diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 348 |
1 files changed, 171 insertions, 177 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index d19efeaa9919..1f1fe26b98c7 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -30,16 +30,16 @@ /* CRL score values */ -#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ -#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ -#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* CRL times valid */ -#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ +#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* No unhandled critical extensions */ +#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ +#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* CRL times valid */ +#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ #define CRL_SCORE_VALID /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ \ (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL | CRL_SCORE_TIME | CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) -#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ -#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ -#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ -#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ +#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ +#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ +#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ +#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); @@ -61,20 +61,20 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); static int check_curve(X509 *cert); static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, - unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); + unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, - X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); + X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, - int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, - STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); + int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, + STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, - int *pcrl_score); + int *pcrl_score); static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, - unsigned int *preasons); + unsigned int *preasons); static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, - STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, - STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); + STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, + STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); @@ -163,9 +163,9 @@ static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err) return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } -#define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \ +#define CB_FAIL_IF(cond, ctx, cert, depth, err) \ if ((cond) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, depth, err) == 0) \ - return 0 + return 0 /*- * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the @@ -196,13 +196,13 @@ static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) * check the security of issuer keys. */ CB_FAIL_IF(i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert), - ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); /* * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1. */ CB_FAIL_IF(i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert), - ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); + ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); } return 1; } @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) return ok; err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, - ctx->param->flags); + ctx->param->flags); CB_FAIL_IF(err != X509_V_OK, ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err); /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ CB_FAIL_IF(!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert), - ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); ret = DANETLS_ENABLED(ctx->dane) ? dane_verify(ctx) : verify_chain(ctx); @@ -332,8 +332,7 @@ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) { if (ossl_x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1)) return issuer; - if (rv == NULL || ASN1_TIME_compare(X509_get0_notAfter(issuer), - X509_get0_notAfter(rv)) > 0) + if (rv == NULL || ASN1_TIME_compare(X509_get0_notAfter(issuer), X509_get0_notAfter(rv)) > 0) rv = issuer; } } @@ -371,7 +370,7 @@ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) * Returns NULL on internal error (such as out of memory). */ static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, - const X509_NAME *nm) + const X509_NAME *nm) { STACK_OF(X509) *sk = sk_X509_new_null(); X509 *x; @@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, * Sadly, returns 0 also on internal error. */ static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth, - int must_be_ca) + int must_be_ca) { int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; @@ -471,24 +470,23 @@ static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) allow_proxy_certs = 0; purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; } else { - allow_proxy_certs = - (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS) != 0; + allow_proxy_certs = (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS) != 0; purpose = ctx->param->purpose; } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0 - && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); + && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION); CB_FAIL_IF(!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) != 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED); + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED); ret = X509_check_ca(x); switch (must_be_ca) { case -1: CB_FAIL_IF((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0 - && ret != 1 && ret != 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA); + && ret != 1 && ret != 0, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA); break; case 0: CB_FAIL_IF(ret != 0, ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA); @@ -496,9 +494,10 @@ static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) default: /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */ CB_FAIL_IF(ret == 0 - || ((i + 1 < num + || ((i + 1 < num || (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) != 0) - && ret != 1), ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA); + && ret != 1), + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA); break; } if (num > 1) { @@ -521,62 +520,63 @@ static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) /* Check Basic Constraints according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.9 */ if (x->ex_pathlen != -1) { CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA); + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA); CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) == 0, ctx, - x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN); + x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATHLEN_WITHOUT_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN); } CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 - && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0 - && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL) == 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL); + && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS) != 0 + && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_BCONS_CRITICAL) == 0, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_BCONS_NOT_CRITICAL); /* Check Key Usage according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.3 */ if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0) { CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) == 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE); + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_CERT_MISSING_KEY_USAGE); } else { CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_kusage & KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN) != 0, ctx, x, i, - X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA); + X509_V_ERR_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN_INVALID_FOR_NON_CA); } /* Check issuer is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.4 */ CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_issuer_name(x)) == 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY); + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_ISSUER_NAME_EMPTY); /* Check subject is non-empty acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.2.6 */ CB_FAIL_IF(((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 - || (x->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0 - || x->altname == NULL) - && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY); + || (x->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) != 0 + || x->altname == NULL) + && X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_NAME_EMPTY); CB_FAIL_IF(X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0 - && x->altname != NULL - && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL) == 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL); + && x->altname != NULL + && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SAN_CRITICAL) == 0, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_SAN_NOT_CRITICAL); /* Check SAN is non-empty according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.6 */ CB_FAIL_IF(x->altname != NULL - && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname) <= 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME); + && sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname) <= 0, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EMPTY_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME); /* Check sig alg consistency acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.1.1.2 */ CB_FAIL_IF(X509_ALGOR_cmp(&x->sig_alg, &x->cert_info.signature) != 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY); + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM_INCONSISTENCY); CB_FAIL_IF(x->akid != NULL - && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL) != 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL); + && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_AKID_CRITICAL) != 0, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL); CB_FAIL_IF(x->skid != NULL - && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL) != 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL); + && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SKID_CRITICAL) != 0, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_CRITICAL); if (X509_get_version(x) >= X509_VERSION_3) { /* Check AKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.1 */ CB_FAIL_IF(i + 1 < num /* * this means not last cert in chain, * taken as "generated by conforming CAs" */ - && (x->akid == NULL || x->akid->keyid == NULL), ctx, - x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER); + && (x->akid == NULL || x->akid->keyid == NULL), + ctx, + x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER); /* Check SKID presence acc. to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.2 */ CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) != 0 && x->skid == NULL, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER); + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_MISSING_SUBJECT_KEY_IDENTIFIER); } else { CB_FAIL_IF(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(X509_get0_extensions(x)) > 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3); + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_EXTENSIONS_REQUIRE_VERSION_3); } } @@ -585,8 +585,8 @@ static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) return 0; /* Check path length */ CB_FAIL_IF(i > 1 && x->ex_pathlen != -1 - && plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); + && plen > x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length, + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); /* Increment path length if not a self-issued intermediate CA */ if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0) plen++; @@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ static int check_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) */ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { CB_FAIL_IF(proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; } proxy_path_length++; @@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) */ if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_loc)) == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, - last_loc - 1))) { + last_loc - 1))) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } @@ -739,9 +739,11 @@ static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) /* If EE certificate check commonName too */ if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0 && (ctx->param->hostflags - & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0 + & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) + == 0 && ((ctx->param->hostflags - & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0 + & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) + != 0 || (ret = has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS)) == 0)) rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc); if (ret < 0) @@ -795,7 +797,7 @@ static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) return 0; } if (vpm->email != NULL - && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { + && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) return 0; } @@ -853,7 +855,7 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) } if (num_untrusted == num - && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0) { + && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) != 0) { /* * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf * for a direct trust store match. @@ -889,11 +891,12 @@ static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) */ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; - rejected: +rejected: return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED) == 0 - ? X509_TRUST_REJECTED : X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; + ? X509_TRUST_REJECTED + : X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; - trusted: +trusted: if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; if (dane->pdpth < 0) @@ -948,10 +951,20 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ - if (ctx->get_crl != NULL) + if (ctx->get_crl != NULL) { + X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; + unsigned int reasons = 0; + ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); - else + if (crl != NULL) { + ctx->current_crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, + &reasons, crl, x); + ctx->current_issuer = crl_issuer; + ctx->current_reasons = reasons; + } + } else { ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); + } /* If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */ if (!ok) { ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); @@ -993,7 +1006,7 @@ static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) goto done; } } - done: +done: X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); @@ -1054,8 +1067,8 @@ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) } static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, - X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, - STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) + X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, + STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; @@ -1074,7 +1087,8 @@ static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, int day, sec; if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl), - X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) + X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) + == 0) continue; /* * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| @@ -1150,7 +1164,8 @@ static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) return 0; /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), - X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)) != 0) + X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)) + != 0) return 0; /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) @@ -1169,7 +1184,7 @@ static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) * retrieve a chain of deltas... */ static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, - X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) + X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { X509_CRL *delta; int i; @@ -1199,7 +1214,7 @@ static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. */ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, - unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) + unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { int crl_score = 0; unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; @@ -1255,11 +1270,10 @@ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, *preasons = tmp_reasons; return crl_score; - } static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, - X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) + X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) { X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; const X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); @@ -1318,7 +1332,7 @@ static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, */ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { - X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx = {0}; + X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx = { 0 }; int ret; /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ @@ -1341,7 +1355,7 @@ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) /* Check chain is acceptable */ ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); - err: +err: X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); return ret; } @@ -1355,8 +1369,8 @@ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) * RFC5280 version */ static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, - STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, - STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) + STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, + STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) { X509 *cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); X509 *crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); @@ -1424,7 +1438,6 @@ static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) } return 0; - } static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) @@ -1448,7 +1461,7 @@ static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, - unsigned int *preasons) + unsigned int *preasons) { int i; @@ -1467,14 +1480,14 @@ static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { if (crl->idp == NULL - || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { + || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; return 1; } } } return (crl->idp == NULL || crl->idp->distpoint == NULL) - && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0; + && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) != 0; } /* @@ -1482,7 +1495,7 @@ static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, * to find a delta CRL too */ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, - X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) + X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) { int ok; X509 *issuer = NULL; @@ -1494,7 +1507,7 @@ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, reasons = ctx->current_reasons; ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, - &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); + &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); if (ok) goto done; @@ -1509,7 +1522,7 @@ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); - done: +done: /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ if (crl != NULL) { ctx->current_issuer = issuer; @@ -1533,17 +1546,16 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) /* If we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ if (ctx->current_issuer != NULL) { issuer = ctx->current_issuer; - /* - * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next - * certificate in chain. - */ + /* + * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next + * certificate in chain. + */ } else if (cnum < chnum) { issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); } else { issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); /* If not self-issued, can't check signature */ - if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) && - !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER)) + if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER)) return 0; } @@ -1555,33 +1567,25 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) */ if (crl->base_crl_number == NULL) { /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ - if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && - (issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) == 0 && - !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN)) + if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) != 0 && (issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) == 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN)) return 0; - if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) == 0 && - !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE)) + if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) == 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE)) return 0; - if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) == 0 && - check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 && - !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR)) + if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) == 0 && check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR)) return 0; - if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0 && - !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION)) + if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) != 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION)) return 0; } - if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) == 0 && - !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) + if ((ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) == 0 && !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) return 0; /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); - if (ikey == NULL && - !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) + if (ikey == NULL && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) return 0; if (ikey != NULL) { @@ -1590,8 +1594,7 @@ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv)) return 0; /* Verify CRL signature */ - if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 && - !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) + if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) return 0; } return 1; @@ -1609,8 +1612,7 @@ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) * change the meaning of CRL entries. */ if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) == 0 - && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0 && - !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION)) + && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) != 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION)) return 0; /* * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure @@ -1646,7 +1648,7 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) goto memerr; ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, - ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); + ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) (void)sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); @@ -1663,7 +1665,7 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if ((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0) cbcalled = 1; CB_FAIL_IF((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY) != 0, - ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); + ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION); } if (!cbcalled) { /* Should not be able to get here */ @@ -1697,7 +1699,7 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) return 1; - memerr: +memerr: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return -1; @@ -1755,15 +1757,15 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) */ xi = NULL; } else if (ossl_x509_likely_issued(xi, xi) != X509_V_OK - /* exceptional case: last cert in the chain is not self-issued */ - && ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) == 0)) { + /* exceptional case: last cert in the chain is not self-issued */ + && ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) == 0)) { if (n > 0) { n--; ctx->error_depth = n; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } else { CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, 0, - X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE); + X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE); } /* * The below code will certainly not do a @@ -1813,15 +1815,16 @@ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs. */ int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 - ? X509_V_OK : ossl_x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs); + ? X509_V_OK + : ossl_x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs); CB_FAIL_IF(ret != X509_V_OK, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret); if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { CB_FAIL_IF(1, ctx, xi, issuer_depth, - X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY); + X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY); } else { CB_FAIL_IF(X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0, - ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); + ctx, xs, n, X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); } } @@ -1918,7 +1921,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) */ ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; - err: +err: ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); return ret; } @@ -1928,7 +1931,7 @@ int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) * or else 1 if it is past the end, or -1 if it is before the start */ int X509_cmp_timeframe(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm, - const ASN1_TIME *start, const ASN1_TIME *end) + const ASN1_TIME *start, const ASN1_TIME *end) { time_t ref_time; time_t *time = NULL; @@ -1959,7 +1962,7 @@ ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, - int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) + int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { time_t t; @@ -2018,7 +2021,7 @@ int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) * Sadly, returns NULL also on internal error. */ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, - EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) + EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL; int i; @@ -2036,7 +2039,8 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, } /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), - X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)) != 0) { + X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer)) + != 0) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); return NULL; } @@ -2055,8 +2059,7 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, return NULL; } /* CRLs must verify */ - if (skey != NULL && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || - X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { + if (skey != NULL && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); return NULL; } @@ -2116,7 +2119,7 @@ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, return crl; - memerr: +memerr: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509_CRL_free(crl); return NULL; @@ -2229,7 +2232,7 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) * client/server. */ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, - int purpose, int trust) + int purpose, int trust) { int idx; @@ -2319,7 +2322,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) } int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, - STACK_OF(X509) *chain) + STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { if (ctx == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); @@ -2439,11 +2442,11 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, } if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, - &ctx->ex_data)) + &ctx->ex_data)) return 1; ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - err: +err: /* * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. @@ -2500,7 +2503,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, - time_t t) + time_t t) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); } @@ -2527,7 +2530,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, - X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) + X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) { ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; } @@ -2538,7 +2541,7 @@ X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(const X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, - X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify) + X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify) { ctx->verify = verify; } @@ -2650,7 +2653,7 @@ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane) } static unsigned char *dane_i2d(X509 *cert, uint8_t selector, - unsigned int *i2dlen) + unsigned int *i2dlen) { unsigned char *buf = NULL; int len; @@ -2804,8 +2807,7 @@ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth) * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a * full chain. */ - if (cmplen == t->dlen && - memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { + if (cmplen == t->dlen && memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK) matched = 1; if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) { @@ -2861,10 +2863,7 @@ static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) { t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); - if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || - t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || - t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || - X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) + if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) continue; /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */ @@ -2938,8 +2937,7 @@ static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) return 0; /* Callback invoked as needed */ - if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 && - !check_id(ctx)) + if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 && !check_id(ctx)) return 0; /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */ ctx->error_depth = 0; @@ -3004,7 +3002,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) goto int_err; #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ -#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ +#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ /* * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled, @@ -3138,14 +3136,12 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); ctx->num_untrusted = num; - if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && - dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { + if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { dane->mdpth = -1; X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; } - if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && - dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) + if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) dane->pdpth = -1; } @@ -3214,8 +3210,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) continue; /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ - if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || - ctx->num_untrusted < 2) + if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || ctx->num_untrusted < 2) break; /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ search |= S_DOALTERNATE; @@ -3231,8 +3226,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) goto int_err; curr = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); - issuer = (X509_self_signed(curr, 0) > 0 || num > max_depth) ? - NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sk_untrusted, curr); + issuer = (X509_self_signed(curr, 0) > 0 || num > max_depth) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sk_untrusted, curr); if (issuer == NULL) { /* * Once we have reached a self-signed cert or num > max_depth @@ -3284,7 +3278,7 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) return 0; case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: default: - switch(ctx->error) { + switch (ctx->error) { case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: @@ -3296,28 +3290,28 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) break; } CB_FAIL_IF(num > max_depth, - ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); + ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); CB_FAIL_IF(DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) - && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0), - ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); + && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0), + ctx, NULL, num - 1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); if (X509_self_signed(sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1), 0) > 0) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, - num == 1 - ? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT - : X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN); + num == 1 + ? X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT + : X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN); return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num - 1, - ctx->num_untrusted < num - ? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT - : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY); + ctx->num_untrusted < num + ? X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT + : X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY); } - int_err: +int_err: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); return -1; - memerr: +memerr: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_X509, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; sk_X509_free(sk_untrusted); @@ -3325,8 +3319,8 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_build_chain(X509 *target, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, - X509_STORE *store, int with_self_signed, - OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) + X509_STORE *store, int with_self_signed, + OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq) { int finish_chain = store != NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *ctx; @@ -3361,7 +3355,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_build_chain(X509 *target, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, result = NULL; } - err: +err: X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); return result; } @@ -3419,8 +3413,8 @@ static int check_curve(X509 *cert) int ret, val; ret = EVP_PKEY_get_int_param(pkey, - OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_DECODED_FROM_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, - &val); + OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_DECODED_FROM_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, + &val); return ret == 1 ? !val : -1; } |