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* Un-staticize mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms() so that it may be usedRobert Watson2002-11-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | by policy modules making use of downgrades in the MAC AST event. This is required by the mac_lomac port of LOMAC to the MAC Framework. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=107271
* Introduce p_label, extensible security label storage for the MAC frameworkRobert Watson2002-11-201-1/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | in struct proc. While the process label is actually stored in the struct ucred pointed to by p_ucred, there is a need for transient storage that may be used when asynchronous (deferred) updates need to be performed on the "real" label for locking reasons. Unlike other label storage, this label has no locking semantics, relying on policies to provide their own protection for the label contents, meaning that a policy leaf mutex may be used, avoiding lock order issues. This permits policies that act based on historical process behavior (such as audit policies, the MAC Framework port of LOMAC, etc) can update process properties even when many existing locks are held without violating the lock order. No currently committed policies implement use of this label storage. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=107105
* Merge kld access control checks from the MAC tree: these access controlRobert Watson2002-11-191-0/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | checks permit policy modules to augment the system policy for permitting kld operations. This permits policies to limit access to kld operations based on credential (and other) properties, as well as to perform checks on the kld being loaded (integrity, etc). Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=107089
* Introduce a condition variable to avoid returning EBUSY whenRobert Watson2002-11-131-29/+52
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the MAC policy list is busy during a load or unload attempt. We assert no locks held during the cv wait, meaning we should be fairly deadlock-safe. Because of the cv model and busy count, it's possible for a cv waiter waiting for exclusive access to the policy list to be starved by active and long-lived access control/labeling events. For now, we accept that as a necessary tradeoff. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106856
* Garbage collect mac_create_devfs_vnode() -- it hasn't been used sinceRobert Watson2002-11-121-7/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | we brought in the new cache and locking model for vnode labels. We now rely on mac_associate_devfs_vnode(). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106788
* Garbage collect definition of M_MACOPVEC -- we no longer perform aRobert Watson2002-11-111-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | dynamic mapping of an operation vector into an operation structure, rather, we rely on C99 sparse structure initialization. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106779
* Add an explicit execlabel argument to exec-related MAC policy entryRobert Watson2002-11-081-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | points, rather than relying on policies to grub around in the image activator instance structure. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106647
* Bring in two sets of changes:Robert Watson2002-11-051-6/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (1) Permit userland applications to request a change of label atomic with an execve() via mac_execve(). This is required for the SEBSD port of SELinux/FLASK. Attempts to invoke this without MAC compiled in result in ENOSYS, as with all other MAC system calls. Complexity, if desired, is present in policy modules, rather than the framework. (2) Permit policies to have access to both the label of the vnode being executed as well as the interpreter if it's a shell script or related UNIX nonsense. Because we can't hold both vnode locks at the same time, cache the interpreter label. SEBSD relies on this because it supports secure transitioning via shell script executables. Other policies might want to take both labels into account during an integrity or confidentiality decision at execve()-time. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106468
* Assert that appropriate vnodes are locked in mac_execve_will_transition().Robert Watson2002-11-051-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | Allow transitioning to be twiddled off using the process and fs enforcement flags, although at some point this should probably be its own flag. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106460
* Permit MAC policies to instrument the access control decisions forRobert Watson2002-11-041-0/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | system accounting configuration and for nfsd server thread attach. Policies might use this to protect the integrity or confidentiality of accounting data, limit the ability to turn on or off accounting, as well as to prevent inappropriately labeled threads from becoming nfs server threads. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106412
* Remove mac_cache_fslabel_in_vnode sysctl -- with the new VFS/MACRobert Watson2002-11-041-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | construction, labels are always cached. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106410
* License clarification and wording changes: NAI has approved removal ofRobert Watson2002-11-041-7/+4
| | | | | | | | clause three, and NAI Labs now goes by the name Network Associates Laboratories. Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106392
* Introduce mac_check_system_settime(), a MAC check allowing policies toRobert Watson2002-11-031-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | augment the system policy for changing the system time. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106369
* Add MAC checks for various kenv() operations: dump, get, set, unset,Robert Watson2002-11-011-0/+52
| | | | | | | | | | permitting MAC policies to limit access to the kernel environment. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106308
* Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_opsRobert Watson2002-10-301-583/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two reasons: (1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in a few hundred NULL function pointers. (2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its entry point set. Both of these no longer apply: (1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure. (2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers, argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the complexity. This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point implementation arguments. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106217
