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-rw-r--r--module/setcred.c474
1 files changed, 474 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/module/setcred.c b/module/setcred.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5b98b2919c88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/module/setcred.c
@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
+/*
+ * Ticket creation routines for pam-krb5.
+ *
+ * pam_setcred and pam_open_session need to do similar but not identical work
+ * to create the user's ticket cache. The shared code is abstracted here into
+ * the pamk5_setcred function.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2005-2009, 2014, 2017, 2020 Russ Allbery <eagle@eyrie.org>
+ * Copyright 2011
+ * The Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
+ * Copyright 2005 Andres Salomon <dilinger@debian.org>
+ * Copyright 1999-2000 Frank Cusack <fcusack@fcusack.com>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-clause or GPL-1+
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <portable/krb5.h>
+#include <portable/pam.h>
+#include <portable/system.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include <module/internal.h>
+#include <pam-util/args.h>
+#include <pam-util/logging.h>
+
+
+/*
+ * Given a cache name and an existing cache, initialize a new cache, store the
+ * credentials from the existing cache in it, and return a pointer to the new
+ * cache in the cache argument. Returns either PAM_SUCCESS or
+ * PAM_SERVICE_ERR.
+ */
+static int
+cache_init_from_cache(struct pam_args *args, const char *ccname,
+ krb5_ccache old, krb5_ccache *cache)
+{
+ struct context *ctx;
+ krb5_creds creds;
+ krb5_cc_cursor cursor;
+ int pamret;
+ krb5_error_code status;
+
+ *cache = NULL;
+ memset(&creds, 0, sizeof(creds));
+ if (args == NULL || args->config == NULL || args->config->ctx == NULL
+ || args->config->ctx->context == NULL)
+ return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ if (old == NULL)
+ return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ ctx = args->config->ctx;
+ status = krb5_cc_start_seq_get(ctx->context, old, &cursor);
+ if (status != 0) {
+ putil_err_krb5(args, status, "cannot open new credentials");
+ return PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ }
+ status = krb5_cc_next_cred(ctx->context, old, &cursor, &creds);
+ if (status != 0) {
+ putil_err_krb5(args, status, "cannot read new credentials");
+ pamret = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ pamret = pamk5_cache_init(args, ccname, &creds, cache);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx->context, &creds);
+ pamret = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx->context, &creds);
+
+ /*
+ * There probably won't be any additional credentials, but check for them
+ * and copy them just in case.
+ */
+ while (krb5_cc_next_cred(ctx->context, old, &cursor, &creds) == 0) {
+ status = krb5_cc_store_cred(ctx->context, *cache, &creds);
+ krb5_free_cred_contents(ctx->context, &creds);
+ if (status != 0) {
+ putil_err_krb5(args, status,
+ "cannot store additional credentials"
+ " in %s",
+ ccname);
+ pamret = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ pamret = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+done:
+ krb5_cc_end_seq_get(ctx->context, ctx->cache, &cursor);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS && *cache != NULL) {
+ krb5_cc_destroy(ctx->context, *cache);
+ *cache = NULL;
+ }
+ return pamret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Determine the name of a new ticket cache. Handles ccache and ccache_dir
+ * PAM options and returns newly allocated memory.
+ *
+ * The ccache option, if set, contains a string with possible %u and %p
+ * escapes. The former is replaced by the UID and the latter is replaced by
+ * the PID (a suitable unique string).
+ */
+static char *
+build_ccache_name(struct pam_args *args, uid_t uid)
+{
+ char *cache_name = NULL;
+ int retval;
+
+ if (args->config->ccache == NULL) {
+ retval = asprintf(&cache_name, "%s/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXX",
+ args->config->ccache_dir, (int) uid);
+ if (retval < 0) {
+ putil_crit(args, "malloc failure: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ size_t len = 0, delta;
+ char *p, *q;
+
+ for (p = args->config->ccache; *p != '\0'; p++) {
+ if (p[0] == '%' && p[1] == 'u') {
+ len += snprintf(NULL, 0, "%ld", (long) uid);
+ p++;
+ } else if (p[0] == '%' && p[1] == 'p') {
+ len += snprintf(NULL, 0, "%ld", (long) getpid());
+ p++;
+ } else {
+ len++;
+ }
+ }
+ len++;
+ cache_name = malloc(len);
+ if (cache_name == NULL) {
+ putil_crit(args, "malloc failure: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ for (p = args->config->ccache, q = cache_name; *p != '\0'; p++) {
+ if (p[0] == '%' && p[1] == 'u') {
+ delta = snprintf(q, len, "%ld", (long) uid);
+ q += delta;
+ len -= delta;
+ p++;
+ } else if (p[0] == '%' && p[1] == 'p') {
+ delta = snprintf(q, len, "%ld", (long) getpid());
+ q += delta;
+ len -= delta;
+ p++;
+ } else {
+ *q = *p;
+ q++;
+ len--;
+ }
+ }
+ *q = '\0';
+ }
+ return cache_name;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Create a new context for a session if we've lost the context created during
+ * authentication (such as when running under OpenSSH). Return PAM_IGNORE if
+ * we're ignoring this user or if apparently our pam_authenticate never
+ * succeeded.
