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authorRobert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>2002-07-30 21:32:34 +0000
committerRobert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>2002-07-30 21:32:34 +0000
commitddcdf2650b42d1900bce8af4b25d018036a8193c (patch)
tree4ed361797eb006521e3e7f9764eeab3d54b6143d /sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
parent25c911a50a08243a543621800c955e94ad32abc0 (diff)
Notes
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h')
-rw-r--r--sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h407
1 files changed, 407 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h
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+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
+ * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
+ *
+ * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by NAI Labs,
+ * the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
+ * DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA
+ * CHATS research program.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior written
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $FreeBSD$
+ */
+/*
+ * Userland/kernel interface for Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * The POSIX.1e implementation page may be reached at:
+ * http://www.trustedbsd.org/
+ */
+#ifndef _SYS_MAC_H
+#define _SYS_MAC_H
+
+#ifndef _POSIX_MAC
+#define _POSIX_MAC
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * XXXMAC: The single MAC extended attribute will be deprecated once
+ * compound EA writes on a single target file can be performed cleanly
+ * with UFS2.
+ */
+#define FREEBSD_MAC_EXTATTR_NAME "freebsd.mac"
+#define FREEBSD_MAC_EXTATTR_NAMESPACE EXTATTR_NAMESPACE_SYSTEM
+
+/*
+ * XXXMAC: Per-policy structures will be moved from mac.h to per-policy
+ * include files once the revised user interface is available.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Structures and constants associated with a Biba Integrity policy.
+ * mac_biba represents a Biba label, with mb_type determining its properties,
+ * and mb_grade represents the hierarchal grade if valid for the current
+ * mb_type. These structures will move to mac_biba.h once we have dymamic
+ * labels exposed to userland.
+ */
+struct mac_biba_element {
+ u_short mbe_type;
+ u_short mbe_grade;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Biba labels consist of two components: a single label, and a label
+ * range. Depending on the context, one or both may be used; the mb_flags
+ * field permits the provider to indicate what fields are intended for
+ * use.
+ */
+struct mac_biba {
+ int mb_flags;
+ struct mac_biba_element mb_single;
+ struct mac_biba_element mb_rangelow, mb_rangehigh;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structures and constants associated with a Multi-Level Security policy.
+ * mac_mls represents an MLS label, with mm_type determining its properties,
+ * and mm_level represents the hierarchal sensitivity level if valid for the
+ * current mm_type. These structures will move to mac_mls.h once we have
+ * dynamic labels exposed to userland.
+ */
+struct mac_mls_element {
+ u_short mme_type;
+ u_short mme_level;
+};
+
+/*
+ * MLS labels consist of two components: a single label, and a label
+ * range. Depending on the context, one or both may be used; the mb_flags
+ * field permits the provider to indicate what fields are intended for
+ * use.
+ */
+struct mac_mls {
+ int mm_flags;
+ struct mac_mls_element mm_single;
+ struct mac_mls_element mm_rangelow, mm_rangehigh;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structures and constants associated with a Type Enforcement policy.
+ * mac_te represents a Type Enforcement label.
+ */
+#define MAC_TE_TYPE_MAXLEN 32
+struct mac_te {
+ char mt_type[MAC_TE_TYPE_MAXLEN+1]; /* TE type */
+};
+
+struct mac_sebsd {
+ uint32_t ms_psid; /* persistent sid storage */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Composite structures and constants which combine the various policy
+ * elements into common structures to be associated with subjects and
+ * objects.
+ */
+struct mac {
+ int m_macflags;
+ struct mac_biba m_biba;
+ struct mac_mls m_mls;
+ struct mac_te m_te;
+ struct mac_sebsd m_sebsd;
+};
+typedef struct mac *mac_t;
+
+#define MAC_FLAG_INITIALIZED 0x00000001 /* Is initialized. */
+
+#ifndef _KERNEL
+
+/*
+ * POSIX.1e functions visible in the application namespace.
+ */
+int mac_dominate(const mac_t _labela, const mac_t _labelb);
+int mac_equal(const mac_t labela, const mac_t _labelb);
+int mac_free(void *_buf_p);
+mac_t mac_from_text(const char *_text_p);
+mac_t mac_get_fd(int _fildes);
+mac_t mac_get_file(const char *_path_p);
+mac_t mac_get_proc(void);
+mac_t mac_glb(const mac_t _labela, const mac_t _labelb);
+mac_t mac_lub(const mac_t _labela, const mac_t _labelb);
+int mac_set_fd(int _fildes, const mac_t _label);
+int mac_set_file(const char *_path_p, mac_t _label);
+int mac_set_proc(const mac_t _label);
+ssize_t mac_size(mac_t _label);
+char * mac_to_text(const mac_t _label, size_t *_len_p);
+int mac_valid(const mac_t _label);
+
+/*
+ * Extensions to POSIX.1e visible in the application namespace.