* While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument forRobert Watson2002-10-301-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106212
* An inappropriate ASSERT slipped in during the recent merge of theRobert Watson2002-10-281-2/+0
| | | | | | | reboot checking; remove. Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106088
* Centrally manage enforcement of {reboot,swapon,sysctl} using theRobert Watson2002-10-271-13/+9
| | | | | | | | | | mac_enforce_system toggle, rather than several separate toggles. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106045
* Implement mac_check_system_sysctl(), a MAC Framework entry point toRobert Watson2002-10-271-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | permit MAC policies to augment the security protections on sysctl() operations. This is not really a wonderful entry point, as we only have access to the MIB of the target sysctl entry, rather than the more useful entry name, but this is sufficient for policies like Biba that wish to use their notions of privilege or integrity to prevent inappropriate sysctl modification. Affects MAC kernels only. Since SYSCTL_LOCK isn't in sysctl.h, just kern_sysctl.c, we can't assert the SYSCTL subsystem lockin the MAC Framework. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106025
* Hook up mac_check_system_reboot(), a MAC Framework entry point thatRobert Watson2002-10-271-0/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | permits MAC modules to augment system security decisions regarding the reboot() system call, if MAC is compiled into the kernel. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106024
* Merge from MAC tree: rename mac_check_vnode_swapon() toRobert Watson2002-10-271-18/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | mac_check_system_swapon(), to reflect the fact that the primary object of this change is the running kernel as a whole, rather than just the vnode. We'll drop additional checks of this class into the same check namespace, including reboot(), sysctl(), et al. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=106023
* Slightly change the semantics of vnode labels for MAC: rather thanRobert Watson2002-10-261-485/+89
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | "refreshing" the label on the vnode before use, just get the label right from inception. For single-label file systems, set the label in the generic VFS getnewvnode() code; for multi-label file systems, leave the labeling up to the file system. With UFS1/2, this means reading the extended attribute during vfs_vget() as the inode is pulled off disk, rather than hitting the extended attributes frequently during operations later, improving performance. This also corrects sematics for shared vnode locks, which were not previously present in the system. This chances the cache coherrency properties WRT out-of-band access to label data, but in an acceptable form. With UFS1, there is a small race condition during automatic extended attribute start -- this is not present with UFS2, and occurs because EAs aren't available at vnode inception. We'll introduce a work around for this shortly. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=105988
* Comment describing the semantics of mac_late.Robert Watson2002-10-251-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | Trim trailing whitespace. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=105959
* Introduce MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SWAPON, which permits MAC policies toRobert Watson2002-10-221-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | perform authorization checks during swapon() events; policies might choose to enforce protections based on the credential requesting the swap configuration, the target of the swap operation, or other factors such as internal policy state. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=105717
* Missed in previous merge: export sizeof(struct oldmac) rather thanRobert Watson2002-10-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | sizeof(struct mac). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=105716
* Support the new MAC user API in kernel: modify existing system callsRobert Watson2002-10-221-169/+917
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | to use a modified notion of 'struct mac', and flesh out the new variation system calls (almost identical to existing ones except that they permit a pid to be specified for process label retrieval, and don't follow symlinks). This generalizes the label API so that the framework is now almost entirely policy-agnostic. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=105694
* Use if_printf(ifp, "blah") instead ofBrooks Davis2002-10-211-2/+1
| | | | | | | printf("%s%d: blah", ifp->if_name, ifp->if_xname). Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=105598
* If MAC_MAX_POLICIES isn't defined, don't try to define it, just let theRobert Watson2002-10-201-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | compile fail. MAC_MAX_POLICIES should always be defined, or we have bigger problems at hand. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=105497
* Make sure to clear the 'registered' flag for MAC policies when theyRobert Watson2002-10-191-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | unregister. Under some obscure (perhaps demented) circumstances, this can result in a panic if a policy is unregistered, and then someone foolishly unregisters it again. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=105474
* Integrate mac_check_socket_send() and mac_check_socket_receive()Robert Watson2002-10-061-0/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | checks from the MAC tree: allow policies to perform access control for the ability of a process to send and receive data via a socket. At some point, we might also pass in additional address information if an explicit address is requested on send. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104571
* Sync from MAC tree: break out the single mmap entry point intoRobert Watson2002-10-061-18/+63
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | seperate entry points for each occasion: mac_check_vnode_mmap() Check at initial mapping mac_check_vnode_mprotect() Check at mapping protection change mac_check_vnode_mmap_downgrade() Determine if a mapping downgrade should take place following subject relabel. Implement mmap() and mprotect() entry points for labeled vnode policies. These entry points are currently not hooked up to the VM system in the base tree. These changes improve the consistency of the access control interface and offer more flexibility regarding limiting access to vnode mmaping. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104546
