diff options
| author | Enji Cooper <ngie@FreeBSD.org> | 2026-01-29 01:27:53 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Enji Cooper <ngie@FreeBSD.org> | 2026-01-29 01:27:53 +0000 |
| commit | 808413da28df9fb93e1f304e6016b15e660f54c8 (patch) | |
| tree | f3ecb4f928716223c9563ee34e044ab84549debb /crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c | |
| parent | 8e12a5c4eb3507846b507d0afe87d115af41df40 (diff) | |
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c | 42 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c b/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c index e4f3bffed720..1c8d2135fdab 100644 --- a/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c +++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ * returns ASN1_BIT_STRING representing the protection on success, else NULL */ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, - const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) + const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) { ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL; OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part; @@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, } if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->propq, - pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len, - ctx->secretValue->data, ctx->secretValue->length, - &protection, &sig_len)) + pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len, + ctx->secretValue->data, ctx->secretValue->length, + &protection, &sig_len)) goto end; if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, if (ctx->pkey == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, - CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION); + CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION); return NULL; } if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_name(ctx->pkey, name, sizeof(name)) > 0 @@ -121,9 +121,9 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) return NULL; if (ASN1_item_sign_ex(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_PROTECTEDPART), - msg->header->protectionAlg, /* sets X509_ALGOR */ - NULL, prot, &prot_part, NULL, ctx->pkey, md, - ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) + msg->header->protectionAlg, /* sets X509_ALGOR */ + NULL, prot, &prot_part, NULL, ctx->pkey, md, + ctx->libctx, ctx->propq)) return prot; ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot); return NULL; @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ void ossl_cmp_set_own_chain(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx) if (ctx->chain == NULL) { ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "trying to build chain for own CMP signer cert"); ctx->chain = X509_build_chain(ctx->cert, ctx->untrusted, NULL, 0, - ctx->libctx, ctx->propq); + ctx->libctx, ctx->propq); if (ctx->chain != NULL) { ossl_cmp_debug(ctx, "success building chain for own CMP signer cert"); } else { @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) /* Add first ctx->cert and its chain if using signature-based protection */ if (!ctx->unprotectedSend && ctx->secretValue == NULL - && ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) { + && ctx->cert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) { int prepend = X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP | X509_ADD_FLAG_PREPEND | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_SS; @@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) /* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */ if (!ossl_x509_add_certs_new(&msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut, - X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP)) + X509_ADD_FLAG_UP_REF | X509_ADD_FLAG_NO_DUP)) return 0; /* in case extraCerts are empty list avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */ @@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ static X509_ALGOR *pbmac_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx) return NULL; pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->libctx, ctx->pbm_slen, - EVP_MD_get_type(ctx->pbm_owf), ctx->pbm_itercnt, - ctx->pbm_mac); + EVP_MD_get_type(ctx->pbm_owf), ctx->pbm_itercnt, + ctx->pbm_mac); pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL) goto err; @@ -212,8 +212,8 @@ static X509_ALGOR *pbmac_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx) if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len)) goto err; alg = ossl_X509_ALGOR_from_nid(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC, - V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str); - err: + V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str); +err: if (alg == NULL) ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str); OPENSSL_free(pbm_der); @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static X509_ALGOR *pbmac_algor(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx) } static int set_senderKID(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, - const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id) + const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id) { if (id == NULL) id = ctx->referenceValue; /* standard for PBM, fallback for sig-based */ @@ -280,12 +280,12 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) */ } else { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, - CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION); + CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION); goto err; } if (!ctx->unprotectedSend /* protect according to msg->header->protectionAlg partly set above */ - && ((msg->protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL)) + && ((msg->protection = ossl_cmp_calc_protection(ctx, msg)) == NULL)) goto err; /* @@ -298,16 +298,16 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg) goto err; /* - * As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known + * As required by RFC 9810 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known * to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least * the senderKID must be set, where we took the referenceValue as fallback. */ if (!(ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(msg->header->sender) - && msg->header->senderKID == NULL)) + && msg->header->senderKID == NULL)) return 1; ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION); - err: +err: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CMP, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE); return 0; } |
