diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/t1_enc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/t1_enc.c | 498 |
1 files changed, 110 insertions, 388 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/t1_enc.c b/ssl/t1_enc.c index 6cb7baaf7c9c..474ea7bf5b66 100644 --- a/ssl/t1_enc.c +++ b/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "record/record_local.h" #include "internal/ktls.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" #include <openssl/comp.h> #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/kdf.h> @@ -22,7 +23,7 @@ #include <openssl/trace.h> /* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */ -static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, +static int tls1_PRF(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, @@ -45,7 +46,9 @@ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF, s->ctx->propq); + kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx, + OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF, + SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->propq); if (kdf == NULL) goto err; kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); @@ -83,7 +86,8 @@ static int tls1_PRF(SSL *s, return 0; } -static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num) +static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *km, + size_t num) { int ret; @@ -98,80 +102,6 @@ static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num) return ret; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS - /* - * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary. - * - * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the - * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this - * function will fail. - */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX -static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL *s) -{ - SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); - PACKET pkt, subpkt; - int count = 0; - - if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left)) - return -1; - - while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) { - /* Skip record type and version */ - if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3)) - return -1; - - /* Read until next record */ - if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt)) - return -1; - - count += 1; - } - - return count; -} -# endif -#endif - - -int tls_provider_set_tls_params(SSL *s, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, - const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, - const EVP_MD *md) -{ - /* - * Provided cipher, the TLS padding/MAC removal is performed provider - * side so we need to tell the ctx about our TLS version and mac size - */ - OSSL_PARAM params[3], *pprm = params; - size_t macsize = 0; - int imacsize = -1; - - if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(ciph) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0 - /* - * We look at s->ext.use_etm instead of SSL_READ_ETM() or - * SSL_WRITE_ETM() because this test applies to both reading - * and writing. - */ - && !s->ext.use_etm) - imacsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md); - if (imacsize >= 0) - macsize = (size_t)imacsize; - - *pprm++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_VERSION, - &s->version); - *pprm++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_TLS_MAC_SIZE, - &macsize); - *pprm = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); - - if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_params(ctx, params)) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - - static int tls_iv_length_within_key_block(const EVP_CIPHER *c) { /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */ @@ -183,32 +113,23 @@ static int tls_iv_length_within_key_block(const EVP_CIPHER *c) return EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c); } -int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) +int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which) { unsigned char *p, *mac_secret; - unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; + unsigned char *key, *iv; const EVP_CIPHER *c; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - const SSL_COMP *comp; -#endif + const SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; const EVP_MD *m; int mac_type; - size_t *mac_secret_size; - EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; - EVP_PKEY *mac_key; + size_t mac_secret_size; size_t n, i, j, k, cl; - int reuse_dd = 0; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS - ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info; - unsigned char *rec_seq; - void *rl_sequence; -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX - int count_unprocessed; - int bit; -# endif - BIO *bio; -#endif + int iivlen; + /* + * Taglen is only relevant for CCM ciphersuites. Other ciphersuites + * ignore this value so we can default it to 0. + */ + size_t taglen = 0; + int direction; c = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc; m = s->s3.tmp.new_hash; @@ -217,128 +138,20 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) comp = s->s3.tmp.new_compression; #endif - if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { - if (s->ext.use_etm) - s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ; - else - s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ; - - if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) - s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; - else - s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; - - if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE) - s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE; - else - s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE; - - if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { - reuse_dd = 1; - } else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } else { - /* - * make sure it's initialised in case we exit later with an error - */ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx); - } - dd = s->enc_read_ctx; - mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL); - if (mac_ctx == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); - s->expand = NULL; - if (comp != NULL) { - s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); - if (s->expand == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, - SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } -#endif - /* - * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS - */ - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); - mac_secret = &(s->s3.read_mac_secret[0]); - mac_secret_size = &(s->s3.read_mac_secret_size); - } else { - s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID; - if (s->ext.use_etm) - s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE; - else - s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE; - - if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) - s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; - else - s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; - - if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE) - s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE; - else - s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE; - if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - reuse_dd = 1; - } else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - dd = s->enc_write_ctx; - if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { - mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (mac_ctx == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - s->write_hash = mac_ctx; - } else { - mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL); - if (mac_ctx == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP - COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); - s->compress = NULL; - if (comp != NULL) { - s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); - if (s->compress == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, - SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } -#endif - /* - * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS - */ - if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) - RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer); - mac_secret = &(s->s3.write_mac_secret[0]); - mac_secret_size = &(s->s3.write_mac_secret_size); - } - - if (reuse_dd) - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(dd); - p = s->s3.tmp.key_block; - i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size; + i = mac_secret_size = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size; cl = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c); j = cl; - k = tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c); + iivlen = tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c); + if (iivlen < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + k = iivlen; if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { - ms = &(p[0]); + mac_secret = &(p[0]); n = i + i; key = &(p[n]); n += j + j; @@ -346,7 +159,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) n += k + k; } else { n = i; - ms = &(p[n]); + mac_secret = &(p[n]); n += i + j; key = &(p[n]); n += j + k; @@ -359,160 +172,75 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) goto err; } - memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i); - - if (!(EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { - if (mac_type == EVP_PKEY_HMAC) { - mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(s->ctx->libctx, "HMAC", - s->ctx->propq, mac_secret, - *mac_secret_size); - } else { - /* - * If its not HMAC then the only other types of MAC we support are - * the GOST MACs, so we need to use the old style way of creating - * a MAC key. - */ - mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, mac_secret, - (int)*mac_secret_size); - } - if (mac_key == NULL - || EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mac_ctx, NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(m), - s->ctx->libctx, s->ctx->propq, mac_key, - NULL) <= 0) { - EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); - } - - OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { - BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, mac key:\n", which); - BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, ms, i, 4); - } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); - - if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) - || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, - iv) <= 0) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { - int taglen; - if (s->s3.tmp. - new_cipher->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) + switch (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c)) { + case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE: + taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; + break; + case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE: + if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc + & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) != 0) taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN; else taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, NULL, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) - || (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, 12, NULL) <= 0) - || (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, NULL) <= 0) - || (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IV_FIXED, (int)k, iv) <= 0) - || !EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1)) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - } else { - if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + break; + default: + if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "CHACHA20-POLY1305")) { + taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN; + } else { + /* MAC secret size corresponds to the MAC output size */ + taglen = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size; } - } - /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ - if ((EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) - && *mac_secret_size - && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, - (int)*mac_secret_size, mac_secret) <= 0) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } - - /* - * The cipher we actually ended up using in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX may be - * different to that in c if we have an ENGINE in use - */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_get0_provider(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get0_cipher(dd)) != NULL - && !tls_provider_set_tls_params(s, dd, c, m)) { - /* SSLfatal already called */ - goto err; + break; } -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS - if (s->compress || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0) - goto skip_ktls; + if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { + if (s->ext.use_etm) + s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ; + else + s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ; - /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */ - if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) - goto skip_ktls; + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) + s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; + else + s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; - /* check that cipher is supported */ - if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, c, dd)) - goto skip_ktls; + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE) + s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE; + else + s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE; - if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) - bio = s->wbio; - else - bio = s->rbio; + direction = OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ; + } else { + if (s->ext.use_etm) + s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE; + else + s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE; - if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; - } + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) + s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; + else + s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; - /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */ - if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) { - if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0) - goto skip_ktls; - } + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE) + s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE; + else + s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE; - /* ktls doesn't support renegotiation */ - if ((BIO_get_ktls_send(s->wbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) || - (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - goto err; + direction = OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE; } - if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) - rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer); - else - rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); - - if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, c, dd, rl_sequence, &crypto_info, &rec_seq, - iv, key, ms, *mac_secret_size)) - goto skip_ktls; + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) + dtls1_increment_epoch(s, which); - if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX - count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s); - if (count_unprocessed < 0) - goto skip_ktls; - - /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */ - while (count_unprocessed) { - for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */ - ++rec_seq[bit]; - if (rec_seq[bit] != 0) - break; - } - count_unprocessed--; - } -# else - goto skip_ktls; -# endif - } - - /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */ - if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) { - if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) - ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); - SSL_set_options(s, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version, direction, + OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION, + NULL, 0, key, cl, iv, (size_t)k, mac_secret, + mac_secret_size, c, taglen, mac_type, + m, comp, NULL)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; } - skip_ktls: -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KTLS */ - s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID; - OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, key:\n", which); BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c), 4); @@ -525,7 +253,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) return 0; } -int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) +int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { unsigned char *p; const EVP_CIPHER *c; @@ -534,12 +262,14 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) int mac_type = NID_undef; size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0; int ret = 0; + int ivlen; if (s->s3.tmp.key_block_length != 0) return 1; - if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->ctx, s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, - &mac_secret_size, &comp, s->ext.use_etm)) { + if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash, + &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp, + s->ext.use_etm)) { /* Error is already recorded */ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; @@ -551,14 +281,18 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash; s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; - num = mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c) - + tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c); + ivlen = tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c); + if (ivlen < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + num = mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c) + ivlen; num *= 2; ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); goto err; } @@ -587,30 +321,13 @@ int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, num, 4); } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); - if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) - && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { - /* - * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV - * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) - */ - s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 1; - - if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { - if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) - s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0; - - if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) - s->s3.need_empty_fragments = 0; - } - } - ret = 1; err: return ret; } -size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, - unsigned char *out) +size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str, + size_t slen, unsigned char *out) { size_t hashlen; unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; @@ -639,8 +356,9 @@ size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, return finished_size; } -int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, - size_t len, size_t *secret_size) +int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out, + unsigned char *p, size_t len, + size_t *secret_size) { if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; @@ -702,14 +420,23 @@ int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, return 1; } -int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, - const char *label, size_t llen, +int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out, + size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context) { unsigned char *val = NULL; size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos; - int rv; + int rv = 0; + + /* + * RFC 5705 embeds context length as uint16; reject longer context + * before proceeding. + */ + if (contextlen > 0xffff) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + return 0; + } /* * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather @@ -723,7 +450,7 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); if (val == NULL) - goto err2; + goto ret; currentvalpos = 0; memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen); currentvalpos += llen; @@ -775,11 +502,6 @@ int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, goto ret; err1: ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); - rv = 0; - goto ret; - err2: - ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - rv = 0; ret: OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen); return rv; |