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Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl/quic/quic_wire_pkt.c')
-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/ssl/quic/quic_wire_pkt.c962
1 files changed, 962 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/quic/quic_wire_pkt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/quic/quic_wire_pkt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b6ee898eddf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/quic/quic_wire_pkt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,962 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2022-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include "internal/common.h"
+#include "internal/quic_wire_pkt.h"
+
+int ossl_quic_hdr_protector_init(QUIC_HDR_PROTECTOR *hpr,
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+ const char *propq,
+ uint32_t cipher_id,
+ const unsigned char *quic_hp_key,
+ size_t quic_hp_key_len)
+{
+ const char *cipher_name = NULL;
+
+ switch (cipher_id) {
+ case QUIC_HDR_PROT_CIPHER_AES_128:
+ cipher_name = "AES-128-ECB";
+ break;
+ case QUIC_HDR_PROT_CIPHER_AES_256:
+ cipher_name = "AES-256-ECB";
+ break;
+ case QUIC_HDR_PROT_CIPHER_CHACHA:
+ cipher_name = "ChaCha20";
+ break;
+ default:
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_UNSUPPORTED);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ hpr->cipher_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (hpr->cipher_ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ hpr->cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(libctx, cipher_name, propq);
+ if (hpr->cipher == NULL
+ || quic_hp_key_len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(hpr->cipher)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(hpr->cipher_ctx, hpr->cipher, NULL,
+ quic_hp_key, NULL, 1)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ hpr->libctx = libctx;
+ hpr->propq = propq;
+ hpr->cipher_id = cipher_id;
+ return 1;
+
+err:
+ ossl_quic_hdr_protector_cleanup(hpr);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void ossl_quic_hdr_protector_cleanup(QUIC_HDR_PROTECTOR *hpr)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(hpr->cipher_ctx);
+ hpr->cipher_ctx = NULL;
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(hpr->cipher);
+ hpr->cipher = NULL;
+}
+
+static int hdr_generate_mask(QUIC_HDR_PROTECTOR *hpr,
+ const unsigned char *sample, size_t sample_len,
+ unsigned char *mask)
+{
+ int l = 0;
+ unsigned char dst[16];
+ static const unsigned char zeroes[5] = {0};
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (hpr->cipher_id == QUIC_HDR_PROT_CIPHER_AES_128
+ || hpr->cipher_id == QUIC_HDR_PROT_CIPHER_AES_256) {
+ if (sample_len < 16) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(hpr->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 1)
+ || !EVP_CipherUpdate(hpr->cipher_ctx, dst, &l, sample, 16)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 5; ++i)
+ mask[i] = dst[i];
+ } else if (hpr->cipher_id == QUIC_HDR_PROT_CIPHER_CHACHA) {
+ if (sample_len < 16) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(hpr->cipher_ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, sample, 1)
+ || !EVP_CipherUpdate(hpr->cipher_ctx, mask, &l,
+ zeroes, sizeof(zeroes))) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ assert(0);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
+ /* No matter what we did above we use the same mask in fuzzing mode */
+ memset(mask, 0, 5);
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_hdr_protector_decrypt(QUIC_HDR_PROTECTOR *hpr,
+ QUIC_PKT_HDR_PTRS *ptrs)
+{
+ return ossl_quic_hdr_protector_decrypt_fields(hpr,
+ ptrs->raw_sample,
+ ptrs->raw_sample_len,
+ ptrs->raw_start,
+ ptrs->raw_pn);
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_hdr_protector_decrypt_fields(QUIC_HDR_PROTECTOR *hpr,
+ const unsigned char *sample,
+ size_t sample_len,
+ unsigned char *first_byte,
