Fix build on -CURRENT by conditionalizing S/Key support and adding OPIE

support.

Reported by:	bento

8 files changed, 377 insertions, 53 deletions

diff --git a/net/tac_plus4/Makefile b/net/tac_plus4/Makefile
index 17b739404f74..e3cd359ac932 100644
--- a/net/tac_plus4/Makefile
+++ b/net/tac_plus4/Makefile
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	tac_plus
 PORTVERSION=	F4.0.4
+PORTREVISION=	1
 CATEGORIES=	net
 MASTER_SITES=	ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/pub/tacacs/
 DISTNAME=	tac_plus.F4.0.4.alpha
@@ -38,6 +39,14 @@ CFLAGS+=	-DTAC_IOS_VERSION=${TAC_IOS_VERSION}
 CFLAGS+=	-DTAC_IOS_VERSION=11
 .endif
 
+.if exists(/usr/include/skey.h) && !defined(WITHOUT_SKEY)
+MAKE_ENV+=	WITH_SKEY=1
+.endif
+
+.if exists(/usr/include/opie.h) && !defined(WITHOUT_OPIE)
+MAKE_ENV+=	WITH_OPIE=1
+.endif
+
 do-install:
 	${INSTALL_PROGRAM} ${WRKSRC}/tac_plus ${PREFIX}/sbin
 	${INSTALL_MAN} ${WRKSRC}/tac_plus.1 ${PREFIX}/man/man1/tac_plus.1
diff --git a/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-aa b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-aa
index 6de9ec665dff..f8cdce952b66 100644
--- a/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-aa
+++ b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-aa
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
---- Makefile.orig	Sun Jun 18 19:26:54 2000
-+++ Makefile	Mon Jan 22 20:22:57 2001
+--- Makefile.orig	Sun Jun 18 13:26:54 2000
++++ Makefile	Sun Dec  8 15:18:58 2002
 @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  # LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
  # FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 
@@ -27,15 +27,22 @@
  # NOTE: If you want your password encryption to be compatible with
  # e.g. SunOS, you may need to instead use:
  # OSLIBS=-ldescrypt
-@@ -64,12 +64,12 @@
+@@ -64,12 +64,19 @@
  # FLAGS   = -DTAC_PLUS_USERID=$(USERID) -DTAC_PLUS_GROUPID=$(GROUPID)
  
  # Definitions for SKEY functionality
 -# DEFINES = -DSKEY
 -# LIBS = ../crimelab/skey/src/libskey.a
++.if defined(WITH_SKEY)
 +DEFINES = -DSKEY
 +LIBS = -lskey -lmd
  # INCLUDES = -I../crimelab/skey/src
++.endif
++
++.if defined(WITH_OPIE)
++DEFINES += -DOPIE
++LIBS += -lopie -lmd
++.endif
  
  # Debugging flags
 -DEBUG = -g
@@ -43,7 +50,7 @@
  
  # Enforce a limit on maximum sessions per user. See the user's guide
  # for more information.
-@@ -85,13 +85,13 @@
+@@ -85,13 +92,13 @@
  # possible), containing its process id. Uncomment and modify the
  # following line to change this filename
  
@@ -59,7 +66,16 @@
  
  HFILES = expire.h parse.h regmagic.h md5.h regexp.h tac_plus.h 
  
-@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@
+@@ -99,7 +106,7 @@
+ 	do_author.c dump.c encrypt.c expire.c $(MSCHAP_MD4_SRC) md5.c \
+ 	packet.c report.c sendauth.c tac_plus.c utils.c pw.c hash.c \
+ 	parse.c regexp.c programs.c enable.c pwlib.c default_fn.c \
+-	skey_fn.c default_v0_fn.c sendpass.c maxsess.c
++	skey_fn.c opie_fn.c default_v0_fn.c sendpass.c maxsess.c
+ 
+ OBJS = $(SRCS:.c=.o)
+ 
+@@ -130,8 +137,8 @@
  	-rm -f *.o *~ *.BAK tac_plus generate_passwd
  