* Modify label allocation semantics for sockets: pass in soalloc's mallocRobert Watson2002-10-051-13/+69
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | flags so that we can call malloc with M_NOWAIT if necessary, avoiding potential sleeps while holding mutexes in the TCP syncache code. Similar to the existing support for mbuf label allocation: if we can't allocate all the necessary label store in each policy, we back out the label allocation and fail the socket creation. Sync from MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104541
* Integrate a devfs/MAC fix from the MAC tree: avoid a race condition duringRobert Watson2002-10-051-0/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | devfs VOP symlink creation by introducing a new entry point to determine the label of the devfs_dirent prior to allocation of a vnode for the symlink. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104533
* Merge support for mac_check_vnode_link(), a MAC framework/policy entryRobert Watson2002-10-051-0/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | point that instruments the creation of hard links. Policy implementations to follow. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104529
* While the MAC API has supported the ability to handle M_NOWAIT passedRobert Watson2002-10-051-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | to mbuf label initialization, that functionality was never merged to the main tree. Go ahead and merge that functionality now. Note that this requires policy modules to accept the case where the label element may be destroyed even if init has not succeeded on it (in the event that policy failed the init). This will shortly also apply to sockets. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104528
* Rearrange object and label init/destroy functions to match theRobert Watson2002-10-051-101/+101
| | | | | | | | | | | | order used in mac_policy.h and elsewhere. Sort order is basically "by operation category", then "alphabetically by object". Sync to MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104527
* Sync to MAC tree: use 'flag' instead of 'how' for mac_init_mbuf();Robert Watson2002-10-051-3/+3
| | | | | | | remove a slightly less than useful comment. Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104524
* Another big diff, little functional change: move label internalization,Robert Watson2002-10-051-65/+65
| | | | | | | | | | | externalization, and cred label life cycle events to entirely above devfs and vnode events. Sync from MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104522
* Move all object label init/destroy routines to the head of theRobert Watson2002-10-051-285/+285
| | | | | | | | | | | entry points to better match the entry point ordering in mac_policy.h. Big diff, no functional change; merge from the MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104521
* Synch from TrustedBSD MAC tree:Robert Watson2002-10-051-3/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | - If a policy isn't registered when a policy module unloads, silently succeed. - Hold the policy list lock across more of the validity tests to avoid races. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104520
* Cosmetic line wrap synchronization.Robert Watson2002-10-051-2/+4
| | | | Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104518
* Push the debugging obect label counters into security.mac.debug.countersRobert Watson2002-10-051-11/+16
| | | | | | | | | | rather than directly under security.mac.debug. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104517
* Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:Robert Watson2002-10-051-68/+86
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes. - Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels. - Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost all entry points, implement these entry points using common implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of almost identical looking functions. This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104514
* Add a new MAC entry point, mac_thread_userret(td), which permits policyRobert Watson2002-10-021-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | modules to perform MAC-related events when a thread returns to user space. This is required for policies that have floating process labels, as it's not always possible to acquire the process lock at arbitrary points in the stack during system call processing; process labels might represent traditional authentication data, process history information, or other data. LOMAC will use this entry point to perform the process label update prior to the thread returning to userspace, when plugged into the MAC framework. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104338
* Remember to include "opt_devfs.h" so we get any relevant changesPoul-Henning Kamp2002-10-011-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | to NDEVFSINO before we include devfs.h. Spotted by: FlexeLint Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104300
* Improve locking of pipe mutexes in the context of MAC:Robert Watson2002-10-011-0/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (1) Where previously the pipe mutex was selectively grabbed during pipe_ioctl(), now always grab it and then release if if not needed. This protects the call to mac_check_pipe_ioctl() to make sure the label remains consistent. (Note: it looks like sigio locking may be incorrect for fgetown() since we call it not-by-reference and sigio locking assumes call by reference). (2) In pipe_stat(), lock the pipe if MAC is compiled in so that the call to mac_check_pipe_stat() gets a locked pipe to protect label consistency. We still release the lock before returning actual stat() data, risking inconsistency, but apparently our pipe locking model accepts that risk. (3) In various pipe MAC authorization checks, assert that the pipe lock is held. (4) Grab the lock when performing a pipe relabel operation, and assert it a little deeper in the stack. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104269
* Push 'security.mac.debug_label_fallback' behind options MAC_DEBUG.Robert Watson2002-10-011-10/+14
| | | | | | | | Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104268
* Add tunables for the existing sysctl twiddles for pipe and vmRobert Watson2002-09-301-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | enforcement so they can be disabled prior to kernel start. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=104236
* Remove un-needed stack variable 'ops'.Robert Watson2002-09-181-3/+2
| | | | | | | | Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=103570
* Add a toggle to disable VM enforcement.Robert Watson2002-09-181-0/+7
| | | | | | | | Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs Notes: svn path=/head/; revision=103514
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