+ unsigned char *pn_bytes)
+{
+ unsigned char mask[5], pn_len, i;
+
+ if (!hdr_generate_mask(hpr, sample, sample_len, mask))
+ return 0;
+
+ *first_byte ^= mask[0] & ((*first_byte & 0x80) != 0 ? 0xf : 0x1f);
+ pn_len = (*first_byte & 0x3) + 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < pn_len; ++i)
+ pn_bytes[i] ^= mask[i + 1];
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_hdr_protector_encrypt(QUIC_HDR_PROTECTOR *hpr,
+ QUIC_PKT_HDR_PTRS *ptrs)
+{
+ return ossl_quic_hdr_protector_encrypt_fields(hpr,
+ ptrs->raw_sample,
+ ptrs->raw_sample_len,
+ ptrs->raw_start,
+ ptrs->raw_pn);
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_hdr_protector_encrypt_fields(QUIC_HDR_PROTECTOR *hpr,
+ const unsigned char *sample,
+ size_t sample_len,
+ unsigned char *first_byte,
+ unsigned char *pn_bytes)
+{
+ unsigned char mask[5], pn_len, i;
+
+ if (!hdr_generate_mask(hpr, sample, sample_len, mask))
+ return 0;
+
+ pn_len = (*first_byte & 0x3) + 1;
+ for (i = 0; i < pn_len; ++i)
+ pn_bytes[i] ^= mask[i + 1];
+
+ *first_byte ^= mask[0] & ((*first_byte & 0x80) != 0 ? 0xf : 0x1f);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_wire_decode_pkt_hdr(PACKET *pkt,
+ size_t short_conn_id_len,
+ int partial,
+ int nodata,
+ QUIC_PKT_HDR *hdr,
+ QUIC_PKT_HDR_PTRS *ptrs,
+ uint64_t *fail_cause)
+{
+ unsigned int b0;
+ unsigned char *pn = NULL;
+ size_t l = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+
+ if (fail_cause != NULL)
+ *fail_cause = QUIC_PKT_HDR_DECODE_DECODE_ERR;
+
+ if (ptrs != NULL) {
+ ptrs->raw_start = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(pkt);
+ ptrs->raw_sample = NULL;
+ ptrs->raw_sample_len = 0;
+ ptrs->raw_pn = NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (l < QUIC_MIN_VALID_PKT_LEN
+ || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &b0))
+ return 0;
+
+ hdr->partial = partial;
+ hdr->unused = 0;
+ hdr->reserved = 0;
+
+ if ((b0 & 0x80) == 0) {
+ /* Short header. */
+ if (short_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((b0 & 0x40) == 0 /* fixed bit not set? */
+ || l < QUIC_MIN_VALID_PKT_LEN_CRYPTO)
+ return 0;
+
+ hdr->type = QUIC_PKT_TYPE_1RTT;
+ hdr->fixed = 1;
+ hdr->spin_bit = (b0 & 0x20) != 0;
+ if (partial) {
+ hdr->key_phase = 0; /* protected, zero for now */
+ hdr->pn_len = 0; /* protected, zero for now */
+ hdr->reserved = 0; /* protected, zero for now */
+ } else {
+ hdr->key_phase = (b0 & 0x04) != 0;
+ hdr->pn_len = (b0 & 0x03) + 1;
+ hdr->reserved = (b0 & 0x18) >> 3;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy destination connection ID field to header structure. */
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, hdr->dst_conn_id.id, short_conn_id_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len = (unsigned char)short_conn_id_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Skip over the PN. If this is a partial decode, the PN length field
+ * currently has header protection applied. Thus we do not know the
+ * length of the PN but we are allowed to assume it is 4 bytes long at
+ * this stage.
+ */
+ memset(hdr->pn, 0, sizeof(hdr->pn));
+ pn = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(pkt);
+ if (partial) {
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, sizeof(hdr->pn)))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, hdr->pn, hdr->pn_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Fields not used in short-header packets. */
+ hdr->version = 0;
+ hdr->src_conn_id.id_len = 0;
+ hdr->token = NULL;
+ hdr->token_len = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Short-header packets always come last in a datagram, the length
+ * is the remainder of the buffer.
+ */
+ hdr->len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+ hdr->data = PACKET_data(pkt);
+
+ /*
+ * Skip over payload. Since this is a short header packet, which cannot
+ * be followed by any other kind of packet, this advances us to the end
+ * of the datagram.
