systems may - * fill up as the finger server keeps sending data. Text editors may bomb - * out on extremely long lines. The finger server may take forever because - * it is somehow wedged. The code below takes care of all this badness. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) safe_finger.c 1.4 94/12/28 17:42:41"; -#endif - -/* System libraries */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <signal.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <ctype.h> -#include <pwd.h> - -extern void exit(); - -/* Local stuff */ - -char path[] = "PATH=/bin:/usr/bin:/usr/ucb:/usr/bsd:/etc:/usr/etc:/usr/sbin"; - -#define TIME_LIMIT 60 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ -#define INPUT_LENGTH 100000 /* Do not keep listinging forever */ -#define LINE_LENGTH 128 /* Editors can choke on long lines */ -#define FINGER_PROGRAM "finger" /* Most, if not all, UNIX systems */ -#define UNPRIV_NAME "nobody" /* Preferred privilege level */ -#define UNPRIV_UGID 32767 /* Default uid and gid */ - -int finger_pid; - -void cleanup(sig) -int sig; -{ - kill(finger_pid, SIGKILL); - exit(0); -} - -main(argc, argv) -int argc; -char **argv; -{ - int c; - int line_length = 0; - int finger_status; - int wait_pid; - int input_count = 0; - struct passwd *pwd; - - /* - * First of all, let's don't run with superuser privileges. - */ - if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { - if ((pwd = getpwnam(UNPRIV_NAME)) && pwd->pw_uid > 0) { - setgid(pwd->pw_gid); - setuid(pwd->pw_uid); - } else { - setgid(UNPRIV_UGID); - setuid(UNPRIV_UGID); - } - } - - /* - * Redirect our standard input through the raw finger command. - */ - if (putenv(path)) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s: putenv: out of memory", argv[0]); - exit(1); - } - argv[0] = FINGER_PROGRAM; - finger_pid = pipe_stdin(argv); - - /* - * Don't wait forever (Peter Wemm <peter@gecko.DIALix.oz.au>). - */ - signal(SIGALRM, cleanup); - (void) alarm(TIME_LIMIT); - - /* - * Main filter loop. - */ - while ((c = getchar()) != EOF) { - if (input_count++ >= INPUT_LENGTH) { /* don't listen forever */ - fclose(stdin); - printf("\n\n Input truncated to %d bytes...\n", input_count - 1); - break; - } - if (c == '\n') { /* good: end of line */ - putchar(c); - line_length = 0; - } else { - if (line_length >= LINE_LENGTH) { /* force end of line */ - printf("\\\n"); - line_length = 0; - } - if (line_length == 0) { /* protect left margin */ - putchar(' '); - line_length++; - } - if (isascii(c) && (isprint(c) || isspace(c))) { /* text */ - if (c == '\\') { - putchar(c); - line_length++; - } - putchar(c); - line_length++; - } else { /* quote all other thash */ - printf("\\%03o", c & 0377); - line_length += 4; - } - } - } - - /* - * Wait until the finger child process has terminated and account for its - * exit status. Which will always be zero on most systems. - */ - while ((wait_pid = wait(&finger_status)) != -1 && wait_pid != finger_pid) - /* void */ ; - return (wait_pid != finger_pid || finger_status != 0); -} - -/* perror_exit - report system error text and terminate */ - -void perror_exit(text) -char *text; -{ - perror(text); - exit(1); -} - -/* pipe_stdin - pipe stdin through program (from my ANSI to OLD C converter) */ - -int pipe_stdin(argv) -char **argv; -{ - int pipefds[2]; - int pid; - int i; - struct stat st; - - /* - * The code that sets up the pipe requires that file descriptors 0,1,2 - * are already open. All kinds of mysterious things will happen if that - * is not the case. The following loops makes sure that descriptors 0,1,2 - * are set up properly. - */ - - for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { - if (fstat(i, &st) == -1 && open("/dev/null", 2) != i) - perror_exit("open /dev/null"); - } - - /* - * Set up the pipe that interposes the command into our standard input - * stream. - */ - - if (pipe(pipefds)) - perror_exit("pipe"); - - switch (pid = fork()) { - case -1: /* error */ - perror_exit("fork"); - /* NOTREACHED */ - case 0: /* child */ - (void) close(pipefds[0]); /* close reading end */ - (void) close(1); /* connect stdout to pipe */ - if (dup(pipefds[1]) != 1) - perror_exit("dup"); - (void) close(pipefds[1]); /* close redundant fd */ - (void) execvp(argv[0], argv); - perror_exit(argv[0]); - /* NOTREACHED */ - default: /* parent */ - (void) close(pipefds[1]); /* close writing end */ - (void) close(0); /* connect stdin to pipe */ - if (dup(pipefds[0]) != 0) - perror_exit("dup"); - (void) close(pipefds[0]); /* close redundant fd */ - return (pid); - } -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.c deleted file mode 100644 index afce15a64e4d..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,213 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Routines for testing only. Not really industrial strength. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccs_id[] = "@(#) scaffold.c 1.6 97/03/21 19:27:24"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <arpa/inet.h> -#include <netdb.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <setjmp.h> -#include <string.h> - -#ifndef INADDR_NONE -#define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ -#endif - -extern char *malloc(); - -/* Application-specific. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" -#include "scaffold.h" - - /* - * These are referenced by the options module and by rfc931.c. - */ -int allow_severity = SEVERITY; -int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; -int rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT; - -/* dup_hostent - create hostent in one memory block */ - -static struct hostent *dup_hostent(hp) -struct hostent *hp; -{ - struct hostent_block { - struct hostent host; - char *addr_list[1]; - }; - struct hostent_block *hb; - int count; - char *data; - char *addr; - - for (count = 0; hp->h_addr_list[count] != 0; count++) - /* void */ ; - - if ((hb = (struct hostent_block *) malloc(sizeof(struct hostent_block) - + (hp->h_length + sizeof(char *)) * count)) == 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "Sorry, out of memory\n"); - exit(1); - } - memset((char *) &hb->host, 0, sizeof(hb->host)); - hb->host.h_length = hp->h_length; - hb->host.h_addr_list = hb->addr_list; - hb->host.h_addr_list[count] = 0; - data = (char *) (hb->host.h_addr_list + count + 1); - - for (count = 0; (addr = hp->h_addr_list[count]) != 0; count++) { - hb->host.h_addr_list[count] = data + hp->h_length * count; - memcpy(hb->host.h_addr_list[count], addr, hp->h_length); - } - return (&hb->host); -} - -/* find_inet_addr - find all addresses for this host, result to free() */ - -struct hostent *find_inet_addr(host) -char *host; -{ - struct in_addr addr; - struct hostent *hp; - static struct hostent h; - static char *addr_list[2]; - - /* - * Host address: translate it to internal form. - */ - if ((addr.s_addr = dot_quad_addr(host)) != INADDR_NONE) { - h.h_addr_list = addr_list; - h.h_addr_list[0] = (char *) &addr; - h.h_length = sizeof(addr); - return (dup_hostent(&h)); - } - - /* - * Map host name to a series of addresses. Watch out for non-internet - * forms or aliases. The NOT_INADDR() is here in case gethostbyname() has - * been "enhanced" to accept numeric addresses. Make a copy of the - * address list so that later gethostbyXXX() calls will not clobber it. - */ - if (NOT_INADDR(host) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("%s: not an internet address", host); - return (0); - } - if ((hp = gethostbyname(host)) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("%s: host not found", host); - return (0); - } - if (hp->h_addrtype != AF_INET) { - tcpd_warn("%d: not an internet host", hp->h_addrtype); - return (0); - } - if (STR_NE(host, hp->h_name)) { - tcpd_warn("%s: hostname alias", host); - tcpd_warn("(official name: %.*s)", STRING_LENGTH, hp->h_name); - } - return (dup_hostent(hp)); -} - -/* check_dns - give each address thorough workout, return address count */ - -int check_dns(host) -char *host; -{ - struct request_info request; - struct sockaddr_in sin; - struct hostent *hp; - int count; - char *addr; - - if ((hp = find_inet_addr(host)) == 0) - return (0); - request_init(&request, RQ_CLIENT_SIN, &sin, 0); - sock_methods(&request); - memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin)); - sin.sin_family = AF_INET; - - for (count = 0; (addr = hp->h_addr_list[count]) != 0; count++) { - memcpy((char *) &sin.sin_addr, addr, sizeof(sin.sin_addr)); - - /* - * Force host name and address conversions. Use the request structure - * as a cache. Detect hostname lookup problems. Any name/name or - * name/address conflicts will be reported while eval_hostname() does - * its job. - */ - request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, "", RQ_CLIENT_NAME, "", 0); - if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), unknown)) - tcpd_warn("host address %s->name lookup failed", - eval_hostaddr(request.client)); - } - free((char *) hp); - return (count); -} - -/* dummy function to intercept the real shell_cmd() */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -void shell_cmd(command) -char *command; -{ - if (hosts_access_verbose) - printf("command: %s", command); -} - -/* dummy function to intercept the real clean_exit() */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -void clean_exit(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - exit(0); -} - -/* dummy function to intercept the real rfc931() */ - -/* ARGSUSED */ - -void rfc931(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - strcpy(request->user, unknown); -} - -/* check_path - examine accessibility */ - -int check_path(path, st) -char *path; -struct stat *st; -{ - struct stat stbuf; - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - - if (stat(path, st) < 0) - return (-1); -#ifdef notdef - if (st->st_uid != 0) - tcpd_warn("%s: not owned by root", path); - if (st->st_mode & 020) - tcpd_warn("%s: group writable", path); -#endif - if (st->st_mode & 002) - tcpd_warn("%s: world writable", path); - if (path[0] == '/' && path[1] != 0) { - strrchr(strcpy(buf, path), '/')[0] = 0; - (void) check_path(buf[0] ? buf : "/", &stbuf); - } - return (0); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.h b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.h deleted file mode 100644 index 2273f4730b3f..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/scaffold.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - /* - * @(#) scaffold.h 1.3 94/12/31 18:19:19 - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -extern struct hostent *find_inet_addr(); -extern int check_dns(); -extern int check_path(); diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/setenv.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/setenv.c deleted file mode 100644 index 03c706280c64..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/setenv.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,34 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Some systems do not have setenv(). This one is modeled after 4.4 BSD, but - * is implemented in terms of portable primitives only: getenv(), putenv() - * and malloc(). It should therefore be safe to use on every UNIX system. - * - * If clobber == 0, do not overwrite an existing variable. - * - * Returns nonzero if memory allocation fails. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) setenv.c 1.1 93/03/07 22:47:58"; -#endif - -/* setenv - update or insert environment (name,value) pair */ - -int setenv(name, value, clobber) -char *name; -char *value; -int clobber; -{ - char *malloc(); - char *getenv(); - char *cp; - - if (clobber == 0 && getenv(name) != 0) - return (0); - if ((cp = malloc(strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2)) == 0) - return (1); - sprintf(cp, "%s=%s", name, value); - return (putenv(cp)); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/shell_cmd.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/shell_cmd.c deleted file mode 100644 index 62d31bc5240d..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/shell_cmd.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,92 +0,0 @@ - /* - * shell_cmd() takes a shell command after %<character> substitutions. The - * command is executed by a /bin/sh child process, with standard input, - * standard output and standard error connected to /dev/null. - * - * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) shell_cmd.c 1.5 94/12/28 17:42:44"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <signal.