diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/tls13_enc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssl/tls13_enc.c | 514 |
1 files changed, 261 insertions, 253 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/tls13_enc.c b/ssl/tls13_enc.c index ddcff5eb8911..6bddc9b51c4a 100644 --- a/ssl/tls13_enc.c +++ b/ssl/tls13_enc.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy @@ -12,17 +12,15 @@ #include "internal/ktls.h" #include "record/record_local.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/kdf.h> #include <openssl/core_names.h> #define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249 -#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC -static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = { 0x74, 0x6C, 0x73, 0x31, 0x33, 0x20, 0x00 }; -#else -static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 "; -#endif +/* ASCII: "tls13 ", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ +static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "\x74\x6C\x73\x31\x33\x20"; /* * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length @@ -30,14 +28,16 @@ static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "tls13 "; * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|. * The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if * |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. + * If |raise_error| is set, ERR_raise is called on failure. */ -int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, - const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen, - const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, - unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal) +int tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq, + const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *secret, + const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int raise_error) { - EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, - s->ctx->propq); + EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, propq); EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params; int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY; @@ -51,24 +51,20 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, return 0; if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) { - if (fatal) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - } else { + if (raise_error) /* * Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(), * or SSL_export_keying_material_early(). */ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); - } + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); return 0; } if ((ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) { EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); - if (fatal) - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - else + if (raise_error) ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } @@ -94,27 +90,41 @@ int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); if (ret != 0) { - if (fatal) - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); - else + if (raise_error) ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); } return ret == 0; } +int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *secret, + const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal) +{ + int ret; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + + ret = tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, md, + secret, label, labellen, data, datalen, + out, outlen, !fatal); + if (ret == 0 && fatal) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + return ret; +} + /* * Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on * success 0 on failure. */ -int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, +int tls13_derive_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { -#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC - static const unsigned char keylabel[] ={ 0x6B, 0x65, 0x79, 0x00 }; -#else - static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "key"; -#endif + /* ASCII: "key", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "\x6B\x65\x79"; return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1, NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1); @@ -124,28 +134,23 @@ int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, * Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on * success 0 on failure. */ -int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, +int tls13_derive_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen) { -#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC - static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = { 0x69, 0x76, 0x00 }; -#else - static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "iv"; -#endif + /* ASCII: "iv", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "\x69\x76"; return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1); } -int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, +int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen) { -#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC - static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = { 0x66, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x69, 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 }; -#else - static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "finished"; -#endif + /* ASCII: "finished", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "\x66\x69\x6E\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64"; return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel, sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1); @@ -156,7 +161,7 @@ int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, * length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location * pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. */ -int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, +int tls13_generate_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *prevsecret, const unsigned char *insecret, size_t insecretlen, @@ -170,13 +175,11 @@ int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params; int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY; const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md); -#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC - static const char derived_secret_label[] = { 0x64, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x64, 0x00 }; -#else - static const char derived_secret_label[] = "derived"; -#endif + /* ASCII: "derived", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const char derived_secret_label[] = "\x64\x65\x72\x69\x76\x65\x64"; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); - kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, s->ctx->propq); + kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(sctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, sctx->propq); kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); EVP_KDF_free(kdf); if (kctx == NULL) { @@ -186,7 +189,7 @@ int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md); /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ - if (!ossl_assert(mdleni >= 0)) { + if (!ossl_assert(mdleni > 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); return 0; @@ -225,8 +228,9 @@ int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, * handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been * generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. */ -int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret, - size_t insecretlen) +int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + const unsigned char *insecret, + size_t insecretlen) { /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */ return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret, @@ -239,13 +243,19 @@ int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret, * secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on * failure. */ -int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, +int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen, size_t *secret_size) { const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + int md_size; - *secret_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md); + md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md); + if (md_size <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + *secret_size = (size_t)md_size; /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */ return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out); } @@ -254,7 +264,7 @@ int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, * Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or * 0 on error. */ -size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, +size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str, size_t slen, unsigned char *out) { const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); @@ -264,14 +274,15 @@ size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, unsigned char *key = NULL; size_t len = 0, hashlen; OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); if (md == NULL) return 0; /* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */ - if (s->ctx->propq != NULL) + if (sctx->propq != NULL) *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES, - (char *)s->ctx->propq, + (char *)sctx->propq, 0); *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); @@ -280,7 +291,7 @@ size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, goto err; } - if (str == s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) { + if (str == SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) { key = s->server_finished_secret; } else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { key = s->client_finished_secret; @@ -292,7 +303,7 @@ size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, key = finsecret; } - if (!EVP_Q_mac(s->ctx->libctx, "HMAC", s->ctx->propq, mdname, + if (!EVP_Q_mac(sctx->libctx, "HMAC", sctx->propq, mdname, params, key, hashlen, hash, hashlen, /* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */ out, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2, &len)) { @@ -309,14 +320,16 @@ size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, * There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function * for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. */ -int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s) +int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s) { const EVP_CIPHER *c; const EVP_MD *hash; + int mac_type = NID_undef; + size_t mac_secret_size = 0; s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher; - if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(s->ctx, s->session, &c, &hash, NULL, NULL, NULL, - 