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, hdr->len))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Long header. */
+ unsigned long version;
+ unsigned int dst_conn_id_len, src_conn_id_len, raw_type;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &version))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * All QUIC packets must have the fixed bit set, except exceptionally
+ * for Version Negotiation packets.
+ */
+ if (version != 0 && (b0 & 0x40) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &dst_conn_id_len)
+ || dst_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN
+ || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, hdr->dst_conn_id.id, dst_conn_id_len)
+ || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &src_conn_id_len)
+ || src_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN
+ || !PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, hdr->src_conn_id.id, src_conn_id_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ hdr->version = (uint32_t)version;
+ hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len = (unsigned char)dst_conn_id_len;
+ hdr->src_conn_id.id_len = (unsigned char)src_conn_id_len;
+
+ if (version == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Version negotiation packet. Version negotiation packets are
+ * identified by a version field of 0 and the type bits in the first
+ * byte are ignored (they may take any value, and we ignore them).
+ */
+ hdr->type = QUIC_PKT_TYPE_VERSION_NEG;
+ hdr->fixed = (b0 & 0x40) != 0;
+
+ hdr->data = PACKET_data(pkt);
+ hdr->len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+
+ /*
+ * Version negotiation packets must contain an array of u32s, so it
+ * is invalid for their payload length to not be divisible by 4.
+ */
+ if ((hdr->len % 4) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Version negotiation packets are always fully decoded. */
+ hdr->partial = 0;
+
+ /* Fields not used in version negotiation packets. */
+ hdr->pn_len = 0;
+ hdr->spin_bit = 0;
+ hdr->key_phase = 0;
+ hdr->token = NULL;
+ hdr->token_len = 0;
+ memset(hdr->pn, 0, sizeof(hdr->pn));
+
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, hdr->len))
+ return 0;
+ } else if (version != QUIC_VERSION_1) {
+ if (fail_cause != NULL)
+ *fail_cause |= QUIC_PKT_HDR_DECODE_BAD_VERSION;
+ /* Unknown version, do not decode. */
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ if (l < QUIC_MIN_VALID_PKT_LEN_CRYPTO)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Get long packet type and decode to QUIC_PKT_TYPE_*. */
+ raw_type = ((b0 >> 4) & 0x3);
+
+ switch (raw_type) {
+ case 0:
+ hdr->type = QUIC_PKT_TYPE_INITIAL;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ hdr->type = QUIC_PKT_TYPE_0RTT;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ hdr->type = QUIC_PKT_TYPE_HANDSHAKE;
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ hdr->type = QUIC_PKT_TYPE_RETRY;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ hdr->pn_len = 0;
+ hdr->fixed = 1;
+
+ /* Fields not used in long-header packets. */
+ hdr->spin_bit = 0;
+ hdr->key_phase = 0;
+
+ if (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_INITIAL) {
+ /* Initial packet. */
+ uint64_t token_len;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_quic_vlint(pkt, &token_len)
+ || token_len > SIZE_MAX
+ || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &hdr->token, (size_t)token_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ hdr->token_len = (size_t)token_len;
+ if (token_len == 0)
+ hdr->token = NULL;
+ } else {
+ hdr->token = NULL;
+ hdr->token_len = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_RETRY) {
+ /* Retry packet. */
+ hdr->data = PACKET_data(pkt);
+ hdr->len = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+
+ /* Retry packets are always fully decoded. */
+ hdr->partial = 0;
+
+ /* Unused bits in Retry header. */
+ hdr->unused = b0 & 0x0f;
+
+ /* Fields not used in Retry packets. */
+ memset(hdr->pn, 0, sizeof(hdr->pn));
+
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, hdr->len))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Initial, 0-RTT or Handshake packet. */
+ uint64_t len;
+
+ hdr->pn_len = partial ? 0 : ((b0 & 0x03) + 1);
+ hdr->reserved = partial ? 0 : ((b0 & 0x0C) >> 2);
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_quic_vlint(pkt, &len)
+ || len < sizeof(hdr->pn))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!nodata && len > PACKET_remaining(pkt))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Skip over the PN. If this is a partial decode, the PN length
+ * field currently has header protection applied. Thus we do not
+ * know the length of the PN but we are allowed to assume it is
+ * 4 bytes long at this stage.
