Fix security issues in xorg client libraries.

Most libraries were updated to newer versions, in some cases patches
were backported instead.

Most notably, x11/libX11 was updated to 1.6.0

Security:	CVE-2013-1981
		CVE-2013-1982
		CVE-2013-1983
		CVE-2013-1984
		CVE-2013-1985
		CVE-2013-1986
		CVE-2013-1987
		CVE-2013-1988
		CVE-2013-1989
		CVE-2013-1990
		CVE-2013-1991
		CVE-2013-1992
		CVE-2013-1993
		CVE-2013-1994
		CVE-2013-1995
		CVE-2013-1996
		CVE-2013-1997
		CVE-2013-1998
		CVE-2013-1999
		CVE-2013-2000
		CVE-2013-2001
		CVE-2013-2002
		CVE-2013-2003
		CVE-2013-2004
		CVE-2013-2005
		CVE-2013-2062
		CVE-2013-2063
		CVE-2013-2064
		CVE-2013-2066

12 files changed, 821 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/x11/libXi/Makefile b/x11/libXi/Makefile
index b36c6f4c4220..81b66525f9c9 100644
--- a/x11/libXi/Makefile
+++ b/x11/libXi/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 
 PORTNAME=	libXi
 PORTVERSION=	1.7.1
+PORTREVISION=	1
 PORTEPOCH=	1
 CATEGORIES=	x11
 
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGMotion.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGMotion.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4902168a6023
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGMotion.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From bb922ed4253b35590f0369f32a917ff89ade0830 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000
+Subject: integer overflow in XGetDeviceMotionEvents() [CVE-2013-1984 4/8]
+
+If the number of events or axes reported by the server is large enough
+that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct,
+then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the
+X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+diff --git a/src/XGMotion.c b/src/XGMotion.c
+index 5feac85..a4c75b6 100644
+--- src/XGMotion.c
++++ src/XGMotion.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ XDeviceTimeCoord *
+ XGetDeviceMotionEvents(
+@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ XGetDeviceMotionEvents(
+     xGetDeviceMotionEventsReply rep;
+     XDeviceTimeCoord *tc;
+     int *data, *bufp, *readp, *savp;
+-    long size, size2;
++    unsigned long size;
+     int i, j;
+     XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+ 
+@@ -104,10 +105,21 @@ XGetDeviceMotionEvents(
+ 	SyncHandle();
+ 	return (NULL);
+     }
+-    size = rep.length << 2;
+-    size2 = rep.nEvents * (sizeof(XDeviceTimeCoord) + (rep.axes * sizeof(int)));
+-    savp = readp = (int *)Xmalloc(size);
+-    bufp = (int *)Xmalloc(size2);
++    if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++	size = rep.length << 2;
++	savp = readp = Xmalloc(size);
++    } else {
++	size = 0;
++	savp = readp = NULL;
++    }
++    /* rep.axes is a CARD8, so assume max number of axes for bounds check */
++    if (rep.nEvents <
++	(INT_MAX / (sizeof(XDeviceTimeCoord) + (UCHAR_MAX * sizeof(int))))) {
++	size_t bsize = rep.nEvents *
++	    (sizeof(XDeviceTimeCoord) + (rep.axes * sizeof(int)));
++	bufp = Xmalloc(bsize);
++    } else
++	bufp = NULL;
+     if (!bufp || !savp) {
+ 	Xfree(bufp);
+ 	Xfree(savp);
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetBMap.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetBMap.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d395088fb500
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetBMap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+From f3e08e4fbe40016484ba795feecf1a742170ffc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:26:52 +0000
+Subject: Stack buffer overflow in XGetDeviceButtonMapping() [CVE-2013-1998 1/3]
+
+We copy the entire reply sent by the server into the fixed size
+mapping[] array on the stack, even if the server says it's a larger
+size than the mapping array can hold.  HULK SMASH STACK!
