55 files changed, 685 insertions, 381 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
index 30b8ef2cc359..67cd6caba29e 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog
@@ -1,6 +1,169 @@
+20020626
+ - (stevesk) [monitor.c] remove duplicate proto15 dispatch entry for PAM
+ - (bal) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 21:34:07
+     [channels.c]
+     tcode is u_int
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/24 13:12:23
+     [ssh-agent.1]
+     the socket name contains ssh-agent's ppid; via mpech@ from form@
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/24 14:33:27
+     [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c]
+     move channel counter to u_int
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/24 14:55:38
+     [authfile.c kex.c ssh-agent.c]
+     cat to (void) when output from buffer_get_X is ignored
+   - itojun@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/24 15:49:22
+     [msg.c]
+     printf type pedant
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/24 17:57:20
+     [sftp-server.c sshpty.c]
+     explicit (u_int) for uid and gid
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/25 16:22:42
+     [authfd.c]
+     unnecessary cast
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/25 18:51:04
+     [sshd.c]
+     lightweight do_setusercontext after chroot()
+ - (bal) Updated AIX package build.  Patch by dtucker@zip.com.au
+ - (tim) [Makefile.in] fix test on installing ssh-rand-helper.8
+ - (bal) added back in error check for mmap().  I screwed up, Pointed
+   out by stevesk@
+ - (tim) [README.privsep] UnixWare tip no longer needed.
+ - (bal) fixed NeXTStep missing munmap() issue. It defines HAVE_MMAP,
+   but it all damned lies.
+ - (stevesk) [README.privsep] more for sshd pseudo-account.
+ - (tim) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] add support for privsep
+ - (djm) setlogin needs pgid==pid on BSD/OS; from itojun@
+ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 08:53:12
+     [bufaux.c]
+     limit size of BNs to 8KB; ok provos/deraadt
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 08:54:18
+     [buffer.c]
+     limit append to 1MB and buffers to 10MB
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 08:55:02
+     [channels.c]
+     limit # of channels to 10000
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 08:58:26
+     [session.c]
+     limit # of env vars to 1000; ok deraadt/djm
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 13:20:57
+     [monitor.c]
+     be careful in mm_zalloc
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 13:49:26
+     [session.c]
+     disclose less information from environment files; based on input 
+     from djm, and dschultz@uclink.Berkeley.EDU
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 13:55:37
+     [auth2-chall.c]
+     make sure # of response matches # of queries, fixes int overflow; 
+     from ISS
+   - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/26 13:56:27
+     [version.h]
+     3.4
+ - (djm) Require krb5 devel for RPM build w/ KrbV 
+ - (djm) Improve PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt text from Nalin Dahyabhai 
+   <nalin@redhat.com>
+ - (djm) Update spec files for release 
+ - (djm) Fix int overflow in auth2-pam.c, similar to one discovered by ISS
+ - (djm) Release 3.4p1
+
+20020625
+ - (stevesk) [INSTALL acconfig.h configure.ac defines.h] remove --with-rsh
+ - (stevesk) [README.privsep] minor updates
+ - (djm) Create privsep directory and warn if privsep user is missing 
+   during make install
+ - (bal) Started list of PrivSep issues in TODO
+ - (bal) if mmap() is substandard, don't allow compression on server side.
+   Post 'event' we will add more options.
+ - (tim) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] Sync with Caldera
+ - (bal) moved aix_usrinfo() and noted not setting real TTY.  Patch by
+   dtucker@zip.com.au
+ - (tim) [acconfig.h configure.ac sshd.c] BROKEN_FD_PASSING fix from Markus
+   for Cygwin, Cray, & SCO
+
+20020624
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 03:25:50
+     [tildexpand.c]
+     KNF
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 03:26:19
+     [cipher.c key.c]
+     KNF
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 03:30:58
+     [scard.c ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c
+      sshpty.c]
+     various KNF and %d for unsigned
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 09:30:14
+     [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-common.c sftp-int.c sftp-server.c
+      sftp.c]
+     bunch of u_int vs int stuff
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 09:39:55
+     [ssh-keygen.c]
+     u_int stuff
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 09:46:51
+     [bufaux.c servconf.c]
+     minor KNF.  things the fingers do while you read
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 10:29:52
+     [ssh-agent.c sshd.c]
+     some minor KNF and %u
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 20:39:45
+     [session.c]
+     compression_level is u_int
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 21:06:13
+     [sshpty.c]
+     KNF
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 21:06:41
+     [channels.c channels.h session.c session.h]
+     display, screen, row, col, xpixel, ypixel are u_int; markus ok
+   - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 21:10:02
+     [packet.c]
+     packet_get_int() returns unsigned for reason & seqnr
+  - (bal) Also fixed IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY case where display, screen, row, col,
+    xpixel are u_int.
+
+
+20020623
+ - (stevesk) [configure.ac] bug #255 LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX for AIX.
+ - (bal) removed GNUism for getops in ssh-agent since glibc lacks optreset.
+ - (bal) add extern char *getopt.  Based on report by dtucker@zip.com.au 
+ - OpenBSD CVS Sync
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/22 02:00:29
+     [ssh.h]
+     correct comment
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/22 02:40:23
+     [ssh.1]
+     section 5 not 4 for ssh_config
+   - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/22 11:51:39
+     [ssh.1]
+     typo
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/22 16:32:54
+     [sshd.8]
+     add /var/empty in FILES section
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/22 16:40:19
+     [sshd.c]
+     check /var/empty owner mode; ok provos@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/22 16:41:57
+     [scp.1]
+     typo
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/22 16:45:29
+     [ssh-agent.1 sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
+     use process ID vs. pid/PID/process identifier
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/22 20:05:27
+     [sshd.c]
+     don't call setsid() if debugging or run from inetd; no "Operation not
+     permitted" errors now; ok millert@ markus@
+   - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/22 23:09:51
+     [monitor.c]
+     save auth method before monitor_reset_key_state(); bugzilla bug #284;
+     ok provos@
+
 20020622
  - (djm) Update README.privsep; spotted by fries@
  - (djm) Release 3.3p1
+ - (bal) getopt now can be staticly compiled on those platforms missing
+   optreset.  Patch by binder@arago.de
 
 20020621
  - (djm) Sync:
@@ -1004,4 +1167,4 @@
  - (stevesk) entropy.c: typo in debug message
  - (djm) ssh-keygen -i needs seeded RNG; report from markus@
 
-$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2240 2002/06/21 15:44:45 djm Exp $
+$Id: ChangeLog,v 1.2301 2002/06/26 13:59:10 djm Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/INSTALL b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
index a7f73e6489f3..07da06b5615d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
+++ b/crypto/openssh/INSTALL
@@ -105,11 +105,6 @@ name).
 
 There are a few other options to the configure script:
 
---with-rsh=PATH allows you to specify the path to your rsh program. 
-Normally ./configure will search the current $PATH for 'rsh'. You 
-may need to specify this option if rsh is not in your path or has a
-different name.
-
 --with-pam enables PAM support.
 
 --enable-gnome-askpass will build the GNOME passphrase dialog. You
@@ -226,4 +221,4 @@ Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
 http://www.openssh.com/
 
 
-$Id: INSTALL,v 1.53 2002/05/13 05:22:21 djm Exp $
+$Id: INSTALL,v 1.54 2002/06/24 16:26:49 stevesk Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
index 4b3e278658b8..e7faa1591297 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
+++ b/crypto/openssh/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.215 2002/06/21 01:38:53 mouring Exp $
+# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.217 2002/06/25 23:45:42 tim Exp $
 
 # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
 #SHELL = @SH@
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
 SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
 RAND_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-rand-helper
 PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
 
 PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
 	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
@@ -197,9 +198,13 @@ distprep: catman-do
 	$(AUTORECONF)
 	(cd scard && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.in distprep)
 
-install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files host-key
+install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files host-key check-user
 install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files
 
+check-user:
+	id $(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER) || \
+		echo "WARNING: Privilege separation user \"$(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)\" does not exist"
+
 scard-install:
 	(cd scard && $(MAKE) DESTDIR=$(DESTDIR) install)
 
@@ -212,6 +217,8 @@ install-files: scard-install
 	$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5
 	$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
 	$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
+	$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)
+	chmod 0700 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s scp $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 -s ssh-add $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add
@@ -234,7 +241,7 @@ install-files: scard-install
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
-	if [ ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS)" ]; then \
+	if [ ! -z "$(INSTALL_SSH_RAND_HELPER)" ]; then \
 		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-rand-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-rand-helper.8 ; \
 	fi
 	@NO_SFTP@$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/README.privsep b/crypto/openssh/README.privsep
index 6c798f3a4e4b..ced943f262fe 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/README.privsep
+++ b/crypto/openssh/README.privsep
@@ -12,19 +12,20 @@ On systems which lack mmap or anonymous (MAP_ANON) memory mapping,
 compression must be disabled in order for privilege separation to 
 function.
 
-When privsep is enabled, the pre-authentication sshd process will
+When privsep is enabled, during the pre-authentication phase sshd will
 chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the "sshd" user
-and its primary group.  You should do something like the following to
-prepare the privsep preauth environment:
+and its primary group.  sshd is a pseudo-account that should not be
+used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a
+"nologin" or invalid shell.
+
+You should do something like the following to prepare the privsep
+preauth environment:
 
 	# mkdir /var/empty
 	# chown root:sys /var/empty
 	# chmod 755 /var/empty
 	# groupadd sshd
-	# useradd -g sshd sshd
-
-If you are on UnixWare 7 or OpenUNIX 8 do this additional step.
-	# ln /usr/lib/.ns.so /usr/lib/ns.so.1
+	# useradd -g sshd -c 'sshd privsep' -d /var/empty -s /bin/false sshd
 
 /var/empty should not contain any files.
 
@@ -34,8 +35,8 @@ privsep user and chroot directory:
   --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot
   --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
 
-Privsep requires operating system support for file descriptor passing
-and mmap(MAP_ANON).
+Privsep requires operating system support for file descriptor passing.
+Compression will be disabled on systems without a working mmap MAP_ANON.
 
 PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on Linux.  
 It does not function on HP-UX with a trusted system
@@ -57,4 +58,4 @@ process 1005 is the sshd process listening for new connections.
 process 6917 is the privileged monitor process, 6919 is the user owned
 sshd process and 6921 is the shell process.
 