+ */
+ pn = (unsigned char *)PACKET_data(pkt);
+ memset(hdr->pn, 0, sizeof(hdr->pn));
+ if (partial) {
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, sizeof(hdr->pn)))
+ return 0;
+
+ hdr->len = (size_t)(len - sizeof(hdr->pn));
+ } else {
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, hdr->pn, hdr->pn_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ hdr->len = (size_t)(len - hdr->pn_len);
+ }
+
+ if (nodata) {
+ hdr->data = NULL;
+ } else {
+ hdr->data = PACKET_data(pkt);
+
+ /* Skip over packet body. */
+ if (!PACKET_forward(pkt, hdr->len))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ptrs != NULL) {
+ ptrs->raw_pn = pn;
+ if (pn != NULL) {
+ ptrs->raw_sample = pn + 4;
+ ptrs->raw_sample_len = PACKET_end(pkt) - ptrs->raw_sample;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Good decode, clear the generic DECODE_ERR flag
+ */
+ if (fail_cause != NULL)
+ *fail_cause &= ~QUIC_PKT_HDR_DECODE_DECODE_ERR;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_wire_encode_pkt_hdr(WPACKET *pkt,
+ size_t short_conn_id_len,
+ const QUIC_PKT_HDR *hdr,
+ QUIC_PKT_HDR_PTRS *ptrs)
+{
+ unsigned char b0;
+ size_t off_start, off_sample, off_pn;
+ unsigned char *start = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt);
+
+ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &off_start))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ptrs != NULL) {
+ /* ptrs would not be stable on non-static WPACKET */
+ if (!ossl_assert(pkt->staticbuf != NULL))
+ return 0;
+ ptrs->raw_start = NULL;
+ ptrs->raw_sample = NULL;
+ ptrs->raw_sample_len = 0;
+ ptrs->raw_pn = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Cannot serialize a partial header, or one whose DCID length is wrong. */
+ if (hdr->partial
+ || (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_1RTT
+ && hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len != short_conn_id_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_1RTT) {
+ /* Short header. */
+
+ /*
+ * Cannot serialize a header whose DCID length is wrong, or with an
+ * invalid PN length.
+ */
+ if (hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len != short_conn_id_len
+ || short_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN
+ || hdr->pn_len < 1 || hdr->pn_len > 4)
+ return 0;
+
+ b0 = (hdr->spin_bit << 5)
+ | (hdr->key_phase << 2)
+ | (hdr->pn_len - 1)
+ | (hdr->reserved << 3)
+ | 0x40; /* fixed bit */
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, b0)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, hdr->dst_conn_id.id, short_conn_id_len)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &off_pn)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, hdr->pn, hdr->pn_len))
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Long header. */
+ unsigned int raw_type;
+
+ if (hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN
+ || hdr->src_conn_id.id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (ossl_quic_pkt_type_has_pn(hdr->type)
+ && (hdr->pn_len < 1 || hdr->pn_len > 4))
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (hdr->type) {
+ case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_VERSION_NEG:
+ if (hdr->version != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Version negotiation packets use zero for the type bits */
+ raw_type = 0;
+ break;
+
+ case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_INITIAL: raw_type = 0; break;
+ case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_0RTT: raw_type = 1; break;
+ case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_HANDSHAKE: raw_type = 2; break;
+ case QUIC_PKT_TYPE_RETRY: raw_type = 3; break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ b0 = (raw_type << 4) | 0x80; /* long */
+ if (hdr->type != QUIC_PKT_TYPE_VERSION_NEG || hdr->fixed)
+ b0 |= 0x40; /* fixed */
+ if (ossl_quic_pkt_type_has_pn(hdr->type)) {
+ b0 |= hdr->pn_len - 1;
+ b0 |= (hdr->reserved << 2);
+ }
+ if (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_RETRY)
