aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/fips/rsa/fips_rsa_eay.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'fips/rsa/fips_rsa_eay.c')
-rw-r--r--fips/rsa/fips_rsa_eay.c1535
1 files changed, 757 insertions, 778 deletions
diff --git a/fips/rsa/fips_rsa_eay.c b/fips/rsa/fips_rsa_eay.c
index 937a14e68494..82f370f3cce6 100644
--- a/fips/rsa/fips_rsa_eay.c
+++ b/fips/rsa/fips_rsa_eay.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -119,816 +119,795 @@
#if !defined(RSA_NULL) && defined(OPENSSL_FIPS)
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
-static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
+static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
+ BN_CTX *ctx);
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
-static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
- "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
- RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
- RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
- RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
- RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
- RSA_eay_mod_exp,
- BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
- RSA_eay_init,
- RSA_eay_finish,
- RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */
- NULL,
- 0, /* rsa_sign */
- 0, /* rsa_verify */
- NULL /* rsa_keygen */
- };
+static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth = {
+ "Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
+ RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
+ RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
+ RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
+ RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
+ RSA_eay_mod_exp,
+ BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery
+ * if e == 3 */
+ RSA_eay_init,
+ RSA_eay_finish,
+ RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD, /* flags */
+ NULL,
+ 0, /* rsa_sign */
+ 0, /* rsa_verify */
+ NULL /* rsa_keygen */
+};
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
- {
- return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
- }
+{
+ return (&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
+}
-/* Usage example;
- * MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+/*
+ * Usage example; MONT_HELPER(rsa, bn_ctx, p, rsa->flags &
+ * RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
*/
-#define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \
- if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \
- !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \
- CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, \
- (rsa)->m, (ctx))) \
- err_instr
+# define MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, m, pre_cond, err_instr) \
+ if((pre_cond) && ((rsa)->_method_mod_##m == NULL) && \
+ !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&((rsa)->_method_mod_##m), \
+ CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA, \
+ (rsa)->m, (ctx))) \
+ err_instr
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f,*ret;
- int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
- if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
- {
- FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if (!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
- break;
-#endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-
- /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
- * length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(ret);
- i=BN_bn2bin(ret,&(to[num-j]));
- for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
- to[k]=0;
-
- r=num;
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+ int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (FIPS_selftest_failed()) {
+ FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (FIPS_mode()
+ && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+# endif
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+ * modulus
+ */
+ j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
+ i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
+ for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
+ to[k] = 0;
+
+ r = num;
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+}
static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- BN_BLINDING *ret;
- int got_write_lock = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
-
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- got_write_lock = 1;
-
- if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
- rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- }
-
- ret = rsa->blinding;
- if (ret == NULL)
- goto err;
-
- if (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret) == CRYPTO_thread_id())
- {
- /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
-
- *local = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
-
- *local = 0; /* instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert()
- * that the BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses
- * require locks, and that the blinding factor must be
- * stored outside the BN_BLINDING
- */
-
- if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
- {
- if (!got_write_lock)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- got_write_lock = 1;
- }
-
- if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
- rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
- }
- ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
- }
+ BN_BLINDING *ret;
+ int got_write_lock = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL) {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+
+ if (rsa->blinding == NULL)
+ rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ }
+
+ ret = rsa->blinding;
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id(ret) == CRYPTO_thread_id()) {
+ /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
+
+ *local = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
+
+ /*
+ * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the
+ * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and
+ * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING
+ */
+ *local = 0;
+
+ if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) {
+ if (!got_write_lock) {
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ got_write_lock = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL)
+ rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
+ }
+ ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
+ }
err:
- if (got_write_lock)
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- else
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
- return ret;
+ if (got_write_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ else
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
+ return ret;
}
static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
- BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (local)
- return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
- else
- {
- int ret;
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- return ret;
- }
+ if (local)
+ return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
+ else {
+ int ret;
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ return ret;
+ }
}
static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, int local, BIGNUM *f,
- BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
+ BIGNUM *r, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
- if (local)
- return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
- else
- {
- int ret;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
- return ret;
- }
+ if (local)
+ return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
+ else {
+ int ret;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ ret = BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, r, b, ctx);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING);
+ return ret;
+ }
}
/* signing */
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
- int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- int local_blinding = 0;
- BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
- if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
- {
- FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if(!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_X931(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
- break;
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (i <= 0) goto err;
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
- {
- blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
- if (blinding == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (blinding != NULL)