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+diff --git a/src/XGetBMap.c b/src/XGetBMap.c
+index 211c9ca..002daba 100644
+--- src/XGetBMap.c
++++ src/XGetBMap.c
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ #ifdef MIN	/* some systems define this in <sys/param.h> */
+ #undef MIN
+@@ -75,7 +76,6 @@ XGetDeviceButtonMapping(
+ {
+     int status = 0;
+     unsigned char mapping[256];	/* known fixed size */
+-    long nbytes;
+     XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+ 
+     register xGetDeviceButtonMappingReq *req;
+@@ -92,13 +92,18 @@ XGetDeviceButtonMapping(
+ 
+     status = _XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse);
+     if (status == 1) {
+-	nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2;
+-	_XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes);
+-
+-	/* don't return more data than the user asked for. */
+-	if (rep.nElts)
+-	    memcpy((char *)map, (char *)mapping, MIN((int)rep.nElts, nmap));
+-	status = rep.nElts;
++	if (rep.length <= (sizeof(mapping) >> 2)) {
++	    unsigned long nbytes = rep.length << 2;
++	    _XRead(dpy, (char *)mapping, nbytes);
++
++	    /* don't return more data than the user asked for. */
++	    if (rep.nElts)
++		memcpy(map, mapping, MIN((int)rep.nElts, nmap));
++	    status = rep.nElts;
++	} else {
++	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
++	    status = 0;
++	}
+     } else
+ 	status = 0;
+     UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDCtl.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDCtl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d93276c74c64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDCtl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From b0b13c12a8079a5a0e7f43b2b8983699057b2cec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000
+Subject: integer overflow in XGetDeviceControl() [CVE-2013-1984 1/8]
+
+If the number of valuators reported by the server is large enough that
+it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, then
+memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the X server
+reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+v2: check that reply size fits inside the data read from the server, so
+we don't read out of bounds either
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+diff --git a/src/XGetDCtl.c b/src/XGetDCtl.c
+index f73a4e8..51ed0ae 100644
+--- src/XGetDCtl.c
++++ src/XGetDCtl.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ XDeviceControl *
+ XGetDeviceControl(
+@@ -68,8 +69,6 @@ XGetDeviceControl(
+     XDevice		*dev,
+     int			 control)
+ {
+-    int size = 0;
+-    int nbytes, i;
+     XDeviceControl *Device = NULL;
+     XDeviceControl *Sav = NULL;
+     xDeviceState *d = NULL;
+@@ -92,8 +91,12 @@ XGetDeviceControl(
+ 	goto out;
+ 
+     if (rep.length > 0) {
+-	nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2;
+-	d = (xDeviceState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)nbytes);
++	unsigned long nbytes;
++	size_t size = 0;
++	if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++	    nbytes = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
++	    d = Xmalloc(nbytes);
++	}
+ 	if (!d) {
+ 	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    goto out;
+@@ -111,33 +114,46 @@ XGetDeviceControl(
+ 	case DEVICE_RESOLUTION:
+ 	{
+ 	    xDeviceResolutionState *r;
++	    size_t val_size;
+ 
+ 	    r = (xDeviceResolutionState *) d;
+-	    size += sizeof(XDeviceResolutionState) +
+-		(3 * sizeof(int) * r->num_valuators);
++	    if (r->num_valuators >= (INT_MAX / (3 * sizeof(int))))
++		goto out;
++	    val_size = 3 * sizeof(int) * r->num_valuators;
++	    if ((sizeof(xDeviceResolutionState) + val_size) > nbytes)
++		goto out;
++	    size += sizeof(XDeviceResolutionState) + val_size;
+ 	    break;
+ 	}
+         case DEVICE_ABS_CALIB:
+         {
++            if (sizeof(xDeviceAbsCalibState) > nbytes)
++                goto out;
+             size += sizeof(XDeviceAbsCalibState);
+             break;
+         }
+         case DEVICE_ABS_AREA:
+         {
++            if (sizeof(xDeviceAbsAreaState) > nbytes)
++                goto out;
+             size += sizeof(XDeviceAbsAreaState);
+             break;
+         }
+         case DEVICE_CORE:
+         {
++            if (sizeof(xDeviceCoreState) > nbytes)