-$Id: README.privsep,v 1.7 2002/06/21 14:48:02 djm Exp $
+$Id: README.privsep,v 1.10 2002/06/26 00:43:57 stevesk Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/TODO b/crypto/openssh/TODO
index d094942ea622..4331a1364be0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/TODO
+++ b/crypto/openssh/TODO
@@ -87,4 +87,20 @@ Packaging:
 - HP-UX: Provide DEPOT package scripts.
   (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
 
-$Id: TODO,v 1.46 2002/01/22 11:26:20 djm Exp $
+
+PrivSep Issues:
+- mmap() issues.
+  + /dev/zero solution (Solaris)
+  + No/broken MAP_ANON (Irix)
+  + broken /dev/zero parse (Linux)
+- PAM 
+  + See above PAM notes
+- AIX
+  + usrinfo() does not set TTY, but only required for legicy systems.  Works
+    with PrivSep.
+- OSF
+  + SIA is broken
+- Cygwin
+  + Privsep for Pre-auth only (no fd passing)
+
+$Id: TODO,v 1.50 2002/06/25 17:12:27 mouring Exp $
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h b/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h
index 713b094d6a0f..3e51d6112173 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/acconfig.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $Id: acconfig.h,v 1.138 2002/06/12 16:57:15 mouring Exp $ */
+/* $Id: acconfig.h,v 1.141 2002/06/25 22:35:16 tim Exp $ */
 
 #ifndef _CONFIG_H
 #define _CONFIG_H
@@ -228,9 +228,6 @@
 /* Define if xauth is found in your path */
 #undef XAUTH_PATH
 
-/* Define if rsh is found in your path */
-#undef RSH_PATH
-
 /* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */
 #undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
 
@@ -358,6 +355,12 @@
 /* Path that unprivileged child will chroot() to in privep mode */
 #undef PRIVSEP_PATH
 
+/* Define if you have the `mmap' function that supports MAP_ANON|SHARED */
+#undef HAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED
+
+/* Define if sendmsg()/recvmsg() has problems passing file descriptors */
+#undef BROKEN_FD_PASSING
+
 @BOTTOM@
 
 /* ******************* Shouldn't need to edit below this line ************** */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
index f35bfb2f8ee7..e1440f47d7cb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-chall.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.18 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.19 2002/06/26 13:55:37 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "auth.h"
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ struct KbdintAuthctxt
 	char *devices;
 	void *ctxt;
 	KbdintDevice *device;
+	u_int nreq;
 };
 
 static KbdintAuthctxt *
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@ kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
 	debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices);
 	kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
 	kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
+	kbdintctxt->nreq = 0;
 
 	return kbdintctxt;
 }
@@ -209,26 +211,26 @@ send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
 	char *name, *instr, **prompts;
 	int i;
-	u_int numprompts, *echo_on;
+	u_int *echo_on;
 
 	kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
 	if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
-	    &name, &instr, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on))
+	    &name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on))
 		return 0;
 
 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST);
 	packet_put_cstring(name);
 	packet_put_cstring(instr);
 	packet_put_cstring("");		/* language not used */
-	packet_put_int(numprompts);
-	for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++) {
+	packet_put_int(kbdintctxt->nreq);
+	for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) {
 		packet_put_cstring(prompts[i]);
 		packet_put_char(echo_on[i]);
 	}
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 
-	for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++)
 		xfree(prompts[i]);
 	xfree(prompts);
 	xfree(echo_on);
@@ -256,6 +258,10 @@ input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 
 	authctxt->postponed = 0;	/* reset */
 	nresp = packet_get_int();
+	if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq)
+		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies");
+	if (nresp > 100)
+		fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies");
 	if (nresp > 0) {
 		response = xmalloc(nresp * sizeof(char*));
 		for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c
index dd29ebd483e2..99aedeaebbeb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$Id: auth2-pam.c,v 1.12 2002/01/22 12:43:13 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$Id: auth2-pam.c,v 1.13 2002/06/26 13:58:00 djm Exp $");
 
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 #include <security/pam_appl.h>
@@ -140,6 +140,15 @@ input_userauth_info_response_pam(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt)
 	nresp = packet_get_int();	/* Number of responses. */
 	debug("got %d responses", nresp);
 
+
+	if (nresp != context_pam2.num_expected)
+		fatal("%s: Received incorrect number of responses "
+		    "(expected %u, received %u)", __func__, nresp,
+		    context_pam2.num_expected);
+
+	if (nresp > 100)
+		fatal("%s: too many replies", __func__);
+
 	for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
 		int j = context_pam2.prompts[i];
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
index a452a792ee66..4c4552d527f0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfd.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.55 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.56 2002/06/25 16:22:42 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply
 			error("Error reading response from authentication socket.");
 			return 0;
 		}
-		buffer_append(reply, (char *) buf, l);
+		buffer_append(reply, buf, l);
 		len -= l;
 	}
 	return 1;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
index 6d936de56e39..1fa5d811ae31 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/authfile.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.49 2002/05/23 19:24:30 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.50 2002/06/24 14:55:38 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ key_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, char **commentp)
 	(void) buffer_get_int(&buffer);		/* reserved */
 
 	/* Read the public key from the buffer. */
-	buffer_get_int(&buffer);
+	(void) buffer_get_int(&buffer);
 	pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
 	buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, pub->rsa->n);
 	buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, pub->rsa->e);
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ key_load_private_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
 	(void) buffer_get_int(&buffer);	/* Reserved data. */
 
 	/* Read the public key from the buffer. */
-	buffer_get_int(&buffer);
+	(void) buffer_get_int(&buffer);
 	prv = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
 
 	buffer_get_bignum(&buffer, prv->rsa->n);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
index 79f8bbd49667..d3dc674ce404 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/bufaux.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.25 2002/04/20 09:14:58 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.27 2002/06/26 08:53:12 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include "bufaux.h"
@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 	bits = GET_16BIT(buf);
 	/* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */
 	bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+	if (bytes > 8 * 1024)
+		fatal("buffer_get_bignum: cannot handle BN of size %d", bytes);
 	if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes)
 		fatal("buffer_get_bignum: input buffer too small");
 	bin = buffer_ptr(buffer);
@@ -105,6 +107,7 @@ buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 	u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes);
 	int oi;
 	int hasnohigh = 0;
+
 	buf[0] = '\0';
 	/* Get the value of in binary */
 	oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1);
@@ -128,12 +131,15 @@ buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 	xfree(buf);
 }
 
+/* XXX does not handle negative BNs */
 void
 buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value)
 {
-	/**XXX should be two's-complement */
-	int len;
-	u_char *bin = buffer_get_string(buffer, (u_int *)&len);
+	u_int len;
+	u_char *bin = buffer_get_string(buffer, &len);
+
+	if (len > 8 * 1024)
+		fatal("buffer_get_bignum2: cannot handle BN of size %d", len);
 	BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value);
 	xfree(bin);
 }
@@ -145,6 +151,7 @@ u_short
 buffer_get_short(Buffer *buffer)
 {
 	u_char buf[2];
+
 	buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 2);
 	return GET_16BIT(buf);
 }
@@ -153,6 +160,7 @@ u_int
 buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer)
 {
 	u_char buf[4];
+
 	buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 4);
 	return GET_32BIT(buf);
 }
@@ -162,6 +170,7 @@ u_int64_t
 buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer)
 {
 	u_char buf[8];
+
 	buffer_get(buffer, (char *) buf, 8);
 	return GET_64BIT(buf);
 }
@@ -174,6 +183,7 @@ void
 buffer_put_short(Buffer *buffer, u_short value)
 {
 	char buf[2];
+
 	PUT_16BIT(buf, value);
 	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 2);
 }
@@ -182,6 +192,7 @@ void
 buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value)
 {
 	char buf[4];
+
 	PUT_32BIT(buf, value);
 	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 4);
 }
@@ -191,6 +202,7 @@ void
 buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
 {
 	char buf[8];
+
 	PUT_64BIT(buf, value);
 	buffer_append(buffer, buf, 8);
 }
@@ -207,8 +219,9 @@ buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value)
 void *
 buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr)
 {
-	u_int len;
 	u_char *value;
+	u_int len;
+
 	/* Get the length. */
 	len = buffer_get_int(buffer);
 	if (len > 256 * 1024)
@@ -249,6 +262,7 @@ int
 buffer_get_char(Buffer *buffer)
 {
 	char ch;
+
 	buffer_get(buffer, &ch, 1);
 	return (u_char) ch;
 }
@@ -260,5 +274,6 @@ void
 buffer_put_char(Buffer *buffer, int value)
 {
 	char ch = value;
+
 	buffer_append(buffer, &ch, 1);
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/buffer.c b/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
index 40572e5ac30e..ad04b267e0d8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/buffer.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.15 2002/01/18 18:14:17 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.16 2002/06/26 08:54:18 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
@@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ buffer_append_space(Buffer *buffer, u_int len)
 {
 	void *p;
 
+	if (len > 0x100000)
+		fatal("buffer_append_space: len %u not supported", len);
+
 	/* If the buffer is empty, start using it from the beginning. */
 	if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) {
 		buffer->offset = 0;
@@ -96,6 +99,9 @@ restart:
 	}
 	/* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */
 	buffer->alloc += len + 32768;
+	if (buffer->alloc > 0xa00000)
+		fatal("buffer_append_space: alloc %u not supported",
+		    buffer->alloc);
 	buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, buffer->alloc);
 	goto restart;
 	/* NOTREACHED */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.c b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
index d34411e18787..29eaee7c4d60 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.175 2002/06/10 22:28:41 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.179 2002/06/26 08:55:02 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
 
 Channel *
 channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
-    int window, int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
+    u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
 {
 	int i, found;
 	Channel *c;
@@ -229,6 +229,9 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
 		/* There are no free slots.  Take last+1 slot and expand the array.  */
 		found = channels_alloc;
 		channels_alloc += 10;
+		if (channels_alloc > 10000)
+			fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d "
+			    "too big.", channels_alloc);
 		debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc);
 		channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc * sizeof(Channel *));
 		for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++)
@@ -1568,8 +1571,9 @@ channel_after_select(fd_set * readset, fd_set * writeset)
 void
 channel_output_poll(void)
 {
-	int len, i;
 	Channel *c;
+	int i;
+	u_int len;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) {
 		c = channels[i];
@@ -1647,7 +1651,7 @@ channel_output_poll(void)
 		    c->remote_window > 0 &&
 		    (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 &&
 		    c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) {
-			debug2("channel %d: rwin %d elen %d euse %d",
+			debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %u euse %d",
 			    c->self, c->remote_window, buffer_len(&c->extended),
 			    c->extended_usage);
 			if (len > c->remote_window)
@@ -1717,9 +1721,8 @@ void
 channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	int id;
-	int tcode;
 	char *data;
-	u_int data_len;
+	u_int data_len, tcode;
 	Channel *c;
 
 	/* Get the channel number and verify it. */
@@ -1874,7 +1877,7 @@ channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 			c->confirm(c->self, NULL);
 			debug2("callback done");
 		}
-		debug("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %d rmax %d", c->self,
+		debug("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self,
 		    c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket);
 	}
 	packet_check_eom();
@@ -1931,7 +1934,8 @@ void
 channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c;
-	int id, adjust;
+	int id;
+	u_int adjust;
 
 	if (!compat20)
 		return;
@@ -1947,7 +1951,7 @@ channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	}
 	adjust = packet_get_int();
 	packet_check_eom();
-	debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %d", id, adjust);
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust);
 	c->remote_window += adjust;
 }
 