0)) { + if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash, + &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, NULL, 0)) { /* Error is already recorded */ SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; @@ -326,25 +339,30 @@ int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s) s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c; ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash); s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash; + s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; + s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; return 1; } -static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md, +static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, + int mac_type, + const EVP_MD *mac_md, const unsigned char *insecret, const unsigned char *hash, const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret, - unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx) + unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen, + unsigned char **iv, size_t *ivlen, + size_t *taglen) { - size_t ivlen, keylen, taglen; int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md); size_t hashlen; + int mode, mac_mdleni; /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ - if (!ossl_assert(hashleni >= 0)) { + if (!ossl_assert(hashleni > 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); return 0; } @@ -356,72 +374,98 @@ static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL *s, int sending, const EVP_MD *md, return 0; } - keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph); - if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { - uint32_t algenc; - - ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN; - if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) { - algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc; - } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { - /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */ - algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc; - } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) { - /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */ - algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc; - } else { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + /* if ciph is NULL cipher, then use new_hash to calculate keylen */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(ciph, "NULL") + && mac_md != NULL + && mac_type == NID_hmac) { + mac_mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(mac_md); + + if (mac_mdleni <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } - if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) - taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN; - else - taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; + *ivlen = *taglen = (size_t)mac_mdleni; + *keylen = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size; } else { - ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph); - taglen = 0; + + *keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph); + + mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph); + if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { + uint32_t algenc; + + *ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN; + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) { + algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc; + } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { + /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */ + algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc; + } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) { + /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */ + algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc; + } else { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + return 0; + } + if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) + *taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN; + else + *taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; + } else { + int iivlen; + + if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { + *taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; + } else { + /* CHACHA20P-POLY1305 */ + *taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN; + } + iivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph); + if (iivlen < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + return 0; + } + *ivlen = iivlen; + } } - if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, keylen) - || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, iv, ivlen)) { - /* SSLfatal() already called */ - return 0; + if (*ivlen > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) { + *iv = OPENSSL_malloc(*ivlen); + if (*iv == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } } - if (EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, ciph, NULL, NULL, NULL, sending) <= 0 - || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL) <= 0 - || (taglen != 0 && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ciph_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, - taglen, NULL) <= 0) - || EVP_CipherInit_ex(ciph_ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, -1) <= 0) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, *keylen) + || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, *iv, *ivlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } return 1; } -int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) +int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which) { -#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC - static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x65, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00}; - static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00}; - static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = {0x63, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00}; - static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x68, 0x73, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00}; - static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = {0x73, 0x20, 0x61, 0x70, 0x20, /*traffic*/0x74, 0x72, 0x61, 0x66, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x00}; - static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00}; - static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = {0x72, 0x65, 0x73, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00}; - static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = {0x65, 0x20, 0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x20, /* master*/ 0x6D, 0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00}; -#else - static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "c e traffic"; - static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "c hs traffic"; - static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "c ap traffic"; - static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "s hs traffic"; - static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "s ap traffic"; - static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "exp master"; - static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "res master"; - static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "e exp master"; -#endif - unsigned char *iv; + /* ASCII: "c e traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x65\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63"; + /* ASCII: "c hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63"; + /* ASCII: "c ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63"; + /* ASCII: "s hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63"; + /* ASCII: "s ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63"; + /* ASCII: "exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72"; + /* ASCII: "res master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "\x72\x65\x73\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72"; + /* ASCII: "e exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x20\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72"; + unsigned char iv_intern[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char *iv = iv_intern; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; @@ -429,52 +473,22 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) unsigned char *insecret; unsigned char *finsecret = NULL; const char *log_label = NULL; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx; - size_t finsecretlen = 0; + int finsecretlen = 0; const unsigned char *label; size_t labellen, hashlen = 0; int ret = 0; - const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mac_md = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; -#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13) - ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info; - BIO *bio; -#endif - - if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { - if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_read_ctx); - } else { - s->enc_read_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx; - iv = s->read_iv; - - RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); - } else { - s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID; - if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(s->enc_write_ctx); - } else { - s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); - if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - goto err; - } - } - ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; - iv = s->write_iv; - - RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer); - } + int mac_pkey_type = NID_undef; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + size_t keylen, ivlen = EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH, taglen; + int level; + int direction = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0 ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ + : OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE; if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) || ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) { - if (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) { + if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) { EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL; long handlen; void *hdata; @@ -514,28 +528,34 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) } /* - * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from - * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't - * use ssl_handshake_md(). + * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free + * it again */ - mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); - if (mdctx == NULL) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(sctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) { + /* Error