++                goto out;
+             size += sizeof(XDeviceCoreState);
+             break;
+         }
+ 	default:
++	    if (d->length > nbytes)
++		goto out;
+ 	    size += d->length;
+ 	    break;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	Device = (XDeviceControl *) Xmalloc((unsigned)size);
++	Device = Xmalloc(size);
+ 	if (!Device)
+ 	    goto out;
+ 
+@@ -150,6 +166,7 @@ XGetDeviceControl(
+ 	    int *iptr, *iptr2;
+ 	    xDeviceResolutionState *r;
+ 	    XDeviceResolutionState *R;
++	    unsigned int i;
+ 
+ 	    r = (xDeviceResolutionState *) d;
+ 	    R = (XDeviceResolutionState *) Device;
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDProp.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDProp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7ad4e6d9a282
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetDProp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+From 17071c1c608247800b2ca03a35b1fcc9c4cabe6c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 20:30:55 +0000
+Subject: Avoid integer overflow in XGetDeviceProperties() [CVE-2013-1984 7/8]
+
+If the number of items as reported by the Xserver is too large, it
+could overflow the calculation for the size of the buffer to copy the
+reply into, causing memory corruption.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+--- src/XGetDProp.c.orig	2010-09-07 05:21:05.000000000 +0000
++++ src/XGetDProp.c	2013-05-29 16:46:04.000000000 +0000
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ in this Software without prior written a
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ int
+ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice* dev,
+@@ -48,7 +49,8 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice
+ {
+     xGetDevicePropertyReq   *req;
+     xGetDevicePropertyReply rep;
+-    long                    nbytes, rbytes;
++    unsigned long           nbytes, rbytes;
++    int                     ret = Success;
+ 
+     XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+ 
+@@ -81,30 +83,43 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice
+ 	 * data, but this last byte is null terminated and convenient for
+ 	 * returning string properties, so the client doesn't then have to
+ 	 * recopy the string to make it null terminated.
++	 *
++	 * Maximum item limits are set to both prevent integer overflow when
++	 * calculating the amount of memory to malloc, and to limit how much
++	 * memory will be used if a server provides an insanely high count.
+ 	 */
+ 	switch (rep.format) {
+ 	case 8:
+-	    nbytes = rep.nItems;
+-	    rbytes = rep.nItems + 1;
+-	    if (rbytes > 0 &&
+-		(*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes)))
+-		_XReadPad (dpy, (char *) *prop, nbytes);
++	    if (rep.nItems < INT_MAX) {
++		nbytes = rep.nItems;
++		rbytes = rep.nItems + 1;
++		if ((*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes)))
++		    _XReadPad (dpy, (char *) *prop, nbytes);
++		else
++		    ret = BadAlloc;
++	    }
+ 	    break;
+ 
+ 	case 16:
+-	    nbytes = rep.nItems << 1;
+-	    rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (short) + 1;
+-	    if (rbytes > 0 &&
+-		(*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes)))
+-		_XRead16Pad (dpy, (short *) *prop, nbytes);
++	    if (rep.nItems < (INT_MAX / sizeof (short))) {
++		nbytes = rep.nItems << 1;
++		rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (short) + 1;
++		if ((*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes)))
++		    _XRead16Pad (dpy, (short *) *prop, nbytes);
++		else
++		    ret = BadAlloc;
++	    }
+ 	    break;
+ 
+ 	case 32:
+-	    nbytes = rep.nItems << 2;
+-	    rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (long) + 1;
+-	    if (rbytes > 0 &&
+-		(*prop = (unsigned char *) Xmalloc ((unsigned)rbytes)))
+-		_XRead32 (dpy, (long *) *prop, nbytes);
++	    if (rep.nItems < (INT_MAX / sizeof (long))) {
++		nbytes = rep.nItems << 2;
++		rbytes = rep.nItems * sizeof (long) + 1;
++		if ((*prop = Xmalloc (rbytes)))
++		    _XRead32 (dpy, (long *) *prop, nbytes);
++		else
++		    ret = BadAlloc;
++	    }
+ 	    break;
+ 
+ 	default:
+@@ -112,17 +127,13 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice
+ 	     * This part of the code should never be reached.  If it is,
+ 	     * the server sent back a property with an invalid format.