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern void exit(); - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* Forward declarations. */ - -static void do_child(); - -/* shell_cmd - execute shell command */ - -void shell_cmd(command) -char *command; -{ - int child_pid; - int wait_pid; - - /* - * Most of the work is done within the child process, to minimize the - * risk of damage to the parent. - */ - - switch (child_pid = fork()) { - case -1: /* error */ - tcpd_warn("cannot fork: %m"); - break; - case 00: /* child */ - do_child(command); - /* NOTREACHED */ - default: /* parent */ - while ((wait_pid = wait((int *) 0)) != -1 && wait_pid != child_pid) - /* void */ ; - } -} - -/* do_child - exec command with { stdin, stdout, stderr } to /dev/null */ - -static void do_child(command) -char *command; -{ - char *error; - int tmp_fd; - - /* - * Systems with POSIX sessions may send a SIGHUP to grandchildren if the - * child exits first. This is sick, sessions were invented for terminals. - */ - - signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); - - /* Set up new stdin, stdout, stderr, and exec the shell command. */ - - for (tmp_fd = 0; tmp_fd < 3; tmp_fd++) - (void) close(tmp_fd); - if (open("/dev/null", 2) != 0) { - error = "open /dev/null: %m"; - } else if (dup(0) != 1 || dup(0) != 2) { - error = "dup: %m"; - } else { - (void) execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", command, (char *) 0); - error = "execl /bin/sh: %m"; - } - - /* Something went wrong. We MUST terminate the child process. */ - - tcpd_warn(error); - _exit(0); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/socket.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/socket.c deleted file mode 100644 index c659b166698f..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/socket.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,235 +0,0 @@ - /* - * This module determines the type of socket (datagram, stream), the client - * socket address and port, the server socket address and port. In addition, - * it provides methods to map a transport address to a printable host name - * or address. Socket address information results are in static memory. - * - * The result from the hostname lookup method is STRING_PARANOID when a host - * pretends to have someone elses name, or when a host name is available but - * could not be verified. - * - * When lookup or conversion fails the result is set to STRING_UNKNOWN. - * - * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) socket.c 1.15 97/03/21 19:27:24"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <netdb.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern char *inet_ntoa(); - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* Forward declarations. */ - -static void sock_sink(); - -#ifdef APPEND_DOT - - /* - * Speed up DNS lookups by terminating the host name with a dot. Should be - * done with care. The speedup can give problems with lookups from sources - * that lack DNS-style trailing dot magic, such as local files or NIS maps. - */ - -static struct hostent *gethostbyname_dot(name) -char *name; -{ - char dot_name[MAXHOSTNAMELEN + 1]; - - /* - * Don't append dots to unqualified names. Such names are likely to come - * from local hosts files or from NIS. - */ - - if (strchr(name, '.') == 0 || strlen(name) >= MAXHOSTNAMELEN - 1) { - return (gethostbyname(name)); - } else { - sprintf(dot_name, "%s.", name); - return (gethostbyname(dot_name)); - } -} - -#define gethostbyname gethostbyname_dot -#endif - -/* sock_host - look up endpoint addresses and install conversion methods */ - -void sock_host(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - static struct sockaddr_in client; - static struct sockaddr_in server; - int len; - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - int fd = request->fd; - - sock_methods(request); - - /* - * Look up the client host address. Hal R. Brand <BRAND@addvax.llnl.gov> - * suggested how to get the client host info in case of UDP connections: - * peek at the first message without actually looking at its contents. We - * really should verify that client.sin_family gets the value AF_INET, - * but this program has already caused too much grief on systems with - * broken library code. - */ - - len = sizeof(client); - if (getpeername(fd, (struct sockaddr *) & client, &len) < 0) { - request->sink = sock_sink; - len = sizeof(client); - if (recvfrom(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_PEEK, - (struct sockaddr *) & client, &len) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("can't get client address: %m"); - return; /* give up */ - } -#ifdef really_paranoid - memset(buf, 0 sizeof(buf)); -#endif - } - request->client->sin = &client; - - /* - * Determine the server binding. This is used for client username - * lookups, and for access control rules that trigger on the server - * address or name. - */ - - len = sizeof(server); - if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr *) & server, &len) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("getsockname: %m"); - return; - } - request->server->sin = &server; -} - -/* sock_hostaddr - map endpoint address to printable form */ - -void sock_hostaddr(host) -struct host_info *host; -{ - struct sockaddr_in *sin = host->sin; - - if (sin != 0) - STRN_CPY(host->addr, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), sizeof(host->addr)); -} - -/* sock_hostname - map endpoint address to host name */ - -void sock_hostname(host) -struct host_info *host; -{ - struct sockaddr_in *sin = host->sin; - struct hostent *hp; - int i; - - /* - * On some systems, for example Solaris 2.3, gethostbyaddr(0.0.0.0) does - * not fail. Instead it returns "INADDR_ANY". Unfortunately, this does - * not work the other way around: gethostbyname("INADDR_ANY") fails. We - * have to special-case 0.0.0.0, in order to avoid false alerts from the - * host name/address checking code below. - */ - if (sin != 0 && sin->sin_addr.s_addr != 0 - && (hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &(sin->sin_addr), - sizeof(sin->sin_addr), AF_INET)) != 0) { - - STRN_CPY(host->name, hp->h_name, sizeof(host->name)); - - /* - * Verify that the address is a member of the address list returned - * by gethostbyname(hostname). - * - * Verify also that gethostbyaddr() and gethostbyname() return the same - * hostname, or rshd and rlogind may still end up being spoofed. - * - * On some sites, gethostbyname("localhost") returns "localhost.domain". - * This is a DNS artefact. We treat it as a special case. When we - * can't believe the address list from gethostbyname("localhost") - * we're in big trouble anyway. - */ - - if ((hp = gethostbyname(host->name)) == 0) { - - /* - * Unable to verify that the host name matches the address. This - * may be a transient problem or a botched name server setup. - */ - - tcpd_warn("can't verify hostname: gethostbyname(%s) failed", - host->name); - - } else if (STR_NE(host->name, hp->h_name) - && STR_NE(host->name, "localhost")) { - - /* - * The gethostbyaddr() and gethostbyname() calls did not return - * the same hostname. This could be a nameserver configuration - * problem. It could also be that someone is trying to spoof us. - */ - - tcpd_warn("host name/name mismatch: %s != %.*s", - host->name, STRING_LENGTH, hp->h_name); - - } else { - - /* - * The address should be a member of the address list returned by - * gethostbyname(). We should first verify that the h_addrtype - * field is AF_INET, but this program has already caused too much - * grief on systems with broken library code. - */ - - for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) { - if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i], - (char *) &sin->sin_addr, - sizeof(sin->sin_addr)) == 0) - return; /* name is good, keep it */ - } - - /* - * The host name does not map to the initial address. Perhaps - * someone has messed up. Perhaps someone compromised a name - * server. - */ - - tcpd_warn("host name/address mismatch: %s != %.*s", - inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr), STRING_LENGTH, hp->h_name); - } - strcpy(host->name, paranoid); /* name is bad, clobber it */ - } -} - -/* sock_sink - absorb unreceived IP datagram */ - -static void sock_sink(fd) -int fd; -{ - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - struct sockaddr_in sin; - int size = sizeof(sin); - - /* - * Eat up the not-yet received datagram. Some systems insist on a - * non-zero source address argument in the recvfrom() call below. - */ - - (void) recvfrom(fd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, &size); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/strcasecmp.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/strcasecmp.c deleted file mode 100644 index a54e82816171..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/strcasecmp.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -/* - * Copyright (c) 1987 Regents of the University of California. - * All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted - * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are - * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation, - * advertising materials, and other materials related to such - * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed - * by the University of California, Berkeley. The name of the - * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived - * from this software without specific prior written permission. - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED - * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. - */ - -#if defined(LIBC_SCCS) && !defined(lint) -static char sccsid[] = "@(#)strcasecmp.c 5.6 (Berkeley) 6/27/88"; -#endif /* LIBC_SCCS and not lint */ - -/* Some environments don't define u_char -- WZV */ -#if 0 -#include <sys/types.h> -#else -typedef unsigned char u_char; -#endif - -/* - * This array is designed for mapping upper and lower case letter - * together for a case independent comparison. The mappings are - * based upon ascii character sequences. - */ -static u_char charmap[] = { - '\000', '\001', '\002', '\003', '\004', '\005', '\006', '\007', - '\010', '\011', '\012', '\013', '\014', '\015', '\016', '\017', - '\020', '\021', '\022', '\023', '\024', '\025', '\026', '\027', - '\030', '\031', '\032', '\033', '\034', '\035', '\036', '\037', - '\040', '\041', '\042', '\043', '\044', '\045', '\046', '\047', - '\050', '\051', '\052', '\053', '\054', '\055', '\056', '\057', - '\060', '\061', '\062', '\063', '\064', '\065', '\066', '\067', - '\070', '\071', '\072', '\073', '\074', '\075', '\076', '\077', - '\100', '\141', '\142', '\143', '\144', '\145', '\146', '\147', - '\150', '\151', '\152', '\153', '\154', '\155', '\156', '\157', - '\160', '\161', '\162', '\163', '\164', '\165', '\166', '\167', - '\170', '\171', '\172', '\133', '\134', '\135', '\136', '\137', - '\140', '\141', '\142', '\143', '\144', '\145', '\146', '\147', - '\150', '\151', '\152', '\153', '\154', '\155', '\156', '\157', - '\160', '\161', '\162', '\163', '\164', '\165', '\166', '\167', - '\170', '\171', '\172', '\173', '\174', '\175', '\176', '\177', - '\200', '\201', '\202', '\203', '\204', '\205', '\206', '\207', - '\210', '\211', '\212', '\213', '\214', '\215', '\216', '\217', - '\220', '\221', '\222', '\223', '\224', '\225', '\226', '\227', - '\230', '\231', '\232', '\233', '\234', '\235', '\236', '\237', - '\240', '\241', '\242', '\243', '\244', '\245', '\246', '\247', - '\250', '\251', '\252', '\253', '\254', '\255', '\256', '\257', - '\260', '\261', '\262', '\263', '\264', '\265', '\266', '\267', - '\270', '\271', '\272', '\273', '\274', '\275', '\276', '\277', - '\300', '\341', '\342', '\343', '\344', '\345', '\346', '\347', - '\350', '\351', '\352', '\353', '\354', '\355', '\356', '\357', - '\360', '\361', '\362', '\363', '\364', '\365', '\366', '\367', - '\370', '\371', '\372', '\333', '\334', '\335', '\336', '\337', - '\340', '\341', '\342', '\343', '\344', '\345', '\346', '\347', - '\350', '\351', '\352', '\353', '\354', '\355', '\356', '\357', - '\360', '\361', '\362', '\363', '\364', '\365', '\366', '\367', - '\370', '\371', '\372', '\373', '\374', '\375', '\376', '\377', -}; - -strcasecmp(s1, s2) - char *s1, *s2; -{ - register u_char *cm = charmap, - *us1 = (u_char *)s1, - *us2 = (u_char *)s2; - - while (cm[*us1] == cm[*us2++]) - if (*us1++ == '\0') - return(0); - return(cm[*us1] - cm[*--us2]); -} - -strncasecmp(s1, s2, n) - char *s1, *s2; - register int n; -{ - register u_char *cm = charmap, - *us1 = (u_char *)s1, - *us2 = (u_char *)s2; - - while (--n >= 0 && cm[*us1] == cm[*us2++]) - if (*us1++ == '\0') - return(0); - return(n < 0 ? 0 : cm[*us1] - cm[*--us2]); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.8 b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.8 deleted file mode 100644 index 351390714be1..