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diff --git a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
index f7b879be0830..c74b067aa0f6 100644
--- a/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
+++ b/security/vuxml/vuln.xml
@@ -51,6 +51,69 @@ Note: Please add new entries to the beginning of this file.
-->
<vuxml xmlns="http://www.vuxml.org/apps/vuxml-1">
+ <vuln vid="5f326d75-1db9-11e2-bc8f-d0df9acfd7e5">
+ <topic>django -- multiple vulnerabilities</topic>
+ <affects>
+ <package>
+ <name>django</name>
+ <range><lt>1.4.2</lt></range>
+ </package>
+ <package>
+ <name>django13</name>
+ <range><lt>1.3.4</lt></range>
+ </package>
+ </affects>
+ <description>
+ <body xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
+ <p>The Django Project reports:</p>
+ <blockquote cite="https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2012/oct/17/security/">
+ <ol>
+ <li>
+ <p>Host header poisoning</p>
+ <p>Some parts of Django -- independent of end-user-written applications
+ -- make use of full URLs, including domain name, which are generated
+ from the HTTP Host header. Some attacks against this are beyond Django's
+ ability to control, and require the web server to be properly configured;
+ Django's documentation has for some time contained notes advising users
+ on such configuration.</p>
+ <p>Django's own built-in parsing of the Host header is, however, still
+ vulnerable, as was reported to us recently. The Host header parsing
+ in Django 1.3 and Django 1.4 -- specifically, django.http.HttpRequest.get_host()
+ -- was incorrectly handling username/password information in the header.
+ Thus, for example, the following Host header would be accepted by Django when
+ running on "validsite.com":</p>
+ <p>Host: validsite.com:random@evilsite.com</p>
+ <p>Using this, an attacker can cause parts of Django -- particularly the
+ password-reset mechanism -- to generate and display arbitrary URLs to users.</p>
+ <p>To remedy this, the parsing in HttpRequest.get_host() is being modified; Host
+ headers which contain potentially dangerous content (such as username/password
+ pairs) now raise the exception django.core.exceptions.SuspiciousOperation.</p>
+ </li>
+ <li>
+ <p>Documentation of HttpOnly cookie option</p>
+ <p>As of Django 1.4, session cookies are always sent with the HttpOnly flag, which
+ provides some additional protection from cross-site scripting attacks by denying
+ client-side scripts access to the session cookie.</p>
+ <p>Though not directly a security issue in Django, it has been reported that the
+ Django 1.4 documentation incorrectly described this change, by claiming that this
+ was now the default for all cookies set by the HttpResponse.set_cookie() method.</p>
+ <p>The Django documentation has been updated to reflect that this only applies to the
+ session cookie. Users of Django are encouraged to review their use of set_cookie()
+ to ensure that the HttpOnly flag is being set or unset appropriately.</p>
+ </li>
+ </ol>
+ </blockquote>
+ </body>
+ </description>
+ <references>
+ <url>https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2012/oct/17/security/</url>
+ </references>
+ <dates>
+ <discovery>2012-10-17</discovery>
+ <entry>2012-10-24</entry>
+ </dates>
+ </vuln>
+
<vuln vid="a7706414-1be7-11e2-9aad-902b343deec9">
<topic>Wireshark -- Multiple Vulnerabilities</topic>
<affects>