@@ -2328,12 +2332,12 @@ channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_short port)
 
 /*
  * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections.
- * Returns a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable, or -1 if
- * an error occurs.
+ * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable
+ * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs.
  */
 int
 x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
-    int single_connection)
+    int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp)
 {
 	Channel *nc = NULL;
 	int display_number, sock;
@@ -2431,7 +2435,8 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost,
 	}
 
 	/* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */
-	return display_number;
+	*display_numberp = display_number;
+	return (0);
 }
 
 static int
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/channels.h b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
index 9ceff3e73199..dd54114d6c01 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/channels.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/channels.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.68 2002/06/10 22:28:41 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.70 2002/06/24 14:33:27 markus Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -90,12 +90,12 @@ struct Channel {
 	int     host_port;	/* remote port to connect for forwards */
 	char   *remote_name;	/* remote hostname */
 
-	int	remote_window;
-	int	remote_maxpacket;
-	int	local_window;
-	int	local_window_max;
-	int	local_consumed;
-	int	local_maxpacket;
+	u_int	remote_window;
+	u_int	remote_maxpacket;
+	u_int	local_window;
+	u_int	local_window_max;
+	u_int	local_consumed;
+	u_int	local_maxpacket;
 	int     extended_usage;
 	int	single_connection;
 
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ struct Channel {
 /* channel management */
 
 Channel	*channel_lookup(int);
-Channel *channel_new(char *, int, int, int, int, int, int, int, char *, int);
+Channel *channel_new(char *, int, int, int, int, u_int, u_int, int, char *, int);
 void	 channel_set_fds(int, int, int, int, int, int, u_int);
 void	 channel_free(Channel *);
 void	 channel_free_all(void);
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int	 channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short, int);
 /* x11 forwarding */
 
 int	 x11_connect_display(void);
-int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int);
+int	 x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *);
 void     x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *);
 void	 deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
index b18c701fb031..6db340d7a991 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/cipher.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.59 2002/06/19 18:01:00 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.60 2002/06/23 03:26:52 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -95,11 +95,13 @@ cipher_blocksize(Cipher *c)
 {
 	return (c->block_size);
 }
+
 u_int
 cipher_keylen(Cipher *c)
 {
 	return (c->key_len);
 }
+
 u_int
 cipher_get_number(Cipher *c)
 {
@@ -314,6 +316,7 @@ struct ssh1_3des_ctx
 {
 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	k1, k2, k3;
 };
+
 static int
 ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
     int enc)
@@ -356,6 +359,7 @@ ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
 #endif
 	return (1);
 }
+
 static int
 ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
 {
@@ -377,6 +381,7 @@ ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len)
 #endif
 	return (1);
 }
+
 static int
 ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 {
@@ -389,6 +394,7 @@ ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 	}
 	return (1);
 }
+
 static const EVP_CIPHER *
 evp_ssh1_3des(void)
 {
@@ -430,7 +436,9 @@ swap_bytes(const u_char *src, u_char *dst, int n)
 		*dst++ = c[3];
 	}
 }
+
 static int (*orig_bf)(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int) = NULL;
+
 static int
 bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *out, const u_char *in, u_int len)
 {
@@ -441,6 +449,7 @@ bf_ssh1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *out, const u_char *in, u_int len)
 	swap_bytes(out, out, len);
 	return (ret);
 }
+
 static const EVP_CIPHER *
 evp_ssh1_bf(void)
 {
@@ -483,6 +492,7 @@ ssh_rijndael_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
 		memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
 	return (1);
 }
+
 static int
 ssh_rijndael_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
     u_int len)
@@ -528,6 +538,7 @@ ssh_rijndael_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
 	}
 	return (1);
 }
+
 static int
 ssh_rijndael_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 {
@@ -540,6 +551,7 @@ ssh_rijndael_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 	}
 	return (1);
 }
+
 static const EVP_CIPHER *
 evp_rijndael(void)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
index 75d24ace2b41..cd2eab77a9c0 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.101 2002/06/09 13:32:01 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.102 2002/06/24 14:33:27 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -1208,10 +1208,8 @@ client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *ctype;
-	u_int len;
 	int rchan;
-	int rmaxpack;
-	int rwindow;
+	u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
 
 	ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
 	rchan = packet_get_int();
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
index 9daf3b007e44..ad5d5cde971a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
+++ b/crypto/openssh/configure.ac
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.67 2002/06/21 00:01:19 mouring Exp $
+# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.72 2002/06/25 22:35:16 tim Exp $
 
 AC_INIT
 AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ case "$host" in
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_REALPATH)
 	dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+	AC_DEFINE(LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX)
 	;;
 *-*-cygwin*)
 	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textmode.o"
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ case "$host" in
 	AC_DEFINE(IPV4_DEFAULT)
 	AC_DEFINE(IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN)
 	AC_DEFINE(NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_FD_PASSING)
 	AC_DEFINE(SETGROUPS_NOOP)
 	;;
 *-*-dgux*)
@@ -246,7 +248,6 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dftruncate=chsize -I/usr/local/include"
 	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
 	LIBS="$LIBS -los -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
-	rsh_path="/usr/bin/rcmd"
 	RANLIB=true
 	no_dev_ptmx=1
 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H)
@@ -263,10 +264,10 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L/usr/local/lib"
 	LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
 	no_dev_ptmx=1
-	rsh_path="/usr/bin/rcmd"
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
 	AC_DEFINE(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_FD_PASSING)
 	AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getluid setluid)
 	MANTYPE=man
 	;;
@@ -274,6 +275,7 @@ mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
 	no_libsocket=1
 	no_libnsl=1
 	AC_DEFINE(USE_PIPES)
+	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_FD_PASSING)
 	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal,-L/usr/local/lib"
 	LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc"
 	;;
@@ -575,6 +577,30 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(arc4random b64_ntop bcopy bindresvport_sa \
 	socketpair strerror strlcat strlcpy strmode strsep sysconf tcgetpgrp \
 	truncate utimes vhangup vsnprintf waitpid __b64_ntop _getpty)
 
+if test $ac_cv_func_mmap = yes ; then
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for mmap anon shared])
+AC_TRY_RUN(
+	[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
+#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
+#endif
+main() { char *p;
+p = (char *) mmap(NULL, 10, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED, -1, 0);
+if (p == (char *)-1)
+	exit(1);
+exit(0);
+}
+	],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED)
+	],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) ] 
+)
+fi
+
 dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
 AC_CHECK_FUNCS(dirname, [AC_CHECK_HEADERS(libgen.h)] ,[
 	AC_CHECK_LIB(gen, dirname,[
@@ -907,16 +933,17 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(entropy-timeout,
 )
 AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(ENTROPY_TIMEOUT_MSEC, $entropy_timeout)
 
-ssh_privsep_user=sshd
+SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
 AC_ARG_WITH(privsep-user,
 	[  --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation],
 	[
 		if test -n "$withval"; then
-			ssh_privsep_user=$withval
+			SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
 		fi
 	]	
 )
-AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER, "$ssh_privsep_user")
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER, "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER")
+AC_SUBST(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)
 
 # We do this little dance with the search path to insure
 # that programs that we select for use by installed programs
@@ -1789,17 +1816,6 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(afs,
 LIBS="$LIBS $KLIBS $K5LIBS"
 
 # Looking for programs, paths and files
-AC_ARG_WITH(rsh,
-	[  --with-rsh=PATH         Specify path to remote shell program ],
-	[
-		if test "x$withval" != "$no" ; then
-			rsh_path=$withval
-		fi
-	],
-	[
-		AC_PATH_PROG(rsh_path, rsh)
-	]
-)
 
 PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
 AC_ARG_WITH(privsep-path,
@@ -1835,9 +1851,6 @@ else
 	XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
 	AC_SUBST(XAUTH_PATH)
 fi
-if test ! -z "$rsh_path" ; then
-	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(RSH_PATH, "$rsh_path")
-fi
 
 # Check for mail directory (last resort if we cannot get it from headers)
 if test ! -z "$MAIL" ; then
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/defines.h b/crypto/openssh/defines.h
index 1f52c545cae3..b87dbc51e325 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/defines.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/defines.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 #ifndef _DEFINES_H
 #define _DEFINES_H
 
-/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.90 2002/06/07 03:19:36 mouring Exp $ */
+/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.92 2002/06/24 16:26:49 stevesk Exp $ */
 
 
 /* Constants */
@@ -316,14 +316,6 @@ struct winsize {
 # define _PATH_MAILDIR MAILDIR
 #endif /* !defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAILDIR) */
 
-#ifndef _PATH_RSH
-# ifdef RSH_PATH
-#  define _PATH_RSH RSH_PATH
-# else /* RSH_PATH */
-#  define _PATH_RSH "/usr/bin/rsh"
-# endif /* RSH_PATH */
-#endif /* _PATH_RSH */
-
 #ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
 # define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
 #endif
@@ -417,7 +409,18 @@ struct winsize {
 #endif
 
 #ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
-#define getopt(ac, av, o)  BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
+# undef getopt
+# undef opterr
+# undef optind
+# undef optopt
+# undef optreset
+# undef optarg
+# define getopt(ac, av, o)  BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
+# define opterr             BSDopterr
+# define optind             BSDoptind
+# define optopt             BSDoptopt
+# define optreset           BSDoptreset
+# define optarg             BSDoptarg
 #endif
 
 /* In older versions of libpam, pam_strerror takes a single argument */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/kex.c b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
index d079ab0e388a..bdbf3882c82b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/kex.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/kex.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.50 2002/05/15 15:47:49 mouring Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.51 2002/06/24 14:55:38 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 
@@ -202,8 +202,8 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 		packet_get_char();
 	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
 		xfree(packet_get_string(NULL));
-	packet_get_char();
-	packet_get_int();
+	(void) packet_get_char();
+	(void) packet_get_int();
 	packet_check_eom();
 
 	kex_kexinit_finish(kex);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/key.c b/crypto/openssh/key.c
index 2d850c8e5712..fb1f8410a190 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/key.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/key.c
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.44 2002/05/31 13:16:48 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.45 2002/06/23 03:26:19 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ key_new(int type)
 	}
 	return k;
 }
+
 Key *
 key_new_private(int type)
 {
@@ -120,6 +121,7 @@ key_new_private(int type)
 	}
 	return k;
 }
+
 void
 key_free(Key *k)
 {
@@ -359,6 +361,7 @@ read_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM * value)
 	*cpp = cp;
 	return 1;
 }
+
 static int
 write_bignum(FILE *f, BIGNUM *num)
 {
@@ -485,6 +488,7 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
 	}
 	return success;
 }
+
 int
 key_write(Key *key, FILE *f)
 {
@@ -516,6 +520,7 @@ key_write(Key *key, FILE *f)
 	}
 	return success;
 }
+
 char *
 key_type(Key *k)
 {
@@ -532,6 +537,7 @@ key_type(Key *k)
 	}
 	return "unknown";
 }
+
 char *
 key_ssh_name(Key *k)
 {
@@ -545,6 +551,7 @@ key_ssh_name(Key *k)
 	}
 	return "ssh-unknown";
 }
+
 u_int
 key_size(Key *k)
 {
@@ -807,7 +814,6 @@ key_verify(
 }
 