+ 	     */
+-	    nbytes = rep.length << 2;
+-	    _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long) nbytes);
+-	    UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+-	    SyncHandle();
+-	    return(BadImplementation);
++	    ret = BadImplementation;
+ 	}
+ 	if (! *prop) {
+-	    _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long) nbytes);
+-	    UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+-	    SyncHandle();
+-	    return(BadAlloc);
++	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
++	    if (ret == Success)
++		ret = BadAlloc;
++	    goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	(*prop)[rbytes - 1] = '\0';
+     }
+@@ -131,9 +142,10 @@ XGetDeviceProperty(Display* dpy, XDevice
+     *actual_format = rep.format;
+     *nitems = rep.nItems;
+     *bytes_after = rep.bytesAfter;
++  out:
+     UnlockDisplay (dpy);
+     SyncHandle ();
+ 
+-    return Success;
++    return ret;
+ }
+ 
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetFCtl.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetFCtl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6c9949b61446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetFCtl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+From 322ee3576789380222d4403366e4fd12fb24cb6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000
+Subject: integer overflow in XGetFeedbackControl() [CVE-2013-1984 2/8]
+
+If the number of feedbacks reported by the server is large enough that
+it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct, or
+if the total size of all the feedback structures overflows when added
+together, then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from
+the X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+v2: check that reply size fits inside the data read from the server, so
+    we don't read out of bounds either
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+diff --git a/src/XGetFCtl.c b/src/XGetFCtl.c
+index 28fab4d..bb50bf3 100644
+--- src/XGetFCtl.c
++++ src/XGetFCtl.c
+@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ XFeedbackState *
+ XGetFeedbackControl(
+@@ -68,8 +69,6 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+     XDevice		*dev,
+     int			*num_feedbacks)
+ {
+-    int size = 0;
+-    int nbytes, i;
+     XFeedbackState *Feedback = NULL;
+     XFeedbackState *Sav = NULL;
+     xFeedbackState *f = NULL;
+@@ -91,9 +90,16 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+ 	goto out;
+ 
+     if (rep.length > 0) {
++	unsigned long nbytes;
++	size_t size = 0;
++	int i;
++
+ 	*num_feedbacks = rep.num_feedbacks;
+-	nbytes = (long)rep.length << 2;
+-	f = (xFeedbackState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)nbytes);
++
++	if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++	    nbytes = rep.length << 2;
++	    f = Xmalloc(nbytes);
++	}
+ 	if (!f) {
+ 	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    goto out;
+@@ -102,6 +108,10 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+ 	_XRead(dpy, (char *)f, nbytes);
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < *num_feedbacks; i++) {
++	    if (f->length > nbytes)
++		goto out;
++	    nbytes -= f->length;
++
+ 	    switch (f->class) {
+ 	    case KbdFeedbackClass:
+ 		size += sizeof(XKbdFeedbackState);
+@@ -116,6 +126,8 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+ 	    {
+ 		xStringFeedbackState *strf = (xStringFeedbackState *) f;
+ 
++		if (strf->num_syms_supported >= (INT_MAX / sizeof(KeySym)))
++		    goto out;
+ 		size += sizeof(XStringFeedbackState) +
+ 		    (strf->num_syms_supported * sizeof(KeySym));
+ 	    }
+@@ -130,10 +142,12 @@ XGetFeedbackControl(
+ 		size += f->length;
+ 		break;
+ 	    }
++	    if (size > INT_MAX)
++		goto out;
+ 	    f = (xFeedbackState *) ((char *)f + f->length);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	Feedback = (XFeedbackState *) Xmalloc((unsigned)size);
++	Feedback = Xmalloc(size);
+ 	if (!Feedback)
+ 	    goto out;
+ 
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetProp.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetProp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8049cf6fd4bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XGetProp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+From 6dd6dc51a2935c72774be81e5cc2ba2c30e9feff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000