+ b0 |= hdr->unused;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, b0)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, hdr->version)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, hdr->dst_conn_id.id,
+ hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, hdr->src_conn_id.id_len)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, hdr->src_conn_id.id,
+ hdr->src_conn_id.id_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_VERSION_NEG) {
+ if (hdr->len > 0 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, hdr->len, NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_INITIAL) {
+ if (!WPACKET_quic_write_vlint(pkt, hdr->token_len)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, hdr->token, hdr->token_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_RETRY) {
+ if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, hdr->token, hdr->token_len))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_quic_write_vlint(pkt, hdr->len + hdr->pn_len)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &off_pn)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, hdr->pn, hdr->pn_len))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->len > 0 && !WPACKET_reserve_bytes(pkt, hdr->len, NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ off_sample = off_pn + 4;
+
+ if (ptrs != NULL) {
+ ptrs->raw_start = start;
+ ptrs->raw_sample = start + (off_sample - off_start);
+ ptrs->raw_sample_len
+ = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) + hdr->len - ptrs->raw_sample;
+ ptrs->raw_pn = start + (off_pn - off_start);
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_wire_get_encoded_pkt_hdr_len(size_t short_conn_id_len,
+ const QUIC_PKT_HDR *hdr)
+{
+ size_t len = 0, enclen;
+
+ /* Cannot serialize a partial header, or one whose DCID length is wrong. */
+ if (hdr->partial
+ || (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_1RTT
+ && hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len != short_conn_id_len))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_1RTT) {
+ /* Short header. */
+
+ /*
+ * Cannot serialize a header whose DCID length is wrong, or with an
+ * invalid PN length.
+ */
+ if (hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len != short_conn_id_len
+ || short_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN
+ || hdr->pn_len < 1 || hdr->pn_len > 4)
+ return 0;
+
+ return 1 + short_conn_id_len + hdr->pn_len;
+ } else {
+ /* Long header. */
+ if (hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN
+ || hdr->src_conn_id.id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ len += 1 /* Initial byte */ + 4 /* Version */
+ + 1 + hdr->dst_conn_id.id_len /* DCID Len, DCID */
+ + 1 + hdr->src_conn_id.id_len /* SCID Len, SCID */
+ ;
+
+ if (ossl_quic_pkt_type_has_pn(hdr->type)) {
+ if (hdr->pn_len < 1 || hdr->pn_len > 4)
+ return 0;
+
+ len += hdr->pn_len;
+ }
+
+ if (hdr->type == QUIC_PKT_TYPE_INITIAL) {
+ enclen = ossl_quic_vlint_encode_len(hdr->token_len);
+ if (!enclen)
+ return 0;
+
+ len += enclen + hdr->token_len;
+ }
+
+ if (!ossl_quic_pkt_type_must_be_last(hdr->type)) {
+ enclen = ossl_quic_vlint_encode_len(hdr->len + hdr->pn_len);
+ if (!enclen)
+ return 0;
+
+ len += enclen;
+ }
+
+ return len;
+ }
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_wire_get_pkt_hdr_dst_conn_id(const unsigned char *buf,
+ size_t buf_len,
+ size_t short_conn_id_len,
+ QUIC_CONN_ID *dst_conn_id)
+{
+ unsigned char b0;
+ size_t blen;
+
+ if (buf_len < QUIC_MIN_VALID_PKT_LEN
+ || short_conn_id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ b0 = buf[0];
+ if ((b0 & 0x80) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Long header. We need 6 bytes (initial byte, 4 version bytes, DCID
+ * length byte to begin with). This is covered by the buf_len test
+ * above.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If the version field is non-zero (meaning that this is not a Version
+ * Negotiation packet), the fixed bit must be set.