+ */
+static int
+create_session_context(struct pam_args *args)
+{
+ struct context *ctx = NULL;
+ PAM_CONST char *user;
+ const char *tmpname;
+ int status, pamret;
+
+ /* If we're going to ignore the user anyway, don't even bother. */
+ if (args->config->ignore_root || args->config->minimum_uid > 0) {
+ pamret = pam_get_user(args->pamh, &user, NULL);
+ if (pamret == PAM_SUCCESS && pamk5_should_ignore(args, user)) {
+ pamret = PAM_IGNORE;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Create the context and locate the temporary ticket cache. Load the
+ * ticket cache back into the context and flush out the other data that
+ * would have been set if we'd kept our original context.
+ */
+ pamret = pamk5_context_new(args);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ putil_crit_pam(args, pamret, "creating session context failed");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ ctx = args->config->ctx;
+ tmpname = pamk5_get_krb5ccname(args, "PAM_KRB5CCNAME");
+ if (tmpname == NULL) {
+ putil_debug(args, "unable to get PAM_KRB5CCNAME, assuming"
+ " non-Kerberos login");
+ pamret = PAM_IGNORE;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ putil_debug(args, "found initial ticket cache at %s", tmpname);
+ status = krb5_cc_resolve(ctx->context, tmpname, &ctx->cache);
+ if (status != 0) {
+ putil_err_krb5(args, status, "cannot resolve cache %s", tmpname);
+ pamret = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ status = krb5_cc_get_principal(ctx->context, ctx->cache, &ctx->princ);
+ if (status != 0) {
+ putil_err_krb5(args, status, "cannot retrieve principal");
+ pamret = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We've rebuilt the context. Push it back into the PAM state for any
+ * further calls to session or account management, which OpenSSH does keep
+ * the context for.
+ */
+ pamret = pam_set_data(args->pamh, "pam_krb5", ctx, pamk5_context_destroy);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ putil_err_pam(args, pamret, "cannot set context data");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+fail:
+ pamk5_context_free(args);
+ return pamret;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Sets user credentials by creating the permanent ticket cache and setting
+ * the proper ownership. This function may be called by either pam_sm_setcred
+ * or pam_sm_open_session. The refresh flag should be set to true if we
+ * should reinitialize an existing ticket cache instead of creating a new one.
+ */
+int
+pamk5_setcred(struct pam_args *args, bool refresh)
+{
+ struct context *ctx = NULL;
+ krb5_ccache cache = NULL;
+ char *cache_name = NULL;
+ bool set_context = false;
+ int status = 0;
+ int pamret;
+ struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
+
+ /* If configured not to create a cache, we have nothing to do. */
+ if (args->config->no_ccache) {
+ pamret = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we weren't able to obtain a context, we were probably run by OpenSSH
+ * with its weird PAM handling, so we're going to cobble up a new context
+ * for ourselves.
+ */
+ pamret = pamk5_context_fetch(args);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ putil_debug(args, "no context found, creating one");
+ pamret = create_session_context(args);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS || args->config->ctx == NULL)
+ goto done;
+ set_context = true;
+ }
+ ctx = args->config->ctx;
+
+ /*
+ * Some programs (xdm, for instance) appear to call setcred over and over
+ * again, so avoid doing useless work.
+ */
+ if (ctx->initialized) {
+ pamret = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Get the uid. The user is not required to be a local account for
+ * pam_authenticate, but for either pam_setcred (other than DELETE) or for
+ * pam_open_session, the user must be a local account.
+ */
+ pw = pam_modutil_getpwnam(args->pamh, ctx->name);
+ if (pw == NULL) {
+ putil_err(args, "getpwnam failed for %s", ctx->name);
+ pamret = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ uid = pw->pw_uid;
+ gid = pw->pw_gid;
+
+ /* Get the cache name. If reinitializing, this is our existing cache. */
+ if (refresh) {
+ const char *name, *k5name;
+
+ /*
+ * Solaris su calls pam_setcred as root with PAM_REINITIALIZE_CREDS,
+ * preserving the user-supplied environment. An xlock program may
+ * also do this if it's setuid root and doesn't drop credentials
+ * before calling pam_setcred.
+ *
+ * There isn't any safe way of reinitializing the exiting ticket cache
+ * for the user if we're setuid without calling setreuid(). Calling
+ * setreuid() is possible, but if the calling application is threaded,
+ * it will change credentials for the whole application, with possibly
+ * bizarre and unintended (and insecure) results. Trying to verify
+ * ownership of the existing ticket cache before using it fails under
+ * various race conditions (for example, having one of the elements of
+ * the path be a symlink and changing the target of that symlink
+ * between our check and the call to krb5_cc_resolve). Without
+ * calling setreuid(), we run the risk of replacing a file owned by
+ * another user with a credential cache.
+ *
+ * We could fail with an error in the setuid case, which would be
+ * maximally safe, but it would prevent use of the module for
+ * authentication with programs such as Solaris su. Failure to
+ * reinitialize the cache is normally not a serious problem, just a
+ * missing feature. We therefore log an error and exit with
+ * PAM_SUCCESS for the setuid case.