  install:
diff --git a/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-ab b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-ab
index e91f6f07290c..5745c397efc0 100644
--- a/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-ab
+++ b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-ab
@@ -1,28 +1,18 @@
-*** skey_fn.c.orig	Sat Jul 29 02:49:18 1995
---- skey_fn.c	Mon Mar  3 17:33:57 1997
-***************
-*** 153,158 ****
---- 153,163 ----
-  		char buf[256];
-  		sprintf(buf, "%s\nPassword: ", skeyprompt);
-  		data->server_msg = tac_strdup(buf);
-+ 
-+ 		/* We try to make it in accordance of standard FreeBSD
-+ 		 * behaviour in order to avoid surprises for user */
-+ 		data->flags = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_FLAG_NOECHO;
-+ 
-  		data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_GETPASS;
-  		p->state = STATE_AUTHEN_GETPASS;
-  		return (0);
-*** tac_plus.h.orig	Sat Jul 29 02:49:19 1995
---- tac_plus.h	Mon Mar  3 17:35:51 1997
-***************
-*** 91,96 ****
---- 91,97 ----
-  #ifdef FREEBSD
-  #define CONST_SYSERRLIST
-  #define STDLIB_MALLOC
-+ #define NO_PWAGE
-  #define VOIDSIG
-  #endif
-  
+--- tac_plus.h.orig	Sun Jun 18 13:26:54 2000
++++ tac_plus.h	Sun Dec  8 15:24:27 2002
+@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@
+ #ifdef FREEBSD
+ #define CONST_SYSERRLIST
+ #define STDLIB_MALLOC
++#define NO_PWAGE
+ #define VOIDSIG
+ #define NO_PWAGE
+ #endif
+@@ -701,6 +702,7 @@
+ extern int default_fn();
+ extern int default_v0_fn();
+ extern int skey_fn();
++extern int opie_fn();
+ #ifdef MSCHAP
+ extern void mschap_lmchallengeresponse();
+ extern void mschap_ntchallengeresponse();
diff --git a/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-ac b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-ac
index 444a0a679658..2c6827694910 100644
--- a/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-ac
+++ b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-ac
@@ -27,23 +27,3 @@
  contains the process id of the currently running daemon.  The port
  number is appended to the filename only if the port being used is not
  the default one of 49.
---- users_guide.orig	Sat Apr  3 08:03:48 1999
-+++ users_guide	Tue Nov  9 21:57:03 1999
-@@ -1368,7 +1368,7 @@
- and then send the daemon a SIGUSR1. This will cause it to reinitialize
- itself and re-read the configuration file.
- 
--On startup, tac_plus creates the file /etc/tac_plus.pid , if possible,
-+On startup, tac_plus creates the file /var/run/tac_plus.pid , if possible,
- containing its process id. If you invoke the daemon so that it listens
- on a non-standard port, the file created is /etc/tac_plus.pid.<port>
- instead, where <port> is the port number the daemon is listening on.
-@@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@
- Assuming you are listening on the default port 49, something like the
- following should work:
- 
--# kill -USR1 `cat /etc/tac_plus.pid`
-+# kill -USR1 `cat /var/run/tac_plus.pid`
- 
- It's a good idea to check that the daemon is still running after
- sending it a SIGUSR1, since a syntactically incorrect configuration
diff --git a/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-choose_authen.c b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-choose_authen.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b3cd95631cb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-choose_authen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+--- choose_authen.c.orig	Sun Jun 18 13:26:53 2000
++++ choose_authen.c	Sun Dec  8 15:26:08 2002
+@@ -118,10 +118,27 @@
+ #else /* SKEY */
+ 	    report(LOG_ERR, 
+ 		   "%s %s: user %s s/key support has not been compiled in",
+-		   name ? name : "<unknown>",
+-		   session.peer, session.port);
++		   session.peer, session.port,
++		   name ? name : "<unknown>");
+ 	    return(CHOOSE_FAILED);
+ #endif	/* SKEY */
++	}
++
++	if (cfg_passwd && STREQ(cfg_passwd, "opie")) {
++	    if (debug & DEBUG_PASSWD_FLAG)
++		report(LOG_DEBUG, "%s %s: user %s requires opie",
++			session.peer, session.port, name);
++#ifdef OPIE
++		type->authen_func = opie_fn;
++		strcpy(type->authen_name, "opie_fn");
++		return (CHOOSE_OK);
++#else /* OPIE */
++		report(LOG_ERR,
++			"%s %s: user %s opie support has not been compiled in",
++			session.peer, session.port,
++			name ? name : "<unknown>");
++		return(CHOOSE_FAILED);
++#endif /* OPIE */
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Not an skey user. Must be none, des, cleartext or file password */
diff --git a/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-opie_fn.c b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-opie_fn.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..cf4356b6eee0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-opie_fn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+--- opie_fn.c.orig	Sun Dec  8 15:26:20 2002
++++ opie_fn.c	Sun Dec  8 15:27:01 2002
+@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
++/* 
++   Copyright (c) 1995-2000 by Cisco systems, Inc.
++
++   Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute modified and
++   unmodified copies of this software for any purpose and without fee is
