| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This uses the new layout of the upstream repository, which was recently
migrated to GitHub, and converted into a "monorepo". That is, most of
the earlier separate sub-projects with their own branches and tags were
consolidated into one top-level directory, and are now branched and
tagged together.
Updating the vendor area to match this layout is next.
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=355940
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svn path=/projects/clang900-import/; revision=351344
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svn path=/projects/clang800-import/; revision=343210
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resolve conflicts.
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svn path=/projects/clang700-import/; revision=337149
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svn path=/projects/clang700-import/; revision=336916
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6.0.0 (branches/release_60 r324090).
This introduces retpoline support, with the -mretpoline flag. The
upstream initial commit message (r323155 by Chandler Carruth) contains
quite a bit of explanation. Quoting:
Introduce the "retpoline" x86 mitigation technique for variant #2 of
the speculative execution vulnerabilities disclosed today,
specifically identified by CVE-2017-5715, "Branch Target Injection",
and is one of the two halves to Spectre.
Summary:
First, we need to explain the core of the vulnerability. Note that
this is a very incomplete description, please see the Project Zero
blog post for details:
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2018/01/reading-privileged-memory-with-side.html
The basis for branch target injection is to direct speculative
execution of the processor to some "gadget" of executable code by
poisoning the prediction of indirect branches with the address of
that gadget. The gadget in turn contains an operation that provides a
side channel for reading data. Most commonly, this will look like a
load of secret data followed by a branch on the loaded value and then
a load of some predictable cache line. The attacker then uses timing
of the processors cache to determine which direction the branch took
*in the speculative execution*, and in turn what one bit of the
loaded value was. Due to the nature of these timing side channels and
the branch predictor on Intel processors, this allows an attacker to
leak data only accessible to a privileged domain (like the kernel)
back into an unprivileged domain.
The goal is simple: avoid generating code which contains an indirect
branch that could have its prediction poisoned by an attacker. In
many cases, the compiler can simply use directed conditional branches
and a small search tree. LLVM already has support for lowering
switches in this way and the first step of this patch is to disable
jump-table lowering of switches and introduce a pass to rewrite
explicit indirectbr sequences into a switch over integers.
However, there is no fully general alternative to indirect calls. We
introduce a new construct we call a "retpoline" to implement indirect
calls in a non-speculatable way. It can be thought of loosely as a
trampoline for indirect calls which uses the RET instruction on x86.
Further, we arrange for a specific call->ret sequence which ensures
the processor predicts the return to go to a controlled, known
location. The retpoline then "smashes" the return address pushed onto
the stack by the call with the desired target of the original
indirect call. The result is a predicted return to the next
instruction after a call (which can be used to trap speculative
execution within an infinite loop) and an actual indirect branch to
an arbitrary address.
On 64-bit x86 ABIs, this is especially easily done in the compiler by
using a guaranteed scratch register to pass the target into this
device. For 32-bit ABIs there isn't a guaranteed scratch register
and so several different retpoline variants are introduced to use a
scratch register if one is available in the calling convention and to
otherwise use direct stack push/pop sequences to pass the target
address.
This "retpoline" mitigation is fully described in the following blog
post: https://support.google.com/faqs/answer/7625886
We also support a target feature that disables emission of the
retpoline thunk by the compiler to allow for custom thunks if users
want them. These are particularly useful in environments like
kernels that routinely do hot-patching on boot and want to hot-patch
their thunk to different code sequences. They can write this custom
thunk and use `-mretpoline-external-thunk` *in addition* to
`-mretpoline`. In this case, on x86-64 thu thunk names must be:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_r11
```
or on 32-bit:
```
__llvm_external_retpoline_eax
__llvm_external_retpoline_ecx
__llvm_external_retpoline_edx
__llvm_external_retpoline_push
```
And the target of the retpoline is passed in the named register, or in
the case of the `push` suffix on the top of the stack via a `pushl`
instruction.
There is one other important source of indirect branches in x86 ELF
binaries: the PLT. These patches also include support for LLD to
generate PLT entries that perform a retpoline-style indirection.
The only other indirect branches remaining that we are aware of are
from precompiled runtimes (such as crt0.o and similar). The ones we
have found are not really attackable, and so we have not focused on
them here, but eventually these runtimes should also be replicated for
retpoline-ed configurations for completeness.
For kernels or other freestanding or fully static executables, the
compiler switch `-mretpoline` is sufficient to fully mitigate this
particular attack. For dynamic executables, you must compile *all*
libraries with `-mretpoline` and additionally link the dynamic
executable and all shared libraries with LLD and pass `-z
retpolineplt` (or use similar functionality from some other linker).