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.8 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,178 +0,0 @@ -.TH TCPD 8 -.SH NAME -tcpd \- access control facility for internet services -.SH DESCRIPTION -.PP -The \fItcpd\fR program can be set up to monitor incoming requests for -\fItelnet\fR, \fIfinger\fR, \fIftp\fR, \fIexec\fR, \fIrsh\fR, -\fIrlogin\fR, \fItftp\fR, \fItalk\fR, \fIcomsat\fR and other services -that have a one-to-one mapping onto executable files. -.PP -The program supports both 4.3BSD-style sockets and System V.4-style -TLI. Functionality may be limited when the protocol underneath TLI is -not an internet protocol. -.PP -Operation is as follows: whenever a request for service arrives, the -\fIinetd\fP daemon is tricked into running the \fItcpd\fP program -instead of the desired server. \fItcpd\fP logs the request and does -some additional checks. When all is well, \fItcpd\fP runs the -appropriate server program and goes away. -.PP -Optional features are: pattern-based access control, client username -lookups with the RFC 931 etc. protocol, protection against hosts that -pretend to have someone elses host name, and protection against hosts -that pretend to have someone elses network address. -.SH LOGGING -Connections that are monitored by -.I tcpd -are reported through the \fIsyslog\fR(3) facility. Each record contains -a time stamp, the client host name and the name of the requested -service. The information can be useful to detect unwanted activities, -especially when logfile information from several hosts is merged. -.PP -In order to find out where your logs are going, examine the syslog -configuration file, usually /etc/syslog.conf. -.SH ACCESS CONTROL -Optionally, -.I tcpd -supports a simple form of access control that is based on pattern -matching. The access-control software provides hooks for the execution -of shell commands when a pattern fires. For details, see the -\fIhosts_access\fR(5) manual page. -.SH HOST NAME VERIFICATION -The authentication scheme of some protocols (\fIrlogin, rsh\fR) relies -on host names. Some implementations believe the host name that they get -from any random name server; other implementations are more careful but -use a flawed algorithm. -.PP -.I tcpd -verifies the client host name that is returned by the address->name DNS -server by looking at the host name and address that are returned by the -name->address DNS server. If any discrepancy is detected, -.I tcpd -concludes that it is dealing with a host that pretends to have someone -elses host name. -.PP -If the sources are compiled with -DPARANOID, -.I tcpd -will drop the connection in case of a host name/address mismatch. -Otherwise, the hostname can be matched with the \fIPARANOID\fR wildcard, -after which suitable action can be taken. -.SH HOST ADDRESS SPOOFING -Optionally, -.I tcpd -disables source-routing socket options on every connection that it -deals with. This will take care of most attacks from hosts that pretend -to have an address that belongs to someone elses network. UDP services -do not benefit from this protection. This feature must be turned on -at compile time. -.SH RFC 931 -When RFC 931 etc. lookups are enabled (compile-time option) \fItcpd\fR -will attempt to establish the name of the client user. This will -succeed only if the client host runs an RFC 931-compliant daemon. -Client user name lookups will not work for datagram-oriented -connections, and may cause noticeable delays in the case of connections -from PCs. -.SH EXAMPLES -The details of using \fItcpd\fR depend on pathname information that was -compiled into the program. -.SH EXAMPLE 1 -This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the original network -daemons will be moved to an "other" place. -.PP -In order to monitor access to the \fIfinger\fR service, move the -original finger daemon to the "other" place and install tcpd in the -place of the original finger daemon. No changes are required to -configuration files. -.nf -.sp -.in +5 -# mkdir /other/place -# mv /usr/etc/in.fingerd /other/place -# cp tcpd /usr/etc/in.fingerd -.fi -.PP -The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some -systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, or have -no `in.\' prefix to their name. -.SH EXAMPLE 2 -This example applies when \fItcpd\fR expects that the network daemons -are left in their original place. -.PP -In order to monitor access to the \fIfinger\fR service, perform the -following edits on the \fIinetd\fR configuration file (usually -\fI/etc/inetd.conf\fR or \fI/etc/inet/inetd.conf\fR): -.nf -.sp -.ti +5 -finger stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/etc/in.fingerd in.fingerd -.sp -becomes: -.sp -.ti +5 -finger stream tcp nowait nobody /some/where/tcpd in.fingerd -.sp -.fi -.PP -The example assumes that the network daemons live in /usr/etc. On some -systems, network daemons live in /usr/sbin or in /usr/libexec, the -daemons have no `in.\' prefix to their name, or there is no userid -field in the inetd configuration file. -.PP -Similar changes will be needed for the other services that are to be -covered by \fItcpd\fR. Send a `kill -HUP\' to the \fIinetd\fR(8) -process to make the changes effective. AIX users may also have to -execute the `inetimp\' command. -.SH EXAMPLE 3 -In the case of daemons that do not live in a common directory ("secret" -or otherwise), edit the \fIinetd\fR configuration file so that it -specifies an absolute path name for the process name field. For example: -.nf -.sp - ntalk dgram udp wait root /some/where/tcpd /usr/local/lib/ntalkd -.sp -.fi -.PP -Only the last component (ntalkd) of the pathname will be used for -access control and logging. -.SH BUGS -Some UDP (and RPC) daemons linger around for a while after they have -finished their work, in case another request comes in. In the inetd -configuration file these services are registered with the \fIwait\fR -option. Only the request that started such a daemon will be logged. -.PP -The program does not work with RPC services over TCP. These services -are registered as \fIrpc/tcp\fR in the inetd configuration file. The -only non-trivial service that is affected by this limitation is -\fIrexd\fR, which is used by the \fIon(1)\fR command. This is no great -loss. On most systems, \fIrexd\fR is less secure than a wildcard in -/etc/hosts.equiv. -.PP -RPC broadcast requests (for example: \fIrwall, rup, rusers\fR) always -appear to come from the responding host. What happens is that the -client broadcasts the request to all \fIportmap\fR daemons on its -network; each \fIportmap\fR daemon forwards the request to a local -daemon. As far as the \fIrwall\fR etc. daemons know, the request comes -from the local host. -.SH FILES -.PP -The default locations of the host access control tables are: -.PP -/etc/hosts.allow -.br -/etc/hosts.deny -.SH SEE ALSO -.na -.nf -hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables. -syslog.conf(5), format of the syslogd control file. -inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file. -.SH AUTHORS -.na -.nf -Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl), -Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, -Eindhoven University of Technology -Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, -5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands -\" @(#) tcpd.8 1.5 96/02/21 16:39:16 diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.c deleted file mode 100644 index d865b9cce8eb..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,129 +0,0 @@ - /* - * General front end for stream and datagram IP services. This program logs - * the remote host name and then invokes the real daemon. For example, - * install as /usr/etc/{tftpd,fingerd,telnetd,ftpd,rlogind,rshd,rexecd}, - * after saving the real daemons in the directory specified with the - * REAL_DAEMON_DIR macro. This arrangement requires that the network daemons - * are started by inetd or something similar. Connections and diagnostics - * are logged through syslog(3). - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) tcpd.c 1.10 96/02/11 17:01:32"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <string.h> - -#ifndef MAXPATHNAMELEN -#define MAXPATHNAMELEN BUFSIZ -#endif - -#ifndef STDIN_FILENO -#define STDIN_FILENO 0 -#endif - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "patchlevel.h" -#include "tcpd.h" - -int allow_severity = SEVERITY; /* run-time adjustable */ -int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; /* ditto */ - -main(argc, argv) -int argc; -char **argv; -{ - struct request_info request; - char path[MAXPATHNAMELEN]; - - /* Attempt to prevent the creation of world-writable files. */ - -#ifdef DAEMON_UMASK - umask(DAEMON_UMASK); -#endif - - /* - * If argv[0] is an absolute path name, ignore REAL_DAEMON_DIR, and strip - * argv[0] to its basename. - */ - - if (argv[0][0] == '/') { - strcpy(path, argv[0]); - argv[0] = strrchr(argv[0], '/') + 1; - } else { - sprintf(path, "%s/%s", REAL_DAEMON_DIR, argv[0]); - } - - /* - * Open a channel to the syslog daemon. Older versions of openlog() - * require only two arguments. - */ - -#ifdef LOG_MAIL - (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID, FACILITY); -#else - (void) openlog(argv[0], LOG_PID); -#endif - - /* - * Find out the endpoint addresses of this conversation. Host name - * lookups and double checks will be done on demand. - */ - - request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, argv[0], RQ_FILE, STDIN_FILENO, 0); - fromhost(&request); - - /* - * Optionally look up and double check the remote host name. Sites - * concerned with security may choose to refuse connections from hosts - * that pretend to have someone elses host name. - */ - -#ifdef PARANOID - if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), paranoid)) - refuse(&request); -#endif - - /* - * The BSD rlogin and rsh daemons that came out after 4.3 BSD disallow - * socket options at the IP level. They do so for a good reason. - * Unfortunately, we cannot use this with SunOS 4.1.x because the - * getsockopt() system call can panic the system. - */ - -#ifdef KILL_IP_OPTIONS - fix_options(&request); -#endif - - /* - * Check whether this host can access the service in argv[0]. The - * access-control code invokes optional shell commands as specified in - * the access-control tables. - */ - -#ifdef HOSTS_ACCESS - if (!hosts_access(&request)) - refuse(&request); -#endif - - /* Report request and invoke the real daemon program. */ - - syslog(allow_severity, "connect from %s", eval_client(&request)); - closelog(); - (void) execv(path, argv); - syslog(LOG_ERR, "error: cannot execute %s: %m", path); - clean_exit(&request); - /* NOTREACHED */ -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.h b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.h deleted file mode 100644 index 3eecc9115997..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpd.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,219 +0,0 @@ - /* - * @(#) tcpd.h 1.5 96/03/19 16:22:24 - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -/* Structure to describe one communications endpoint. */ - -#define STRING_LENGTH 128 /* hosts, users, processes */ - -struct host_info { - char name[STRING_LENGTH]; /* access via eval_hostname(host) */ - char addr[STRING_LENGTH]; /* access via eval_hostaddr(host) */ - struct sockaddr_in *sin; /* socket address or 0 */ - struct t_unitdata *unit; /* TLI transport address or 0 */ - struct request_info *request; /* for shared information */ -}; - -/* Structure to describe what we know about a service request. */ - -struct request_info { - int fd; /* socket handle */ - char user[STRING_LENGTH]; /* access via eval_user(request) */ - char daemon[STRING_LENGTH]; /* access via eval_daemon(request) */ - char pid[10]; /* access via eval_pid(request) */ - struct host_info client[1]; /* client endpoint info */ - struct host_info server[1]; /* server endpoint info */ - void (*sink) (); /* datagram sink function or 0 */ - void (*hostname) (); /* address to printable hostname */ - void (*hostaddr) (); /* address to printable address */ - void (*cleanup) (); /* cleanup function or 0 */ - struct netconfig *config; /* netdir handle */ -}; - -/* Common string operations. Less clutter should be more readable. */ - -#define STRN_CPY(d,s,l) { strncpy((d),(s),(l)); (d)[(l)-1] = 0; } - -#define STRN_EQ(x,y,l) (strncasecmp((x),(y),(l)) == 0) -#define STRN_NE(x,y,l) (strncasecmp((x),(y),(l)) != 0) -#define STR_EQ(x,y) (strcasecmp((x),(y)) == 0) -#define STR_NE(x,y) (strcasecmp((x),(y)) != 0) - - /* - * Initially, all above strings have the empty value. Information that - * cannot be determined at runtime is set to "unknown", so that we can - * distinguish between `unavailable' and `not yet looked up'. A hostname - * that we do not believe in is set to "paranoid". - */ - -#define STRING_UNKNOWN "unknown" /* lookup failed */ -#define STRING_PARANOID "paranoid" /* hostname conflict */ - -extern char unknown[]; -extern char paranoid[]; - -#define HOSTNAME_KNOWN(s) (STR_NE((s),unknown) && STR_NE((s),paranoid)) - -#define NOT_INADDR(s) (s[strspn(s,"01234567890./")] != 0) - -/* Global functions. */ - -#if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) -extern void fromhost(); /* get/validate client host info */ -#else -#define fromhost sock_host /* no TLI support needed */ -#endif - -extern int hosts_access(); /* access control */ -extern void shell_cmd(); /* execute shell command */ -extern char *percent_x(); /* do %<char> expansion */ -extern void rfc931(); /* client name from RFC 931 daemon */ -extern void clean_exit(); /* clean up and exit */ -extern void refuse(); /* clean up and exit */ -extern char *xgets(); /* fgets() on steroids */ -extern char *split_at(); /* strchr() and split */ -extern unsigned long dot_quad_addr(); /* restricted inet_addr() */ - -/* Global variables. */ - -extern int allow_severity; /* for connection logging */ -extern int deny_severity; /* for connection logging */ -extern char *hosts_allow_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ -extern char *hosts_deny_table; /* for verification mode redirection */ -extern int hosts_access_verbose; /* for verbose matching mode */ -extern int rfc931_timeout; /* user lookup timeout */ -extern int resident; /* > 0 if resident process */ - - /* - * Routines for controlled initialization and update of request structure - * attributes. Each attribute has its own key. - */ - -#ifdef __STDC__ -extern struct request_info *request_init(struct request_info *,...); -extern struct request_info *request_set(struct request_info *,...); -#else -extern struct request_info *request_init(); /* initialize request */ -extern struct request_info *request_set(); /* update request structure */ -#endif - -#define RQ_FILE 1 /* file descriptor */ -#define RQ_DAEMON 2 /* server process (argv[0]) */ -#define RQ_USER 3 /* client user name */ -#define RQ_CLIENT_NAME 4 /* client host name */ -#define RQ_CLIENT_ADDR 5 /* client host address */ -#define RQ_CLIENT_SIN 6 /* client endpoint (internal) */ -#define RQ_SERVER_NAME 7 /* server host name */ -#define RQ_SERVER_ADDR 8 /* server host address */ -#define RQ_SERVER_SIN 9 /* server endpoint (internal) */ - - /* - * Routines for delayed evaluation of request attributes. Each attribute - * type has its own access method. The trivial ones are implemented by - * macros. The other ones are wrappers around the transport-specific host - * name, address, and client user lookup methods. The request_info and - * host_info structures serve as caches for the lookup results. - */ - -extern char *eval_user(); /* client user */ -extern char *eval_hostname(); /* printable hostname */ -extern char *eval_hostaddr(); /* printable host address */ -extern char *eval_hostinfo(); /* host name or address */ -extern char *eval_client(); /* whatever is available */ -extern char *eval_server(); /* whatever is available */ -#define eval_daemon(r) ((r)->daemon) /* daemon process name */ -#define eval_pid(r) ((r)->pid) /* process id */ - -/* Socket-specific methods, including DNS hostname lookups. */ - -extern void sock_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses */ -extern void sock_hostname(); /* translate address to hostname */ -extern void sock_hostaddr(); /* address to printable address */ -#define sock_methods(r) \ - { (r)->hostname = sock_hostname; (r)->hostaddr = sock_hostaddr; } - -/* The System V Transport-Level Interface (TLI) interface. */ - -#if defined(TLI) || defined(PTX) || defined(TLI_SEQUENT) -extern void tli_host(); /* look up endpoint addresses etc. */ -#endif - - /* - * Problem reporting interface. Additional file/line context is reported - * when available. The jump buffer (tcpd_buf) is not declared here, or - * everyone would have to include <setjmp.h>. - */ - -#ifdef __STDC__ -extern void tcpd_warn(char *, ...); /* report problem and proceed */ -extern void tcpd_jump(char *, ...); /* report problem and jump */ -#else -extern void tcpd_warn(); -extern void tcpd_jump(); -#endif - -struct tcpd_context { - char *file; /* current file */ - int line; /* current line */ -}; -extern struct tcpd_context tcpd_context; - - /* - * While processing access control rules, error conditions are handled by - * jumping back into the hosts_access() routine. This is cleaner than - * checking the return value of each and every silly little function. The - * (-1) returns are here because zero is already taken by longjmp(). - */ - -#define AC_PERMIT 1 /* permit access */ -#define AC_DENY (-1) /* deny_access */ -#define AC_ERROR AC_DENY /* XXX */ - - /* - * In verification mode an option function should just say what it would do, - * instead of really doing it. An option function that would not return - * should clear the dry_run flag to inform the caller of this unusual - * behavior. - */ - -extern void process_options(); /* execute options */ -extern int dry_run; /* verification flag */ - -/* Bug workarounds. */ - -#ifdef INET_ADDR_BUG /* inet_addr() returns struct */ -#define inet_addr fix_inet_addr -extern long fix_inet_addr(); -#endif - -#ifdef BROKEN_FGETS /* partial reads from sockets */ -#define fgets fix_fgets -extern char *fix_fgets(); -#endif - -#ifdef RECVFROM_BUG /* no address family info */ -#define recvfrom fix_recvfrom -extern int fix_recvfrom(); -#endif - -#ifdef GETPEERNAME_BUG /* claims success with UDP */ -#define getpeername fix_getpeername -extern int fix_getpeername(); -#endif - -#ifdef SOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG /* lists addresses as aliases */ -#define gethostbyname fix_gethostbyname -extern struct hostent *fix_gethostbyname(); -#endif - -#ifdef USE_STRSEP /* libc calls strtok() */ -#define strtok fix_strtok -extern char *fix_strtok(); -#endif - -#ifdef LIBC_CALLS_STRTOK /* libc calls strtok() */ -#define strtok my_strtok -extern char *my_strtok(); -#endif diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdchk.8 b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdchk.8 deleted file mode 100644 index acc65e6441ad..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdchk.8 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,66 +0,0 @@ -.TH TCPDCHK 8 -.SH NAME -tcpdchk \- tcp wrapper configuration checker -.SH SYNOPSYS -tcpdchk [-a] [-d] [-i inet_conf] [-v] -.SH DESCRIPTION -.PP -\fItcpdchk\fR examines your tcp wrapper configuration and reports all -potential and real problems it can find. The program examines the -\fItcpd\fR access control files (by default, these are -\fI/etc/hosts.allow\fR and \fI/etc/hosts.deny\fR), and compares the -entries in these files against entries in the \fIinetd\fR or \fItlid\fR -network configuration files. -.PP -\fItcpdchk\fR reports problems such as non-existent pathnames; services -that appear in \fItcpd\fR access control rules, but are not controlled -by \fItcpd\fR; services that should not be wrapped; non-existent host -names or non-internet address forms; occurrences of host aliases -instead of official host names; hosts with a name/address conflict; -inappropriate use of wildcard patterns; inappropriate use of NIS -netgroups or references to non-existent NIS netgroups; references to -non-existent options; invalid arguments to options; and so on. -.PP -Where possible, \fItcpdchk\fR provides a helpful suggestion to fix the -problem. -.SH OPTIONS -.IP -a -Report access control rules that permit access without an explicit -ALLOW keyword. This applies only when the extended access control -language is enabled (build with -DPROCESS_OPTIONS). -.IP -d -Examine \fIhosts.allow\fR and \fIhosts.deny\fR files in the current -directory instead of the default ones. -.IP "-i inet_conf" -Specify this option when \fItcpdchk\fR is unable to find your -\fIinetd.conf\fR or \fItlid.conf\fR network configuration file, or when -you suspect that the program uses the wrong one. -.IP -v -Display the contents of each access control rule. Daemon lists, client -lists, shell commands and options are shown in a pretty-printed format; -this makes it easier for you to spot any discrepancies between what you -want and what the program understands. -.SH FILES -.PP -The default locations of the \fItcpd\fR access control tables are: -.PP -/etc/hosts.allow -.br -/etc/hosts.deny -.SH SEE ALSO -.na -.nf -tcpdmatch(8), explain what tcpd would do in specific cases. -hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables. -hosts_options(5), format of the language extensions. -inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file. -tlid.conf(5), format of the tlid control file. -.SH AUTHORS -.na -.nf -Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl), -Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, -Eindhoven University of Technology -Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, -5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands -\" @(#) tcpdchk.8 1.3 95/01/08 17:00:30 diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdchk.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdchk.c deleted file mode 100644 index 49c5c82c1b44..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdchk.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,462 +0,0 @@ - /* - * tcpdchk - examine all tcpd access control rules and inetd.conf entries - * - * Usage: tcpdchk [-a] [-d] [-i inet_conf] [-v] - * - * -a: complain about implicit "allow" at end of rule. - * - * -d: rules in current directory. - * - * -i: location of inetd.conf file. - * - * -v: show all rules. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) tcpdchk.c 1.8 97/02/12 02:13:25"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <arpa/inet.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <setjmp.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <netdb.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern int errno; -extern void exit(); -extern int optind; -extern char *optarg; - -#ifndef INADDR_NONE -#define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ -#endif - -#ifndef S_ISDIR -#define S_ISDIR(m) (((m) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) -#endif - -/* Application-specific. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" -#include "inetcf.h" -#include "scaffold.h" - - /* - * Stolen from hosts_access.c... - */ -static char sep[] = ", \t\n"; - -#define BUFLEN 2048 - -int resident = 0; -int hosts_access_verbose = 0; -char *hosts_allow_table = HOSTS_ALLOW; -char *hosts_deny_table = HOSTS_DENY; -extern jmp_buf tcpd_buf; - - /* - * Local stuff. - */ -static void usage(); -static void parse_table(); -static void print_list(); -static void check_daemon_list(); -static void check_client_list(); -static void check_daemon(); -static void check_user(); -static int check_host(); -static int reserved_name(); - -#define PERMIT 1 -#define DENY 0 - -#define YES 1 -#define NO 0 - -static int defl_verdict; -static char *myname; -static int allow_check; -static char *inetcf; - -int main(argc, argv) -int argc; -char **argv; -{ - struct request_info request; - struct stat st; - int c; - - myname = argv[0]; - - /* - * Parse the JCL. - */ - while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "adi:v")) != EOF) { - switch (c) { - case 'a': - allow_check = 1; - break; - case 'd': - hosts_allow_table = "hosts.allow"; - hosts_deny_table = "hosts.deny"; - break; - case 'i': - inetcf = optarg; - break; - case 'v': - hosts_access_verbose++; - break; - default: - usage(); - /* NOTREACHED */ - } - } - if (argc != optind) - usage(); - - /* - * When confusion really strikes... - */ - if (check_path(REAL_DAEMON_DIR, &st) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("REAL_DAEMON_DIR %s: %m", REAL_DAEMON_DIR); - } else if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { - tcpd_warn("REAL_DAEMON_DIR %s is not a directory", REAL_DAEMON_DIR); - } - - /* - * Process the inet configuration file (or its moral equivalent). This - * information is used later to find references in hosts.allow/deny to - * unwrapped services, and other possible problems. - */ - inetcf = inet_cfg(inetcf); - if (hosts_access_verbose) - printf("Using network configuration file: %s\n", inetcf); - - /* - * These are not run from inetd but may have built-in access control. - */ - inet_set("portmap", WR_NOT); - inet_set("rpcbind", WR_NOT); - - /* - * Check accessibility of access control files. - */ - (void) check_path(hosts_allow_table, &st); - (void) check_path(hosts_deny_table, &st); - - /* - * Fake up an arbitrary service request. - */ - request_init(&request, - RQ_DAEMON, "daemon_name", - RQ_SERVER_NAME, "server_hostname", - RQ_SERVER_ADDR, "server_addr", - RQ_USER, "user_name", - RQ_CLIENT_NAME, "client_hostname", - RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, "client_addr", - RQ_FILE, 1, - 0); - - /* - * Examine all access-control rules. - */ - defl_verdict = PERMIT; - parse_table(hosts_allow_table, &request); - defl_verdict = DENY; - parse_table(hosts_deny_table, &request); - return (0); -} - -/* usage - explain */ - -static void usage() -{ - fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-a] [-d] [-i inet_conf] [-v]\n", myname); - fprintf(stderr, " -a: report rules with implicit \"ALLOW\" at end\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -d: use allow/deny files in current directory\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -i: location of inetd.conf file\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -v: list all rules\n"); - exit(1); -} - -/* parse_table - like table_match(), but examines _all_ entries */ - -static void parse_table(table, request) -char *table; -struct request_info *request; -{ - FILE *fp; - int real_verdict; - char sv_list[BUFLEN]; /* becomes list of daemons */ - char *cl_list; /* becomes list of requests */ - char *sh_cmd; /* becomes