++   hereby granted, provided that (a) this copyright and permission notice
++   appear on all copies of the software and supporting documentation, (b)
++   the name of Cisco Systems, Inc. not be used in advertising or
++   publicity pertaining to distribution of the program without specific
++   prior permission, and (c) notice be given in supporting documentation
++   that use, modification, copying and distribution is by permission of
++   Cisco Systems, Inc.
++
++   Cisco Systems, Inc. makes no representations about the suitability
++   of this software for any purpose.  THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS
++   IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING,
++   WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND
++   FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
++*/
++
++#ifdef OPIE
++#include "tac_plus.h"
++#include "expire.h"
++
++/* internal state variables */
++#define STATE_AUTHEN_START   0	/* no requests issued */
++#define STATE_AUTHEN_GETUSER 1	/* username has been requested */
++#define STATE_AUTHEN_GETPASS 2	/* password has been requested */
++
++#include <opie.h>
++
++struct private_data {
++    struct opie opiedata;
++    char password[MAX_PASSWD_LEN + 1];
++    int state;
++};
++
++/* Use s/key to verify a supplied password using state set up earlier
++when the username was supplied */
++
++static int
++opie_verify(passwd, data)
++char *passwd;
++struct authen_data *data;
++{
++    struct private_data *p = data->method_data;
++    struct opie *opiep = &p->opiedata;
++
++    data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_FAIL;
++
++    if (opieverify(opiep, passwd) == 0) {
++	/* S/Key authentication succeeded */
++	data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_PASS;
++	if (opiep->opie_n < 5) {
++	    data->server_msg = tac_strdup("Password will expire soon");
++	    return (1);
++	}
++    }
++    return (0);
++}
++
++/*
++ * Skey tacacs login authentication function. Wants a username
++ * and a password, and tries to verify them via opie.
++ *
++ * Choose_authen will ensure that we already have a username before this
++ * gets called.
++ *
++ * We will query for a password and keep it in the method_data.
++ *
++ * Any strings returned via pointers in authen_data must come from the
++ * heap. They will get freed by the caller.
++ *
++ * Return 0 if data->status is valid, otherwise 1
++ */
++
++int
++opie_fn(data)
++struct authen_data *data;
++{
++    char *name, *passwd;
++    struct private_data *p;
++    char *prompt;
++    int pwlen;
++
++    p = (struct private_data *) data->method_data;
++
++    /* An abort has been received. Clean up and return */
++    if (data->flags & TAC_PLUS_CONTINUE_FLAG_ABORT) {
++	if (data->method_data)
++	    free(data->method_data);
++	data->method_data = NULL;
++	return (1);
++    }
++    /* Initialise method_data if first time through */
++    if (!p) {
++	p = (struct private_data *) tac_malloc(sizeof(struct private_data));
++	bzero(p, sizeof(struct private_data));
++	data->method_data = p;
++	p->state = STATE_AUTHEN_START;
++    }
++
++    /* Unless we're enabling, we need a username */
++    if (data->service != TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_SVC_ENABLE &&
++	!(char) data->NAS_id->username[0]) {
++	switch (p->state) {
++
++	case STATE_AUTHEN_GETUSER:
++	    /* we have previously asked for a username but none came back.
++	     * This is a gross error */
++	    data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR;
++	    report(LOG_ERR, "%s: No username supplied after GETUSER",
++		   session.peer);
++	    return (0);
++
++	case STATE_AUTHEN_START:
++	    /* No username. Try requesting one */
++	    data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_GETUSER;
++	    if (data->service == TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_SVC_LOGIN) {
++		prompt = "\nUser Access Verification\n\nUsername: ";
++	    } else {
++		prompt = "Username: ";
++	    }
++	    data->server_msg = tac_strdup(prompt);
++	    p->state = STATE_AUTHEN_GETUSER;
++	    return (0);
++
++	default:
++	    /* something awful has happened. Give up and die */
++	    report(LOG_ERR, "%s: opie_fn bad state %d", 
++		   session.peer, p->state);
++	    return (1);
++	}
++    }
++
++    /* we now have a username if we needed one */
++    name = data->NAS_id->username;
++
++    /* Do we have a password? */
++    passwd = p->password;
++
++    if (!passwd[0]) {
++	char opieprompt[80];
++
++	/* no password yet. Either we need to ask for one and expect to get
++	 * called again, or we asked but nothing came back, which is fatal */
++
++	switch (p->state) {
++	case STATE_AUTHEN_GETPASS:
++	    /* We already asked for a password. This should be the reply */
++	    if (data->client_msg) {
++		pwlen = MIN(strlen(data->client_msg), MAX_PASSWD_LEN);
++	    } else {
++		pwlen = 0;
++	    }
++	    strncpy(passwd, data->client_msg, pwlen);
++	    passwd[pwlen] = '\0';
++	    break;
++
++	default:
++	    /* Request a password */
++	    passwd = cfg_get_login_secret(name, TAC_PLUS_RECURSE);
++	    if (!passwd && !STREQ(passwd, "opie")) {
++		report(LOG_ERR, "Cannot find opie password declaration for %s",