+Subject: integer overflow in XGetDeviceDontPropagateList() [CVE-2013-1984 3/8]
+
+If the number of event classes reported by the server is large enough
+that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct,
+then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the
+X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+V2: EatData if count is 0 but length is > 0 to avoid XIOErrors
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+(limited to 'src/XGetProp.c')
+
+--- src/XGetProp.c.orig	2011-12-20 00:28:44.000000000 +0000
++++ src/XGetProp.c	2013-05-29 16:49:01.000000000 +0000
+@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ XEventClass *
+ XGetDeviceDontPropagateList(
+@@ -89,11 +90,11 @@ XGetDeviceDontPropagateList(
+     }
+     *count = rep.count;
+ 
+-    if (*count) {
+-	rlen = rep.length << 2;
+-	list = (XEventClass *) Xmalloc(rep.length * sizeof(XEventClass));
++    if (rep.length != 0) {
++	if ((rep.count != 0) && (rep.length < (INT_MAX / sizeof(XEventClass))))
++	    list = Xmalloc(rep.length * sizeof(XEventClass));
+ 	if (list) {
+-	    int i;
++	    unsigned int i;
+ 	    CARD32 ec;
+ 
+ 	    /* read and assign each XEventClass separately because
+@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ XGetDeviceDontPropagateList(
+ 		list[i] = (XEventClass) ec;
+ 	    }
+ 	} else
+-	    _XEatData(dpy, (unsigned long)rlen);
++	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+     }
+ 
+     UnlockDisplay(dpy);
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIPassiveGrab.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIPassiveGrab.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b41d9f4b15a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIPassiveGrab.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 91434737f592e8f5cc1762383882a582b55fc03a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 07:37:23 +0000
+Subject: memory corruption in _XIPassiveGrabDevice() [CVE-2013-1998 2/3]
+
+If the server returned more modifiers than the caller asked for,
+we'd just keep copying past the end of the array provided by the
+caller, writing over who-knows-what happened to be there.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+diff --git a/src/XIPassiveGrab.c b/src/XIPassiveGrab.c
+index ac17c01..53b4084 100644
+--- src/XIPassiveGrab.c
++++ src/XIPassiveGrab.c
+@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ _XIPassiveGrabDevice(Display* dpy, int deviceid, int grabtype, int detail,
+         return -1;
+     _XRead(dpy, (char*)failed_mods, reply.num_modifiers * sizeof(xXIGrabModifierInfo));
+ 
+-    for (i = 0; i < reply.num_modifiers; i++)
++    for (i = 0; i < reply.num_modifiers && i < num_modifiers; i++)
+     {
+         modifiers_inout[i].status = failed_mods[i].status;
+         modifiers_inout[i].modifiers = failed_mods[i].modifiers;
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIProperties.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIProperties.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4d62f1962984
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XIProperties.c
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 242f92b490a695fbab244af5bad11b71f897c732 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000
+Subject: integer overflow in XIGetProperty() [CVE-2013-1984 5/8]
+
+If the number of items reported by the server is large enough that
+it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate item type,
+then memory corruption can occur when more bytes are copied from the
+X server reply than the size of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+diff --git a/src/XIProperties.c b/src/XIProperties.c
+index 5e58fb6..32436d1 100644
+--- src/XIProperties.c
++++ src/XIProperties.c
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput2.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ Atom*
+ XIListProperties(Display* dpy, int deviceid, int *num_props_return)
+@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ XIGetProperty(Display* dpy, int deviceid, Atom property, long offset,
+ {
+     xXIGetPropertyReq   *req;
+     xXIGetPropertyReply rep;
+-    long                    nbytes, rbytes;
++    unsigned long       nbytes, rbytes;
+ 
+     XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+ 
+@@ -216,9 +217,11 @@ XIGetProperty(Display* dpy, int deviceid, Atom property, long offset,
+ 	 * recopy the string to make it null terminated.