optional shell command */ - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - int verdict; - struct tcpd_context saved_context; - - saved_context = tcpd_context; /* stupid compilers */ - - if (fp = fopen(table, "r")) { - tcpd_context.file = table; - tcpd_context.line = 0; - while (xgets(sv_list, sizeof(sv_list), fp)) { - if (sv_list[strlen(sv_list) - 1] != '\n') { - tcpd_warn("missing newline or line too long"); - continue; - } - if (sv_list[0] == '#' || sv_list[strspn(sv_list, " \t\r\n")] == 0) - continue; - if ((cl_list = split_at(sv_list, ':')) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("missing \":\" separator"); - continue; - } - sh_cmd = split_at(cl_list, ':'); - - if (hosts_access_verbose) - printf("\n>>> Rule %s line %d:\n", - tcpd_context.file, tcpd_context.line); - - if (hosts_access_verbose) - print_list("daemons: ", sv_list); - check_daemon_list(sv_list); - - if (hosts_access_verbose) - print_list("clients: ", cl_list); - check_client_list(cl_list); - -#ifdef PROCESS_OPTIONS - real_verdict = defl_verdict; - if (sh_cmd) { - verdict = setjmp(tcpd_buf); - if (verdict != 0) { - real_verdict = (verdict == AC_PERMIT); - } else { - dry_run = 1; - process_options(sh_cmd, request); - if (dry_run == 1 && real_verdict && allow_check) - tcpd_warn("implicit \"allow\" at end of rule"); - } - } else if (defl_verdict && allow_check) { - tcpd_warn("implicit \"allow\" at end of rule"); - } - if (hosts_access_verbose) - printf("access: %s\n", real_verdict ? "granted" : "denied"); -#else - if (sh_cmd) - shell_cmd(percent_x(buf, sizeof(buf), sh_cmd, request)); - if (hosts_access_verbose) - printf("access: %s\n", defl_verdict ? "granted" : "denied"); -#endif - } - (void) fclose(fp); - } else if (errno != ENOENT) { - tcpd_warn("cannot open %s: %m", table); - } - tcpd_context = saved_context; -} - -/* print_list - pretty-print a list */ - -static void print_list(title, list) -char *title; -char *list; -{ - char buf[BUFLEN]; - char *cp; - char *next; - - fputs(title, stdout); - strcpy(buf, list); - - for (cp = strtok(buf, sep); cp != 0; cp = next) { - fputs(cp, stdout); - next = strtok((char *) 0, sep); - if (next != 0) - fputs(" ", stdout); - } - fputs("\n", stdout); -} - -/* check_daemon_list - criticize daemon list */ - -static void check_daemon_list(list) -char *list; -{ - char buf[BUFLEN]; - char *cp; - char *host; - int daemons = 0; - - strcpy(buf, list); - - for (cp = strtok(buf, sep); cp != 0; cp = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) { - if (STR_EQ(cp, "EXCEPT")) { - daemons = 0; - } else { - daemons++; - if ((host = split_at(cp + 1, '@')) != 0 && check_host(host) > 1) { - tcpd_warn("host %s has more than one address", host); - tcpd_warn("(consider using an address instead)"); - } - check_daemon(cp); - } - } - if (daemons == 0) - tcpd_warn("daemon list is empty or ends in EXCEPT"); -} - -/* check_client_list - criticize client list */ - -static void check_client_list(list) -char *list; -{ - char buf[BUFLEN]; - char *cp; - char *host; - int clients = 0; - - strcpy(buf, list); - - for (cp = strtok(buf, sep); cp != 0; cp = strtok((char *) 0, sep)) { - if (STR_EQ(cp, "EXCEPT")) { - clients = 0; - } else { - clients++; - if (host = split_at(cp + 1, '@')) { /* user@host */ - check_user(cp); - check_host(host); - } else { - check_host(cp); - } - } - } - if (clients == 0) - tcpd_warn("client list is empty or ends in EXCEPT"); -} - -/* check_daemon - criticize daemon pattern */ - -static void check_daemon(pat) -char *pat; -{ - if (pat[0] == '@') { - tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with \"@\"", pat); - } else if (pat[0] == '.') { - tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name begins with dot", pat); - } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { - tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name ends in dot", pat); - } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "ALL") || STR_EQ(pat, unknown)) { - /* void */ ; - } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "FAIL")) { /* obsolete */ - tcpd_warn("FAIL is no longer recognized"); - tcpd_warn("(use EXCEPT or DENY instead)"); - } else if (reserved_name(pat)) { - tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name may be reserved word", pat); - } else { - switch (inet_get(pat)) { - case WR_UNKNOWN: - tcpd_warn("%s: no such process name in %s", pat, inetcf); - inet_set(pat, WR_YES); /* shut up next time */ - break; - case WR_NOT: - tcpd_warn("%s: service possibly not wrapped", pat); - inet_set(pat, WR_YES); - break; - } - } -} - -/* check_user - criticize user pattern */ - -static void check_user(pat) -char *pat; -{ - if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ - tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with \"@\"", pat); - } else if (pat[0] == '.') { - tcpd_warn("%s: user name begins with dot", pat); - } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { - tcpd_warn("%s: user name ends in dot", pat); - } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "ALL") || STR_EQ(pat, unknown) - || STR_EQ(pat, "KNOWN")) { - /* void */ ; - } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "FAIL")) { /* obsolete */ - tcpd_warn("FAIL is no longer recognized"); - tcpd_warn("(use EXCEPT or DENY instead)"); - } else if (reserved_name(pat)) { - tcpd_warn("%s: user name may be reserved word", pat); - } -} - -/* check_host - criticize host pattern */ - -static int check_host(pat) -char *pat; -{ - char *mask; - int addr_count = 1; - - if (pat[0] == '@') { /* @netgroup */ -#ifdef NO_NETGRENT - /* SCO has no *netgrent() support */ -#else -#ifdef NETGROUP - char *machinep; - char *userp; - char *domainp; - - setnetgrent(pat + 1); - if (getnetgrent(&machinep, &userp, &domainp) == 0) - tcpd_warn("%s: unknown or empty netgroup", pat + 1); - endnetgrent(); -#else - tcpd_warn("netgroup support disabled"); -#endif -#endif - } else if (mask = split_at(pat, '/')) { /* network/netmask */ - if (dot_quad_addr(pat) == INADDR_NONE - || dot_quad_addr(mask) == INADDR_NONE) - tcpd_warn("%s/%s: bad net/mask pattern", pat, mask); - } else if (STR_EQ(pat, "FAIL")) { /* obsolete */ - tcpd_warn("FAIL is no longer recognized"); - tcpd_warn("(use EXCEPT or DENY instead)"); - } else if (reserved_name(pat)) { /* other reserved */ - /* void */ ; - } else if (NOT_INADDR(pat)) { /* internet name */ - if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] == '.') { - tcpd_warn("%s: domain or host name ends in dot", pat); - } else if (pat[0] != '.') { - addr_count = check_dns(pat); - } - } else { /* numeric form */ - if (STR_EQ(pat, "0.0.0.0") || STR_EQ(pat, "255.255.255.255")) { - /* void */ ; - } else if (pat[0] == '.') { - tcpd_warn("%s: network number begins with dot", pat); - } else if (pat[strlen(pat) - 1] != '.') { - check_dns(pat); - } - } - return (addr_count); -} - -/* reserved_name - determine if name is reserved */ - -static int reserved_name(pat) -char *pat; -{ - return (STR_EQ(pat, unknown) - || STR_EQ(pat, "KNOWN") - || STR_EQ(pat, paranoid) - || STR_EQ(pat, "ALL") - || STR_EQ(pat, "LOCAL")); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdmatch.8 b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdmatch.8 deleted file mode 100644 index ebd8c7874c3f..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdmatch.8 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,98 +0,0 @@ -.TH TCPDMATCH 8 -.SH NAME -tcpdmatch \- tcp wrapper oracle -.SH SYNOPSYS -tcpdmatch [-d] [-i inet_conf] daemon client -.sp -tcpdmatch [-d] [-i inet_conf] daemon[@server] [user@]client -.SH DESCRIPTION -.PP -\fItcpdmatch\fR predicts how the tcp wrapper would handle a specific -request for service. Examples are given below. -.PP -The program examines the \fItcpd\fR access control tables (default -\fI/etc/hosts.allow\fR and \fI/etc/hosts.deny\fR) and prints its -conclusion. For maximal accuracy, it extracts additional information -from your \fIinetd\fR or \fItlid\fR network configuration file. -.PP -When \fItcpdmatch\fR finds a match in the access control tables, it -identifies the matched rule. In addition, it displays the optional -shell commands or options in a pretty-printed format; this makes it -easier for you to spot any discrepancies between what you want and what -the program understands. -.SH ARGUMENTS -The following two arguments are always required: -.IP daemon -A daemon process name. Typically, the last component of a daemon -executable pathname. -.IP client -A host name or network address, or one of the `unknown' or `paranoid' -wildcard patterns. -.sp -When a client host name is specified, \fItcpdmatch\fR gives a -prediction for each address listed for that client. -.sp -When a client address is specified, \fItcpdmatch\fR predicts what -\fItcpd\fR would do when client name lookup fails. -.PP -Optional information specified with the \fIdaemon@server\fR form: -.IP server -A host name or network address, or one of the `unknown' or `paranoid' -wildcard patterns. The default server name is `unknown'. -.PP -Optional information specified with the \fIuser@client\fR form: -.IP user -A client user identifier. Typically, a login name or a numeric userid. -The default user name is `unknown'. -.SH OPTIONS -.IP -d -Examine \fIhosts.allow\fR and \fIhosts.deny\fR files in the current -directory instead of the default ones. -.IP "-i inet_conf" -Specify this option when \fItcpdmatch\fR is unable to find your -\fIinetd.conf\fR or \fItlid.conf\fR network configuration file, or when -you suspect that the program uses the wrong one. -.SH EXAMPLES -To predict how \fItcpd\fR would handle a telnet request from the local -system: -.sp -.ti +5 -tcpdmatch in.telnetd localhost -.PP -The same request, pretending that hostname lookup failed: -.sp -.ti +5 -tcpdmatch in.telnetd 127.0.0.1 -.PP -To predict what tcpd would do when the client name does not match the -client address: -.sp -.ti +5 -tcpdmatch in.telnetd paranoid -.PP -On some systems, daemon names have no `in.' prefix, or \fItcpdmatch\fR -may need some help to locate the inetd configuration file. -.SH FILES -.PP -The default locations of the \fItcpd\fR access control tables are: -.PP -/etc/hosts.allow -.br -/etc/hosts.deny -.SH SEE ALSO -.na -.nf -tcpdchk(8), tcpd configuration checker -hosts_access(5), format of the tcpd access control tables. -hosts_options(5), format of the language extensions. -inetd.conf(5), format of the inetd control file. -tlid.conf(5), format of the tlid control file. -.SH AUTHORS -.na -.nf -Wietse Venema (wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl), -Department of Mathematics and Computing Science, -Eindhoven University of Technology -Den Dolech 2, P.O. Box 513, -5600 MB Eindhoven, The Netherlands -\" @(#) tcpdmatch.8 1.5 96/02/11 17:01:35 diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdmatch.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdmatch.c deleted file mode 100644 index b1cf75f25cee..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tcpdmatch.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,328 +0,0 @@ - /* - * tcpdmatch - explain what tcpd would do in a specific case - * - * usage: tcpdmatch [-d] [-i inet_conf] daemon[@host] [user@]host - * - * -d: use the access control tables in the current directory. - * - * -i: location of inetd.conf file. - * - * All errors are reported to the standard error stream, including the errors - * that would normally be reported via the syslog daemon. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) tcpdmatch.c 1.5 96/02/11 17:01:36"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <arpa/inet.h> -#include <netdb.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <setjmp.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern void exit(); -extern int optind; -extern char *optarg; - -#ifndef INADDR_NONE -#define INADDR_NONE (-1) /* XXX should be 0xffffffff */ -#endif - -#ifndef S_ISDIR -#define S_ISDIR(m) (((m) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) -#endif - -/* Application-specific. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" -#include "inetcf.h" -#include "scaffold.h" - -static void usage(); -static void tcpdmatch(); - -/* The main program */ - -int main(argc, argv) -int argc; -char **argv; -{ - struct hostent *hp; - char *myname = argv[0]; - char *client; - char *server; - char *addr; - char *user; - char *daemon; - struct request_info request; - int ch; - char *inetcf = 0; - int count; - struct sockaddr_in server_sin; - struct sockaddr_in client_sin; - struct stat st; - - /* - * Show what rule actually matched. - */ - hosts_access_verbose = 2; - - /* - * Parse the JCL. - */ - while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "di:")) != EOF) { - switch (ch) { - case 'd': - hosts_allow_table = "hosts.allow"; - hosts_deny_table = "hosts.deny"; - break; - case 'i': - inetcf = optarg; - break; - default: - usage(myname); - /* NOTREACHED */ - } - } - if (argc != optind + 2) - usage(myname); - - /* - * When confusion really strikes... - */ - if (check_path(REAL_DAEMON_DIR, &st) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("REAL_DAEMON_DIR %s: %m", REAL_DAEMON_DIR); - } else if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) { - tcpd_warn("REAL_DAEMON_DIR %s is not a directory", REAL_DAEMON_DIR); - } - - /* - * Default is to specify a daemon process name. When daemon@host is - * specified, separate the two parts. - */ - if ((server = split_at(argv[optind], '@')) == 0) - server = unknown; - if (argv[optind][0] == '/') { - daemon = strrchr(argv[optind], '/') + 1; - tcpd_warn("%s: daemon name normalized to: %s", argv[optind], daemon); - } else { - daemon = argv[optind]; - } - - /* - * Default is to specify a client hostname or address. When user@host is - * specified, separate the two parts. - */ - if ((client = split_at(argv[optind + 1], '@')) != 0) { - user = argv[optind + 1]; - } else { - client = argv[optind + 1]; - user = unknown; - } - - /* - * Analyze the inetd (or tlid) configuration file, so that we can warn - * the user about services that may not be wrapped, services that are not - * configured, or services that are wrapped in an incorrect manner. Allow - * for services that are not run from inetd, or that have tcpd access - * control built into them. - */ - inetcf = inet_cfg(inetcf); - inet_set("portmap", WR_NOT); - inet_set("rpcbind", WR_NOT); - switch (inet_get(daemon)) { - case WR_UNKNOWN: - tcpd_warn("%s: no such process name in %s", daemon, inetcf); - break; - case WR_NOT: - tcpd_warn("%s: service possibly not wrapped", daemon); - break; - } - - /* - * Check accessibility of access control files. - */ - (void) check_path(hosts_allow_table, &st); - (void) check_path(hosts_deny_table, &st); - - /* - * Fill in what we have figured out sofar. Use socket and DNS routines - * for address and name conversions. We attach stdout to the request so - * that banner messages will become visible. - */ - request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, daemon, RQ_USER, user, RQ_FILE, 1, 0); - sock_methods(&request); - - /* - * If a server hostname is specified, insist that the name maps to at - * most one address. eval_hostname() warns the user about name server - * problems, while using the request.server structure as a cache for host - * address and name conversion results. - */ - if (NOT_INADDR(server) == 0 || HOSTNAME_KNOWN(server)) { - if ((hp = find_inet_addr(server)) == 0) - exit(1); - memset((char *) &server_sin, 0, sizeof(server_sin)); - server_sin.sin_family = AF_INET; - request_set(&request, RQ_SERVER_SIN, &server_sin, 0); - - for (count = 0; (addr = hp->h_addr_list[count]) != 0; count++) { - memcpy((char *) &server_sin.sin_addr, addr, - sizeof(server_sin.sin_addr)); - - /* - * Force evaluation of server host name and address. Host name - * conflicts will be reported while eval_hostname() does its job. - */ - request_set(&request, RQ_SERVER_NAME, "", RQ_SERVER_ADDR, "", 0); - if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.server), unknown)) - tcpd_warn("host address %s->name lookup failed", - eval_hostaddr(request.server)); - } - if (count > 1) { - fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s has more than one address\n", server); - fprintf(stderr, "Please specify an address instead\n"); - exit(1); - } - free((char *) hp); - } else { - request_set(&request, RQ_SERVER_NAME, server, 0); - } - - /* - * If a client address is specified, we simulate the effect of client - * hostname lookup failure. - */ - if (dot_quad_addr(client) != INADDR_NONE) { - request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, client, 0); - tcpdmatch(&request); - exit(0); - } - - /* - * Perhaps they are testing special client hostname patterns that aren't - * really host names at all. - */ - if (NOT_INADDR(client) && HOSTNAME_KNOWN(client) == 0) { - request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_NAME, client, 0); - tcpdmatch(&request); - exit(0); - } - - /* - * Otherwise, assume that a client hostname is specified, and insist that - * the address can be looked up. The reason for this requirement is that - * in real life the client address is available (at least with IP). Let - * eval_hostname() figure out if this host is properly registered, while - * using the request.client structure as a cache for host name and - * address conversion results. - */ - if ((hp = find_inet_addr(client)) == 0) - exit(1); - memset((char *) &client_sin, 0, sizeof(client_sin)); - client_sin.sin_family = AF_INET; - request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_SIN, &client_sin, 0); - - for (count = 0; (addr = hp->h_addr_list[count]) != 0; count++) { - memcpy((char *) &client_sin.sin_addr, addr, - sizeof(client_sin.sin_addr)); - - /* - * Force evaluation of client host name and address. Host name - * conflicts will be reported while eval_hostname() does its job. - */ - request_set(&request, RQ_CLIENT_NAME, "", RQ_CLIENT_ADDR, "", 0); - if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request.client), unknown)) - tcpd_warn("host address %s->name lookup failed", - eval_hostaddr(request.client)); - tcpdmatch(&request); - if (hp->h_addr_list[count + 1]) - printf("\n"); - } - free((char *) hp); - exit(0); -} - -/* Explain how to use this program */ - -static void usage(myname) -char *myname; -{ - fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-d] [-i inet_conf] daemon[@host] [user@]host\n", - myname); - fprintf(stderr, " -d: use allow/deny files in current directory\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -i: location of inetd.conf file\n"); - exit(1); -} - -/* Print interesting expansions */ - -static void expand(text, pattern, request) -char *text; -char *pattern; -struct request_info *request; -{ - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - - if (STR_NE(percent_x(buf, sizeof(buf), pattern, request), unknown)) - printf("%s %s\n", text, buf); -} - -/* Try out a (server,client) pair */ - -static void tcpdmatch(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - int verdict; - - /* - * Show what we really know. Suppress uninteresting noise. - */ - expand("client: hostname", "%n", request); - expand("client: address ", "%a", request); - expand("client: username", "%u", request); - expand("server: hostname", "%N", request); - expand("server: address ", "%A", request); - expand("server: process ", "%d", request); - - /* - * Reset stuff that might be changed by options handlers. In dry-run - * mode, extension language routines that would not return should inform - * us of their plan, by clearing the dry_run flag. This is a bit clumsy - * but we must be able to verify hosts with more than one network - * address. - */ - rfc931_timeout = RFC931_TIMEOUT; - allow_severity = SEVERITY; - deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; - dry_run = 1; - - /* - * When paranoid mode is enabled, access is rejected no matter what the - * access control rules say. - */ -#ifdef PARANOID - if (STR_EQ(eval_hostname(request->client), paranoid)) { - printf("access: denied (PARANOID mode)\n\n"); - return; - } -#endif - - /* - * Report the access control verdict. - */ - verdict = hosts_access(request); - printf("access: %s\n", - dry_run == 0 ? "delegated" : - verdict ? "granted" : "denied"); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tli-sequent.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tli-sequent.c deleted file mode 100644 index 8858966876a4..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tli-sequent.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,193 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Warning - this relies heavily on the TLI implementation in PTX 2.X and will - * probably not work under PTX 4. - * - * Author: Tim Wright, Sequent Computer Systems Ltd., UK. - * - * Modified slightly to conform to the new internal interfaces - Wietse - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) tli-sequent.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:51"; -#endif - -#ifdef TLI_SEQUENT - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <sys/tiuser.h> -#include <sys/stream.h> -#include <sys/stropts.h> -#include <sys/tihdr.h> -#include <sys/timod.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern int errno; -extern char *sys_errlist[]; -extern int sys_nerr; -extern int t_errno; -extern char *t_errlist[]; -extern int t_nerr; - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" -#include "tli-sequent.h" - -/* Forward declarations. */ - -static char *tli_error(); -static void tli_sink(); - -/* tli_host - determine endpoint info */ - -int tli_host(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - static struct sockaddr_in client; - static struct sockaddr_in server; - struct _ti_user *tli_state_ptr; - union T_primitives *TSI_prim_ptr; - struct strpeek peek; - int len; - - /* - * Use DNS and socket routines for name and address conversions. - */ - - sock_methods(request); - - /* - * Find out the client address using getpeerinaddr(). This call is the - * TLI equivalent to getpeername() under Dynix/ptx. - */ - - len = sizeof(client); - t_sync(request->fd); - if (getpeerinaddr(request->fd, &client, len) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("can't get client address: %s", tli_error()); - return; - } - request->client->sin = &client; - - /* Call TLI utility routine to get information on endpoint */ - if ((tli_state_ptr = _t_checkfd(request->fd)) == NULL) - return; - - if (tli_state_ptr->ti_servtype == T_CLTS) { - /* UDP - may need to get address the hard way */ - if (client.sin_addr.s_addr == 0) { - /* The UDP endpoint is not connected so we didn't get the */ - /* remote address - get it the hard way ! */ - - /* Look at the control part of the top message on the stream */ - /* we don't want to remove it from the stream so we use I_PEEK */ - peek.ctlbuf.maxlen = tli_state_ptr->ti_ctlsize; - peek.ctlbuf.len = 0; - peek.ctlbuf.buf = tli_state_ptr->ti_ctlbuf; - /* Don't even look at the data */ - peek.databuf.maxlen = -1; - peek.databuf.len = 0; - peek.databuf.buf = 0; - peek.flags = 0; - - switch (ioctl(request->fd, I_PEEK, &peek)) { - case -1: - tcpd_warn("can't peek at endpoint: %s", tli_error()); - return; - case 0: - /* No control part - we're hosed */ - tcpd_warn("can't get UDP info: %s", tli_error()); - return; - default: - /* FALL THROUGH */ - ; - } - /* Can we even check the PRIM_type ? */ - if (peek.ctlbuf.len < sizeof(long)) { - tcpd_warn("UDP control info garbage"); - return; - } - TSI_prim_ptr = (union T_primitives *) peek.ctlbuf.buf; - if (TSI_prim_ptr->type != T_UNITDATA_IND) { - tcpd_warn("wrong type for UDP control info"); - return; - } - /* Validate returned unitdata indication packet */ - if ((peek.ctlbuf.len < sizeof(struct T_unitdata_ind)) || - ((TSI_prim_ptr->unitdata_ind.OPT_length != 0) && - (peek.ctlbuf.len < - TSI_prim_ptr->unitdata_ind.OPT_length + - TSI_prim_ptr->unitdata_ind.OPT_offset))) { - tcpd_warn("UDP control info garbaged"); - return; - } - /* Extract the address */ - memcpy(&client, - peek.ctlbuf.buf + TSI_prim_ptr->unitdata_ind.SRC_offset, - TSI_prim_ptr->unitdata_ind.SRC_length); - } - request->sink = tli_sink; - } - if (getmyinaddr(request->fd, &server, len) < 0) - tcpd_warn("can't get local address: %s", tli_error()); - else - request->server->sin = &server; -} - -/* tli_error - convert tli error number to text */ - -static char *tli_error() -{ - static char buf[40]; - - if (t_errno != TSYSERR) { - if (t_errno < 0 || t_errno >= t_nerr) { - sprintf(buf, "Unknown TLI error %d", t_errno); - return (buf); - } else { - return (t_errlist[t_errno]); - } - } else { - if (errno < 0 || errno >= sys_nerr) { - sprintf(buf, "Unknown UNIX error %d", errno); - return (buf); - } else { - return (sys_errlist[errno]); - } - } -} - -/* tli_sink - absorb unreceived datagram */ - -static void tli_sink(fd) -int fd; -{ - struct t_unitdata *unit; - int flags; - - /* - * Something went wrong. Absorb the datagram to keep inetd from looping. - * Allocate storage for address, control and data. If that fails, sleep - * for a couple of seconds in an attempt to keep inetd from looping too - * fast. - */ - - if ((unit = (struct t_unitdata *) t_alloc(fd, T_UNITDATA, T_ALL)) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("t_alloc: %s", tli_error()); - sleep(5); - } else { - (void) t_rcvudata(fd, unit, &flags); - t_free((void *) unit, T_UNITDATA); - } -} - -#endif /* TLI_SEQUENT */ diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tli-sequent.h b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tli-sequent.h deleted file mode 100644 index 4474d3cdb6fa..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tli-sequent.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,13 +0,0 @@ -#ifdef __STDC__ -#define __P(X) X -#else -#define __P(X) () -#endif - -extern int t_sync __P((int)); -extern char *t_alloc __P((int, int, int)); -extern int t_free __P((char *, int)); -extern int t_rcvudata __P((int, struct t_unitdata *, int *)); -extern int getpeerinaddr __P((int, struct sockaddr_in *, int)); -extern int getmyinaddr __P((int, struct sockaddr_in *, int)); -extern struct _ti_user *_t_checkfd __P((int)); diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tli.