++		       name);
++		data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR;
++		return(1);
++	    }
++
++	    if (opiechallenge(&p->opiedata, name, opieprompt) == 0) {
++		char buf[256];
++		sprintf(buf, "%s\nPassword: ", opieprompt);
++		data->server_msg = tac_strdup(buf);
++
++		/* We try to make it in accordance of standard FreeBSD
++		 * behaviour in order to avoid surprises for user */
++		data->flags = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_FLAG_NOECHO;
++
++		data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_GETPASS;
++		p->state = STATE_AUTHEN_GETPASS;
++		return (0);
++	    } 
++
++	    data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR;
++	    report(LOG_ERR, "Cannot generate opie prompt for %s", name);
++	    return(1);
++	}
++    }
++
++    /* We have a username and password. Try validating */
++
++    /* Assume the worst */
++    data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_FAIL;
++
++    switch (data->service) {
++    case TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_SVC_LOGIN:
++	opie_verify(passwd, data);
++	if (debug)
++	    report(LOG_INFO, "login query for '%s' %s from %s %s",
++		   name && name[0] ? name : "unknown",
++		   data->NAS_id->NAS_port && data->NAS_id->NAS_port[0] ?
++		       data->NAS_id->NAS_port : "unknown",
++		   session.peer,
++		   (data->status == TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_PASS) ?
++		   "accepted" : "rejected");
++	break;
++
++    default:
++	data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR;
++	report(LOG_ERR, "%s: Bogus service value %d from packet", 
++	       session.peer, data->service);
++	break;
++    }
++
++    if (data->method_data)
++	free(data->method_data);
++    data->method_data = NULL;
++
++    switch (data->status) {
++    case TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR:
++    case TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_FAIL:
++    case TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_PASS:
++	return (0);
++    default:
++	report(LOG_ERR, "%s: opie_fn couldn't set recognizable status %d",
++	       session.peer, data->status);
++	data->status = TAC_PLUS_AUTHEN_STATUS_ERROR;
++	return (1);
++    }
++}
++#else /* OPIE */
++
++/* The following code is not needed or used. It exists solely to
++   prevent compilers from "helpfully" complaining that this source
++   file is empty, which upsets novices building the software */
++
++static int dummy = 0;
++
++#endif /* OPIE */
diff --git a/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-parse.h b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-parse.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..63b59e03235c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-parse.h
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+--- parse.h.orig	Sun Dec  8 15:22:51 2002
++++ parse.h	Sun Dec  8 15:23:26 2002
+@@ -76,3 +76,4 @@
+ #ifdef MSCHAP
+ #define S_mschap          42
+ #endif /* MSCHAP */
++#define S_opie            43
diff --git a/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-users_guide b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-users_guide
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5e499e741a7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/net/tac_plus4/files/patch-users_guide
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+--- users_guide.orig	Sun Jun 18 13:26:54 2000
++++ users_guide	Sun Dec  8 15:14:01 2002
+@@ -166,7 +166,10 @@
+ crimelab.com but now it appears the only source is ftp.bellcore.com. I
+ suggest you try a web search for s/key source code.
+ 
+-Note: S/KEY is a trademark of Bell Communications Research (Bellcore).
++To use OPIE, you must have built tac_plus with the -DWITH_OPIE flag.
++
++Note: S/KEY and OPIE are a trademark of Bell Communications Research 
++(Bellcore).
+ 
+ Should you need them, there are routines for accessing password files
+ (getpwnam,setpwent,endpwent,setpwfile) in pw.c.
+@@ -436,6 +439,15 @@
+       login = skey
+     }
+ 
++4. Authentication using opie.
++
++If you have successfully built tac_plus with opie support, you can specify
++a user be authenticated via opie, as follows:
++
++    user = marcus {
++      login = opie
++    }
++
+ RECURSIVE PASSWORD LOOKUPS
+ ---------------------------
+ 
+@@ -1370,7 +1382,7 @@
+ and then send the daemon a SIGUSR1. This will cause it to reinitialize
+ itself and re-read the configuration file.
+ 
+-On startup, tac_plus creates the file /etc/tac_plus.pid , if possible,
++On startup, tac_plus creates the file /var/run/tac_plus.pid , if possible,
+ containing its process id. If you invoke the daemon so that it listens
+ on a non-standard port, the file created is /etc/tac_plus.pid.<port>
+ instead, where <port> is the port number the daemon is listening on.
+@@ -1378,7 +1390,7 @@
+ Assuming you are listening on the default port 49, something like the
+ following should work:
+ 
+-# kill -USR1 `cat /etc/tac_plus.pid`
++# kill -USR1 `cat /var/run/tac_plus.pid`
+ 
+ It's a good idea to check that the daemon is still running after
+ sending it a SIGUSR1, since a syntactically incorrect configuration