+ 	 */
+ 
+-        nbytes = rep.num_items * rep.format/8;
+-        rbytes = nbytes + 1;
+-        *data = Xmalloc(rbytes);
++	if (rep.num_items < (INT_MAX / (rep.format/8))) {
++	    nbytes = rep.num_items * rep.format/8;
++	    rbytes = nbytes + 1;
++	    *data = Xmalloc(rbytes);
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (!(*data)) {
+ 	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XISelEv.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XISelEv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c86656f2cfb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XISelEv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From 528419b9ef437e7eeafb41bf45e8ff7d818bd845 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 06:55:23 +0000
+Subject: integer overflow in XIGetSelectedEvents() [CVE-2013-1984 6/8]
+
+If the number of events or masks reported by the server is large enough
+that it overflows when multiplied by the size of the appropriate struct,
+or the sizes overflow as they are totaled up, then memory corruption can
+occur when more bytes are copied from the X server reply than the size
+of the buffer we allocated to hold them.
+
+v2: check that reply size fits inside the data read from the server,
+    so that we don't read out of bounds either
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+diff --git a/src/XISelEv.c b/src/XISelEv.c
+index f871222..0471bef 100644
+--- src/XISelEv.c
++++ src/XISelEv.c
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ in this Software without prior written authorization from the author.
+ #include <X11/extensions/ge.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/geproto.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ int
+ XISelectEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, XIEventMask* masks, int num_masks)
+@@ -101,13 +102,14 @@ out:
+ XIEventMask*
+ XIGetSelectedEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, int *num_masks_return)
+ {
+-    int i, len = 0;
++    unsigned int i, len = 0;
+     unsigned char *mask;
+     XIEventMask *mask_out = NULL;
+     xXIEventMask *mask_in = NULL, *mi;
+     xXIGetSelectedEventsReq *req;
+     xXIGetSelectedEventsReply reply;
+     XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
++    size_t rbytes;
+ 
+     *num_masks_return = -1;
+     LockDisplay(dpy);
+@@ -129,11 +131,16 @@ XIGetSelectedEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, int *num_masks_return)
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+-    mask_in = Xmalloc(reply.length * 4);
+-    if (!mask_in)
++    if (reply.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++        rbytes = (unsigned long) reply.length << 2;
++        mask_in = Xmalloc(rbytes);
++    }
++    if (!mask_in) {
++        _XEatDataWords(dpy, reply.length);
+         goto out;
++    }
+ 
+-    _XRead(dpy, (char*)mask_in, reply.length * 4);
++    _XRead(dpy, (char*)mask_in, rbytes);
+ 
+     /*
+      * This function takes interleaved xXIEventMask structs & masks off
+@@ -148,8 +155,14 @@ XIGetSelectedEvents(Display* dpy, Window win, int *num_masks_return)
+ 
+     for (i = 0, mi = mask_in; i < reply.num_masks; i++)
+     {
+-        len += mi->mask_len * 4;
+-        mi = (xXIEventMask*)((char*)mi + mi->mask_len * 4);
++        unsigned int mask_bytes = mi->mask_len * 4;
++        len += mask_bytes;
++        if (len > INT_MAX)
++            goto out;
++        if ((sizeof(xXIEventMask) + mask_bytes) > rbytes)
++            goto out;
++        rbytes -= (sizeof(xXIEventMask) + mask_bytes);
++        mi = (xXIEventMask*)((char*)mi + mask_bytes);
+         mi++;
+     }
+ 
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XListDev.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XListDev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8231e6b59089
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XListDev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+From 81b4df8ac6aa1520c41c3526961014a6f115cc46 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Mar 2013 08:16:22 +0000
+Subject: sign extension issue in XListInputDevices() [CVE-2013-1995]
+
+nptr is (signed) char, which can be negative, and will sign extend
+when added to the int size, which means size can be subtracted from,
+leading to allocating too small a buffer to hold the data being copied
+from the X server's reply.