We strongly recommend also using `-z now` as non-lazy binding allows
the retpoline-mitigated PLT to be substantially smaller.
When manually apply similar transformations to `-mretpoline` to the
Linux kernel we observed very small performance hits to applications
running typic al workloads, and relatively minor hits (approximately
2%) even for extremely syscall-heavy applications. This is largely
due to the small number of indirect branches that occur in
performance sensitive paths of the kernel.
When using these patches on statically linked applications,
especially C++ applications, you should expect to see a much more
dramatic performance hit. For microbenchmarks that are switch,
indirect-, or virtual-call heavy we have seen overheads ranging from
10% to 50%.
However, real-world workloads exhibit substantially lower performance
impact. Notably, techniques such as PGO and ThinLTO dramatically
reduce the impact of hot indirect calls (by speculatively promoting
them to direct calls) and allow optimized search trees to be used to
lower switches. If you need to deploy these techniques in C++
applications, we *strongly* recommend that you ensure all hot call
targets are statically linked (avoiding PLT indirection) and use both
PGO and ThinLTO. Well tuned servers using all of these techniques saw
5% - 10% overhead from the use of retpoline.
We will add detailed documentation covering these components in
subsequent patches, but wanted to make the core functionality
available as soon as possible. Happy for more code review, but we'd
really like to get these patches landed and backported ASAP for
obvious reasons. We're planning to backport this to both 6.0 and 5.0
release streams and get a 5.0 release with just this cherry picked
ASAP for distros and vendors.
This patch is the work of a number of people over the past month:
Eric, Reid, Rui, and myself. I'm mailing it out as a single commit
due to the time sensitive nature of landing this and the need to
backport it. Huge thanks to everyone who helped out here, and
everyone at Intel who helped out in discussions about how to craft
this. Also, credit goes to Paul Turner (at Google, but not an LLVM
contributor) for much of the underlying retpoline design.
Reviewers: echristo, rnk, ruiu, craig.topper, DavidKreitzer
Subscribers: sanjoy, emaste, mcrosier, mgorny, mehdi_amini, hiraditya, llvm-commits
Differential Revision: https://reviews.llvm.org/D41723
MFC after: 3 months
X-MFC-With: r327952
PR: 224669
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=328817
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Notes:
svn path=/projects/clang600-import/; revision=327023
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build glue.
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svn path=/projects/clang500-import/; revision=320970
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build glue.
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svn path=/projects/clang500-import/; revision=320397
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build glue.
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svn path=/projects/clang500-import/; revision=319799
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build glue.
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svn path=/projects/clang500-import/; revision=319479
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build glue.
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svn path=/projects/clang500-import/; revision=317969
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build glue.
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svn path=/projects/clang500-import/; revision=317472
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svn path=/projects/clang500-import/; revision=317230
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svn path=/projects/clang500-import/; revision=317029
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svn path=/projects/clang400-import/; revision=311327
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svn path=/projects/clang400-import/; revision=311142
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svn path=/projects/clang390-import/; revision=304240
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Italiano and Quentin Colombet.
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svn path=/projects/clang380-import/; revision=296008
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svn path=/projects/clang380-import/; revision=295859
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the safe point to insert the prologue and epilogue of the function) on
X86. This prevents problems with some functions using TLS, such as in
jemalloc, and which was the cause for Address Sanitizer crashes. The
correct fix is still being discussed upstream.
Notes:
svn path=/projects/clang380-import/; revision=295543
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svn path=/projects/clang380-import/; revision=294609
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svn path=/projects/clang380-import/; revision=294170
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svn path=/projects/clang380-import/; revision=293265
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svn path=/projects/clang380-import/; revision=292941
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svn path=/projects/clang370-import/; revision=287521
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svn path=/projects/clang-trunk/; revision=286684
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svn path=/projects/clang-trunk/; revision=284734
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preserve our customizations, where necessary.
Notes:
svn path=/projects/clang-trunk/; revision=283631
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This release contains the following cherry-picked revisions from
upstream trunk:
226124 226151 226164 226165 226166 226407 226408 226409 226652
226905 226983 227084 227087 227089 227208 227209 227210 227211
227212 227213 227214 227269 227430 227482 227503 227519 227574
227822 227986 227987 227988 227989 227990 228037 228038 228039
228040 228188 228189 228190 228273 228372 228373 228374 228403
228765 228848 228918 229223 229225 229226 229227 229228 229230
229234 229235 229236 229238 229239 229413 229507 229680 229750
229751 229752 229911 230146 230147 230235 230253 230255 230469
230500 230564 230603 230657 230742 230748 230956 231219 231237
231245 231259 231280 231451 231563 231601 231658 231659 231662
231984 231986 232046 232085 232142 232176 232179 232189 232382
232386 232389 232425 232438 232443 232675 232786 232797 232943
232957 233075 233080 233351 233353 233409 233410 233508 233584
233819 233904 234629 234636 234891 234975 234977 235524 235641
235662 235931 236099 236306 236307
Please note that from 3.5.0 onwards, clang and llvm require C++11
support to build; see UPDATING for more information.