 /* Converts a private to a public key */
-
 Key *
 key_demote(Key *k)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
index 39b6248d44ff..89b712f2d77f 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.16 2002/06/21 05:50:51 djm Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.18 2002/06/26 13:20:57 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 
@@ -188,9 +188,6 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
     {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
     {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
     {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
-#ifdef USE_PAM
-    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
-#endif
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH,mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
@@ -982,14 +979,14 @@ mm_answer_keyverify(int socket, Buffer *m)
 	xfree(signature);
 	xfree(data);
 
+	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
+
 	monitor_reset_key_state();
 
 	buffer_clear(m);
 	buffer_put_int(m, verified);
 	mm_request_send(socket, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
 
-	auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased";
-
 	return (verified);
 }
 
@@ -1456,9 +1453,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor)
 void *
 mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
 {
+	int len = size * ncount;
 	void *address;
 
-	address = mm_malloc(mm, size * ncount);
+	if (len <= 0)
+		fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
+
+	address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
 
 	return (address);
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h
index cb12c41e2820..31d080e21ed6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_fdpass.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*      $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.h,v 1.2 2002/03/26 03:24:01 stevesk Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.h,v 1.2 2002/03/26 03:24:01 stevesk Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
index 0076c4210d79..c363036e6720 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.c
@@ -84,13 +84,13 @@ mm_create(struct mm_master *mmalloc, size_t size)
 	 */
 	mm->mmalloc = mmalloc;
 
-#if  defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(MAP_ANON)
+#ifdef HAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED
 	address = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_ANON|MAP_SHARED,
 	    -1, 0);
 	if (address == MAP_FAILED)
 		fatal("mmap(%lu): %s", (u_long)size, strerror(errno));
 #else
-	fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes not supported",
+	fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes and Compression=yes not supported",
 	    __func__);
 #endif
 
@@ -130,12 +130,12 @@ mm_destroy(struct mm_master *mm)
 	mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_free);
 	mm_freelist(mm->mmalloc, &mm->rb_allocated);
 
-#ifdef HAVE_MMAP
+#ifdef HAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED
 	if (munmap(mm->address, mm->size) == -1)
 		fatal("munmap(%p, %lu): %s", mm->address, (u_long)mm->size,
 		    strerror(errno));
 #else
-	fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes not supported",
+	fatal("%s: UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes and Compression=yes not supported",
 	    __func__);
 #endif
 	if (mm->mmalloc == NULL)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h
index c0af432d0ef3..c0a66d5e7c94 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/monitor_mm.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*      $OpenBSD: monitor_mm.h,v 1.2 2002/03/26 03:24:01 stevesk Exp $  */
+/*	$OpenBSD: monitor_mm.h,v 1.2 2002/03/26 03:24:01 stevesk Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/msg.c b/crypto/openssh/msg.c
index 103aed2cde2c..7275c847dabb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/msg.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/msg.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.2 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.3 2002/06/24 15:49:22 itojun Exp $");
 
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "getput.h"
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ msg_send(int fd, u_char type, Buffer *m)
 	u_char buf[5];
 	u_int mlen = buffer_len(m);
 
-	debug3("msg_send: type %d", type);
+	debug3("msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
 
 	PUT_32BIT(buf, mlen + 1);
 	buf[4] = type;		/* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ msg_recv(int fd, Buffer *m)
 	if (res != sizeof(buf)) {
 		if (res == 0)
 			return -1;
-		fatal("msg_recv: read: header %d", res);
+		fatal("msg_recv: read: header %ld", (long)res);
 	}
 	msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
 	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c
index 9e13504a0e4c..f4fbc9bac3ec 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/getopt.c
@@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ static char *rcsid = "$OpenBSD: getopt.c,v 1.2 1996/08/19 08:33:32 tholo Exp $";
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
-int	opterr = 1,		/* if error message should be printed */
-	optind = 1,		/* index into parent argv vector */
-	optopt,			/* character checked for validity */
-	optreset;		/* reset getopt */
-char	*optarg;		/* argument associated with option */
+int	BSDopterr = 1,		/* if error message should be printed */
+	BSDoptind = 1,		/* index into parent argv vector */
+	BSDoptopt,		/* character checked for validity */
+	BSDoptreset;		/* reset getopt */
+char	*BSDoptarg;		/* argument associated with option */
 
 #define	BADCH	(int)'?'
 #define	BADARG	(int)':'
@@ -66,57 +66,57 @@ BSDgetopt(nargc, nargv, ostr)
 	static char *place = EMSG;		/* option letter processing */
 	char *oli;				/* option letter list index */
 
-	if (optreset || !*place) {		/* update scanning pointer */
-		optreset = 0;
-		if (optind >= nargc || *(place = nargv[optind]) != '-') {
+	if (BSDoptreset || !*place) {		/* update scanning pointer */
+		BSDoptreset = 0;
+		if (BSDoptind >= nargc || *(place = nargv[BSDoptind]) != '-') {
 			place = EMSG;
 			return (-1);
 		}
 		if (place[1] && *++place == '-') {	/* found "--" */
-			++optind;
+			++BSDoptind;
 			place = EMSG;
 			return (-1);
 		}
 	}					/* option letter okay? */
-	if ((optopt = (int)*place++) == (int)':' ||
-	    !(oli = strchr(ostr, optopt))) {
+	if ((BSDoptopt = (int)*place++) == (int)':' ||
+	    !(oli = strchr(ostr, BSDoptopt))) {
 		/*
 		 * if the user didn't specify '-' as an option,
 		 * assume it means -1.
 		 */
-		if (optopt == (int)'-')
+		if (BSDoptopt == (int)'-')
 			return (-1);
 		if (!*place)
-			++optind;
-		if (opterr && *ostr != ':')
+			++BSDoptind;
+		if (BSDopterr && *ostr != ':')
 			(void)fprintf(stderr,
-			    "%s: illegal option -- %c\n", __progname, optopt);
+			    "%s: illegal option -- %c\n", __progname, BSDoptopt);
 		return (BADCH);
 	}
 	if (*++oli != ':') {			/* don't need argument */
-		optarg = NULL;
+		BSDoptarg = NULL;
 		if (!*place)
-			++optind;
+			++BSDoptind;
 	}
 	else {					/* need an argument */
 		if (*place)			/* no white space */
-			optarg = place;
-		else if (nargc <= ++optind) {	/* no arg */
+			BSDoptarg = place;
+		else if (nargc <= ++BSDoptind) {	/* no arg */
 			place = EMSG;
 			if (*ostr == ':')
 				return (BADARG);
-			if (opterr)
+			if (BSDopterr)
 				(void)fprintf(stderr,
 				    "%s: option requires an argument -- %c\n",
-				    __progname, optopt);
+				    __progname, BSDoptopt);
 			return (BADCH);
 		}
 	 	else				/* white space */
-			optarg = nargv[optind];
+			BSDoptarg = nargv[BSDoptind];
 		place = EMSG;
-		++optind;
+		++BSDoptind;
 	}
-	return (optopt);			/* dump back option letter */
+	return (BSDoptopt);			/* dump back option letter */
 }
 
 #endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_OPTRESET) */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/packet.c b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
index 86511276f963..a5b2ab61a9c6 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/packet.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/packet.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.95 2002/06/19 18:01:00 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.96 2002/06/23 21:10:02 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
@@ -1015,7 +1015,7 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 int
 packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 {
-	int reason, seqnr;
+	u_int reason, seqnr;
 	u_char type;
 	char *msg;
 
@@ -1038,14 +1038,15 @@ packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 			case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
 				reason = packet_get_int();
 				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-				log("Received disconnect from %s: %d: %.400s", get_remote_ipaddr(),
-					reason, msg);
+				log("Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s",
+				    get_remote_ipaddr(), reason, msg);
 				xfree(msg);
 				fatal_cleanup();
 				break;
 			case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
 				seqnr = packet_get_int();
-				debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %d", seqnr);
+				debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
+				    seqnr);
 				break;
 			default:
 				return type;
@@ -1063,8 +1064,8 @@ packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 				break;
 			case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT:
 				msg = packet_get_string(NULL);
-				log("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s", get_remote_ipaddr(),
-					msg);
+				log("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s",
+				    get_remote_ipaddr(), msg);
 				fatal_cleanup();
 				xfree(msg);
 				break;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scard.c b/crypto/openssh/scard.c
index db0cc4a80ca2..9791938c0b5a 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scard.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scard.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 #if defined(SMARTCARD) && defined(USE_SECTOK)
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: scard.c,v 1.25 2002/03/26 18:46:59 rees Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: scard.c,v 1.26 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <sectok.h>
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ sc_read_pubkey(Key * k)
 
 	status = 0;
 	p = key_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
-	debug("fingerprint %d %s", key_size(k), p);
+	debug("fingerprint %u %s", key_size(k), p);
 	xfree(p);
 
 err:
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/scp.1 b/crypto/openssh/scp.1
index c0caff4cc8c1..396ab64beae5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/scp.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/scp.1
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 .\"
 .\" Created: Sun May  7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.22 2002/06/20 20:00:05 stevesk Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.23 2002/06/22 16:41:57 stevesk Exp $
 .\"
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SCP 1
@@ -152,5 +152,5 @@ California.
 .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-.Xr ssh_config 5
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
 .Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
index fb6332c31b69..f311ae48ddea 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/servconf.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.111 2002/06/20 23:05:55 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.112 2002/06/23 09:46:51 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #if defined(KRB4)
 #include <krb.h>
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
 	if (use_privsep == -1)
 		use_privsep = 1;
 
-#if !defined(HAVE_MMAP) || !defined(MAP_ANON)
+#if !defined(HAVE_MMAP_ANON_SHARED)
 	if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) {
 		error("This platform does not support both privilege "
 		    "separation and compression");
@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, u_short port)
 	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
 	hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
 		fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)",
 		    addr ? addr : "<NULL>",
@@ -439,9 +439,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
     const char *filename, int linenum)
 {
 	char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p;
-	int *intptr, value;
+	int *intptr, value, i, n;
 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
-	int i, n;
 
 	cp = line;
 	arg = strdelim(&cp);
@@ -765,7 +764,8 @@ parse_flag:
 			if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS)
 				fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.",
 				    filename, linenum);
-			options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] = xstrdup(arg);
+			options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] =
+			    xstrdup(arg);
 		}
 		break;
 
@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ parse_flag:
 			if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS)
 				fatal( "%s line %d: too many deny users.",
 				    filename, linenum);
-			options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] = xstrdup(arg);
+			options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] =
+			    xstrdup(arg);
 		}
 		break;
 