+ *
+ * We do not use issetugid here since it always returns true if setuid
+ * was was involved anywhere in the process of running the binary.
+ * This would prevent a setuid screensaver that drops permissions from
+ * refreshing a credential cache. The issetugid behavior is safer,
+ * since the environment should ideally not be trusted even if the
+ * binary completely changed users away from the original user, but in
+ * that case the binary needs to take some responsibility for either
+ * sanitizing the environment or being certain that the calling user
+ * is permitted to act as the target user.
+ */
+ if (getuid() != geteuid() || getgid() != getegid()) {
+ putil_err(args, "credential reinitialization in a setuid context"
+ " ignored");
+ pamret = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ name = pamk5_get_krb5ccname(args, "KRB5CCNAME");
+ if (name == NULL)
+ name = krb5_cc_default_name(ctx->context);
+ if (name == NULL) {
+ putil_err(args, "unable to get ticket cache name");
+ pamret = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (strncmp(name, "FILE:", strlen("FILE:")) == 0)
+ name += strlen("FILE:");
+
+ /*
+ * If the cache we have in the context and the cache we're
+ * reinitializing are the same cache, don't do anything; otherwise,
+ * we'll end up destroying the cache. This should never happen; this
+ * case triggering is a sign of a bug, probably in the calling
+ * application.
+ */
+ if (ctx->cache != NULL) {
+ k5name = krb5_cc_get_name(ctx->context, ctx->cache);
+ if (k5name != NULL) {
+ if (strncmp(k5name, "FILE:", strlen("FILE:")) == 0)
+ k5name += strlen("FILE:");
+ if (strcmp(name, k5name) == 0) {
+ pamret = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ cache_name = strdup(name);
+ if (cache_name == NULL) {
+ putil_crit(args, "malloc failure: %s", strerror(errno));
+ pamret = PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ putil_debug(args, "refreshing ticket cache %s", cache_name);
+
+ /*
+ * If we're refreshing the cache, we didn't really create it and the
+ * user's open session created by login is probably still managing
+ * it. Thus, don't remove it when PAM is shut down.
+ */
+ ctx->dont_destroy_cache = 1;
+ } else {
+ char *cache_name_tmp;
+ size_t len;
+
+ cache_name = build_ccache_name(args, uid);
+ if (cache_name == NULL) {
+ pamret = PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ len = strlen(cache_name);
+ if (len > 6 && strncmp("XXXXXX", cache_name + len - 6, 6) == 0) {
+ if (strncmp(cache_name, "FILE:", strlen("FILE:")) == 0)
+ cache_name_tmp = cache_name + strlen("FILE:");
+ else
+ cache_name_tmp = cache_name;
+ pamret = pamk5_cache_mkstemp(args, cache_name_tmp);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto done;
+ }
+ putil_debug(args, "initializing ticket cache %s", cache_name);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the new ticket cache and point the environment at it. Only
+ * chown the cache if the cache is of type FILE or has no type (making the
+ * assumption that the default cache type is FILE; otherwise, due to the
+ * type prefix, we'd end up with an invalid path.
+ */
+ pamret = cache_init_from_cache(args, cache_name, ctx->cache, &cache);
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto done;
+ if (strncmp(cache_name, "FILE:", strlen("FILE:")) == 0)
+ status = chown(cache_name + strlen("FILE:"), uid, gid);
+ else if (strchr(cache_name, ':') == NULL)
+ status = chown(cache_name, uid, gid);
+ if (status == -1) {
+ putil_crit(args, "chown of ticket cache failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ pamret = PAM_SERVICE_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ pamret = pamk5_set_krb5ccname(args, cache_name, "KRB5CCNAME");
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ putil_crit(args, "setting KRB5CCNAME failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we had a temporary ticket cache, delete the environment variable so
+ * that we won't get confused and think we still have a temporary ticket
+ * cache when called again.
+ *
+ * FreeBSD PAM, at least as of 7.2, doesn't support deleting environment
+ * variables using the syntax supported by Solaris and Linux. Work
+ * around that by setting the variable to an empty value if deleting it
+ * fails.
+ */
+ if (pam_getenv(args->pamh, "PAM_KRB5CCNAME") != NULL) {
+ pamret = pam_putenv(args->pamh, "PAM_KRB5CCNAME");
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ pamret = pam_putenv(args->pamh, "PAM_KRB5CCNAME=");
+ if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Destroy the temporary cache and put the new cache in the context. */
+ krb5_cc_destroy(ctx->context, ctx->cache);
+ ctx->cache = cache;
+ cache = NULL;
+ ctx->initialized = 1;
+ if (args->config->retain_after_close)
+ ctx->dont_destroy_cache = 1;
+
+done:
+ if (ctx != NULL && cache != NULL)
+ krb5_cc_destroy(ctx->context, cache);
+ free(cache_name);
+
+ /* If we stored our Kerberos context in PAM data, don't free it. */
+ if (set_context)
+ args->ctx = NULL;
+
+ return pamret;
+}