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tli.c deleted file mode 100644 index 14579d1cbacb..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/tli.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,341 +0,0 @@ - /* - * tli_host() determines the type of transport (connected, connectionless), - * the transport address of a client host, and the transport address of a - * server endpoint. In addition, it provides methods to map a transport - * address to a printable host name or address. Socket address results are - * in static memory; tli structures are allocated from the heap. - * - * The result from the hostname lookup method is STRING_PARANOID when a host - * pretends to have someone elses name, or when a host name is available but - * could not be verified. - * - * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) tli.c 1.15 97/03/21 19:27:25"; -#endif - -#ifdef TLI - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <sys/stream.h> -#include <sys/stat.h> -#include <sys/mkdev.h> -#include <sys/tiuser.h> -#include <sys/timod.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <netconfig.h> -#include <netdir.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern char *nc_sperror(); -extern int errno; -extern char *sys_errlist[]; -extern int sys_nerr; -extern int t_errno; -extern char *t_errlist[]; -extern int t_nerr; - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* Forward declarations. */ - -static void tli_endpoints(); -static struct netconfig *tli_transport(); -static void tli_hostname(); -static void tli_hostaddr(); -static void tli_cleanup(); -static char *tli_error(); -static void tli_sink(); - -/* tli_host - look up endpoint addresses and install conversion methods */ - -void tli_host(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - static struct sockaddr_in client; - static struct sockaddr_in server; - - /* - * If we discover that we are using an IP transport, pretend we never - * were here. Otherwise, use the transport-independent method and stick - * to generic network addresses. XXX hard-coded protocol family name. - */ - - tli_endpoints(request); - if ((request->config = tli_transport(request->fd)) != 0 - && STR_EQ(request->config->nc_protofmly, "inet")) { - if (request->client->unit != 0) { - client = *(struct sockaddr_in *) request->client->unit->addr.buf; - request->client->sin = &client; - } - if (request->server->unit != 0) { - server = *(struct sockaddr_in *) request->server->unit->addr.buf; - request->server->sin = &server; - } - tli_cleanup(request); - sock_methods(request); - } else { - request->hostname = tli_hostname; - request->hostaddr = tli_hostaddr; - request->cleanup = tli_cleanup; - } -} - -/* tli_cleanup - cleanup some dynamically-allocated data structures */ - -static void tli_cleanup(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - if (request->config != 0) - freenetconfigent(request->config); - if (request->client->unit != 0) - t_free((char *) request->client->unit, T_UNITDATA); - if (request->server->unit != 0) - t_free((char *) request->server->unit, T_UNITDATA); -} - -/* tli_endpoints - determine TLI client and server endpoint information */ - -static void tli_endpoints(request) -struct request_info *request; -{ - struct t_unitdata *server; - struct t_unitdata *client; - int fd = request->fd; - int flags; - - /* - * Determine the client endpoint address. With unconnected services, peek - * at the sender address of the pending protocol data unit without - * popping it off the receive queue. This trick works because only the - * address member of the unitdata structure has been allocated. - * - * Beware of successful returns with zero-length netbufs (for example, - * Solaris 2.3 with ticlts transport). The netdir(3) routines can't - * handle that. Assume connection-less transport when TI_GETPEERNAME - * produces no usable result, even when t_rcvudata() is unable to figure - * out the peer address. Better to hang than to loop. - */ - - if ((client = (struct t_unitdata *) t_alloc(fd, T_UNITDATA, T_ADDR)) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("t_alloc: %s", tli_error()); - return; - } - if (ioctl(fd, TI_GETPEERNAME, &client->addr) < 0 || client->addr.len == 0) { - request->sink = tli_sink; - if (t_rcvudata(fd, client, &flags) < 0 || client->addr.len == 0) { - tcpd_warn("can't get client address: %s", tli_error()); - t_free((void *) client, T_UNITDATA); - return; - } - } - request->client->unit = client; - - /* - * Look up the server endpoint address. This can be used for filtering on - * server address or name, or to look up the client user. - */ - - if ((server = (struct t_unitdata *) t_alloc(fd, T_UNITDATA, T_ADDR)) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("t_alloc: %s", tli_error()); - return; - } - if (ioctl(fd, TI_GETMYNAME, &server->addr) < 0) { - tcpd_warn("TI_GETMYNAME: %m"); - t_free((void *) server, T_UNITDATA); - return; - } - request->server->unit = server; -} - -/* tli_transport - find out TLI transport type */ - -static struct netconfig *tli_transport(fd) -int fd; -{ - struct stat from_client; - struct stat from_config; - void *handlep; - struct netconfig *config; - - /* - * Assuming that the network device is a clone device, we must compare - * the major device number of stdin to the minor device number of the - * devices listed in the netconfig table. - */ - - if (fstat(fd, &from_client) != 0) { - tcpd_warn("fstat(fd %d): %m", fd); - return (0); - } - if ((handlep = setnetconfig()) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("setnetconfig: %m"); - return (0); - } - while (config = getnetconfig(handlep)) { - if (stat(config->nc_device, &from_config) == 0) { - if (minor(from_config.st_rdev) == major(from_client.st_rdev)) - break; - } - } - if (config == 0) { - tcpd_warn("unable to identify transport protocol"); - return (0); - } - - /* - * Something else may clobber our getnetconfig() result, so we'd better - * acquire our private copy. - */ - - if ((config = getnetconfigent(config->nc_netid)) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("getnetconfigent(%s): %s", config->nc_netid, nc_sperror()); - return (0); - } - return (config); -} - -/* tli_hostaddr - map TLI transport address to printable address */ - -static void tli_hostaddr(host) -struct host_info *host; -{ - struct request_info *request = host->request; - struct netconfig *config = request->config; - struct t_unitdata *unit = host->unit; - char *uaddr; - - if (config != 0 && unit != 0 - && (uaddr = taddr2uaddr(config, &unit->addr)) != 0) { - STRN_CPY(host->addr, uaddr, sizeof(host->addr)); - free(uaddr); - } -} - -/* tli_hostname - map TLI transport address to hostname */ - -static void tli_hostname(host) -struct host_info *host; -{ - struct request_info *request = host->request; - struct netconfig *config = request->config; - struct t_unitdata *unit = host->unit; - struct nd_hostservlist *servlist; - - if (config != 0 && unit != 0 - && netdir_getbyaddr(config, &servlist, &unit->addr) == ND_OK) { - - struct nd_hostserv *service = servlist->h_hostservs; - struct nd_addrlist *addr_list; - int found = 0; - - if (netdir_getbyname(config, service, &addr_list) != ND_OK) { - - /* - * Unable to verify that the name matches the address. This may - * be a transient problem or a botched name server setup. We - * decide to play safe. - */ - - tcpd_warn("can't verify hostname: netdir_getbyname(%.*s) failed", - STRING_LENGTH, service->h_host); - - } else { - - /* - * Look up the host address in the address list we just got. The - * comparison is done on the textual representation, because the - * transport address is an opaque structure that may have holes - * with uninitialized garbage. This approach obviously loses when - * the address does not have a textual representation. - */ - - char *uaddr = eval_hostaddr(host); - char *ua; - int i; - - for (i = 0; found == 0 && i < addr_list->n_cnt; i++) { - if ((ua = taddr2uaddr(config, &(addr_list->n_addrs[i]))) != 0) { - found = !strcmp(ua, uaddr); - free(ua); - } - } - netdir_free((void *) addr_list, ND_ADDRLIST); - - /* - * When the host name does not map to the initial address, assume - * someone has compromised a name server. More likely someone - * botched it, but that could be dangerous, too. - */ - - if (found == 0) - tcpd_warn("host name/address mismatch: %s != %.*s", - host->addr, STRING_LENGTH, service->h_host); - } - STRN_CPY(host->name, found ? service->h_host : paranoid, - sizeof(host->name)); - netdir_free((void *) servlist, ND_HOSTSERVLIST); - } -} - -/* tli_error - convert tli error number to text */ - -static char *tli_error() -{ - static char buf[40]; - - if (t_errno != TSYSERR) { - if (t_errno < 0 || t_errno >= t_nerr) { - sprintf(buf, "Unknown TLI error %d", t_errno); - return (buf); - } else { - return (t_errlist[t_errno]); - } - } else { - if (errno < 0 || errno >= sys_nerr) { - sprintf(buf, "Unknown UNIX error %d", errno); - return (buf); - } else { - return (sys_errlist[errno]); - } - } -} - -/* tli_sink - absorb unreceived datagram */ - -static void tli_sink(fd) -int fd; -{ - struct t_unitdata *unit; - int flags; - - /* - * Something went wrong. Absorb the datagram to keep inetd from looping. - * Allocate storage for address, control and data. If that fails, sleep - * for a couple of seconds in an attempt to keep inetd from looping too - * fast. - */ - - if ((unit = (struct t_unitdata *) t_alloc(fd, T_UNITDATA, T_ALL)) == 0) { - tcpd_warn("t_alloc: %s", tli_error()); - sleep(5); - } else { - (void) t_rcvudata(fd, unit, &flags); - t_free((void *) unit, T_UNITDATA); - } -} - -#endif /* TLI */ diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/try-from.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/try-from.c deleted file mode 100644 index 925e144d90b1..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/try-from.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,85 +0,0 @@ - /* - * This program can be called via a remote shell command to find out if the - * hostname and address are properly recognized, if username lookup works, - * and (SysV only) if the TLI on top of IP heuristics work. - * - * Example: "rsh host /some/where/try-from". - * - * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3) and redirected to stderr. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) try-from.c 1.2 94/12/28 17:42:55"; -#endif - -/* System libraries. */ - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <string.h> - -#ifdef TLI -#include <sys/tiuser.h> -#include <stropts.h> -#endif - -#ifndef STDIN_FILENO -#define STDIN_FILENO 0 -#endif - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "tcpd.h" - -int allow_severity = SEVERITY; /* run-time adjustable */ -int deny_severity = LOG_WARNING; /* ditto */ - -main(argc, argv) -int argc; -char **argv; -{ - struct request_info request; - char buf[BUFSIZ]; - char *cp; - - /* - * Simplify the process name, just like tcpd would. - */ - if ((cp = strrchr(argv[0], '/')) != 0) - argv[0] = cp + 1; - - /* - * Turn on the "IP-underneath-TLI" detection heuristics. - */ -#ifdef TLI - if (ioctl(0, I_FIND, "timod") == 0) - ioctl(0, I_PUSH, "timod"); -#endif /* TLI */ - - /* - * Look up the endpoint information. - */ - request_init(&request, RQ_DAEMON, argv[0], RQ_FILE, STDIN_FILENO, 0); - (void) fromhost(&request); - - /* - * Show some results. Name and address information is looked up when we - * ask for it. - */ - -#define EXPAND(str) percent_x(buf, sizeof(buf), str, &request) - - puts(EXPAND("client address (%%a): %a")); - puts(EXPAND("client hostname (%%n): %n")); - puts(EXPAND("client username (%%u): %u")); - puts(EXPAND("client info (%%c): %c")); - puts(EXPAND("server address (%%A): %A")); - puts(EXPAND("server hostname (%%N): %N")); - puts(EXPAND("server process (%%d): %d")); - puts(EXPAND("server info (%%s): %s")); - - return (0); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/update.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/update.c deleted file mode 100644 index a76cf2bb2375..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/update.