+
+v2: check that string size fits inside the data read from the server,
+    so that we don't read out of bounds either
+
+Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+diff --git a/src/XListDev.c b/src/XListDev.c
+index 1c14b96..b85ff3c 100644
+--- src/XListDev.c
++++ src/XListDev.c
+@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static int pad_to_xid(int base_size)
+     return ((base_size + padsize - 1)/padsize) * padsize;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
++static size_t
+ SizeClassInfo(xAnyClassPtr *any, int num_classes)
+ {
+     int size = 0;
+@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ XListInputDevices(
+     register Display	*dpy,
+     int			*ndevices)
+ {
+-    int size;
++    size_t size;
+     xListInputDevicesReq *req;
+     xListInputDevicesReply rep;
+     xDeviceInfo *list, *slist = NULL;
+@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ XListInputDevices(
+     XDeviceInfo *clist = NULL;
+     xAnyClassPtr any, sav_any;
+     XAnyClassPtr Any;
+-    char *nptr, *Nptr;
++    unsigned char *nptr, *Nptr;
+     int i;
+     unsigned long rlen;
+     XExtDisplayInfo *info = XInput_find_display(dpy);
+@@ -217,9 +217,12 @@ XListInputDevices(
+             size += SizeClassInfo(&any, (int)list->num_classes);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	for (i = 0, nptr = (char *)any; i < *ndevices; i++) {
++	Nptr = ((unsigned char *)list) + rlen + 1;
++	for (i = 0, nptr = (unsigned char *)any; i < *ndevices; i++) {
+ 	    size += *nptr + 1;
+ 	    nptr += (*nptr + 1);
++	    if (nptr > Nptr)
++		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	clist = (XDeviceInfoPtr) Xmalloc(size);
+@@ -245,8 +248,8 @@ XListInputDevices(
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	clist = sclist;
+-	nptr = (char *)any;
+-	Nptr = (char *)Any;
++	nptr = (unsigned char *)any;
++	Nptr = (unsigned char *)Any;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < *ndevices; i++, clist++) {
+ 	    clist->name = (char *)Nptr;
+ 	    memcpy(Nptr, nptr + 1, *nptr);
+@@ -256,6 +259,7 @@ XListInputDevices(
+ 	}
+     }
+ 
++  out:
+     XFree((char *)slist);
+     UnlockDisplay(dpy);
+     SyncHandle();
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe
diff --git a/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XQueryDv.c b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XQueryDv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..23e60c2c278c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/x11/libXi/files/patch-src_XQueryDv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From 5398ac0797f7516f2c9b8f2869a6c6d071437352 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Date: Sat, 27 Apr 2013 05:48:36 +0000
+Subject: unvalidated lengths in XQueryDeviceState() [CVE-2013-1998 3/3]
+
+If the lengths given for each class state in the reply add up to more
+than the rep.length, we could read past the end of the buffer allocated
+to hold the data read from the server.
+
+Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
+Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
+---
+diff --git a/src/XQueryDv.c b/src/XQueryDv.c
+index 69c285b..3836777 100644
+--- src/XQueryDv.c
++++ src/XQueryDv.c
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ SOFTWARE.
+ #include <X11/extensions/XInput.h>
+ #include <X11/extensions/extutil.h>
+ #include "XIint.h"
++#include <limits.h>
+ 
+ XDeviceState *
+ XQueryDeviceState(
+@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ XQueryDeviceState(
+     XDevice		*dev)
+ {
+     int i, j;
+-    int rlen;
+-    int size = 0;
++    unsigned long rlen;
++    size_t size = 0;
+     xQueryDeviceStateReq *req;
+     xQueryDeviceStateReply rep;
+     XDeviceState *state = NULL;
+@@ -87,9 +88,11 @@ XQueryDeviceState(
+     if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply *) & rep, 0, xFalse))
+         goto out;
+ 
+-    rlen = rep.length << 2;
+-    if (rlen > 0) {
+-	data = Xmalloc(rlen);
++    if (rep.length > 0) {
++	if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
++	    rlen = (unsigned long) rep.length << 2;
++	    data = Xmalloc(rlen);
++	}
+ 	if (!data) {
+ 	    _XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
+ 	    goto out;
+@@ -97,6 +100,10 @@ XQueryDeviceState(
+ 	_XRead(dpy, data, rlen);
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0, any = (XInputClass *) data; i < (int)rep.num_classes; i++) {
++	    if (any->length > rlen)
++		goto out;
++	    rlen -= any->length;
++
+ 	    switch (any->class) {
+ 	    case KeyClass:
+ 		size += sizeof(XKeyState);
+--
+cgit v0.9.0.2-2-gbebe