@@ -783,7 +784,8 @@ parse_flag:
 			if (options->num_allow_groups >= MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS)
 				fatal("%s line %d: too many allow groups.",
 				    filename, linenum);
-			options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] = xstrdup(arg);
+			options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] =
+			    xstrdup(arg);
 		}
 		break;
 
@@ -921,10 +923,9 @@ parse_flag:
 void
 read_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename)
 {
-	FILE *f;
+	int linenum, bad_options = 0;
 	char line[1024];
-	int linenum;
-	int bad_options = 0;
+	FILE *f;
 
 	f = fopen(filename, "r");
 	if (!f) {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
index 1a148fcbea3b..1349213554dd 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/serverloop.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.102 2002/06/11 05:46:20 mpech Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.103 2002/06/24 14:33:27 markus Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "packet.h"
@@ -902,10 +902,8 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Channel *c = NULL;
 	char *ctype;
-	u_int len;
 	int rchan;
-	int rmaxpack;
-	int rwindow;
+	u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len;
 
 	ctype = packet_get_string(&len);
 	rchan = packet_get_int();
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.c b/crypto/openssh/session.c
index 6169f3307370..747a00afae1b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.138 2002/06/20 23:05:55 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.142 2002/06/26 13:49:26 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh1.h"
@@ -252,8 +252,8 @@ do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	Session *s;
 	char *command;
 	int success, type, screen_flag;
-	int compression_level = 0, enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
-	u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen;
+	int enable_compression_after_reply = 0;
+	u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0;
 
 	s = session_new();
 	s->authctxt = authctxt;
@@ -849,6 +849,9 @@ child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
 	} else {
 		/* New variable.  Expand if necessary. */
 		if (i >= (*envsizep) - 1) {
+			if (*envsizep >= 1000)
+				fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars,"
+				    " skipping: %.100s", name);
 			(*envsizep) += 50;
 			env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, (*envsizep) * sizeof(char *));
 		}
@@ -874,12 +877,15 @@ read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
 	FILE *f;
 	char buf[4096];
 	char *cp, *value;
+	u_int lineno = 0;
 
 	f = fopen(filename, "r");
 	if (!f)
 		return;
 
 	while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
+		if (++lineno > 1000)
+			fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename);
 		for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
 			;
 		if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
@@ -888,7 +894,8 @@ read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
 			*strchr(cp, '\n') = '\0';
 		value = strchr(cp, '=');
 		if (value == NULL) {
-			fprintf(stderr, "Bad line in %.100s: %.200s\n", filename, buf);
+			fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno,
+			    filename);
 			continue;
 		}
 		/*
@@ -1152,6 +1159,8 @@ do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
 void
 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 {
+	char tty='\0';
+
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	if (is_winnt) {
 #else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
@@ -1161,6 +1170,9 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 		setpcred(pw->pw_name);
 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#ifdef __bsdi__
+		setpgid(0, 0);
+#endif
 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~LOGIN_SETPATH)) < 0) {
 			perror("unable to set user context");
@@ -1196,6 +1208,10 @@ do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
 # if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
 		irix_setusercontext(pw);
 #  endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
+# ifdef _AIX
+		/* XXX: Disable tty setting.  Enabled if required later */
+		aix_usrinfo(pw, &tty, -1);
+# endif /* _AIX */
 		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
 		permanently_set_uid(pw);
 #endif
@@ -1258,9 +1274,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
 			do_motd();
 #else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
 		do_nologin(pw);
-# ifdef _AIX
-		aix_usrinfo(pw, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
-# endif /* _AIX */
 		do_setusercontext(pw);
 #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
 	}
@@ -1970,9 +1983,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
 		debug("X11 display already set.");
 		return 0;
 	}
-	s->display_number = x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset,
-	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection);
-	if (s->display_number == -1) {
+	if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset,
+	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+	    &s->display_number) == -1) {
 		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -1986,9 +1999,9 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
 	 * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays.
 	 */
 	if (options.x11_use_localhost) {
-		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%d.%d",
+		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u",
 		    s->display_number, s->screen);
-		snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%d.%d",
+		snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u",
 		    s->display_number, s->screen);
 		s->display = xstrdup(display);
 		s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display);
@@ -2004,10 +2017,10 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s)
 			return 0;
 		}
 		memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
-		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%d.%d", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
+		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
 		    s->display_number, s->screen);
 #else
-		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%d.%d", hostname,
+		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname,
 		    s->display_number, s->screen);
 #endif
 		s->display = xstrdup(display);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/session.h b/crypto/openssh/session.h
index 2a7e4b224fd4..3bce97891fdf 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/session.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/session.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.17 2002/03/29 18:59:32 markus Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.18 2002/06/23 21:06:41 deraadt Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -37,15 +37,15 @@ struct Session {
 	/* tty */
 	char	*term;
 	int	ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
-	int	row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
+	u_int	row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
 	char	tty[TTYSZ];
 	/* last login */
 	char	hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
 	time_t	last_login_time;
 	/* X11 */
-	int	display_number;
+	u_int	display_number;
 	char	*display;
-	int	screen;
+	u_int	screen;
 	char	*auth_display;
 	char	*auth_proto;
 	char	*auth_data;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
index 779ef2fe8950..10b7992d0939 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
 /* XXX: copy between two remote sites */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.32 2002/06/09 13:32:01 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.33 2002/06/23 09:30:14 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h"
 
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ get_msg(int fd, Buffer *m)
 
 	msg_len = GET_32BIT(buf);
 	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
-		fatal("Received message too long %d", msg_len);
+		fatal("Received message too long %u", msg_len);
 
 	while (msg_len) {
 		len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, MIN(msg_len, sizeof(buf)));
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ send_string_request(int fd, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
 	buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len);
 	send_msg(fd, &msg);
-	debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%d I:%d", fd, code, id);
+	debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", fd, code, id);
 	buffer_free(&msg);
 }
 
@@ -129,12 +129,12 @@ send_string_attrs_request(int fd, u_int id, u_int code, char *s,
 	buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len);
 	encode_attrib(&msg, a);
 	send_msg(fd, &msg);
-	debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%d I:%d", fd, code, id);
+	debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", fd, code, id);
 	buffer_free(&msg);
 }
 
 static u_int
-get_status(int fd, int expected_id)
+get_status(int fd, u_int expected_id)
 {
 	Buffer msg;
 	u_int type, id, status;
@@ -145,15 +145,15 @@ get_status(int fd, int expected_id)
 	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
 
 	if (id != expected_id)
-		fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
 	if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
-		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, got %d",
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u",
 		    SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
 
 	status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
 	buffer_free(&msg);
 
-	debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status);
+	debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
 
 	return(status);
 }
@@ -171,14 +171,14 @@ get_handle(int fd, u_int expected_id, u_int *len)
 	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
 
 	if (id != expected_id)
-		fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
 	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
 		int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
 
 		error("Couldn't get handle: %s", fx2txt(status));
 		return(NULL);
 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE)
-		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%d) packet, got %d",
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u",
 		    SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type);
 
 	handle = buffer_get_string(&msg, len);
@@ -200,9 +200,9 @@ get_decode_stat(int fd, u_int expected_id, int quiet)
 	type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
 	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
 
-	debug3("Received stat reply T:%d I:%d", type, id);
+	debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
 	if (id != expected_id)
-		fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
 	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
 		int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
 
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ get_decode_stat(int fd, u_int expected_id, int quiet)
 			error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status));
 		return(NULL);
 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) {
-		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%d) packet, got %d",
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u",
 		    SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type);
 	}
 	a = decode_attrib(&msg);
@@ -224,7 +224,8 @@ get_decode_stat(int fd, u_int expected_id, int quiet)
 struct sftp_conn *
 do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests)
 {
-	int type, version;
+	u_int type;
+	int version;
 	Buffer msg;
 	struct sftp_conn *ret;
 
@@ -239,7 +240,7 @@ do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests)
 
 	/* Expecting a VERSION reply */
 	if ((type = buffer_get_char(&msg)) != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) {
-		error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %d)",
+		error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)",
 		    type);
 		buffer_free(&msg);
 		return(NULL);
@@ -294,7 +295,7 @@ do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len)
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
 	buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len);
 	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
-	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%d", id);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id);
 
 	status = get_status(conn->fd_in, id);
 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
@@ -339,7 +340,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
 
 		id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++;
 
-		debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%d", id);
+		debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id);
 
 		buffer_clear(&msg);
 		buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR);
@@ -354,10 +355,10 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
 		type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
 		id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
 
-		debug3("Received reply T:%d I:%d", type, id);
+		debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
 
 		if (id != expected_id)
-			fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+			fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
 
 		if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
 			int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
@@ -373,7 +374,7 @@ do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int printflag,
 				return(status);
 			}
 		} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
-			fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%d) packet, got %d",
+			fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
 			    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
 
 		count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
@@ -584,7 +585,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
 	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
 
 	if (id != expected_id)
-		fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
 
 	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
 		u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
@@ -592,7 +593,7 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
 		error("Couldn't canonicalise: %s", fx2txt(status));
 		return(NULL);
 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
-		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%d) packet, got %d",
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
 
 	count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
@@ -690,7 +691,7 @@ do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
 	id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
 
 	if (id != expected_id)
-		fatal("ID mismatch (%d != %d)", id, expected_id);
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
 
 	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
 		u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
@@ -698,7 +699,7 @@ do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
 		error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status));
 		return(NULL);
 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
-		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%d) packet, got %d",
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
 
 	count = buffer_get_int(&msg);
@@ -790,7 +791,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
 	attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */
 	encode_attrib(&msg, &junk);
 	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
-	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%d P:%s", id, remote_path);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
 
 	handle = get_handle(conn->fd_in, id, &handle_len);
 	if (handle == NULL) {
@@ -835,7 +836,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
 		get_msg(conn->fd_in, &msg);
 		type = buffer_get_char(&msg);
 		id = buffer_get_int(&msg);
-		debug3("Received reply T:%d I:%d R:%d", type, id, max_req);
+		debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req);
 
 		/* Find the request in our queue */
 		for(req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests);
@@ -862,7 +863,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
 			    (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1);
 			if (len > req->len)
 				fatal("Received more data than asked for "
-				      "%d > %d", len, req->len);
+				      "%u > %u", len, req->len);
 			if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
 			     atomicio(write, local_fd, data, len) != len) &&
 			    !write_error) {
@@ -907,7 +908,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path,
 			}
 			break;
 		default:
-			fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%d) packet, got %d",
+			fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u",
 			    SSH2_FXP_DATA, type);
 		}
 	}
@@ -1006,7 +1007,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC);
 	encode_attrib(&msg, &a);
 	send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
-	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%d P:%s", id, remote_path);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path);
 
 	buffer_clear(&msg);
 