+ */
+int mac_is_present_np(const char *_policyname);
+int mac_policy(const char *_policyname, int call, void *arg);
+
+/*
+ * System calls wrapped by some POSIX.1e functions.
+ */
+int __mac_get_fd(int _fd, struct mac *_mac_p);
+int __mac_get_file(const char *_path_p, struct mac *_mac_p);
+int __mac_get_proc(struct mac *_mac_p);
+int __mac_set_fd(int fd, struct mac *_mac_p);
+int __mac_set_file(const char *_path_p, struct mac *_mac_p);
+int __mac_set_proc(struct mac *_mac_p);
+
+#else /* _KERNEL */
+#endif /* _KERNEL */
+
+/*
+ * XXXMAC: This shouldn't be exported to userland, but is because of ucred.h
+ * and various other messes.
+ */
+
+#define MAC_MAX_POLICIES 8
+
+struct label {
+ int l_flags;
+ union {
+ void *l_ptr;
+ long l_long;
+ } l_perpolicy[MAC_MAX_POLICIES];
+};
+
+#ifdef _KERNEL
+
+/*
+ * MAC entry point operations
+ */
+enum mac_ep_ops {
+ MAC_OP_VNODE_READ,
+ MAC_OP_VNODE_WRITE,
+ MAC_OP_VNODE_POLL,
+ MAC_OP_PIPE_READ,
+ MAC_OP_PIPE_WRITE,
+ MAC_OP_PIPE_STAT,
+ MAC_OP_PIPE_POLL
+};
+
+/*
+ * Kernel functions to manage and evaluate labels.
+ */
+struct bpf_d;
+struct componentname;
+struct devfs_dirent;
+struct ifnet;
+struct ifreq;
+struct ipq;
+struct mbuf;
+struct mount;
+struct proc;
+struct sockaddr;
+struct socket;
+struct pipe;
+struct timespec;
+struct ucred;
+struct uio;
+struct vattr;
+struct vnode;
+
+#include <sys/acl.h> /* XXX acl_type_t */
+
+struct vop_refreshlabel_args;
+struct vop_setlabel_args;
+
+/*
+ * Label operations.
+ */
+void mac_init_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *);
+void mac_init_cred(struct ucred *);
+void mac_init_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *);
+void mac_init_ifnet(struct ifnet *);
+void mac_init_ipq(struct ipq *);
+void mac_init_socket(struct socket *);
+void mac_init_pipe(struct pipe *);
+int mac_init_mbuf(struct mbuf *m, int how);
+void mac_init_mount(struct mount *);
+void mac_init_vnode(struct vnode *);
+void mac_destroy_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *);
+void mac_destroy_cred(struct ucred *);
+void mac_destroy_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *);
+void mac_destroy_ifnet(struct ifnet *);
+void mac_destroy_ipq(struct ipq *);
+void mac_destroy_socket(struct socket *);
+void mac_destroy_pipe(struct pipe *);
+void mac_destroy_mbuf(struct mbuf *);
+void mac_destroy_mount(struct mount *);
+void mac_destroy_vnode(struct vnode *);
+
+/*
+ * Labeling event operations: file system objects, and things that
+ * look a lot like file system objects.
+ */
+void mac_create_devfs_device(dev_t dev, struct devfs_dirent *de);
+void mac_create_devfs_directory(char *dirname, int dirnamelen,
+ struct devfs_dirent *de);
+void mac_create_devfs_vnode(struct devfs_dirent *de, struct vnode *vp);
+void mac_create_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *parent,
+ struct vnode *child);
+void mac_create_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp);
+void mac_create_root_mount(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp);
+void mac_relabel_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ struct label *newlabel);
+void mac_update_devfsdirent(struct devfs_dirent *de, struct vnode *vp);
+void mac_update_procfsvnode(struct vnode *vp, struct ucred *cred);
+void mac_update_vnode_from_mount(struct vnode *vp, struct mount *mp);
+
+/*
+ * Labeling event operations: IPC objects.
+ */
+void mac_create_mbuf_from_socket(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m);
+void mac_create_socket(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket);
+void mac_create_socket_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket,
+ struct socket *newsocket);
+void mac_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *mbuf,
+ struct socket *socket);
+void mac_set_socket_peer_from_socket(struct socket *oldsocket,
+ struct socket *newsocket);
+void mac_create_pipe(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe);
+
+/*
+ * Labeling event operations: network objects.
