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authorBjoern A. Zeeb <bz@FreeBSD.org>2019-12-06 16:53:42 +0000
committerBjoern A. Zeeb <bz@FreeBSD.org>2019-12-06 16:53:42 +0000
commit74ff87cd16e4ebc65b6e80235869bf44b94ce64f (patch)
tree21fcadd48f64b9519516e9a2314e8f6022648e7c /sys/netinet6
parent5ccbeea1c5434b814bcffb069a13ddb085afb1f1 (diff)
Notes
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/netinet6')
-rw-r--r--sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c9
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c b/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c
index 431941dcad10..4044d590b4b3 100644
--- a/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c
+++ b/sys/netinet6/ip6_input.c
@@ -677,11 +677,10 @@ ip6_input(struct mbuf *m)
* and bypass security checks (act as if it was from 127.0.0.1 by using
* IPv6 src ::ffff:127.0.0.1). Be cautious.
*
- * This check chokes if we are in an SIIT cloud. As none of BSDs
- * support IPv4-less kernel compilation, we cannot support SIIT
- * environment at all. So, it makes more sense for us to reject any
- * malicious packets for non-SIIT environment, than try to do a
- * partial support for SIIT environment.
+ * We have supported IPv6-only kernels for a few years and this issue
+ * has not come up. The world seems to move mostly towards not using
+ * v4mapped on the wire, so it makes sense for us to keep rejecting
+ * any such packets.
*/
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_src) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {