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Diffstat (limited to 'contrib/llvm/tools/clang/lib/StaticAnalyzer/Checkers/MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | contrib/llvm/tools/clang/lib/StaticAnalyzer/Checkers/MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp | 337 |
1 files changed, 337 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/contrib/llvm/tools/clang/lib/StaticAnalyzer/Checkers/MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp b/contrib/llvm/tools/clang/lib/StaticAnalyzer/Checkers/MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..fc2ab1d6e3f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/contrib/llvm/tools/clang/lib/StaticAnalyzer/Checkers/MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,337 @@ +// MallocOverflowSecurityChecker.cpp - Check for malloc overflows -*- C++ -*-=// +// +// The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure +// +// This file is distributed under the University of Illinois Open Source +// License. See LICENSE.TXT for details. +// +//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===// +// +// This checker detects a common memory allocation security flaw. +// Suppose 'unsigned int n' comes from an untrusted source. If the +// code looks like 'malloc (n * 4)', and an attacker can make 'n' be +// say MAX_UINT/4+2, then instead of allocating the correct 'n' 4-byte +// elements, this will actually allocate only two because of overflow. +// Then when the rest of the program attempts to store values past the +// second element, these values will actually overwrite other items in +// the heap, probably allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code. +// +//===----------------------------------------------------------------------===// + +#include "ClangSACheckers.h" +#include "clang/AST/EvaluatedExprVisitor.h" +#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/BugReporter/BugReporter.h" +#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/Checker.h" +#include "clang/StaticAnalyzer/Core/PathSensitive/AnalysisManager.h" +#include "llvm/ADT/APSInt.h" +#include "llvm/ADT/SmallVector.h" +#include <utility> + +using namespace clang; +using namespace ento; +using llvm::APSInt; + +namespace { +struct MallocOverflowCheck { + const BinaryOperator *mulop; + const Expr *variable; + APSInt maxVal; + + MallocOverflowCheck(const BinaryOperator *m, const Expr *v, APSInt val) + : mulop(m), variable(v), maxVal(std::move(val)) {} +}; + +class MallocOverflowSecurityChecker : public Checker<check::ASTCodeBody> { +public: + void checkASTCodeBody(const Decl *D, AnalysisManager &mgr, + BugReporter &BR) const; + + void CheckMallocArgument( + SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows, + const Expr *TheArgument, ASTContext &Context) const; + + void OutputPossibleOverflows( + SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows, + const Decl *D, BugReporter &BR, AnalysisManager &mgr) const; + +}; +} // end anonymous namespace + +// Return true for computations which evaluate to zero: e.g., mult by 0. +static inline bool EvaluatesToZero(APSInt &Val, BinaryOperatorKind op) { + return (op == BO_Mul) && (Val == 0); +} + +void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::CheckMallocArgument( + SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows, + const Expr *TheArgument, + ASTContext &Context) const { + + /* Look for a linear combination with a single variable, and at least + one multiplication. + Reject anything that applies to the variable: an explicit cast, + conditional expression, an operation that could reduce the range + of the result, or anything too complicated :-). */ + const Expr *e = TheArgument; + const BinaryOperator * mulop = nullptr; + APSInt maxVal; + + for (;;) { + maxVal = 0; + e = e->IgnoreParenImpCasts(); + if (const BinaryOperator *binop = dyn_cast<BinaryOperator>(e)) { + BinaryOperatorKind opc = binop->getOpcode(); + // TODO: ignore