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
- ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
- (rsa->q != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- BIGNUM local_d;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- BN_init(&local_d);
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- d = rsa->d;
-
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- }
-
- if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING)
- {
- BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
- if (BN_cmp(ret, f))
- res = f;
- else
- res = ret;
- }
- else
- res = ret;
-
- /* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
- * length of the modulus */
- j=BN_num_bytes(res);
- i=BN_bn2bin(res,&(to[num-j]));
- for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
- to[k]=0;
-
- r=num;
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br, *res;
+ int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+ if (FIPS_selftest_failed()) {
+ FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (FIPS_mode()
+ && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
+ break;
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (i <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+ blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL)
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
+ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ BIGNUM local_d;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ BN_init(&local_d);
+ d = &local_d;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC,
+ goto err);
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
+ BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
+ if (BN_cmp(ret, f))
+ res = f;
+ else
+ res = ret;
+ } else
+ res = ret;
+
+ /*
+ * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
+ * modulus
+ */
+ j = BN_num_bytes(res);
+ i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
+ for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
+ to[k] = 0;
+
+ r = num;
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+}
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
- int j,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
- int local_blinding = 0;
- BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
- if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
- {
- FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if(!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* make data into a big number */
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
- {
- blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
- if (blinding == NULL)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- goto err;
- }
- }
-
- if (blinding != NULL)
- if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- /* do the decrypt */
- if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
- ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
- (rsa->q != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
- (rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- BIGNUM local_d;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- d = rsa->d;
-
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,d,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (blinding)
- if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
- goto err;
-
- p=buf;
- j=BN_bn2bin(ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
- case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
- break;
-#endif
- case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret, *br;
+ int j, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int local_blinding = 0;
+ BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
+
+ if (FIPS_selftest_failed()) {
+ FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (FIPS_mode()
+ && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ br = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
+ * top '0' bytes
+ */
+ if (flen > num) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* make data into a big number */
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
+ blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
+ if (blinding == NULL) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (blinding != NULL)
+ if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, local_blinding, f, br, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* do the decrypt */
+ if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
+ ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->q != NULL) &&
+ (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
+ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ BIGNUM local_d;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ d = &local_d;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC,
+ goto err);
+ if (!rsa->
+ meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (blinding)
+ if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, local_blinding, ret, br, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ p = buf;
+ j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ break;
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+ case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
+ break;
+# endif
+ case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+}
/* signature verification */
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
- unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
- {
- BIGNUM *f,*ret;
- int i,num=0,r= -1;
- unsigned char *p;
- unsigned char *buf=NULL;
- BN_CTX *ctx=NULL;
-
- if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
- {
- FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (FIPS_mode() && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS))
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS)
- {
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
- return -1;
- }
- }
-
- if((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
- if(!f || !ret || !buf)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
- goto err;
- }
-
- /* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
- * and chops off the top '0' bytes */
- if (flen > num)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,f) == NULL) goto err;
-
- if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0)
- {
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
- goto err;
- }
-
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
-
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret,f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
-
- if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
- BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret);
-
- p=buf;
- i=BN_bn2bin(ret,p);
-
- switch (padding)
- {
- case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- case RSA_X931_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- case RSA_NO_PADDING:
- r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
- break;
- default:
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
- goto err;
- }
- if (r < 0)
- RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
-err:
- if (ctx != NULL)
- {
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- }
- if (buf != NULL)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
- OPENSSL_free(buf);
- }
- return(r);
- }
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+ BIGNUM *f, *ret;
+ int i, num = 0, r = -1;
+ unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+ if (FIPS_selftest_failed()) {
+ FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (FIPS_mode()
+ && (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) < OPENSSL_RSA_FIPS_MIN_MODULUS_BITS)) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
+ if (!f || !ret || !buf) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
+ * top '0' bytes
+ */
+ if (flen > num) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
+ RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+
+ if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((ret->d[0] & 0xf) != 12))
+ BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret);
+
+ p = buf;
+ i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
+
+ switch (padding) {
+ case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_X931_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ break;
+ case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+ r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
+ break;
+ default:
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (r < 0)
+ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+
+ err:
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