+ */
+ if ((buf[1] || buf[2] || buf[3] || buf[4]) && (b0 & 0x40) == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ blen = (size_t)buf[5]; /* DCID Length */
+ if (blen > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN
+ || buf_len < QUIC_MIN_VALID_PKT_LEN + blen)
+ return 0;
+
+ dst_conn_id->id_len = (unsigned char)blen;
+ memcpy(dst_conn_id->id, buf + 6, blen);
+ return 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Short header. */
+ if ((b0 & 0x40) == 0)
+ /* Fixed bit not set, not a valid QUIC packet header. */
+ return 0;
+
+ if (buf_len < QUIC_MIN_VALID_PKT_LEN_CRYPTO + short_conn_id_len)
+ return 0;
+
+ dst_conn_id->id_len = (unsigned char)short_conn_id_len;
+ memcpy(dst_conn_id->id, buf + 1, short_conn_id_len);
+ return 1;
+ }
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_wire_decode_pkt_hdr_pn(const unsigned char *enc_pn,
+ size_t enc_pn_len,
+ QUIC_PN largest_pn,
+ QUIC_PN *res_pn)
+{
+ int64_t expected_pn, truncated_pn, candidate_pn, pn_win, pn_hwin, pn_mask;
+
+ switch (enc_pn_len) {
+ case 1:
+ truncated_pn = enc_pn[0];
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ truncated_pn = ((QUIC_PN)enc_pn[0] << 8)
+ | (QUIC_PN)enc_pn[1];
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ truncated_pn = ((QUIC_PN)enc_pn[0] << 16)
+ | ((QUIC_PN)enc_pn[1] << 8)
+ | (QUIC_PN)enc_pn[2];
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ truncated_pn = ((QUIC_PN)enc_pn[0] << 24)
+ | ((QUIC_PN)enc_pn[1] << 16)
+ | ((QUIC_PN)enc_pn[2] << 8)
+ | (QUIC_PN)enc_pn[3];
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Implemented as per RFC 9000 Section A.3. */
+ expected_pn = largest_pn + 1;
+ pn_win = ((int64_t)1) << (enc_pn_len * 8);
+ pn_hwin = pn_win / 2;
+ pn_mask = pn_win - 1;
+ candidate_pn = (expected_pn & ~pn_mask) | truncated_pn;
+ if (candidate_pn <= expected_pn - pn_hwin
+ && candidate_pn < (((int64_t)1) << 62) - pn_win)
+ *res_pn = candidate_pn + pn_win;
+ else if (candidate_pn > expected_pn + pn_hwin
+ && candidate_pn >= pn_win)
+ *res_pn = candidate_pn - pn_win;
+ else
+ *res_pn = candidate_pn;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* From RFC 9000 Section A.2. Simplified implementation. */
+int ossl_quic_wire_determine_pn_len(QUIC_PN pn,
+ QUIC_PN largest_acked)
+{
+ uint64_t num_unacked
+ = (largest_acked == QUIC_PN_INVALID) ? pn + 1 : pn - largest_acked;
+
+ /*
+ * num_unacked \in [ 0, 2** 7] -> 1 byte
+ * num_unacked \in (2** 7, 2**15] -> 2 bytes
+ * num_unacked \in (2**15, 2**23] -> 3 bytes
+ * num_unacked \in (2**23, ] -> 4 bytes
+ */
+
+ if (num_unacked <= (1U<<7)) return 1;
+ if (num_unacked <= (1U<<15)) return 2;
+ if (num_unacked <= (1U<<23)) return 3;
+ return 4;
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_wire_encode_pkt_hdr_pn(QUIC_PN pn,
+ unsigned char *enc_pn,
+ size_t enc_pn_len)
+{
+ switch (enc_pn_len) {
+ case 1:
+ enc_pn[0] = (unsigned char)pn;
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ enc_pn[1] = (unsigned char)pn;
+ enc_pn[0] = (unsigned char)(pn >> 8);
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ enc_pn[2] = (unsigned char)pn;
+ enc_pn[1] = (unsigned char)(pn >> 8);
+ enc_pn[0] = (unsigned char)(pn >> 16);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ enc_pn[3] = (unsigned char)pn;
+ enc_pn[2] = (unsigned char)(pn >> 8);
+ enc_pn[1] = (unsigned char)(pn >> 16);
+ enc_pn[0] = (unsigned char)(pn >> 24);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ossl_quic_validate_retry_integrity_tag(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+ const char *propq,
+ const QUIC_PKT_HDR *hdr,
+ const QUIC_CONN_ID *client_initial_dcid)
+{
+ unsigned char expected_tag[QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN];