multiplications by 1, reject if multiplied by 0. + if (mulop == nullptr && opc == BO_Mul) + mulop = binop; + if (opc != BO_Mul && opc != BO_Add && opc != BO_Sub && opc != BO_Shl) + return; + + const Expr *lhs = binop->getLHS(); + const Expr *rhs = binop->getRHS(); + if (rhs->isEvaluatable(Context)) { + e = lhs; + maxVal = rhs->EvaluateKnownConstInt(Context); + if (EvaluatesToZero(maxVal, opc)) + return; + } else if ((opc == BO_Add || opc == BO_Mul) && + lhs->isEvaluatable(Context)) { + maxVal = lhs->EvaluateKnownConstInt(Context); + if (EvaluatesToZero(maxVal, opc)) + return; + e = rhs; + } else + return; + } + else if (isa<DeclRefExpr>(e) || isa<MemberExpr>(e)) + break; + else + return; + } + + if (mulop == nullptr) + return; + + // We've found the right structure of malloc argument, now save + // the data so when the body of the function is completely available + // we can check for comparisons. + + // TODO: Could push this into the innermost scope where 'e' is + // defined, rather than the whole function. + PossibleMallocOverflows.push_back(MallocOverflowCheck(mulop, e, maxVal)); +} + +namespace { +// A worker class for OutputPossibleOverflows. +class CheckOverflowOps : + public EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps> { +public: + typedef SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> theVecType; + +private: + theVecType &toScanFor; + ASTContext &Context; + + bool isIntZeroExpr(const Expr *E) const { + if (!E->getType()->isIntegralOrEnumerationType()) + return false; + llvm::APSInt Result; + if (E->EvaluateAsInt(Result, Context)) + return Result == 0; + return false; + } + + static const Decl *getDecl(const DeclRefExpr *DR) { return DR->getDecl(); } + static const Decl *getDecl(const MemberExpr *ME) { + return ME->getMemberDecl(); + } + + template <typename T1> + void Erase(const T1 *DR, + llvm::function_ref<bool(const MallocOverflowCheck &)> Pred) { + auto P = [DR, Pred](const MallocOverflowCheck &Check) { + if (const auto *CheckDR = dyn_cast<T1>(Check.variable)) + return getDecl(CheckDR) == getDecl(DR) && Pred(Check); + return false; + }; + toScanFor.erase(std::remove_if(toScanFor.begin(), toScanFor.end(), P), + toScanFor.end()); + } + + void CheckExpr(const Expr *E_p) { + auto PredTrue = [](const MallocOverflowCheck &) { return true; }; + const Expr *E = E_p->IgnoreParenImpCasts(); + if (const DeclRefExpr *DR = dyn_cast<DeclRefExpr>(E)) + Erase<DeclRefExpr>(DR, PredTrue); + else if (const auto *ME = dyn_cast<MemberExpr>(E)) { + Erase<MemberExpr>(ME, PredTrue); + } + } + + // Check if the argument to malloc is assigned a value + // which cannot cause an overflow. + // e.g., malloc (mul * x) and, + // case 1: mul = <constant value> + // case 2: mul = a/b, where b > x + void CheckAssignmentExpr(BinaryOperator *AssignEx) { + bool assignKnown = false; + bool numeratorKnown = false, denomKnown = false; + APSInt denomVal; + denomVal = 0; + + // Erase if the multiplicand was assigned a constant value. + const Expr *rhs = AssignEx->getRHS(); + if (rhs->isEvaluatable(Context)) + assignKnown = true; + + // Discard the report if the multiplicand was assigned a value, + // that can never overflow after multiplication. e.g., the assignment + // is a division operator and the denominator is > other multiplicand. + const Expr *rhse = rhs->IgnoreParenImpCasts(); + if (const BinaryOperator *BOp = dyn_cast<BinaryOperator>(rhse)) { + if (BOp->getOpcode() == BO_Div) { + const Expr *denom = BOp->getRHS()->IgnoreParenImpCasts(); + if (denom->EvaluateAsInt(denomVal, Context)) + denomKnown = true; + const Expr *numerator = BOp->getLHS()->IgnoreParenImpCasts(); + if (numerator->isEvaluatable(Context)) + numeratorKnown = true; + } + } + if (!assignKnown && !denomKnown) + return; + auto denomExtVal = denomVal.getExtValue(); + + // Ignore negative denominator. + if (denomExtVal < 0) + return; + + const Expr *lhs = AssignEx->getLHS(); + const Expr *E = lhs->IgnoreParenImpCasts(); + + auto pred = [assignKnown, numeratorKnown, + denomExtVal](const MallocOverflowCheck &Check) { + return assignKnown || + (numeratorKnown && (denomExtVal >= Check.maxVal.getExtValue())); + }; + + if (const DeclRefExpr *DR = dyn_cast<DeclRefExpr>(E)) + Erase<DeclRefExpr>(DR, pred); + else if (const auto *ME = dyn_cast<MemberExpr>(E)) + Erase<MemberExpr>(ME, pred); + } + + public: + void VisitBinaryOperator(BinaryOperator *E) { + if (E->isComparisonOp()) { + const Expr * lhs = E->getLHS(); + const Expr * rhs = E->getRHS(); + // Ignore comparisons against zero, since they generally don't + // protect against an overflow. + if (!isIntZeroExpr(lhs) && !isIntZeroExpr(rhs)) { + CheckExpr(lhs); + CheckExpr(rhs); + } + } + if (E->isAssignmentOp()) + CheckAssignmentExpr(E); + EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps>::VisitBinaryOperator(E); + } + + /* We specifically ignore loop conditions, because they're typically + not error checks. */ + void VisitWhileStmt(WhileStmt *S) { + return this->Visit(S->getBody()); + } + void VisitForStmt(ForStmt *S) { + return this->Visit(S->getBody()); + } + void VisitDoStmt(DoStmt *S) { + return this->Visit(S->getBody()); + } + + CheckOverflowOps(theVecType &v, ASTContext &ctx) + : EvaluatedExprVisitor<CheckOverflowOps>(ctx), + toScanFor(v), Context(ctx) + { } + }; +} + +// OutputPossibleOverflows - We've found a possible overflow earlier, +// now check whether Body might contain a comparison which might be +// preventing the overflow. +// This doesn't do flow analysis, range analysis, or points-to analysis; it's +// just a dumb "is there a comparison" scan. The aim here is to +// detect the most blatent cases of overflow and educate the +// programmer. +void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::OutputPossibleOverflows( + SmallVectorImpl<MallocOverflowCheck> &PossibleMallocOverflows, + const Decl *D, BugReporter &BR, AnalysisManager &mgr) const { + // By far the most common case: nothing to check. + if (PossibleMallocOverflows.empty()) + return; + + // Delete any possible overflows which have a comparison. + CheckOverflowOps c(PossibleMallocOverflows, BR.getContext()); + c.Visit(mgr.getAnalysisDeclContext(D)->getBody()); + + // Output warnings for all overflows that are left. + for (CheckOverflowOps::theVecType::iterator + i = PossibleMallocOverflows.begin(), + e = PossibleMallocOverflows.end(); + i != e; + ++i) { + BR.EmitBasicReport( + D, this, "malloc() size overflow", categories::UnixAPI, + "the computation of the size of the memory allocation may overflow", + PathDiagnosticLocation::createOperatorLoc(i->mulop, + BR.getSourceManager()), + i->mulop->getSourceRange()); + } +} + +void MallocOverflowSecurityChecker::checkASTCodeBody(const Decl *D, + AnalysisManager &mgr, + BugReporter &BR) const { + + CFG *cfg = mgr.getCFG(D); + if (!cfg) + return; + + // A list of variables referenced in possibly overflowing malloc operands. + SmallVector<MallocOverflowCheck, 2> PossibleMallocOverflows; + + for (CFG::iterator it = cfg->begin(), ei = cfg->end(); it != ei; ++it) { + CFGBlock *block = *it; + for (CFGBlock::iterator bi = block->begin(), be = block->end(); + bi != be; ++bi) { + if (Optional<CFGStmt> CS = bi->getAs<CFGStmt>()) { + if (const CallExpr *TheCall = dyn_cast<CallExpr>(CS->getStmt())) { + // Get the callee. + const FunctionDecl *FD = TheCall->getDirectCallee(); + + if (!FD) + continue; + + // Get the name of the callee. If it's a builtin, strip off the prefix. + IdentifierInfo *FnInfo = FD->getIdentifier(); + if (!FnInfo) + continue; + + if (FnInfo->isStr ("malloc") || FnInfo->isStr ("_MALLOC")) { + if (TheCall->getNumArgs() == 1) + CheckMallocArgument(PossibleMallocOverflows, TheCall->getArg(0), + mgr.getASTContext()); + } + } + } + } + } + + OutputPossibleOverflows(PossibleMallocOverflows, D, BR, mgr); +} + +void +ento::registerMallocOverflowSecurityChecker(CheckerManager &mgr) { + mgr.registerChecker<MallocOverflowSecurityChecker>(); +} |