diff options
| author | Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2002-11-19 22:12:42 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org> | 2002-11-19 22:12:42 +0000 |
| commit | a3df768b0440a12b008414eefba89fb8709bb886 (patch) | |
| tree | 27f9795d43925d8d413f84523fd30688a07d2995 /sys/security/mac | |
| parent | 33772a02e9e7b866714fd1ae0a30250fd2b5e957 (diff) | |
Notes
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/security/mac')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c | 46 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h | 46 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_net.c | 46 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_pipe.c | 46 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_process.c | 46 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_syscalls.c | 46 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_system.c | 46 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c | 46 |
10 files changed, 375 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c index 82eded874aa39..bf6c9995420dc 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c @@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects"); TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs); +static int mac_enforce_kld = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld); + static int mac_enforce_network = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets"); @@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name) } int +mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load"); + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount) { int error; diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h index 17cf52ece479c..3e7e6bb6e9e87 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.h @@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ int mac_check_kenv_dump(struct ucred *cred); int mac_check_kenv_get(struct ucred *cred, char *name); int mac_check_kenv_set(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value); int mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name); +int mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp); +int mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred); +int mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred); int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp); int mac_check_pipe_ioctl(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, unsigned long cmd, void *data); diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h b/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h index 82eded874aa39..bf6c9995420dc 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_internal.h @@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects"); TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs); +static int mac_enforce_kld = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld); + static int mac_enforce_network = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets"); @@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name) } int +mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load"); + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount) { int error; diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_net.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_net.c index 82eded874aa39..bf6c9995420dc 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_net.c +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_net.c @@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects"); TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs); +static int mac_enforce_kld = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld); + static int mac_enforce_network = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets"); @@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name) } int +mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load"); + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount) { int error; diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_pipe.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_pipe.c index 82eded874aa39..bf6c9995420dc 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_pipe.c +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_pipe.c @@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects"); TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs); +static int mac_enforce_kld = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld); + static int mac_enforce_network = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets"); @@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name) } int +mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load"); + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount) { int error; diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h b/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h index 20988faddb49d..96fc0601b27a9 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_policy.h @@ -272,6 +272,10 @@ struct mac_policy_ops { int (*mpo_check_kenv_set)(struct ucred *cred, char *name, char *value); int (*mpo_check_kenv_unset)(struct ucred *cred, char *name); + int (*mpo_check_kld_load)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp, + struct label *vlabel); + int (*mpo_check_kld_stat)(struct ucred *cred); + int (*mpo_check_kld_unload)(struct ucred *cred); int (*mpo_check_mount_stat)(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp, struct label *mntlabel); int (*mpo_check_pipe_ioctl)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe, diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c index 82eded874aa39..bf6c9995420dc 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_process.c @@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects"); TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs); +static int mac_enforce_kld = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld); + static int mac_enforce_network = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets"); @@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name) } int +mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load"); + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount) { int error; diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_syscalls.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_syscalls.c index 82eded874aa39..bf6c9995420dc 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_syscalls.c +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_syscalls.c @@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects"); TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs); +static int mac_enforce_kld = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld); + static int mac_enforce_network = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets"); @@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name) } int +mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load"); + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount) { int error; diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c index 82eded874aa39..bf6c9995420dc 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_system.c @@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects"); TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs); +static int mac_enforce_kld = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld); + static int mac_enforce_network = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets"); @@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name) } int +mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load"); + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount) { int error; diff --git a/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c b/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c index 82eded874aa39..bf6c9995420dc 100644 --- a/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c +++ b/sys/security/mac/mac_vfs.c @@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_fs, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_fs, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on file system objects"); TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_fs", &mac_enforce_fs); +static int mac_enforce_kld = 1; +SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_kld, CTLFLAG_RW, + &mac_enforce_kld, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on kld operations"); +TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.enforce_kld", &mac_enforce_kld); + static int mac_enforce_network = 1; SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, enforce_network, CTLFLAG_RW, &mac_enforce_network, 0, "Enforce MAC policy on network packets"); @@ -2293,6 +2298,47 @@ mac_check_kenv_unset(struct ucred *cred, char *name) } int +mac_check_kld_load(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp) +{ + int error; + + ASSERT_VOP_LOCKED(vp, "mac_check_kld_load"); + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_load, cred, vp, &vp->v_label); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_stat(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_stat, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int +mac_check_kld_unload(struct ucred *cred) +{ + int error; + + if (!mac_enforce_kld) + return (0); + + MAC_CHECK(check_kld_unload, cred); + + return (error); +} + +int mac_check_mount_stat(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mount) { int error; |