@@ -1051,7 +1052,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
 			buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset);
 			buffer_put_string(&msg, data, len);
 			send_msg(conn->fd_out, &msg);
-			debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%d O:%llu S:%u",
+			debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u",
 			       id, (unsigned long long)offset, len);
 		} else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL)
 			break;
@@ -1081,7 +1082,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
 			    ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq))
 				;
 			if (ack == NULL)
-				fatal("Can't find request for ID %d", r_id);
+				fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", r_id);
 			TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq);
 
 			if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
@@ -1091,7 +1092,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path,
 				close(local_fd);
 				goto done;
 			}
-			debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %d bytes at %llu",
+			debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %llu",
 			   ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
 			++ackid;
 			free(ack);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h
index ceda879b9283..b0617116816b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.9 2002/02/13 00:59:23 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.10 2002/06/23 09:30:14 deraadt Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2001,2002 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
@@ -41,11 +41,9 @@ struct SFTP_DIRENT {
  * Initialiase a SSH filexfer connection. Returns -1 on error or
  * protocol version on success.
  */
-struct sftp_conn *
-do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int);
+struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int);
 
-u_int
-sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
+u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
 
 /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
 int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
index 4fb4496555ce..6bed0ab8a06d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-common.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.5 2001/12/02 02:08:32 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.6 2002/06/23 09:30:14 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "bufaux.h"
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ Attrib *
 decode_attrib(Buffer *b)
 {
 	static Attrib a;
+
 	attrib_clear(&a);
 	a.flags = buffer_get_int(b);
 	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
@@ -88,6 +89,7 @@ decode_attrib(Buffer *b)
 	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) {
 		char *type, *data;
 		int i, count;
+
 		count = buffer_get_int(b);
 		for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 			type = buffer_get_string(b, NULL);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-int.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-int.c
index 5b1d3848e828..b13e5da5d5b3 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-int.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-int.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 /* XXX: recursive operations */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-int.c,v 1.46 2002/03/30 18:51:15 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-int.c,v 1.47 2002/06/23 09:30:14 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd)
 		help();
 		break;
 	case I_VERSION:
-		printf("SFTP protocol version %d\n", sftp_proto_version(conn));
+		printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn));
 		break;
 	default:
 		fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
index 9db28e7d3c8b..a5c325561efb 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
  * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
  */
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.35 2002/06/06 17:30:11 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.37 2002/06/24 17:57:20 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "bufaux.h"
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t error)
 		"Unknown error"			/* Others */
 	};
 
-	TRACE("sent status id %d error %d", id, error);
+	TRACE("sent status id %u error %u", id, error);
 	buffer_init(&msg);
 	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS);
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
@@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, char *data, int dlen)
 static void
 send_data(u_int32_t id, char *data, int dlen)
 {
-	TRACE("sent data id %d len %d", id, dlen);
+	TRACE("sent data id %u len %d", id, dlen);
 	send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen);
 }
 
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle)
 	int hlen;
 
 	handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen);
-	TRACE("sent handle id %d handle %d", id, handle);
+	TRACE("sent handle id %u handle %d", id, handle);
 	send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen);
 	xfree(string);
 }
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, Stat *stats)
 	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME);
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, count);
-	TRACE("sent names id %d count %d", id, count);
+	TRACE("sent names id %u count %d", id, count);
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].name);
 		buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].long_name);
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ send_attrib(u_int32_t id, Attrib *a)
 {
 	Buffer msg;
 
-	TRACE("sent attrib id %d have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
+	TRACE("sent attrib id %u have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
 	buffer_init(&msg);
 	buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS);
 	buffer_put_int(&msg, id);
@@ -391,7 +391,7 @@ process_open(void)
 	a = get_attrib();
 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
 	mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666;
-	TRACE("open id %d name %s flags %d mode 0%o", id, name, pflags, mode);
+	TRACE("open id %u name %s flags %d mode 0%o", id, name, pflags, mode);
 	fd = open(name, flags, mode);
 	if (fd < 0) {
 		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ process_close(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	handle = get_handle();
-	TRACE("close id %d handle %d", id, handle);
+	TRACE("close id %u handle %d", id, handle);
 	ret = handle_close(handle);
 	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
 	send_status(id, status);
@@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ process_read(void)
 	off = get_int64();
 	len = get_int();
 
-	TRACE("read id %d handle %d off %llu len %d", id, handle,
+	TRACE("read id %u handle %d off %llu len %d", id, handle,
 	    (u_int64_t)off, len);
 	if (len > sizeof buf) {
 		len = sizeof buf;
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ process_write(void)
 	off = get_int64();
 	data = get_string(&len);
 
-	TRACE("write id %d handle %d off %llu len %d", id, handle,
+	TRACE("write id %u handle %d off %llu len %d", id, handle,
 	    (u_int64_t)off, len);
 	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
 	if (fd >= 0) {
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ process_do_stat(int do_lstat)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	name = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("%sstat id %d name %s", do_lstat ? "l" : "", id, name);
+	TRACE("%sstat id %u name %s", do_lstat ? "l" : "", id, name);
 	ret = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@ process_fstat(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	handle = get_handle();
-	TRACE("fstat id %d handle %d", id, handle);
+	TRACE("fstat id %u handle %d", id, handle);
 	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
 	if (fd  >= 0) {
 		ret = fstat(fd, &st);
@@ -582,13 +582,12 @@ process_setstat(void)
 	Attrib *a;
 	u_int32_t id;
 	char *name;
-	int ret;
-	int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+	int status = SSH2_FX_OK, ret;
 
 	id = get_int();
 	name = get_string(NULL);
 	a = get_attrib();
-	TRACE("setstat id %d name %s", id, name);
+	TRACE("setstat id %u name %s", id, name);
 	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
 		ret = truncate(name, a->size);
 		if (ret == -1)
@@ -625,7 +624,7 @@ process_fsetstat(void)
 	id = get_int();
 	handle = get_handle();
 	a = get_attrib();
-	TRACE("fsetstat id %d handle %d", id, handle);
+	TRACE("fsetstat id %u handle %d", id, handle);
 	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
 	name = handle_to_name(handle);
 	if (fd < 0 || name == NULL) {
@@ -677,7 +676,7 @@ process_opendir(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	path = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("opendir id %d path %s", id, path);
+	TRACE("opendir id %u path %s", id, path);
 	dirp = opendir(path);
 	if (dirp == NULL) {
 		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
@@ -713,13 +712,13 @@ ls_file(char *name, struct stat *st)
 	if ((pw = getpwuid(st->st_uid)) != NULL) {
 		user = pw->pw_name;
 	} else {
-		snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%d", st->st_uid);
+		snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
 		user = ubuf;
 	}
 	if ((gr = getgrgid(st->st_gid)) != NULL) {
 		group = gr->gr_name;
 	} else {
-		snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%d", st->st_gid);
+		snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
 		group = gbuf;
 	}
 	if (ltime != NULL) {
@@ -749,7 +748,7 @@ process_readdir(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	handle = get_handle();
-	TRACE("readdir id %d handle %d", id, handle);
+	TRACE("readdir id %u handle %d", id, handle);
 	dirp = handle_to_dir(handle);
 	path = handle_to_name(handle);
 	if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) {
@@ -759,6 +758,7 @@ process_readdir(void)
 		char pathname[1024];
 		Stat *stats;
 		int nstats = 10, count = 0, i;
+
 		stats = xmalloc(nstats * sizeof(Stat));
 		while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
 			if (count >= nstats) {
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ process_remove(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	name = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("remove id %d name %s", id, name);
+	TRACE("remove id %u name %s", id, name);
 	ret = unlink(name);
 	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
 	send_status(id, status);
@@ -822,7 +822,7 @@ process_mkdir(void)
 	a = get_attrib();
 	mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
 	    a->perm & 0777 : 0777;
-	TRACE("mkdir id %d name %s mode 0%o", id, name, mode);
+	TRACE("mkdir id %u name %s mode 0%o", id, name, mode);
 	ret = mkdir(name, mode);
 	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
 	send_status(id, status);
@@ -838,7 +838,7 @@ process_rmdir(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	name = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("rmdir id %d name %s", id, name);
+	TRACE("rmdir id %u name %s", id, name);
 	ret = rmdir(name);
 	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
 	send_status(id, status);
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ process_realpath(void)
 		xfree(path);
 		path = xstrdup(".");
 	}
-	TRACE("realpath id %d path %s", id, path);
+	TRACE("realpath id %u path %s", id, path);
 	if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
 		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
 	} else {
@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ process_rename(void)
 	id = get_int();
 	oldpath = get_string(NULL);
 	newpath = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("rename id %d old %s new %s", id, oldpath, newpath);
+	TRACE("rename id %u old %s new %s", id, oldpath, newpath);
 	/* fail if 'newpath' exists */
 	if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
 		ret = rename(oldpath, newpath);
@@ -902,7 +902,7 @@ process_readlink(void)
 
 	id = get_int();
 	path = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("readlink id %d path %s", id, path);
+	TRACE("readlink id %u path %s", id, path);
 	if ((len = readlink(path, link, sizeof(link) - 1)) == -1)
 		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
 	else {
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ process_symlink(void)
 	id = get_int();
 	oldpath = get_string(NULL);
 	newpath = get_string(NULL);
-	TRACE("symlink id %d old %s new %s", id, oldpath, newpath);
+	TRACE("symlink id %u old %s new %s", id, oldpath, newpath);
 	/* fail if 'newpath' exists */
 	if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
 		ret = symlink(oldpath, newpath);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
index f941d18faae5..fac2564ded5d 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sftp.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.29 2002/04/02 17:37:48 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.30 2002/06/23 09:30:14 deraadt Exp $");
 
 /* XXX: short-form remote directory listings (like 'ls -C') */
 
@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ static void
 connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out, pid_t *sshpid)
 {
 	int c_in, c_out;
+
 #ifdef USE_PIPES
 	int pin[2], pout[2];
+
 	if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1))
 		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
 	*in = pin[0];
@@ -63,6 +65,7 @@ connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out, pid_t *sshpid)
 	c_out = pin[1];
 #else /* USE_PIPES */
 	int inout[2];
+
 	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1)
 		fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
 	*in = *out = inout[0];
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
index e5ea1e325580..0227436c1719 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.33 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.35 2002/06/24 13:12:23 markus Exp $
 .\"
 .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
 .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ The options are as follows:
 Bind the agent to the unix-domain socket
 .Ar bind_address .
 The default is
-.Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<pid> .
+.Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid> .
 .It Fl c
 Generate C-shell commands on
 .Dv stdout .
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ user.
 .Pp
 The
 .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
-environment variable holds the agent's PID.
+environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
 .Pp
 The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
 line terminates.
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user.
 Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user.
 .It Pa $HOME/.ssh/id_rsa
 Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user.
-.It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<pid>
+.It Pa /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
 Unix-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
 authentication agent.
 These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
index c3a907798fab..ac16bae40aa5 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 
 #include "includes.h"
 #include "openbsd-compat/fake-queue.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.95 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.97 2002/06/24 14:55:38 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/md5.h>
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ static void
 idtab_init(void)
 {
 	int i;
+
 	for (i = 0; i <=2; i++) {
 		TAILQ_INIT(&idtable[i].idlist);
 		idtable[i].nentries = 0;
@@ -152,8 +153,8 @@ static void
 process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 {
 	Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
-	Buffer msg;
 	Identity *id;
+	Buffer msg;
 
 	buffer_init(&msg);
 	buffer_put_char(&msg, (version == 1) ?
@@ -182,21 +183,21 @@ process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 static void
 process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e)
 {
-	Identity *id;
-	Key *key;
+	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16];
+	u_int response_type;
 	BIGNUM *challenge;
+	Identity *id;
 	int i, len;
 	Buffer msg;
 	MD5_CTX md;
-	u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16];
-	u_int response_type;
+	Key *key;
 
 	buffer_init(&msg);
 	key = key_new(KEY_RSA1);
 	if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("process_authentication_challenge1: BN_new failed");
 