+ */
+void mac_create_bpfdesc(struct ucred *cred, struct bpf_d *bpf_d);
+void mac_create_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifp);
+void mac_create_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq);
+void mac_create_datagram_from_ipq(struct ipq *ipq, struct mbuf *datagram);
+void mac_create_fragment(struct mbuf *datagram, struct mbuf *fragment);
+void mac_create_mbuf_from_mbuf(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct mbuf *newmbuf);
+void mac_create_mbuf_linklayer(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *m);
+void mac_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct mbuf *m);
+void mac_create_mbuf_from_ifnet(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *m);
+void mac_create_mbuf_multicast_encap(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
+ struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *newmbuf);
+void mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(struct mbuf *oldmbuf, struct mbuf *newmbuf);
+int mac_fragment_match(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq);
+void mac_update_ipq(struct mbuf *fragment, struct ipq *ipq);
+
+/*
+ * Labeling event operations: processes.
+ */
+void mac_create_cred(struct ucred *cred_parent, struct ucred *cred_child);
+void mac_execve_transition(struct ucred *old, struct ucred *new,
+ struct vnode *vp);
+int mac_execve_will_transition(struct ucred *old, struct vnode *vp);
+void mac_create_proc0(struct ucred *cred);
+void mac_create_proc1(struct ucred *cred);
+
+/* Access control checks. */
+int mac_check_bpfdesc_receive(struct bpf_d *bpf_d, struct ifnet *ifnet);
+int mac_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2);
+int mac_check_ifnet_transmit(struct ifnet *ifnet, struct mbuf *m);
+int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp);
+int mac_check_pipe_op(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, int op);
+int mac_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
+ unsigned long cmd, void *data);
+int mac_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
+int mac_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc);
+int mac_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc,
+ int signum);
+int mac_check_socket_bind(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
+ struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
+int mac_check_socket_connect(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
+ struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
+int mac_check_socket_listen(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
+int mac_check_socket_receive(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m);
+int mac_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so);
+int mac_check_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ int flags);
+int mac_check_vnode_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp);
+int mac_check_vnode_chroot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp);
+int mac_check_vnode_create(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
+ struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap);
+int mac_check_vnode_delete(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
+ struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp);
+int mac_check_vnode_deleteacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ acl_type_t type);
+int mac_check_vnode_exec(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
+int mac_check_vnode_getacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ acl_type_t type);
+int mac_check_vnode_getextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio);
+int mac_check_vnode_lookup(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
+ struct componentname *cnp);
+/* XXX This u_char should be vm_prot_t! */
+u_char mac_check_vnode_mmap_prot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ int newmapping);
+int mac_check_vnode_op(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, int op);
+int mac_check_vnode_open(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ mode_t acc_mode);
+int mac_check_vnode_readdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
+int mac_check_vnode_readlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
+int mac_check_vnode_rename_from(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
+ struct vnode *vp, struct componentname *cnp);
+int mac_check_vnode_rename_to(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
+ struct vnode *vp, int samedir, struct componentname *cnp);
+int mac_check_vnode_revoke(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
+int mac_check_vnode_setacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ acl_type_t type, struct acl *acl);
+int mac_check_vnode_setextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio);
+int mac_check_vnode_setflags(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ u_long flags);
+int mac_check_vnode_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ mode_t mode);
+int mac_check_vnode_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
+int mac_check_vnode_setutimes(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
+ struct timespec atime, struct timespec mtime);
+int mac_check_vnode_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp);
+int mac_getsockopt_label_get(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
+ struct mac *extmac);
+int mac_getsockopt_peerlabel_get(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
+ struct mac *extmac);
+int mac_ioctl_ifnet_get(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr,
+ struct ifnet *ifnet);
+int mac_ioctl_ifnet_set(struct ucred *cred, struct ifreq *ifr,
+ struct ifnet *ifnet);
+int mac_setsockopt_label_set(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
+ struct mac *extmac);
+int mac_pipe_label_set(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
+ struct label *label);
+
+/*
+ * Calls to help various file systems implement labeling functionality
+ * using their existing EA implementation.
+ */
+int vop_stdcreatevnode_ea(struct vnode *dvp, struct vnode *tvp,
+ struct ucred *cred);
+int vop_stdrefreshlabel_ea(struct vop_refreshlabel_args *ap);
+int vop_stdsetlabel_ea(struct vop_setlabel_args *ap);
+
+#endif /* _KERNEL */
+
+#endif /* !_SYS_MAC_H */