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=283526
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[X86] Convert esp-relative movs of function arguments to pushes, step 2
This moves the transformation introduced in r223757 into a separate MI pass.
This allows it to cover many more cases (not only cases where there must be a
reserved call frame), and perform rudimentary call folding. It still doesn't
have a heuristic, so it is enabled only for optsize/minsize, with stack
alignment <= 8, where it ought to be a fairly clear win.
(Re-commit of r227728)
Differential Revision: http://reviews.llvm.org/D6789
This helps to get sys/boot/i386/boot2 below the required size again,
when optimizing with -Oz.
Notes:
svn path=/projects/clang360-import/; revision=278112
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^/vendor/clang/dist, resolve conflicts, and cleanup patches.
Notes:
svn path=/projects/clang360-import/; revision=277718
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preserve our customizations, where necessary.
Notes:
svn path=/projects/clang350-import/; revision=274968
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Reland "Fix miscompile of MS inline assembly with stack realignment"
This re-lands commit r196876, which was reverted in r196879.
The tests have been fixed to pass on platforms with a stack alignment
larger than 4.
Update to clang side tests will land shortly.
Pull in r196986 from upstream llvm trunk (by Reid Kleckner):
Revert the backend fatal error from r196939
The combination of inline asm, stack realignment, and dynamic allocas
turns out to be too common to reject out of hand.
ASan inserts empy inline asm fragments and uses aligned allocas.
Compiling any trivial function containing a dynamic alloca with ASan is
enough to trigger the check.
XFAIL the test cases that would be miscompiled and add one that uses the
relevant functionality.
Pull in r202930 from upstream llvm trunk (by Hans Wennborg):
Check for dynamic allocas and inline asm that clobbers sp before building
selection dag (PR19012)
In X86SelectionDagInfo::EmitTargetCodeForMemcpy we check with MachineFrameInfo
to make sure that ESI isn't used as a base pointer register before we choose to
emit rep movs (which clobbers esi).
The problem is that MachineFrameInfo wouldn't know about dynamic allocas or
inline asm that clobbers the stack pointer until SelectionDAGBuilder has
encountered them.
This patch fixes the problem by checking for such things when building the
FunctionLoweringInfo.
Differential Revision: http://llvm-reviews.chandlerc.com/D2954
Together, these commits fix the problem encountered in the devel/emacs
port on the i386 architecture, where a combination of stack realignment,
alloca() and memcpy() could incidentally clobber the %esi register,
leading to segfaults in the temacs build-time utility.
See also: http://llvm.org/PR18171 and http://llvm.org/PR19012
Reported by: ashish
PR: ports/183064
MFC after: 1 week
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=263312
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all of the features in the current working draft of the upcoming C++
standard, provisionally named C++1y.
The code generator's performance is greatly increased, and the loop
auto-vectorizer is now enabled at -Os and -O2 in addition to -O3. The
PowerPC backend has made several major improvements to code generation
quality and compile time, and the X86, SPARC, ARM32, Aarch64 and SystemZ
backends have all seen major feature work.
Release notes for llvm and clang can be found here:
<http://llvm.org/releases/3.4/docs/ReleaseNotes.html>
<http://llvm.org/releases/3.4/tools/clang/docs/ReleaseNotes.html>
MFC after: 1 month
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=261991
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Release notes are still in the works, these will follow soon.
MFC after: 1 month
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=251662
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upcoming 3.3 release (branching and freezing expected in a few weeks).
Preliminary release notes can be found at the usual location:
<http://llvm.org/docs/ReleaseNotes.html>
An MFC is planned once the actual 3.3 release is finished.
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=249423
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branch. This is effectively llvm/clang 3.2 RC2; the 3.2 release is
coming soon.
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=243830
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Benjamin Kramer and Joerg Sonnenberger for their input and fixes.
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=239462
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upcoming 3.1 release (expected in a few weeks). Preliminary release
notes can be found at: <http://llvm.org/docs/ReleaseNotes.html>
MFC after: 2 weeks
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=234353
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branch. This brings us very close to the 3.0 release, which is expected
in a week or two.
MFC after: 1 week
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=226633
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=224145
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=223017
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Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=221345
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This contains many improvements, primarily better C++ support, an
integrated assembler for x86 and support for -pg.
Notes:
svn path=/head/; revision=218893
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