-	buffer_get_int(&e->request);				/* ignored */
+	(void) buffer_get_int(&e->request);			/* ignored */
 	buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->e);
 	buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n);
 	buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, challenge);
@@ -251,13 +252,12 @@ send:
 static void
 process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
 {
-	extern int datafellows;
-	Key *key;
 	u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
 	u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0;
-	int flags;
+	extern int datafellows;
+	int ok = -1, flags;
 	Buffer msg;
-	int ok = -1;
+	Key *key;
 
 	datafellows = 0;
 
@@ -296,11 +296,10 @@ process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
 static void
 process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 {
+	u_int blen, bits;
+	int success = 0;
 	Key *key = NULL;
 	u_char *blob;
-	u_int blen;
-	u_int bits;
-	int success = 0;
 
 	switch (version) {
 	case 1:
@@ -310,7 +309,7 @@ process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n);
 
 		if (bits != key_size(key))
-			log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %d",
+			log("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %u, announced %u",
 			    key_size(key), bits);
 		break;
 	case 2:
@@ -370,10 +369,10 @@ process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 static void
 reaper(void)
 {
-	Idtab *tab;
+	u_int now = time(NULL);
 	Identity *id, *nxt;
 	int version;
-	u_int now = time(NULL);
+	Idtab *tab;
 
 	for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) {
 		tab = idtab_lookup(version);
@@ -391,16 +390,15 @@ reaper(void)
 static void
 process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
 {
-	Key *k = NULL;
-	char *type_name;
-	char *comment;
-	int type, success = 0, death = 0;
 	Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
+	int type, success = 0, death = 0;
+	char *type_name, *comment;
+	Key *k = NULL;
 
 	switch (version) {
 	case 1:
 		k = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
-		buffer_get_int(&e->request);			/* ignored */
+		(void) buffer_get_int(&e->request);		/* ignored */
 		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->n);
 		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->e);
 		buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->d);
@@ -481,8 +479,8 @@ send:
 static void
 process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
 {
-	char *passwd;
 	int success = 0;
+	char *passwd;
 
 	passwd = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
 	if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) {
@@ -523,11 +521,11 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type)
 static void
 process_add_smartcard_key (SocketEntry *e)
 {
-	Identity *id;
-	Idtab *tab;
-	Key **keys, *k;
 	char *sc_reader_id = NULL, *pin;
 	int i, version, success = 0;
+	Key **keys, *k;
+	Identity *id;
+	Idtab *tab;
 
 	sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
 	pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
@@ -566,11 +564,11 @@ send:
 static void
 process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
 {
-	Identity *id;
-	Idtab *tab;
-	Key **keys, *k = NULL;
 	char *sc_reader_id = NULL, *pin;
 	int i, version, success = 0;
+	Key **keys, *k = NULL;
+	Identity *id;
+	Idtab *tab;
 
 	sc_reader_id = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
 	pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL);
@@ -608,8 +606,7 @@ send:
 static void
 process_message(SocketEntry *e)
 {
-	u_int msg_len;
-	u_int type;
+	u_int msg_len, type;
 	u_char *cp;
 
 	/* kill dead keys */
@@ -622,6 +619,7 @@ process_message(SocketEntry *e)
 	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
 		shutdown(e->fd, SHUT_RDWR);
 		close(e->fd);
+		e->fd = -1;
 		e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
 		buffer_free(&e->input);
 		buffer_free(&e->output);
@@ -717,6 +715,7 @@ static void
 new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
 {
 	u_int i, old_alloc;
+
 	if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) < 0)
 		error("fcntl O_NONBLOCK: %s", strerror(errno));
 
@@ -801,11 +800,11 @@ prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, int *nallocp)
 static void
 after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 {
-	u_int i;
-	int len, sock;
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
 	socklen_t slen;
 	char buf[1024];
-	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+	int len, sock;
+	u_int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
 		switch (sockets[i].type) {
@@ -839,6 +838,7 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 				if (len <= 0) {
 					shutdown(sockets[i].fd, SHUT_RDWR);
 					close(sockets[i].fd);
+					sockets[i].fd = -1;
 					sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
 					buffer_free(&sockets[i].input);
 					buffer_free(&sockets[i].output);
@@ -858,6 +858,7 @@ after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
 				if (len <= 0) {
 					shutdown(sockets[i].fd, SHUT_RDWR);
 					close(sockets[i].fd);
+					sockets[i].fd = -1;
 					sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
 					buffer_free(&sockets[i].input);
 					buffer_free(&sockets[i].output);
@@ -928,6 +929,8 @@ int
 main(int ac, char **av)
 {
 	int sock, c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0, ch, nalloc;
+	char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
+	fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
 	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
 #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
 	struct rlimit rlim;
@@ -935,11 +938,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	int prev_mask;
 #endif
-	pid_t pid;
-	char *shell, *format, *pidstr, pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
-	char *agentsocket = NULL;
 	extern int optind;
-	fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
 
 	SSLeay_add_all_algorithms();
 
@@ -947,11 +949,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	init_rng();
 	seed_rng();
 
-#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
-	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "+cdksa:")) != -1) {
-#else /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
 	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksa:")) != -1) {
-#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
 		switch (ch) {
 		case 'c':
 			if (s_flag)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
index 02403f550afc..dbf8465bae54 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-dss.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.14 2002/02/28 15:46:33 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.15 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -40,9 +40,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.14 2002/02/28 15:46:33 markus Exp $");
 #define SIGBLOB_LEN	(2*INTBLOB_LEN)
 
 int
-ssh_dss_sign(
-    Key *key,
-    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ssh_dss_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
     u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
 	DSA_SIG *sig;
@@ -71,7 +69,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(
 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r);
 	slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s);
 	if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
-		error("bad sig size %d %d", rlen, slen);
+		error("bad sig size %u %u", rlen, slen);
 		DSA_SIG_free(sig);
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -104,9 +102,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(
 	return 0;
 }
 int
-ssh_dss_verify(
-    Key *key,
-    u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ssh_dss_verify(Key *key, u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
     u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
 	DSA_SIG *sig;
@@ -151,7 +147,7 @@ ssh_dss_verify(
 	}
 
 	if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) {
-		fatal("bad sigbloblen %d != SIGBLOB_LEN", len);
+		fatal("bad sigbloblen %u != SIGBLOB_LEN", len);
 	}
 
 	/* parse signature */
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
index df8c90afb756..4273c11321c8 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.100 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.101 2002/06/23 09:39:55 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw)
 	}
 	fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN);
 	fprintf(stdout,
-	    "Comment: \"%d-bit %s, converted from OpenSSH by %s@%s\"\n",
+	    "Comment: \"%u-bit %s, converted from OpenSSH by %s@%s\"\n",
 	    key_size(k), key_type(k),
 	    pw->pw_name, hostname);
 	dump_base64(stdout, blob, len);
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
 	public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment);
 	if (public != NULL) {
 		fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
-		printf("%d %s %s\n", key_size(public), fp, comment);
+		printf("%u %s %s\n", key_size(public), fp, comment);
 		key_free(public);
 		xfree(comment);
 		xfree(fp);
@@ -496,7 +496,8 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
 			if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
 				int quoted = 0;
 				comment = cp;
-				for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+				for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' &&
+				    *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
 					if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
 						cp++;	/* Skip both */
 					else if (*cp == '"')
@@ -519,7 +520,7 @@ do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
 			}
 			comment = *cp ? cp : comment;
 			fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
-			printf("%d %s %s\n", key_size(public), fp,
+			printf("%u %s %s\n", key_size(public), fp,
 			    comment ? comment : "no comment");
 			xfree(fp);
 			key_free(public);
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
index 3e66294e9f8c..782279bad23b 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.20 2002/06/10 16:53:06 stevesk Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.21 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
@@ -39,9 +39,7 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.20 2002/06/10 16:53:06 stevesk Exp $");
 
 /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */
 int
-ssh_rsa_sign(
-    Key *key,
-    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ssh_rsa_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
     u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
 	const EVP_MD *evp_md;
@@ -72,17 +70,18 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(
 
 	if (ok != 1) {
 		int ecode = ERR_get_error();
-		error("ssh_rsa_sign: RSA_sign failed: %s", ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
+		error("ssh_rsa_sign: RSA_sign failed: %s",
+		    ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
 		xfree(sig);
 		return -1;
 	}
 	if (len < slen) {
 		int diff = slen - len;
-		debug("slen %d > len %d", slen, len);
+		debug("slen %u > len %u", slen, len);
 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
 		memset(sig, 0, diff);
 	} else if (len > slen) {
-		error("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %d slen2 %d", slen, len);
+		error("ssh_rsa_sign: slen %u slen2 %u", slen, len);
 		xfree(sig);
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -105,9 +104,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(
 }
 
 int
-ssh_rsa_verify(
-    Key *key,
-    u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
+ssh_rsa_verify(Key *key, u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
     u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
 	Buffer b;
@@ -148,12 +145,12 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(
 	/* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */
 	modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
 	if (len > modlen) {
-		error("ssh_rsa_verify: len %d > modlen %d", len, modlen);
+		error("ssh_rsa_verify: len %u > modlen %u", len, modlen);
 		xfree(sigblob);
 		return -1;
 	} else if (len < modlen) {
 		int diff = modlen - len;
-		debug("ssh_rsa_verify: add padding: modlen %d > len %d",
+		debug("ssh_rsa_verify: add padding: modlen %u > len %u",
 		    modlen, len);
 		sigblob = xrealloc(sigblob, modlen);
 		memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len);
@@ -176,7 +173,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(
 	xfree(sigblob);
 	if (ret == 0) {
 		int ecode = ERR_get_error();
-		error("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA_verify failed: %s", ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
+		error("ssh_rsa_verify: RSA_verify failed: %s",
+		    ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL));
 	}
 	debug("ssh_rsa_verify: signature %scorrect", (ret==0) ? "in" : "");
 	return ret;
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
index 8ada41f29723..1f3efca78541 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.1
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.158 2002/06/20 19:56:07 stevesk Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.160 2002/06/22 11:51:39 naddy Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
@@ -952,8 +952,8 @@ protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
 .Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
 .Xr telnet 1 ,
-.Xr ssh_config 4 ,
-.Xr ssh-keysign 8,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
 .Xr sshd 8
 .Rs
 .%A T. Ylonen
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
index e23bb1d5c26c..07eee78b6eac 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/ssh.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.70 2002/06/03 12:04:07 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*	$OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.71 2002/06/22 02:00:29 stevesk Exp $	*/
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@
 #endif
 