+ if (buf != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ }
+ return (r);
+}
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
- {
- BIGNUM *r1,*m1,*vrfy;
- BIGNUM local_dmp1,local_dmq1,local_c,local_r1;
- BIGNUM *dmp1,*dmq1,*c,*pr1;
- int bn_flags;
- int ret=0;
-
- BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
- /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct
- * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
- */
- bn_flags = rsa->p->flags;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- rsa->p->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
- }
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
- /* We restore bn_flags back */
- rsa->p->flags = bn_flags;
-
- /* Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct
- * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
- */
- bn_flags = rsa->q->flags;
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- rsa->q->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
- }
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
- /* We restore bn_flags back */
- rsa->q->flags = bn_flags;
-
- MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
-
- /* compute I mod q */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- c = &local_c;
- BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- }
-
- /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
- BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1,r1,dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
-
- /* compute I mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- c = &local_c;
- BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- if (!BN_mod(r1,c,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- }
- else
- {
- if (!BN_mod(r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
- }
-
- /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
- BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,r1,dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
-
- if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,m1)) goto err;
- /* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
- * affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
- if (BN_is_negative(r0))
- if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
-
- if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- pr1 = &local_r1;
- BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- pr1 = r1;
- if (!BN_mod(r0,pr1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
-
- /* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
- * adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
- * negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
- * second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
- * This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
- * they ensure p > q [steve]
+{
+ BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
+ BIGNUM local_dmp1, local_dmq1, local_c, local_r1;
+ BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *c, *pr1;
+ int bn_flags;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct
+ * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
+ */
+ bn_flags = rsa->p->flags;
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ rsa->p->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
+ }
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, p, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ /* We restore bn_flags back */
+ rsa->p->flags = bn_flags;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure mod_inverse in montgomerey intialization use correct
+ * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag.
+ */
+ bn_flags = rsa->q->flags;
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ rsa->q->flags |= BN_FLG_CONSTTIME;
+ }
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, q, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE, goto err);
+ /* We restore bn_flags back */
+ rsa->q->flags = bn_flags;
+
+ MONT_HELPER(rsa, ctx, n, rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC, goto err);
+
+ /* compute I mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ c = &local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ dmq1 = &local_dmq1;
+ BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ dmq1 = rsa->dmq1;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_q))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* compute I mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ c = &local_c;
+ BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (!BN_mod(r1, I, rsa->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ dmp1 = &local_dmp1;
+ BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ dmp1 = rsa->dmp1;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx, rsa->_method_mod_p))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
+ * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
+ */
+ if (BN_is_negative(r0))
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Turn BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on before division operation */
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ pr1 = &local_r1;
+ BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ pr1 = r1;
+ if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+
+ /*
+ * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
+ * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
+ * break the private key operations: the following second correction
+ * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
+ * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
+ */
+ if (BN_is_negative(r0))
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
+ * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
+ * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
+ * absolute equality, just congruency.
*/
- if (BN_is_negative(r0))
- if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mul(r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
- if (!BN_add(r0,r1,m1)) goto err;
-
- if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
- {
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- /* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
- * will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
- * the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
- * for absolute equality, just congruency. */
- if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I)) goto err;
- if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
- if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
- if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
- if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy))
- {
- /* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
- * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
- * mod_exp and return that instead. */
-
- BIGNUM local_d;
- BIGNUM *d = NULL;
-
- if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME))
- {
- d = &local_d;
- BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
- }
- else
- d = rsa->d;
- if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,d,rsa->n,ctx,
- rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
- }
- }
- ret=1;
-err:
- BN_CTX_end(ctx);
- return(ret);
- }
+ if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
+ if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
+ /*
+ * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
+ * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
+ * return that instead.
+ */
+
+ BIGNUM local_d;
+ BIGNUM *d = NULL;
+
+ if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME)) {
+ d = &local_d;
+ BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ } else
+ d = rsa->d;
+ if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
+ rsa->_method_mod_n))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+ err:
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ return (ret);
+}
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
- {
- FIPS_selftest_check();
- rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ FIPS_selftest_check();
+ rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
+ return (1);
+}
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
- {
- if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
- if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
- BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
- return(1);
- }
+{
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
+ if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
+ BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
+ return (1);
+}
#endif
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-18 05:19:41 +0000