is already recorded */ + SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (((EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0) + && (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_md_mac(sctx, sslcipher, &mac_md, + &mac_pkey_type, NULL))) { + SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* - * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free - * it again + * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from + * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't + * use ssl_handshake_md(). */ - if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(s->ctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) { - /* Error is already recorded */ - SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); - EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx); + mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mdctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } - md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2); + md = ssl_md(sctx, sslcipher->algorithm2); if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) { @@ -565,6 +585,10 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) insecret = s->handshake_secret; finsecret = s->client_finished_secret; finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s)); + if (finsecretlen <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } label = client_handshake_traffic; labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1; log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL; @@ -597,6 +621,10 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) insecret = s->handshake_secret; finsecret = s->server_finished_secret; finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s)); + if (finsecretlen <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } label = server_handshake_traffic; labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1; log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL; @@ -608,9 +636,11 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) } } - if (!(which & SSL3_CC_EARLY)) { + if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) == 0) { md = ssl_handshake_md(s); cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc; + mac_md = s->s3.tmp.new_hash; + mac_pkey_type = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1) || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */; @@ -644,12 +674,12 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) } /* check whether cipher is known */ - if(!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL)) + if (!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL)) goto err; - if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, md, cipher, + if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, md, cipher, mac_pkey_type, mac_md, insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key, - iv, ciph_ctx)) { + &keylen, &iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } @@ -681,83 +711,64 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) if (finsecret != NULL && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret, - finsecret, finsecretlen)) { + finsecret, (size_t)finsecretlen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } - if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic) - s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_WRITE_PLAIN_ALERTS; - else - s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID; -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS -# if defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13) - if (!(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) - || !(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION) - || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0) - goto skip_ktls; - - /* ktls supports only the maximum fragment size */ - if (ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) - goto skip_ktls; - - /* ktls does not support record padding */ - if (s->record_padding_cb != NULL) - goto skip_ktls; - - /* check that cipher is supported */ - if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, cipher, ciph_ctx)) - goto skip_ktls; - - bio = s->wbio; + if ((which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) != 0) { + if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic) + s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 1); + else + s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 0); + } - if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) { - SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + level = (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0 + ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY + : ((which &SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) != 0 + ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE + : OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION); + + if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version, + direction, + level, secret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv, + ivlen, NULL, 0, cipher, taglen, + mac_pkey_type, mac_md, NULL, md)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ goto err; } - /* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */ - if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0) - goto skip_ktls; - - /* configure kernel crypto structure */ - if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, cipher, ciph_ctx, - RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer), - &crypto_info, NULL, iv, key, NULL, 0)) - goto skip_ktls; - - /* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */ - if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) - ssl3_release_write_buffer(s); -skip_ktls: -# endif -#endif ret = 1; err: if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) { /* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */ + if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0) + ssl_evp_md_free(mac_md); ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher); } OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret)); + if (iv != iv_intern) + OPENSSL_free(iv); return ret; } -int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending) +int tls13_update_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sending) { -#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC - static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = { 0x74, 0x72 ,0x61 ,0x66 ,0x66 ,0x69 ,0x63 ,0x20 ,0x75 ,0x70 ,0x64, 0x00}; -#else - static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "traffic upd"; -#endif + /* ASCII: "traffic upd", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63\x20\x75\x70\x64"; const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); size_t hashlen; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; - unsigned char *insecret, *iv; + unsigned char *insecret; unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; char *log_label; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ciph_ctx; + size_t keylen, ivlen, taglen; int ret = 0, l; + int direction = sending ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE + : OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ; + unsigned char iv_intern[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char *iv = iv_intern; if ((l = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); @@ -770,40 +781,41 @@ int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int sending) else insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret; - if (sending) { - s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_INVALID; - iv = s->write_iv; - ciph_ctx = s->enc_write_ctx; - RECORD_LAYER_reset_write_sequence(&s->rlayer); - } else { - iv = s->read_iv; - ciph_ctx = s->enc_read_ctx; - RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); - } - - if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, sending, md, - s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, insecret, NULL, + if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, md, + s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, + s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type, s->s3.tmp.new_hash, + insecret, NULL, application_traffic, sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key, - iv, ciph_ctx)) { + &keylen, &iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen); + if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version, + direction, + OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION, + insecret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, NULL, 0, + s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, taglen, NID_undef, NULL, + NULL, md)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } + /* Call Key log on successful traffic secret update */ log_label = s->server == sending ? SERVER_APPLICATION_N_LABEL : CLIENT_APPLICATION_N_LABEL; if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } - - s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID; ret = 1; err: OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret)); + if (iv != iv_intern) + OPENSSL_free(iv); return ret; } @@ -816,17 +828,15 @@ int tls13_alert_code(int code) return tls1_alert_code(code); } -int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, +int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context) { unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; -#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC - static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00}; -#else - static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter"; -#endif + /* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72"; unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); @@ -858,16 +868,14 @@ int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, return ret; } -int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, +int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen) { -#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC - static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = {0x65, 0x78, 0x70, 0x6F, 0x72, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x00}; -#else - static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "exporter"; -#endif + /* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72"; unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; const EVP_MD *md; @@ -885,7 +893,7 @@ int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, else sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session); - md = ssl_md(s->ctx, sslcipher->algorithm2); + md = ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), sslcipher->algorithm2); /* * Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why |