 /*
- * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the
- * authentication socket.
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the
+ * authentication agent.
  */
 #define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME	"SSH_AGENT_PID"
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
index 9b4c38835a67..b89321fb8392 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.125 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.126 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
 	hints.ai_family = family;
 	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
 	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: %.100s: %s", __progname, host,
 		    gai_strerror(gaierr));
@@ -489,7 +489,6 @@ confirm(const char *prompt)
  * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
  * is not valid. the user_hostfile will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
  */
-
 static int
 check_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key,
     int readonly, const char *user_hostfile, const char *system_hostfile)
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
index 7f28ab51e79d..215f76ca2e36 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.104 2002/06/19 00:27:55 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.105 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -299,12 +299,14 @@ userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist)
 		}
 	}
 }
+
 void
 input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: "
 	   "type %d", type);
 }
+
 void
 input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -316,6 +318,7 @@ input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	xfree(msg);
 	xfree(lang);
 }
+
 void
 input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -327,6 +330,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	clear_auth_state(authctxt);
 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
 }
+
 void
 input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
@@ -375,7 +379,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 	}
 	packet_check_eom();
 
-	debug("input_userauth_pk_ok: pkalg %s blen %d lastkey %p hint %d",
+	debug("input_userauth_pk_ok: pkalg %s blen %u lastkey %p hint %d",
 	    pkalg, blen, authctxt->last_key, authctxt->last_key_hint);
 
 	do {
@@ -894,9 +898,7 @@ input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 }
 
 static int
-ssh_keysign(
-    Key *key,
-    u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+ssh_keysign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
     u_char *data, u_int datalen)
 {
 	Buffer b;
@@ -1098,6 +1100,7 @@ authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
 static Authmethod *current = NULL;
 static char *supported = NULL;
 static char *preferred = NULL;
+
 /*
  * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the
  * next method we should try.  If the server initially sends a nil list,
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
index 22f81432a37b..37a7b58f6f35 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.8
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.184 2002/06/20 19:56:07 stevesk Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.186 2002/06/22 16:45:29 stevesk Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD 8
 .Os
@@ -578,11 +578,18 @@ These files are created using
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
 .It Pa /etc/moduli
 Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange".
+.It Pa /var/empty
+.Xr chroot 2
+directory used by
+.Nm
+during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
+The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
+and not group or world-writable.
 .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
 Contains the process ID of the
 .Nm
 listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
-concurrently for different ports, this contains the pid of the one
+concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
 started last).
 The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
 .It Pa $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
index feea3ce2c5ca..851fad4be04c 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.246 2002/06/20 23:05:56 markus Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.251 2002/06/25 18:51:04 markus Exp $");
 
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
@@ -219,6 +219,7 @@ static void
 close_listen_socks(void)
 {
 	int i;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
 		close(listen_socks[i]);
 	num_listen_socks = -1;
@@ -228,6 +229,7 @@ static void
 close_startup_pipes(void)
 {
 	int i;
+
 	if (startup_pipes)
 		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
 			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
@@ -260,7 +262,8 @@ sighup_restart(void)
 	close_listen_socks();
 	close_startup_pipes();
 	execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
-	log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno));
+	log("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
+	    strerror(errno));
 	exit(1);
 }
 
@@ -280,8 +283,8 @@ sigterm_handler(int sig)
 static void
 main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
 {
-	pid_t pid;
 	int save_errno = errno;
+	pid_t pid;
 	int status;
 
 	while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
@@ -341,6 +344,7 @@ static void
 key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
 {
 	int save_errno = errno;
+
 	signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
 	errno = save_errno;
 	key_do_regen = 1;
@@ -372,7 +376,8 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 
 	if (client_version_string == NULL) {
 		/* Send our protocol version identification. */
-		if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string))
+		if (atomicio(write, sock_out, server_version_string,
+		    strlen(server_version_string))
 		    != strlen(server_version_string)) {
 			log("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
 			fatal_cleanup();
@@ -475,7 +480,6 @@ sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
 	}
 }
 
-
 /* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
 void
 destroy_sensitive_data(void)
@@ -526,8 +530,9 @@ static void
 privsep_preauth_child(void)
 {
 	u_int32_t rand[256];
-	int i;
+	gid_t gidset[2];
 	struct passwd *pw;
+	int i;
 
 	/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
 	privsep_challenge_enable();
@@ -555,7 +560,17 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 	/* Drop our privileges */
 	debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
 	    (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+#if 0
+	/* XXX not ready, to heavy after chroot */
 	do_setusercontext(pw);
+#else
+	gidset[0] = pw->pw_gid;
+	if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0)
+		fatal("setgid failed for %u", pw->pw_gid );
+	if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
+		fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	permanently_set_uid(pw);
+#endif
 }
 
 static Authctxt*
@@ -609,7 +624,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	/* XXX - Remote port forwarding */
 	x_authctxt = authctxt;
 
+#ifdef BROKEN_FD_PASSING
+	if (1) {
+#else
 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
+#endif
 		/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
 		monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
 		use_privsep = 0;
@@ -683,6 +702,7 @@ Key *
 get_hostkey_by_type(int type)
 {
 	int i;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
 		Key *key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
 		if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
@@ -703,6 +723,7 @@ int
 get_hostkey_index(Key *key)
 {
 	int i;
+
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
 		if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i])
 			return (i);
@@ -991,11 +1012,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		 * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
 		 */
 		if (options.server_key_bits >
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED &&
-		    options.server_key_bits <
-		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
+		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
+		    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+		    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
 			options.server_key_bits =
-			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
+			    BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
+			    SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
 			debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
 			    options.server_key_bits);
 		}
@@ -1012,6 +1035,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		    (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
 			fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
 			    _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
+			fatal("Bad owner or mode for %s",
+			    _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
 	}
 
 	/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
@@ -1351,7 +1377,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	 */
 #if 0
 	/* XXX: this breaks Solaris */
-	if (setsid() < 0)
+	if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
 		error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
 #endif
 
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
index 1aecd485b713..aa7b7c7d4eae 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.3 2002/06/20 23:37:12 markus Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.4 2002/06/22 16:45:29 stevesk Exp $
 .Dd September 25, 1999
 .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
 .Os
@@ -305,10 +305,6 @@ To disable keepalives, the value should be set to
 .It Cm KerberosAuthentication
 Specifies whether Kerberos authentication is allowed.
 This can be in the form of a Kerberos ticket, or if
-.It Cm PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt
-Specifies whether PAM challenge response authentication is allowed. This
-allows the use of most PAM challenge response authentication modules, but
-it will allow password authentication regardless of whether
 .Cm PasswordAuthentication
 is yes, the password provided by the user will be validated through
 the Kerberos KDC.
@@ -425,6 +421,12 @@ The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts
 are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches
 .Dq full
 (60).
+.It Cm PAMAuthenticationViaKbdInt
+Specifies whether PAM challenge response authentication is allowed. This
+allows the use of most PAM challenge response authentication modules, but
+it will allow password authentication regardless of whether
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+is enabled.
 .It Cm PasswordAuthentication
 Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
 The default is
@@ -464,7 +466,7 @@ If this option is set to
 .Dq no
 root is not allowed to login.
 .It Cm PidFile
-Specifies the file that contains the process identifier of the
+Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the
 .Nm sshd
 daemon.
 The default is
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
index 78c51abd6793..e76f94534daa 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshlogin.c
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.3 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.4 2002/06/23 03:30:17 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "loginrec.h"
 
@@ -48,10 +48,9 @@ RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.3 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $");
  * information is not available.  This must be called before record_login.
  * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf.
  */
-
 u_long
 get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
-		    char *buf, u_int bufsize)
+    char *buf, u_int bufsize)
 {
   struct logininfo li;
 
@@ -64,10 +63,9 @@ get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
  * Records that the user has logged in.  I these parts of operating systems
  * were more standardized.
  */
-
 void
 record_login(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, uid_t uid,
-	const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr)
+    const char *host, struct sockaddr * addr)
 {
   struct logininfo *li;
 
@@ -92,7 +90,6 @@ record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
 #endif
 
 /* Records that the user has logged out. */
-
 void
 record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user)
 {
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
index a7e7e27693bb..64ac4e5994fa 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.4 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.7 2002/06/24 17:57:20 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
 # include <util.h>
@@ -343,9 +343,8 @@ pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *ttyname)
 	if (fd < 0)
 		error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s",
 		    strerror(errno));
-	else {
+	else 
 		close(fd);
-	}
 #endif /* _CRAY */
 }
 
@@ -356,6 +355,7 @@ pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, int row, int col,
 	int xpixel, int ypixel)
 {
 	struct winsize w;
+
 	w.ws_row = row;
 	w.ws_col = col;
 	w.ws_xpixel = xpixel;
@@ -393,13 +393,13 @@ pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyname)
 	if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
 		if (chown(ttyname, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) {
 			if (errno == EROFS &&
-			   (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0))
-				error("chown(%.100s, %d, %d) failed: %.100s",
-				    ttyname, pw->pw_uid, gid,
+			    (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0))
+				error("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
+				    ttyname, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
 				    strerror(errno));
 			else
-				fatal("chown(%.100s, %d, %d) failed: %.100s",
-				    ttyname, pw->pw_uid, gid,
+				fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
+				    ttyname, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
 				    strerror(errno));
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/tildexpand.c b/crypto/openssh/tildexpand.c
index e89a7ade8acd..cbe981146730 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/tildexpand.c
+++ b/crypto/openssh/tildexpand.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
  */
 
 #include "includes.h"
-RCSID("$OpenBSD: tildexpand.c,v 1.12 2001/08/11 22:51:27 jakob Exp $");
+RCSID("$OpenBSD: tildexpand.c,v 1.13 2002/06/23 03:25:50 deraadt Exp $");
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t my_uid)
 	if (len > MAXPATHLEN)
 		fatal("Home directory too long (%d > %d", len-1, MAXPATHLEN-1);
 	expanded = xmalloc(len);
-	snprintf(expanded, len, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", cp + 1);
+	snprintf(expanded, len, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
+	    strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", cp + 1);
 	return expanded;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/openssh/version.h b/crypto/openssh/version.h
index fcd853d09578..1e9b43128bb2 100644
--- a/crypto/openssh/version.h
+++ b/crypto/openssh/version.h
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.33 2002/06/21 15:41:20 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.34 2002/06/26 13:56:27 markus Exp $ */
 
-#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_3.3"
+#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_3.4p1"