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,119 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Routines for controlled update/initialization of request structures. - * - * request_init() initializes its argument. Pointers and string-valued members - * are initialized to zero, to indicate that no lookup has been attempted. - * - * request_set() adds information to an already initialized request structure. - * - * Both functions take a variable-length name-value list. - * - * Diagnostics are reported through syslog(3). - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) update.c 1.1 94/12/28 17:42:56"; -#endif - -/* System libraries */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <string.h> - -/* Local stuff. */ - -#include "mystdarg.h" -#include "tcpd.h" - -/* request_fill - request update engine */ - -static struct request_info *request_fill(request, ap) -struct request_info *request; -va_list ap; -{ - int key; - char *ptr; - - while ((key = va_arg(ap, int)) > 0) { - switch (key) { - default: - tcpd_warn("request_fill: invalid key: %d", key); - return (request); - case RQ_FILE: - request->fd = va_arg(ap, int); - continue; - case RQ_CLIENT_SIN: - request->client->sin = va_arg(ap, struct sockaddr_in *); - continue; - case RQ_SERVER_SIN: - request->server->sin = va_arg(ap, struct sockaddr_in *); - continue; - - /* - * All other fields are strings with the same maximal length. - */ - - case RQ_DAEMON: - ptr = request->daemon; - break; - case RQ_USER: - ptr = request->user; - break; - case RQ_CLIENT_NAME: - ptr = request->client->name; - break; - case RQ_CLIENT_ADDR: - ptr = request->client->addr; - break; - case RQ_SERVER_NAME: - ptr = request->server->name; - break; - case RQ_SERVER_ADDR: - ptr = request->server->addr; - break; - } - STRN_CPY(ptr, va_arg(ap, char *), STRING_LENGTH); - } - return (request); -} - -/* request_init - initialize request structure */ - -struct request_info *VARARGS(request_init, struct request_info *, request) -{ - static struct request_info default_info; - struct request_info *r; - va_list ap; - - /* - * Initialize data members. We do not assign default function pointer - * members, to avoid pulling in the whole socket module when it is not - * really needed. - */ - VASTART(ap, struct request_info *, request); - *request = default_info; - request->fd = -1; - strcpy(request->daemon, unknown); - sprintf(request->pid, "%d", getpid()); - request->client->request = request; - request->server->request = request; - r = request_fill(request, ap); - VAEND(ap); - return (r); -} - -/* request_set - update request structure */ - -struct request_info *VARARGS(request_set, struct request_info *, request) -{ - struct request_info *r; - va_list ap; - - VASTART(ap, struct request_info *, request); - r = request_fill(request, ap); - VAEND(ap); - return (r); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/vfprintf.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/vfprintf.c deleted file mode 100644 index d6f37d59bfe8..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/vfprintf.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,125 +0,0 @@ - /* - * vfprintf() and vprintf() clones. They will produce unexpected results - * when excessive dynamic ("*") field widths are specified. To be used for - * testing purposes only. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -static char sccsid[] = "@(#) vfprintf.c 1.2 94/03/23 17:44:46"; -#endif - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <ctype.h> -#ifdef __STDC__ -#include <stdarg.h> -#else -#include <varargs.h> -#endif - -/* vfprintf - print variable-length argument list to stream */ - -int vfprintf(fp, format, ap) -FILE *fp; -char *format; -va_list ap; -{ - char fmt[BUFSIZ]; /* format specifier */ - register char *fmtp; - register char *cp; - int count = 0; - - /* - * Iterate over characters in the format string, picking up arguments - * when format specifiers are found. - */ - - for (cp = format; *cp; cp++) { - if (*cp != '%') { - putc(*cp, fp); /* ordinary character */ - count++; - } else { - - /* - * Format specifiers are handled one at a time, since we can only - * deal with arguments one at a time. Try to determine the end of - * the format specifier. We do not attempt to fully parse format - * strings, since we are ging to let fprintf() do the hard work. - * In regular expression notation, we recognize: - * - * %-?0?([0-9]+|\*)?\.?([0-9]+|\*)?l?[a-z] - * - * which includes some combinations that do not make sense. - */ - - fmtp = fmt; - *fmtp++ = *cp++; - if (*cp == '-') /* left-adjusted field? */ - *fmtp++ = *cp++; - if (*cp == '0') /* zero-padded field? */ - *fmtp++ = *cp++; - if (*cp == '*') { /* dynamic field witdh */ - sprintf(fmtp, "%d", va_arg(ap, int)); - fmtp += strlen(fmtp); - cp++; - } else { - while (isdigit(*cp)) /* hard-coded field width */ - *fmtp++ = *cp++; - } - if (*cp == '.') /* width/precision separator */ - *fmtp++ = *cp++; - if (*cp == '*') { /* dynamic precision */ - sprintf(fmtp, "%d", va_arg(ap, int)); - fmtp += strlen(fmtp); - cp++; - } else { - while (isdigit(*cp)) /* hard-coded precision */ - *fmtp++ = *cp++; - } - if (*cp == 'l') /* long whatever */ - *fmtp++ = *cp++; - if (*cp == 0) /* premature end, punt */ - break; - *fmtp++ = *cp; /* type (checked below) */ - *fmtp = 0; - - /* Execute the format string - let fprintf() do the hard work. */ - - switch (fmtp[-1]) { - case 's': /* string-valued argument */ - count += fprintf(fp, fmt, va_arg(ap, char *)); - break; - case 'c': /* integral-valued argument */ - case 'd': - case 'u': - case 'o': - case 'x': - if (fmtp[-2] == 'l') - count += fprintf(fp, fmt, va_arg(ap, long)); - else - count += fprintf(fp, fmt, va_arg(ap, int)); - break; - case 'e': /* float-valued argument */ - case 'f': - case 'g': - count += fprintf(fp, fmt, va_arg(ap, double)); - break; - default: /* anything else */ - putc(fmtp[-1], fp); - count++; - break; - } - } - } - return (count); -} - -/* vprintf - print variable-length argument list to stdout */ - -vprintf(format, ap) -char *format; -va_list ap; -{ - return (vfprintf(stdout, format, ap)); -} diff --git a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/workarounds.c b/contrib/tcp_wrappers/workarounds.c deleted file mode 100644 index 9ffa247a90ba..000000000000 --- a/contrib/tcp_wrappers/workarounds.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,308 +0,0 @@ - /* - * Workarounds for known system software bugs. This module provides wrappers - * around library functions and system calls that are known to have problems - * on some systems. Most of these workarounds won't do any harm on regular - * systems. - * - * Author: Wietse Venema, Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands. - */ - -#ifndef lint -char sccsid[] = "@(#) workarounds.c 1.6 96/03/19 16:22:25"; -#endif - -#include <sys/types.h> -#include <sys/param.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <arpa/inet.h> -#include <netdb.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <syslog.h> -#include <string.h> - -extern int errno; - -#include "tcpd.h" - - /* - * Some AIX versions advertise a too small MAXHOSTNAMELEN value (32). - * Result: long hostnames would be truncated, and connections would be - * dropped because of host name verification failures. Adrian van Bloois - * (A.vanBloois@info.nic.surfnet.nl) figured out what was the problem. - */ - -#if (MAXHOSTNAMELEN < 64) -#undef MAXHOSTNAMELEN -#endif - -/* In case not defined in <sys/param.h>. */ - -#ifndef MAXHOSTNAMELEN -#define MAXHOSTNAMELEN 256 /* storage for host name */ -#endif - - /* - * Some DG/UX inet_addr() versions return a struct/union instead of a long. - * You have this problem when the compiler complains about illegal lvalues - * or something like that. The following code fixes this mutant behaviour. - * It should not be enabled on "normal" systems. - * - * Bug reported by ben@piglet.cr.usgs.gov (Rev. Ben A. Mesander). - */ - -#ifdef INET_ADDR_BUG - -#undef inet_addr - -long fix_inet_addr(string) -char *string; -{ - return (inet_addr(string).s_addr); -} - -#endif /* INET_ADDR_BUG */ - - /* - * With some System-V versions, the fgets() library function does not - * account for partial reads from e.g. sockets. The result is that fgets() - * gives up too soon, causing username lookups to fail. Problem first - * reported for IRIX 4.0.5, by Steve Kotsopoulos <steve@ecf.toronto.edu>. - * The following code works around the problem. It does no harm on "normal" - * systems. - */ - -#ifdef BROKEN_FGETS - -#undef fgets - -char *fix_fgets(buf, len, fp) -char *buf; -int len; -FILE *fp; -{ - char *cp = buf; - int c; - - /* - * Copy until the buffer fills up, until EOF, or until a newline is - * found. - */ - while (len > 1 && (c = getc(fp)) != EOF) { - len--; - *cp++ = c; - if (c == '\n') - break; - } - - /* - * Return 0 if nothing was read. This is correct even when a silly buffer - * length was specified. - */ - if (cp > buf) { - *cp = 0; - return (buf); - } else { - return (0); - } -} - -#endif /* BROKEN_FGETS */ - - /* - * With early SunOS 5 versions, recvfrom() does not completely fill in the - * source address structure when doing a non-destructive read. The following - * code works around the problem. It does no harm on "normal" systems. - */ - -#ifdef RECVFROM_BUG - -#undef recvfrom - -int fix_recvfrom(sock, buf, buflen, flags, from, fromlen) -int sock; -char *buf; -int buflen; -int flags; -struct sockaddr *from; -int *fromlen; -{ - int ret; - - /* Assume that both ends of a socket belong to the same address family. */ - - if ((ret = recvfrom(sock, buf, buflen, flags, from, fromlen)) >= 0) { - if (from->sa_family == 0) { - struct sockaddr my_addr; - int my_addr_len = sizeof(my_addr); - - if (getsockname(0, &my_addr, &my_addr_len)) { - tcpd_warn("getsockname: %m"); - } else { - from->sa_family = my_addr.sa_family; - } - } - } - return (ret); -} - -#endif /* RECVFROM_BUG */ - - /* - * The Apollo SR10.3 and some SYSV4 getpeername(2) versions do not return an - * error in case of a datagram-oriented socket. Instead, they claim that all - * UDP requests come from address 0.0.0.0. The following code works around - * the problem. It does no harm on "normal" systems. - */ - -#ifdef GETPEERNAME_BUG - -#undef getpeername - -int fix_getpeername(sock, sa, len) -int sock; -struct sockaddr *sa; -int *len; -{ - int ret; - struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *) sa; - - if ((ret = getpeername(sock, sa, len)) >= 0 - && sa->sa_family == AF_INET - && sin->sin_addr.s_addr == 0) { - errno = ENOTCONN; - return (-1); - } else { - return (ret); - } -} - -#endif /* GETPEERNAME_BUG */ - - /* - * According to Karl Vogel (vogelke@c-17igp.wpafb.af.mil) some Pyramid - * versions have no yp_default_domain() function. We use getdomainname() - * instead. - */ - -#ifdef USE_GETDOMAIN - -int yp_get_default_domain(ptr) -char **ptr; -{ - static char mydomain[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; - - *ptr = mydomain; - return (getdomainname(mydomain, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)); -} - -#endif /* USE_GETDOMAIN */ - -#ifndef INADDR_NONE -#define INADDR_NONE 0xffffffff -#endif - - /* - * Solaris 2.4 gethostbyname() has problems with multihomed hosts. When - * doing DNS through NIS, only one host address ends up in the address list. - * All other addresses end up in the hostname alias list, interspersed with - * copies of the official host name. This would wreak havoc with tcpd's - * hostname double checks. Below is a workaround that should do no harm when - * accidentally left in. A side effect of the workaround is that address - * list members are no longer properly aligned for structure access. - */ - -#ifdef SOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG - -#undef gethostbyname - -struct hostent *fix_gethostbyname(name) -char *name; -{ - struct hostent *hp; - struct in_addr addr; - char **o_addr_list; - char **o_aliases; - char **n_addr_list; - int broken_gethostbyname = 0; - - if ((hp = gethostbyname(name)) && !hp->h_addr_list[1] && hp->h_aliases[1]) { - for (o_aliases = n_addr_list = hp->h_aliases; *o_aliases; o_aliases++) { - if ((addr.s_addr = inet_addr(*o_aliases)) != INADDR_NONE) { - memcpy(*n_addr_list++, (char *) &addr, hp->h_length); - broken_gethostbyname = 1; - } - } - if (broken_gethostbyname) { - o_addr_list = hp->h_addr_list; - memcpy(*n_addr_list++, *o_addr_list, hp->h_length); - *n_addr_list = 0; - hp->h_addr_list = hp->h_aliases; - hp->h_aliases = o_addr_list + 1; - } - } - return (hp); -} - -#endif /* SOLARIS_24_GETHOSTBYNAME_BUG */ - - /* - * Horror! Some FreeBSD 2.0 libc routines call strtok(). Since tcpd depends - * heavily on strtok(), strange things may happen. Workaround: use our - * private strtok(). This has been fixed in the meantime. - */ - -#ifdef USE_STRSEP - -char *fix_strtok(buf, sep) -char *buf; -char *sep; -{ - static char *state; - char *result; - - if (buf) - state = buf; - while ((result = strsep(&state, sep)) && result[0] == 0) - /* void */ ; - return (result); -} - -#endif /* USE_STRSEP */ - - /* - * IRIX 5.3 (and possibly earlier versions, too) library routines call the - * non-reentrant strtok() library routine, causing hosts to slip through - * allow/deny filters. Workaround: don't rely on the vendor and use our own - * strtok() function. FreeBSD 2.0 has a similar problem (fixed in 2.0.5). - */ - -#ifdef LIBC_CALLS_STRTOK - -char *my_strtok(buf, sep) -char *buf; -char *sep; -{ - static char *state; - char *result; - - if (buf) - state = buf; - - /* - * Skip over separator characters and detect end of string. - */ - if (*(state += strspn(state, sep)) == 0) - return (0); - - /* - * Skip over non-separator characters and terminate result. - */ - result = state; - if (*(state += strcspn(state, sep)) != 0) - *state++ = 0; - return (result); -} - -#endif /* LIBC_CALLS_STRTOK */ |