+ const unsigned char *actual_tag;
+
+ if (hdr == NULL || hdr->len < QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ossl_quic_calculate_retry_integrity_tag(libctx, propq,
+ hdr, client_initial_dcid,
+ expected_tag))
+ return 0;
+
+ actual_tag = hdr->data + hdr->len - QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN;
+
+ return !CRYPTO_memcmp(expected_tag, actual_tag,
+ QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN);
+}
+
+/* RFC 9001 s. 5.8 */
+static const unsigned char retry_integrity_key[] = {
+ 0xbe, 0x0c, 0x69, 0x0b, 0x9f, 0x66, 0x57, 0x5a,
+ 0x1d, 0x76, 0x6b, 0x54, 0xe3, 0x68, 0xc8, 0x4e
+};
+
+static const unsigned char retry_integrity_nonce[] = {
+ 0x46, 0x15, 0x99, 0xd3, 0x5d, 0x63, 0x2b, 0xf2,
+ 0x23, 0x98, 0x25, 0xbb
+};
+
+int ossl_quic_calculate_retry_integrity_tag(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+ const char *propq,
+ const QUIC_PKT_HDR *hdr,
+ const QUIC_CONN_ID *client_initial_dcid,
+ unsigned char *tag)
+{
+ EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *cctx = NULL;
+ int ok = 0, l = 0, l2 = 0, wpkt_valid = 0;
+ WPACKET wpkt;
+ /* Worst case length of the Retry Psuedo-Packet header is 68 bytes. */
+ unsigned char buf[128];
+ QUIC_PKT_HDR hdr2;
+ size_t hdr_enc_len = 0;
+
+ if (hdr->type != QUIC_PKT_TYPE_RETRY || hdr->version == 0
+ || hdr->len < QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN
+ || hdr->data == NULL
+ || client_initial_dcid == NULL || tag == NULL
+ || client_initial_dcid->id_len > QUIC_MAX_CONN_ID_LEN) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not reserve packet body in WPACKET. Retry packet header
+ * does not contain a Length field so this does not affect
+ * the serialized packet header.
+ */
+ hdr2 = *hdr;
+ hdr2.len = 0;
+
+ /* Assemble retry psuedo-packet. */
+ if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&wpkt, buf, sizeof(buf), 0)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ wpkt_valid = 1;
+
+ /* Prepend original DCID to the packet. */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(&wpkt, client_initial_dcid->id_len)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(&wpkt, client_initial_dcid->id,
+ client_initial_dcid->id_len)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Encode main retry header. */
+ if (!ossl_quic_wire_encode_pkt_hdr(&wpkt, hdr2.dst_conn_id.id_len,
+ &hdr2, NULL))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(&wpkt, &hdr_enc_len)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Create and initialise cipher context. */
+ /* TODO(QUIC FUTURE): Cipher fetch caching. */
+ if ((cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(libctx, "AES-128-GCM", propq)) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if ((cctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(cctx, cipher, NULL,
+ retry_integrity_key, retry_integrity_nonce, /*enc=*/1)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Feed packet header as AAD data. */
+ if (EVP_CipherUpdate(cctx, NULL, &l, buf, hdr_enc_len) != 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Feed packet body as AAD data. */
+ if (EVP_CipherUpdate(cctx, NULL, &l, hdr->data,
+ hdr->len - QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN) != 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Finalise and get tag. */
+ if (EVP_CipherFinal_ex(cctx, NULL, &l2) != 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG,
+ QUIC_RETRY_INTEGRITY_TAG_LEN,
+ tag) != 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ok = 1;
+err:
+ EVP_CIPHER_free(cipher);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cctx);
+ if (wpkt_valid)
+ WPACKET_finish(&wpkt);
+
+ return ok;
+}